1 Chalk, Peter The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and challenges for the

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1 Piracy and the compromise of International Security Assertions The global environment of today contains phenomena known as transnational security challenges which pose serious implications to the safety of many. 1 Piracy is one such occurrence. There are two areas in the world where the Latin phrase Pirata este hostes generis persists as a recurring phantasm in the light of International Security. These are notably the Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden, where piracy is truly an enemy of all mankind 2. As this is a paper under the broad topic of International Security, the motivation of this essay is precisely to discover the effects that these rogue actors have on the global world order. Namely, issues towards deterrence and protection from these privateers will be mentioned, as well as the problems undergone by state institutions in coordinating regional assistance and cooperation to ensure that international shipping lanes remain safe for commercial use. With this in mind, the thesis assertion of this essay claims that states must readily commit to cooperate towards the joint cause of tackling piracy in order to successfully combat these belligerents. The features of these commitments transcend national, legal and economic boundaries. However, given the realist and anarchic world order, many obstacles are present in the fight against piracy. Definition of piracy Broadly speaking, piracy may be said to consist in acts of violence done upon the ocean or unappropriated lands, or within the territory of a state through descent from the sea, by a body of men acting independently of any politically organized society 3. This is not to be confused with that of a privateer, where the chief distinction is that the former acts in his own interests and on his own authority while the latter acts under the authority of a state that accepts or is charged with responsibility for his acts 4. Of course, history is inundated with instances where the categorization of these personnel proved to be very thwarting indeed (the Cosairs of the Barbary 1 Chalk, Peter The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and challenges for the United States. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2 Chaikin, Greg. 2005, Piracy in Asia: International Cooperation and Japan s Role in Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses, ed. Mark Valencia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Draft Convention on Piracy, American Journal of International Law 26 (1932) Special Supplement, ; and L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 8 th ed., ed. H. Lauterpact, vol. 1, Peace (New York: Longmans,Green, 1955), Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 22. 1

2 Coast being one notorious example 5 ). Nevertheless, a pirate may be identified as one committing to his or her own individual action, without the command of any sovereign authority. According to Anderson s observations, general occurrences of piracy exist as long as there are criminally inclined persons and maritime zones of ineffective law enforcement. Exacerbating this trend is sustained economic poverty in a coastal region, in which local traditional practice is more respected than the law of remote central authority. 6 The effects of a void in authority and sustained poverty in a seafaring region usually translate to a recurrence of piracy. Both The High Seas Convention and Article 101 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOs) have been crafted to present modern definitions to categorize acts of piracy. These documents define such operations to be acts of violence, depredation or detention which are committed specifically for private ends on the high seas or in an area outside state jurisdiction against the crew and/or passengers of a private craft or vessel and/or persons and/or property onboard. Piracy could also mean the act of voluntary participation in the operation of a [vessel] with knowledge of facts making it a pirate [vessel] or the simple act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating the act. 7 In isolation, piracy can be approached from the nuanced perspectives of politics and economics. Piracy is largely a political act; a protest against the obvious use of state institutions to defend property and discipline labour. Alongside this, it is naturally the theft of private property, with implications as far as the economical perspective of things are concerned. 8 As piracy seeks to distort and manipulate world resources to its own personal gain by engaging in violent means, it stands as a potent force to affect the global world order. The international effects of piracy Piracy involves the loss of goods, personnel and revenue for companies around the world. A recurring trend conducted by pirates is the capture of vessels and the apprehension of the crew 5 IBID, Anderson, J. L., Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation. Journal of World History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall, 1995), Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 15 AND United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article Thomson, 1994., 46. 2

3 for ransom, resulting in more financial loss as countries either adhere to the demands or dispatch personnel to assist the hostages. The goods that the pirates acquire also usually amount to a fare sum of money, especially if they contain valuable resources such as petroleum, freight goods or arms. In certain cases, Pirates share their loot with the local communities, thus earning themselves some protection from the authorities 9, thus justifying their existence to continue their operations. The illegal distribution of valuable resources has sparked fears in the international community that pirates may fuel an underground black market of arms trade. Also, there is no stopping these belligerents from collaborating with terrorist organizations, fuelling them with necessary equipment to conduct organized acts of violence in various parts of the world. In this case, a notable example would be the pirate capture and subsequent demands for ransom of the Faina, a Ukrainian owned ship carrying thirty-three T-72 tanks along with grenade launchers, ammunition, and other material reportedly designed for Kenya s armed forces 10 To take a humanitarian perspective, piracy may result in the hampering of such efforts, much to the demise of those in need. For impoverished countries such as Somalia, the hijacking of aid vessels implies the loss of essential goods to their final destination with the goal of alleviating hunger and poverty in the region. As all ships commonly share international waters and shipping lanes, it is not unusual for pirates to hijack vessels of which the property or personnel hail from different parts of the world, making piracy the business of every country with seafaring vessels. In today s globalized world, many Multi-National Companies or MNCs have affiliates, personnel and resources from all over the world. This invariably elevates piracy from a regional issue of security to one of international security. In order to combat modern pirates, many strategies are employed and they are almost always spearheaded by state actors. Piracy in the Malacca Straits 9 Gershman, John. Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul- Aug 2002): Gettleman, Jeffrey Tensions Rise over Ship Hijacked off Somalia. The New York Times. September (accessed June 2, 2010). 3

4 Piracy in Southeast Asia is particularly notorious in the Straits of Malacca. Here, the number of attacks have accounted for approximately 53% of all worldwide incidents from 1992 to The intensive use of this channel for more than 50,000 seafaring vessels each year easily builds seafaring traffic into a chokepoint. As a result, ships considerably reduce their speed to ensure safe passage, thus greatly increasing their exposure to boarding and possible hijack. Furthermore, security onboard is compromised as many of today s shipping companies employ skeleton crews of only half a dozen personnel as a means to cut costs, limiting whatever counteroffensive the crew may be able to muster, should the need arise. The nature of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia usually involve hit-and-run strategies, where pirate crews use automatic weapons to assault the personnel of a shipping vessel and assume the acquisition of the goods onboard. While these common sea-robbers form the vast majority of Southeast Asian piracy, organized pirate gangs are in existence. These syndicates attack medium-sized cargo ships and tankers. In such incidents, it is usually common for the crew onboard to be held hostage for ransom. In other cases, the entire vessel is hijacked by pirates and is then turned into a phantom ship 12 ; that is, a ship that has its flag of registry and identification details deliberately altered at sea. Many of the activities linked to piracy originate from coastal areas with primitive technology and deficient infrastructure. However, the incentive of entering into a pirate profession may lie in the economic condition of the region. The economic fluctuations of the region, most notably the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), have caused a forced devaluation of numerous regional currencies such as the Thai Baht. In the struggle to sustain one s wages, piracy suddenly becomes a profession for the unemployed and poverty stricken. With the justification to sustain one s family and protect the local population, the heinous profession suddenly becomes an acceptable means of survival. This is very much the case in Indonesia. Here, the country accounts for 51% of reported SEA piracy incidents and 27% of worldwide ones from 1992 to 11 Young, Adam J. 2007, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p Liss, Carolin. 2007, The Privatization of Maritime Security- Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a rock and a hard place? Perth, Western Australia: Murdoch University Working Paper, pp. 3. 4

5 This observation strongly warrants the need for stronger domestic legislation to combat rising rates of pirate attacks so as to restore the monopoly of legitimated violence to the state of Indonesia alone. 14 Parallel to this was the simultaneous lack of state funding for governments to adequately patrol their own territorial coastlines. 15 Moreover, political relations of the region fuel the persistence of piracy. The maritime environment of Southeast Asia is anarchic and essentially self-help in nature. There is no overarching authority to enforce and regulate sea lane security. Differing claims to jurisdiction over the seas abound in different countries, with the geography of the region racked by boundary disputes which ultimately influence which country is responsible to the security of the area. 16 Varying interpretations of maritime law also exacerbate the lack of committed involvement in inter-state regimes governing maritime security. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden The Gulf of Aden is a narrow waterway which connects both the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It flows through the Suez Canal, one of the world s most important shipping lanes. Nicknamed the pirate alley, the Gulf of Aden is also famous for its frequency of pirate attacks. Over the years, the International Maritime Organization has reported that during between 2005 and 2007, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden have exceeded the attacks along the combined seas of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. The cause of pirate notoriety is obvious; Somalia lacks an adequate government infrastructure to control and subdue these actors. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was established in the year 2000, possesses a limited amount of control over the country s land territory, much less its territorial waters. The proliferation of widespread regional conflict has also provided a cover for pirates to execute their activities freely and without restraint. As a result of such lawlessness, piracy has become an unchecked and lucrative occupation for one desperate to make a living. Sometimes, pirate claims to the purpose of their belligerence may seem legitimate and under the 13 Young, 2007, IBID, Chalk (2008), Bateman, Sam. 2007, Building Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia: the Promise of International Regimes in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, ed. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan, Routledge, New York, 97. 5

6 premise of protecting their livelihoods. In several incidents, those apprehended for actions of piracy have claimed to be acting along the premise of deterring overfishing along the coastline, an issue that has been taken advantage of by foreign fishermen since the Somalia disintegrated into ruin. 17 Many of the pirate attacks along the Gulf of Aden involve belligerent vessels harassing Cruise Liners with small arms fire, jeopardizing aid deliveries to the region, as well as apprehending crews of recreational, fishing or aid operations as hostages. Typically, captured vessels are swiftly steered into Somalian waters and anchored off landing points. These areas are usually established pirate command centers. Many pirate incidents involve the attackers apprehending their victims using small buoyant craft. Other tactics that the pirates employed are even more sophisticated and aggressive. Several of these involve the use of larger mother ships located well offshore and in deeper waters. These larger vessels provided a platform from which the pirates would launch smaller and faster skiffs to attack unwary vessels. Most notable are the incidents involving the MV Rozen (a chartered vessel of the World Food Programme that was seized in February 2007) and the Victoria (another chartered vessel seized in May 2007). The most recent confrontation in May 2010 involved the hijack of a Moscow University Oil Tanker by Somali pirates approximately 800km off the Somali coast. 18 Another insidious tactic that has recently emerged is what is known as swarm tactics, where large groups of pirates try to simultaneously flood the Somali basin, preventing naval and security personnel from engaging all of them at once. 19 Combating piracy and the problems encountered The contemporary and conventional prerequisite towards combating piracy is the expansion and modernization of a state s naval capabilities. This form of military spending is varied among the different Southeast Asian countries, and has triggered fears of a naval arms race since the 17 Guifoyle, Douglas and Colin Warbrick and Dominic McGoldrick. 2008, Piracy off Somalia: UN Security and Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-piracy efforts in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p BBC News. Pirates attack Russian Oil Tanker off Somali Coast. (accessed May 6, 2010) 19 BBC News. Navies struggle with swarming pirates. (accessed May 7, 2010) 6

7 1990s. However, these efforts towards continued naval expansion slowed during the 1997 AFC, owing to the damage of many economies. In any case, the countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines currently have relatively advanced naval capabilities which work alongside coastguards and maritime agencies to patrol the relevant waterways. Outside the scope of state resources is the utilization of private companies employed in the fight against piracy. These companies have been working in the region for decades now. A notable company is Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) which functions out of operating centers around Asia, including Singapore, Hong Kong and Indonesia. There has been a spike in the number of companies similar to Glenn Defense which operate in the world today, especially after 9/11 attacks that portended the likely incidence of possible maritime terrorist attacks. These Private Security Companies (PSCs) are part of the recurring worldwide trend towards the outsourcing and privatization of security services. Combating piracy on a regional scale already possesses numerous problems, much more an international effort. The lack of cooperation between states, the very actors who share the same capitalistic interests regarding shipping lanes, intensifies the crux of the dilemma. Furthermore are the nuances of judicial codifications which further encrypt the limitations to security forces that may be mobilized to curb the thwarting problem. Below is a further elaboration on the scope of these problems encountered while combating piracy. Judicial limitations The specifics of what constitutes a pirate itself, as written in UNCLOs and the 1958 High Seas Convention, already provide the basis to which limitations are projected. For instance, the issue on piracy as defined as an act that is committed for private ends can be opened up to numerous interpretations. With regards to this specific denotation, Guifoyle states that the words for private ends must thus be understood broadly. At least one national court decision has sensibly applied this approach and found that violence in international waters committed by one private vessel against another in pursuit of political protest still constituted piracy. 20 The judicial red 20 Guifoyle (2008), pp

8 tape clouds the categorization of what is deemed to be an act of piracy, thereby hindering relevant authorities to gain a warrant to apprehend and prosecute individuals who are allegedly pirates. Another significant restriction to combating piracy is the numerous classifications that limit boundaries of geography at sea. For instance, the categorization of High Seas or International Waters refers to all waters that swirl beyond a country s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Pirate attacks that are committed against vessels in such territorial waters are not considered piracy, but are relegated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) into the grey area of Armed Robbery against Ships ; to which hijacking may fall be classified. Strangely, piracy is not included in this classification. Moreover, the enforcement jurisdiction to all States in international waters does not extend to pursuing pirate vessels into the territorial sea of any State 21. The engagement of hot pursuit from the perspective of a foreign vessel must cease as soon as it crosses into such territorial waters. These limitations in the Rule of Law have allowed pirates in Southeast Asia and Somalia to cunningly evade search-anddestroy tactics employed by state actors. To counter these constrains, influential bodies have issued warning statements to advise sailors to exercise their own discretionary caution. In May 2007, for instance, The International Maritime Bureau issued a statement to warn ships to stay and remain at least 200 nautical miles from the Somali Coast. Such guidance has two main justifications: 200nm is far enough to remain relatively out of reach from pirate vessels as they lack the resources to remain far out in the high seas. Also, once ships venture into Somali waters, international law mandates that they cannot rely on the assistance of foreign patrols without the permission of the local government, one which has been fragmented and resourcefully ill-equipped for almost two decades. 22 On June 2, 2008, attempts were made to improve international legislation for the apprehension of pirates in territorial waters (particularly in the Gulf of Aden) under Resolution USR1816. This was passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The resolution clearly determined 21 IBID. 22 IBID,

9 that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region 23. What is relevant at this point is the material that is presented in Operative Paragraph 7, where the Resolution asserts that for a period of six months from the date of this resolution, States cooperating with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia may enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy. Furthermore, sub clause B of Operative Paragraph 7 calls for all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery inside the territorial waters of Somalia. 24 Although the content of Resolution 1816 attempts to nip the problem in the bud, there are several inherent weaknesses to the document. The first is that the article clearly undermines the capabilities of the Somali TFG, implicitly stating that it requires the additional equipment, personnel and tactics from foreign hands to combat the problem of piracy in its local area. The second is that only the state actors that are nominated by the TFG may be seen to be cooperating and hence be permitted to take action against the belligerents. Furthermore, the words all necessary means cannot encompass striking at pirate command centers on land or arresting pirates after their return to shore. Such action will still require the TFG s specific authorization. 25 Finally, while UNSCR 1816 may provide security agents of nominated member states with enforcement jurisdiction to apprehend the pirates, the document does not provide these agents with prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction to try and convict the pirates. Clearly, after attempts to equip foreign agents with the mandate necessary to combat piracy, the hands of these agencies still remain tightly bound. Resource limitations The lack of resources, equipment and personnel logically pose a major hindrance to combat piracy. A shortfall of trained crew and shipping vessels to adequately patrol vast areas of 23 United Nations Security Council. Resolution (accessed May 6, 2010) 24 IBID. 25 Guifoyle (2008), pp

10 waterways present pirates with the opportunity to conduct their activities virtually free of any hassle. Usually, the security responsibilities fall into the hands of the nearest legitimate state, as codified by the High Seas Convention and UNCLOs. However, the impotency of some of these states to assume such responsibilities causes other state actors with vested interests at hand to step in and assume the role of security providers. Somalia for instance has virtually no ability to provide a passable agency to ensure the safety of its waterways. This has resulted in the influx of state actors and regional actors willing to inject resources to combat piracy and uphold the security of the area. Along the Straits of Malacca, the spectrum of naval capabilities and differing magnitudes of security resources amongst the relevant nations pose numerous problems in the adequate fight against piracy. This occurrence has also presented possible strains to the relations between the various state actors in question. Leading the naval armament is Singapore, with her relatively small area of territorial water and her disproportionate but effective fleet that accounts for her reputable safety. Across the causeway, Malaysia has been successful towards allocating resources towards equipping its naval capabilities. However, rampant corruption within the agency operations and the lack of coordination among numerous agencies (such as the Royal Malaysian Police (Marine), the Royal Customs and Excise Department, the Marine Department, and the Royal Malaysian Navy, among others) cause hindrances towards initiating swift counterattacks against the sabotage effects of local pirates, should the need arise. More pressing dilemmas plague other countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. These countries have persistently weak economies that have been crippled by the effects of regional and world economic crises such as the AFC and the recent US financial crisis of Corruption amongst security personnel in these countries is also rampant. In Thailand, for instance, many military and policemen are involved in sideline activities other than their professional jobs. More often than not, this involves the drug trade. The Philippines also has such a problem. Ironically, although this country has one of the world s most extensive waterways, it is also the region s weakest in terms of naval capability Liss, Carolin (2007), pp

11 In today s post 9/11 world order, the existence of PSCs amidst government sanctioned security agencies is not a rare sight. However, uncertainties abound when governments outsource their security responsibilities to these PSCs. In many cases, the reputation and credentials of the PSC is linked to past combat experience of the company s employees and founders, of whom are usually military personnel. However, it is unclear as to whether these personnel are truly equipped and up to the task at hand. Coupled with such credential ambiguities are legal, ethical and practical problems that might arise when these foreign PSCs work in tandem with the local forces or the local population. 27 A typical example would be the amount of discretionary force that personnel may use to engage suspected belligerents. Regardless of the outcome, the state is ultimately responsible for the actions of these PSCs, however good or ugly. Clearly, the influx of more actors poses a hindrance to the combat against piracy. Threats to state sovereignty Another factor that is counterproductive towards curbing piracy is the inertia of state actors to dispatch resources to combat these security threats in various regional hot spots. The main reason for this is the reluctance of countries to compromise the sovereignty of their neighboring states, fuelling tension within the region due to an increase in military presence. This is along a realist school of thought. In Southeast Asia for instance, there is no regional hegemon to direct or spearhead the policy formulation process. Although other foreign powers such as China and Japan have a vested interest in the security of shipping lanes, these statements would fail to address the need to safeguard littoral states sovereignty. While Japan may aid in equipping the region with the necessary technology and aid in beefing up patrolling efforts, the feasibility of unilateral involvement contradicts the inherently competitive nature of states in a world from a realist perspective. Furthermore, China would never agree to extensive Japanese involvement, rendering the solution unfeasible and even potentially destabilizing. 28 Perhaps the protection of state sovereignty may be found in the institutions that the Southeast Asian countries create to establish their own form of security. The regional body of the 27 IBID. 28 Kivimaki, Timo The Long Peace of ASEAN, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No.1, pp

12 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was founded on this very principle of nonintervention for the protection of each member nation from another s influence. However, this foundation in their ethos usually hinders the achievement of goals stipulated by the association, which is to safeguard national and regional interests. In the face of these regional norms towards non-intervention, the lack of cooperation between littoral states is arguably the result of path dependency along a Southeast Asian and specifically an ASEAN philosophy. The skepticism that Littoral states have of multilateral solutions is therefore a projection of their ingrained identity to advocate the belief of non-intervention. 29 The limitations of idealistic transnational cooperation Piracy as a threat is transnational in nature. It involves this personnel travelling between and operating in more than one country 30, with the potential of sabotaging people from more than one country. As such, cooperation between governments around the world is a crucial and pragmatic solution to dispel pirate attacks. In the Gulf of Aden, the Multinational organization known as Combined Task Force 150 involve global naval assets of participant countries which patrol an international waterway, a corridor designated by the IMO. Inter-regional organizations such as NATO and the EU also play a significant contribution in combating suspected pirates in the Gulf. Among the participating nations are countries from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 31 However, the task of the marine sentinels is an uphill one. The success of these naval campaigns is not dependent on how many pirates are apprehended, but by how few incidents occur in the years to come. To achieve this, resources have to be continuously poured into the region. This may sap the funds and supplies of participant countries in efforts to bolster the fight against regional belligerents. The sustainability of such an operation, which is wholly dependent on the cooperation of countries around the world, remains to be seen. The interest that states have in participating in such peace ventures is not without other disconcerting affairs. For Japan, the contribution to international peace cooperation activities has 29 IBID, Liss, Carolin (2007), THE ASSOCIATED PRESS NATO fleet sails toward Somalia to guard against Piracy. October (accessed June 2, 2010) 12

13 resulted in a conflict of interest with the nation s codified ideals, particularly their post-war constitution. The country sees the need to combat piracy in order to protect its self interests at sea. It has even proposed establishing a military base in Africa to serve as a deployment position against pirates. However, this runs against the clauses of the 1947 Japanese Constitution, which do not permit the use of military power in foreign land and sea territories. 32 The plain negation towards the adherence of state constitution may jeopardize the legitimacy of the current Japanese government. To some, it may even spark concerns of growing global influence that the country may want to exert, bringing forth its legacy as an Imperialist power. What remains certain is that the increase in military presence will undoubtedly compromise the amount of trust countries have in each other. Along the Straits of Malacca, combating piracy also requires the unbridled cooperation of both littoral nations and other countries outside of the region. Though ASEAN has non-interference policies of the domestic affairs of its member states (as elaborated on above), it still has played a leading role in coordinating maritime security in the region. Most notably, ASEAN leaders in 2003 pledged their efforts towards the creation of a security community in the region; one that would combat transnational threats such as maritime piracy and terrorism. Apart from these initiatives, multilateral agreements have enhanced cooperation and official participation among contributing countries. One such agreement, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAPP), was spearheaded by Japan; a country with vested interests in protecting maritime traffic. Of special significance to this particular arrangement is the establishment of the use of the Information Sharing Center, which allows the distribution of important surveillance and information on belligerent activities. All this is channeled with the intention of increasing cooperation among sixteen countries, including member ASEAN states. However, two important countries have yet to pledge their contributions to the ReCAPP. These are the nations of Malaysia and Indonesia, the latter which is responsible for the bulk of pirate activity in the region. Another limitation to this collaboration is that the ReCAPP only permits the sharing of important information about belligerent actors. It does not 32 Rozoff, Rick Japanese Military Joins U.S. and NATO in Horn of Africa. Australia.to News. April (accessed June 3, 2010). 13

14 hold any further authority to apprehend the pirates, arresting the final effort to eliminate the transnational threat. In the end, the self help nature of the anarchic world order persists, leaving states with their own resources to patrol their designated territorial waters. 33 Apart from regional efforts in pursuit of cooperation are bilateral agreements that facilitate state collaboration. Bilateral agreements between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have been introduced over the past decade to conduct joint exercises at sea and to coordinate naval patrols in the Malacca Straits 34. These have manifested in the creation of the MALSINDO coordinated patrols of the Malacca Straits in 2004 by naval units of these countries. This evolved two years later with the inclusion of the Eye in the Sky program (EiS). This involved the cooperation of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand in the conducting of daily-run air patrols along the Straits. Since April 2006, the efforts of MALSINDO and EiS have been brought together under the broad network of the Malacca Straits Patrol Network. Despite such detailed fanfare, the initiative has largely failed to decrease the amount of pirate cases. The patrols have been criticized by the international community as merely being a sharing of each of the countries schedules and resources- nothing more. Indeed, preventing closer cooperation among the countries is the recurring concern over their individual sovereignty. Regulations that restrict a patrol s entry into territorial waters are also another thwarting limitation. 35 Conclusion What is necessary is that the problem be nipped in the bud. Such a quandary lies in the sustained effects of rampart poverty in coastal communities. Perhaps the real solution lies in the continued waves of humanitarian aid and potential foreign investment that is injected to these areas, equipping the locals with education, jobs and better livelihoods. In this respect, the incentive to resort to illegal and violent means to survive decrease. In tandem with this is the increase of penalties and legal punishments that deter one from resorting to piracy; one in which the costs of engaging in these acts clearly outweigh the benefits. However, this requires the commitment and cooperation of the relevant government and judicial authorities. Where such support is absent, 33 Liss, Carolin. (2007), IBID 35 IBID,

15 states may have to resort to strengthening and utilizing multinational agencies in an attempt to garner support from other countries towards the fight against piracy. Inevitably, all solutions have their inherent limitations. What may be more useful will be for nations to draw up specific aims and goals to fulfill along a specific timeframe. What remains clear is the utmost need for the collaboration amongst states and the sharing of resources among themselves to combat their elusive and versatile adversaries. Yet this remains a distant achievement. Whether the world will see unbridled collaboration in the realm of international security is a question that many may remain cynical of. In today s context, states have yet to learn to work together. Most of the time, efforts towards coordination fall short of action and agencies are mostly talk shops. What remains a more feasible and convenient solution for countries in the here and now is that they take care of their own interests, protect their own citizens with the use of their own resources. Until the sweet ideal of liberalism is realized, countries have to rely on their own resources for now in this largely realist, anarchic and selfhelp world order Effects of piracy to Global World Order 1) Threat to sovereignty 15

16 2) Compromise of state enterprise 3) Fuzzy negotiations towards colluding to disarm the maritime threat a. Non-acceptance of responsibility b. Threaten sovereignty and legitimacy of a nation Bibliography Anderson, J. L Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation. Journal of World History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1995): ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE Nato Fleet Sails Toward Somalia To Guard Against Piracy. The New York Times ( October 22, 2008). (accessed June 2, 2010) Bateman, Sam Building Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia: the Promise of International Regimes. In Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, ed. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan, Routledge, New York: BBC News. Pirates attack Russian Oil Tanker off Somalia Coast. (accessed May 6, 2010) BBC News. Navies struggle with swarming pirates. (accessed May 7, 2010) Chaikin, Greg. 2005, Piracy in Asia: International Cooperation and Japan s Role. Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses, ed. Mark Valencia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Gershman, John Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul- Aug): Gettleman, Jeffrey Tensions Rise over Ship hijacked off Somalia. The New York Times (September 28). 16

17 (accessed June 2, 2010). Guifoyle, Douglas and Colin Warbrick and Dominic McGoldrick Piracy off Somalia: UN Security and Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-piracy efforts. International and Comparative Law Quarterly: Kivimaki, Timo The Long Peace of ASEAN. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No.1: Liss, Carolin The Privatisation of Maritime Security Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a rock and a hard place? Perth, Western Australia: Murdoch University Working Paper. Rozoff, Rick Japanese Military joins U.S. and NATO in the Horn of Africa Australia.to News (April 27) (accessed June 3, 2010) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Security Council. Resolution (accessed May 6, 2010) Young, Adam J. 2007, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 17