How do maternity leave and discriminatory social norms relate to women s employment in developing countries?

Transcription

1 How do maternity leave and discriminatory social norms relate to women s employment in developing countries? OECD Development Centre, June 2013 By Somali Cerise, Anna Eliseeva, Francesca Francavilla, Camila Mejia and Michele Tuccio * Key messages The vast majority of developing countries still lags behind the ILO standard (14 weeks) for the duration of maternity leave. In some countries social norms and policies converge to create a double discrimination: on one side, women are discriminated at the family level, while on the other side, governments do not support the cost of maternity leave. Government-funded maternity leave has a greater positive effect on women s employment outcomes in countries with higher levels of discrimination. Increasing women s participation in paid employment is a fundamental step towards women s economic empowerment and improving development outcomes. The benefits of increasing women s labour force participation extend well beyond improving the economic status of women themselves. Gender inequality in labour force participation has a significantly negative impact on economic growth (Klasen and Lamanna, 2009) and conversely, increasing women s labour force participation is a driver of economic growth. Therefore, understanding the determinants of women s employment outcomes, and in particular female labour force participation is, important not only to tackle persistent gender gaps but also to enhance economic growth and accelerate progress on development goals (OECD, 2012). The role of family policies such as maternity leave as a factor shaping women s employment outcomes has been examined for advanced economies, but rarely for developing countries. Yet, as policy-makers are increasingly introducing interventions support women s economic participation in developing countries, family policies are an emerging area of research focus. At the same time, discriminatory social institutions defined as laws, social norms and practices that restrict or exclude women and girls from opportunities and resources - have gained currency as a framework for understanding the barriers to women s economic participation. Previous OECD Development Centre research has found social institutions that discriminate against women as a key factor explaining women s employment outcomes. What is not yet understood is how discriminatory social institutions and family policies interact to influence women s employment outcomes. * The authors convey special thanks to Idil Mohamed for her research assistance.

2 The purpose of this issues paper is to show how family policies and discriminatory social institutions are related to women s employment. Specifically, we use maternity leave as an example of family policy and the Social Institutions and Gender Index sub-index of Discriminatory Family Code as a measure of discriminatory social institutions related to women and girls status and role in the family. We find that in countries where governments contribute to the cost of maternity leave there are also lower levels of discrimination in the family. However, when governments pay maternity leave in countries with higher level of discrimination in the family, the effect on female employment is higher. Most developing countries are yet to meet the 14 weeks International Labour Organisation (ILO) standard duration of maternity leave. To promote gender equality in the labour market, governments should accelerate efforts to meet the ILO standard for maternity leave ensuring broad coverage for all workers while also tackling discriminatory social institutions. Specifically, government-funded or cost-sharing models for maternity leave payments are needed for providing families with replacement income during leave. The issues paper begins by addressing why discriminatory social institutions and maternity leave matter for women s employment. The next section examines the relationship between family policies, discriminatory social institutions and women s employment and concludes with policy recommendations. Why do discriminatory social institutions matter for women s employment? Social institutions are defined as formal and informal laws, social norms and practices that shape or restrict the decisions, choices and behaviours of groups, communities and individuals (North, 1990; Sen, 2007; Jütting et al., 2008). Social institutions set the parameters of what decisions, choices or behaviours are deemed acceptable or unacceptable in a society and therefore play a key role in defining and influencing gender roles and relations. While social institutions in themselves are not inherently good or bad, the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) defines discriminatory social institutions as those that restrict or exclude women and girls and consequently limit their access to opportunities, resources and power. Discriminatory social institutions play an important role in shaping women s employment outcomes; specifically women s labour market participation, gender segregation by employment status, gender segregation by sectors as well as discouraging women from seeking or entering paid employment (Elson, 1999; Miles, 2002; Jutting et al., 2010). Such norms and practices can hinder women s participation in the labour force outside the household by limiting their freedom of movement, while also hindering women s job mobility by reducing their probability of finding work in the non-agricultural sector, which offers better working conditions and social security protection. In particular, family discriminatory norms, such as early marriage, parental authority and limited access to inheritance, limit women s and girls opportunity to enter in the labour market. Addressing discriminatory social institutions is, therefore, paramount in order to improve not only women s economic outcomes but also wider development outcomes such as child health and educational attainment (World Bank, 2011; OECD, 2012). 2

3 The OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index is a cross-country measure of discriminatory social institutions, scoring countries on 14 variables that are grouped into five sub-indices: Discriminatory Family Code, Restricted Physical Integrity, Son Bias, Restricted Civil Liberties and Restricted Resources and Entitlements. As the issues paper examines the relationship between discriminatory social institutions, family policies and women s employment, we focus our analysis on social institutions that relate to the family and household. The Discriminatory Family Code sub-index captures laws, norms and practices which limit and restrict women s decision-making power and status in the family and household. The subindex is made up of four variables: Legal Age of Marriage, Early Marriage, Parental Authority (in marriage and upon divorce) and Inheritance. Women s status and decision-making power in the family has been shown to have an impact on women s employment outcomes. For instance, studies on the consequences of marriage transition on African labour markets found that a delay in marriage was associated with an increase in women s labour force participation (Jah, 2011). Similarly, another example is represented by Ethiopia s 2000 family law, which increased the legal minimum age of marriage for women and introduced the requirement of the consent of both spouses in the administration of marital property. In fact, the law has been linked to an increase in female labour force participation, especially regarding work outside the home, full-time employment, higher skilled and better-paid work (Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo, 2010). Women s inheritance rights are also shown to have an impact on female labour force participation. Equal inheritance rights enhance women s empowerment through greater decision-making power in the household thus leading to greater economic independence (Peterman, 2011). However, legislation on equal inheritance rights may also have a secondary impact on female labour force participation through its impact on girls education and age at first marriage, two factors that have been shown to have an impact on women s labour force participation in India (Deininger, Goyal, and Nagarajan 2010). The Hindu Succession Act, which accords equal inheritance rights to Indian women, has also enhanced girls educational attainment as well as discouraging early marriage. A focus on the quality of women s employment is important for achieving women s economic empowerment because recent data shows that while women are increasingly entering the labour market, they are more likely than men to be confined in the most vulnerable categories within the informal sector (OECD, 2012). The SIGI data shows that women s status in the family is related to the quality of women s employment: discrimination in the family plays a role in preventing women from accessing more secure and better paid jobs, and this in turn reinforces women s lower status in the family. Using the 2012 SIGI Discriminatory Family Code sub-index, we examine the relationship between discrimination against women and female vulnerable employment (Figure 1). Vulnerable employment refers to those categories of jobs that are likely to be unsustainable in the long run, such as unpaid family workers and own-account workers. Our linear regression model shows a strong and positive relationship between Discriminatory Family Code and the rate of female vulnerable employment. Countries where women experience higher levels of discrimination in the family have higher rates of women in vulnerable employment. This relationship holds even when taking into account country income level. On the contrary, we find no clear relationship between Discriminatory Family Code and the total female employment rate (i.e. the share of the country s working age population that is employed). This can be explained by the fact that in many developing countries, women have to work out of financial necessity. Discriminatory social institutions therefore do not necessarily prevent women from working as such, but could influence the type and quality of employment they have. 3

4 % of female employment in vulnerable jobs Figure 1: The share of women in vulnerable jobs is higher in countries with higher levels of discrimination in the family. Percentage of female employment in vulnerable jobs by discriminatory family code Very Low Low Moderate High Very High Level of discrimination, 2012 SIGI Discriminatory Family Code Sub-Index, quintiles Sources: 2012 OECD Gender Institutions and Development Database, World Bank World Development Indicators (average values for ). Note: The chart shows the relationship between the SIGI 2012 Discriminatory Family Code sub-index and the predicted values of female Vulnerable Employment as percentage of women employment, estimated by linear regression model with the following explanatory variables: GDP, GDP square, 2012 SIGI Discriminatory Family Code sub-index. The R-squared of the regression is Regression results available upon request from the authors. Why does maternity leave matter for women s employment? Family policies may have several objectives such as improving child health and welfare outcomes (Carneiro et al., 2011), reducing poverty, influencing fertility rates and supporting those with caring responsibilities to work. Specifically, family policies such as maternity leave and child care are often introduced by governments to incentivise women s employment. Maternity leave not only serves to preserve the health of the mother and her newborn but it also provides a measure of job security guaranteeing that women of childbearing age have access to jobs, maintain their wages and benefits during maternity and have a period of time after return to work (Baker and Milligan, 2008). The International Labour Organisation has underlined the importance of providing maternity protection provisions (including maternity paid leaves) to women in precarious and informal employment (ILO, 2010). This is of particular relevance to developing country contexts where women are over represented in the informal sector, particularly as domestic and agricultural workers (ILO, 2010; OECD 2012). 4

5 Studies carried out in developed economies have shown that female labour force participation is influenced by maternity leave and child care provision. A study on Germany, for instance, has found a positive and significant correlation between paid maternity leaves and women s return to the workforce after giving birth (Bergemann and Riphahn, 2011). Similarly, studies on the relationship between jobprotected maternity leave and women s employment outcomes in Canada have shown increased likelihood of mothers returning to the labour force when job-protected maternity leave options are in place (Baker and Milligan, 2008). Furthermore, a cross-national analysis of motherhood penalty has found a strong effect of childcare provisions for infants and toddlers on reducing motherhood wage gaps (Misra et al., 2011). Insufficient provision of public childcare is also one of the factors found to be significant in decreasing female labour market participation in Russia (Grogan and Koka, 2010). Supporting fathers to play a greater role in caring for children provides an important tool to achieve greater gender equality by shifting norms and practices that entrench child care as women s work and men s role as a primary breadwinner. Paternity leave represents a shift in attitudes towards more equal parenting roles. At the same moment, men taking on a greater share of child caring responsibilities foster gender equality in the labour market by enabling women to enter or come back to the labour market faster with minimal career disruption following maternity leave. Although no ILO standard exists on paternity leave, several national laws support provisions for fathers. In 2000, EU countries approved the Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers for Employment and Social Policy, which promoted also individual and non-transferable right to paternity leave. There are few developing countries with legislated paternity leave, but some positive exceptions emerge. For example, the Philippines allow fathers to take seven days of paternity leave, while in Chile men are entitled to five days (Öun and Trujillo, 2005). However, these provisions are often still symbolic, and much more has to be done in order to extend the coverage and the duration of paternity leave. Due to the absence of cross-country data on paternity leave, this issues paper is focussed on maternity leave. There are different perspectives on the most appropriate duration for maternity leave. Maternity leave which is too short in duration can increase the likelihood of health complications for both mother and newborn. However, prolonged disruptions from the workplace may break women s ties from the labour market (Baker and Milligan, 2008; Dustmann & Schönberg, 2011). The Maternity Convention 2000 (n. 183) adopted by the International Labour Conference in June 2000 stipulates the period of leave to be at least 14 weeks (two more than what was established in the previous Convention). Figure 2 shows that the average duration of maternity leave is in accordance with the 14-weeks ILO standard only in the regions of East Europe and Central Asia and OECD countries. All the other regions, with the exception of South Asia, have met the previous international standard of 12-weeks duration but haven t adapted yet at the new standard. South Asia shows the shorter maternity leave periods with an average duration lower than 12-weeks. 5

6 Figure 2: The majority of developing countries are yet to meet the ILO standard (14 weeks) for the duration of maternity leave. Average duration of maternity leave in weeks, by region. South Asia East Asia & Pacific Middle East & North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America & Caribbean OECD Eastern Europe & Central Asia Duration of maternity leave (weeks) Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW) for non-oecd countries, OECD Family Database for OECD countries. How do discriminatory social institutions and family policies interact? Despite the importance of maternity leave, households are often incapable of sustaining prolonged periods of absence of salary. Accordingly, the ILO recognises the need for cash benefits during maternity leave. Governments are gradually approving employment laws incorporating cash benefits in order to ensure that women can retain an income while caring for their children during maternity leave. There are several different funding models for maternity leave. In some countries schemes are entirely government-funded, while in others they are paid by the employer or through employee contributions. Some governments have opted for a combined funding model between public and private sector. The evidence shows that the costs of cash benefits should be borne by public funds or compulsory social insurance to avoid the marginalization of female participation in the labour market. Otherwise employers would associate higher costs with employing women workers (Olivier and Kaseke, 2007; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013; World Bank & IFC, 2011). Part of the perceived cost is due to the disruption from the workplace. However, in addition to the health and welfare objectives, an additional policy objective of maternity leave is maintaining workplace attachment for mothers, thus improving their labour force participation in the long term. It is important for mothers to return to work after their period of leave, which has to be long enough to ensure the health of the children and the women, but at the same time it should break ties between mothers and the labour market. The ILO standard of 14 weeks is intended to provide guidance on an appropriate length of maternity leave which balances the health of the mother and child with the needs of the employer and female employee. 6

7 % It is useful to examine the relationship between broader social norms regarding women s role in the family and the different models of maternity leave. We can expect that in countries with deeply entrenched gender stereotypes about women and men s role in the household, governments are less likely to financially support policies to facilitate women s engagement with the labour market. The data from the 2012 SIGI and the Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW) confirms that governments are less likely to support the cost of maternity leave in those regions with higher levels of discrimination in the family (Figure 3). For example, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have the lowest Discriminatory Family Code sub-index score (lowest discrimination), and the region has the highest share of countries with government contribution to maternity leave payments. On the other side of the spectrum, no governments in South Asia currently contribute to maternity leave costs. Figure 3: In regions with higher levels of discrimination in the family there are fewer countries in which governments support the cost of maternity leave. Percentage of countries without government s contribution to the cost of maternity leave and average Discriminatory Family Code score, by region South Asia (5) Sub-Saharan Africa (14) Middle East & Nrth Africa (6) Eastern Europe & Central Asia (9) East Asia & Pacific (5) Latin America & Caribbean (18) % of Country without Gov contribution to maternity leave SIGI Family Code sub-index*100 Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW) and OECD 2012 Gender, Institutions and Development Database. 7

8 The data suggests a double disadvantage: more specifically, discrimination in the family includes practices such as early marriage or lack of access to family assets, which can be barriers to women s equal participation in the labour force. This discrimination in the family is coupled with a lower likelihood of governments supporting the cost of maternity leave, which increases the risk of women being discriminated against in the labour market, as employers see hiring women as a higher cost due to maternity leave. Figure 4 shows this relationship. On the contrary, countries where governments provide cash benefits to mothers have lower levels of discrimination in the family. While this difference across regions could be attributed to the general level of development of social security systems or status of general labour laws and regulations, the double disadvantage experienced by women still remains and requires the attention of policy-makers. Figure 4: The double discrimination: in countries where governments do not contribute to the cost of maternity leave there are higher levels of discriminatory social institutions. Average value of SIGI and SIGI-Family Code sub-index by type of maternity leave Only Gov. Employer and Gov. All Employee and Employer Only Employer SIGI Family Code Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW), 2010 and SIGI,

9 How do discriminatory social institutions and family policies affect women s employment? The linkages between maternity leave, discriminatory social institutions and female labour participation in developing countries has not yet been examined in the literature. This is partly due to the lack of good quality data on social protection and employment, and the different degree of development of social protection systems across countries. In addition, specific features of employment in developing countries, like the high level of informal employment, make even more difficult to assess policy measures, particularly if those in informal employment are not eligible for maternity leave or similar policies. However, we can expect that cash benefits during maternity leave will benefit more those countries where women are more discriminated. Consequently, more women will enter or stay in the labour market after their pregnancy, due to the financial help. Using 2010 data on female labour force participation and the 2012 SIGI, we estimate a linear regression model to understand how women s employment is related to maternity leave and discriminatory social institutions. Figure 5 projects three different scenarios of female labour force participation based on assuming that all governments support the cost of maternity leave, no governments support the cost of maternity leave and the actual situation. We find that government-funded paid maternity leave has a greater positive impact effect on female employment in countries with higher levels of discrimination. If all countries have government-funded maternity leave, the predicted values of female labour force participation would be 20% greater in countries with very high levels of discrimination. Conversely, the effect of government-paid cash benefits on women s employment is negligible in countries with low levels of discrimination in the family (0.5% improvement). This suggests that a policy measure such as maternity leave can play a critical role in fostering women s employment in contexts of highly discriminatory social institutions. These findings are robust when using 2012 SIGI Discriminatory Family code sub-index instead of the overall SIGI value. As noted earlier in the paper, it is important to consider the quality of women s employment in the context of developing countries. However, the analysis of the relationship between discriminatory social institutions, maternity leave and vulnerable employment has not been possible due to the low data coverage for developing countries. However, when the data improves, a similar analysis to understand the relationship between maternity leave, discriminatory social institutions and the quality of women s employment would add further insight on the determinants of women s employment outcomes.. 9

10 Female Labour Force Participation (predicted values) Figure 5: Government-funded maternity leave has a greater positive effect on female employment in countries with higher levels of discrimination. Predicted Female Labour Force participation by 2012 SIGI quintiles for three scenarios of maternity leave: real values, no countries have government-funded maternity leave, all countries have government-funded maternity leave Very Low Low Moderate High Very High (5 over 8) (5 over 10) (4 over 9) (2 over 9) (0 over7) Level of discrimination, SIGI 2012 Discriminatory Family Code quintiles (countries providing goverment's maternitly leave) Real values No govs fund mat. leave All govs fund mat. leave Sources: 2012 OECD Gender Institutions and Development Database, World Bank World Development Indicators. Note: The chart shows the relationship between the SIGI 2012 and the predicted values of Female Labour Force Participation rate estimated by linear regression for 42 countries with the following explanatory variables: GDP, GDP-square, urbanisation, fertility rate, dummy for employee-funded maternity leave, dummy for government-funded maternity leave, SIGI 2012, and interaction between government funded maternity leave and SIGI 2012 value. The R-squared of the regression is 0.6. Regression results available upon request from the authors. 10

11 Policy implications The analysis in this issues paper shows that the majority of developing countries (with the exception of Eastern Europe and Central Asia) are yet to meet the international maternity leave duration standard of 14 weeks. However, even if countries have introduced maternity leave, the challenge of coverage and eligibility for all workers remains, particularly in developing countries with higher levels of informal employment. For instance, in Tunisia, Nigeria and Lebanon, coverage excludes women working in family undertakings, while the legislation of Sudan and Zambia does not apply to casual workers (ILO, 2010). This absence of protection hampers those segments of the labour market already very vulnerable (e.g. domestic, agricultural or temporary workers), reinforcing the vicious circles that trap them into poverty. Thus, it is important to assure that maternity leave policies are expanded to the whole labour force. Progress in this direction has been slowly achieved: currently, more than 50 countries include domestic workers in their maternity leave legislations, and several governments are starting to cover also students and apprentices, such as Madagascar, Russia and Vietnam (ILO, 2009). Our study also stressed the relevance of cash benefits in replacing part of women s lost income due to the maternity leave. Without financial support, the interruption of mothers work can put economic pressure on the household, leading women to enter back in the labour market too quickly and in vulnerable jobs. Nevertheless, there is evidence that cash benefits entirely paid by employers foster discrimination against women. It is therefore important that maternity leaves are at least partially funded by compulsory social insurance or public funds (Öun and Trujillo, 2005). For instance, an ILO study of 2007 found that the current maternity leave policy in Jordan had a negative impact on female labour participation, since the whole cost was borne by employers (ILO, 2007). The study then suggested a scheme where each economic actor would benefit, and in 2008 a proposal for the adoption of a government-funded maternity cash benefits scheme has been presented in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (ILO, 2008). However, accelerating progress towards more inclusive maternity leave may not be enough to improve female labour force participation. Discriminatory social institutions and existing gender stereotypes hinder women s access to labour markets, increasing their vulnerability to poverty and poor work conditions. Policies addressing the dimensions of Discriminatory Family Code that can shape women s employment (such as early marriage and inheritance rights) could play an important role in improving female labour force participation, thereby promoting greater gender equality as well as enhancing economic growth. For example, a widely acknowledged successful programme has been established in Bangladesh in 1982 in order to delay marriage, improve the use of contraceptives and reduce fertility (Raynor & Wesson, 2006). The Bangladesh Association for Community Education (BACE) has initially implemented the project and then international organizations scaled it up. An annual stipend between $12 and $36 was given to rural girls conditional on 75 per cent attendance and 45 per cent score (Jones et al., 2010). Since married girls were excluded from the stipend, parents were incentivised to delay daughters marriage (Schurmann, 2009). Despite the fact that no study has been recently undertaken to assess the consequences of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Programme (FSP) on women s employment outcomes, it is expected to increase female labour force participation in the long run. 11

12 Access to assets can also improve women s economic status and enable them to establish businesses and engage in paid work. In 2008 the Government of Nepal put in place an intervention to improve women s access to and control over family assets. For instance, the Ministry of Finance introduced a 10% tax exemption for those lands registered in a woman s name. The percentage then increased to 30% in rural areas and 23% in urban areas, with the objective of fostering inheritance to daughters. According to UN Women, the results have been promising: in 2001, only 11% of land was owned by women, while in 2009 the share increased to 35% (UN Women, 2011). Engaging men and boys in changing discriminatory social norms is critical for women s empowerment. For instance, efforts to involve men in maternity care in India increased the number of men accompanying their wives to hospital facilities and in Uganda training programmes for husbands on health issues lowered unsafe childbirths (ILO, 2008). Legislated paternity leave is an important instrument to encourage and facilitate men to take a greater role in caring for children. The example of OECD countries is illustrative. For instance, the Finland Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Ministry of Labour recently approved a new legislation which allows men to take up to 54 working days of paternity leave, in addition to 158 working days that are eligible to be taken by both mothers and fathers (Salmi and Lammi-Taskula, 2013). In Sweden, 13% of available parental leave (8.5 weeks) is reserved to fathers on a use it or lose it basis. This encourages an equal sharing of caring responsibilities which enables men to have greater involvement in caring for children and women to engage in paid employment. While countries are increasingly recognising the role of paternity leave in promoting gender equality, the large number of developed and developing countries without paternity leave signals that this is a policy area that requires further attention. Conclusions The benefits of maternity leave for women s empowerment include both health and economic outcomes. Despite of the increasing attention of industrialized countries on such policies, this issue paper shows that the vast majority of developing countries still lag behind the 14-week conventional duration of maternity leave. Policies extending the period and coverage of maternity leave are thus required in order to improve women s labour market outcomes. This paper also underlines the importance of government-funded cash benefits in order to help households to sustain prolonged period of absence of salary. When the costs of maternity leave are borne by employers, women may be discriminated by the fact that employers would associate the higher costs with employing them. Our analysis shows that in some countries social norms and policies converge to create double disadvantage: on one side, women are discriminated at the family level, while on the other side, governments do not support the cost of maternity leave. This double discrimination is correlated to female participation in the labour market, especially in those countries where discriminatory social norms are higher. Econometric analysis shows that government-funded maternity leave has a greater positive effect on women s employment outcomes in countries with higher levels of discrimination. As such, governments should accelerate progress towards meeting the ILO standards for maternity leave to improve women s labour market participation. At the same time, comprehensive efforts to tackle discriminatory social institutions are needed, particularly in the realm of the family, to remove the social constraints on women s labour market participation and engagement in high quality jobs. 12

13 References Baker, M., & Milligan, K. (2008). How Does Job Protected Maternity Leave Affect Mothers Employment? Journal of Labor Economics, 26(4), Bergemann, A., & Riphahn, R. T. (2011). The Introduction of a Short-Term Earnings-Related Parental Leave Benefit System and Differential Effects on Employment Intentions. Schmollers Jahrbuch: Journal of Applied Social Science Studies/Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften, 131(2), Carneiro, P., Løken, K., & Salvanes, K. (2011). A flying start? Maternity leave benefits and long run outcomes of children. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5793, IZA. Deininger, K., Goyal, A., & Nagarajan, H. (2010). Can Changes in Inheritance Legislation Improve Female Asset Ownership? Evidence from India's Hindu Succession Act. Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Dustmann, C., & Schonberg, U. (2012). Expansions in maternity leave coverage and children's long-term outcomes. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(3), Grogan, L., & Koka, K. (2010). Young children and women's labour force participation in Russia, Economics of Transition, 18(4), Hallward-Driemeier, M., & Gajigo, O. (2011, March). Strengthening Economic Rights and Women s Occupational Choice: The Impact of Reforming Ethiopia s Family Law. In Centre for Study of African Economies 25th Anniversary Conference. Han, W. J., Ruhm, C., & Waldfogel, J. (2009). Parental leave policies and parents' employment and leave taking. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28(1), ILO (2007). Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Report to the Government Feasibility Study on the Implementation of a Maternity Cash Benefits Scheme. ILO, Geneva. ILO (2008). Protect the future: Maternity, paternity and work. ILO, Geneva. ILO (2009). Decent work for domestic workers, Report IV(1). ILO, Geneva. ILO (2010). Maternity at work: A review of national legislation. ILO, Geneva. Jah, F. (2011). The growing significance of marriage in African labor markets: Implications for the fertility transition and inequality. Paper presented at the Sixth African Population Conference, Burkina Faso. Jones, N., Harper, C., Watson, C., et al. (2010). Stemming Girls' Chronic Poverty: Catalysing Development Change by Building Just Social Institutions. Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper. Jütting, J. P., Morrisson, C., Dayton Johnson, J., & Drechsler, D. (2008). Measuring gender (In) Equality: The OECD gender, institutions and development data base. Journal of Human Development, 9(1), Jütting, J., Luci, A., & Morrison, C. (2012). Why do so many women end up in bad jobs? A cross-country assessment for developing countries. European Journal of Development Research, 24(4), Klasen, S., & Lamanna, F. (2009). The impact of gender inequality in education and employment on economic growth: new evidence for a panel of countries. Feminist Economics, 15(3), Miles, R. (2002). Employment and unemployment in Jordan: The importance of the gender system. World Development, 30(3), Misra, J., Budig, M., & Böckmann, I. (2011). Work-Family Policies and the Effects of Children on Women's Employment Hours and Wages. Community, Work, and Family. 14(2): North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge university press. OECD (2012). Closing the gender gap: Act now. OECD, Paris. Oliver, M., & Kaseke, E. (2007). Labour market participation and social security protection of females: Recent developments in SADC. Paper presented at the 5 th International Research Conference on Social Security. Warsaw, 5-7 March Öun, I., & Trujillo, G. P. (2005). Maternity at Work: A Review of National Legislation: Findings from the ILO's Conditions of Work and Employment Database. International Labour Organisation, Geneva. Peterman, A. (2011). Women's Property Rights and Gendered Policies: Implications for Women's Long-term Welfare in Rural Tanzania. Journal of Development Studies, 47(1),

14 Raynor, J., & Wesson, K. (2006). The girls stipend program in Bangladesh. Journal of Education for International Development, 2(2), Salmi, M., & Lammi-Taskula, J. (2013). Finland country note. In P. Moss (ed.) International Review of Leave Policies and Research Available at: Schurmann, A. T. (2009). Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project using a social exclusion framework. Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition, 27(4), 505. Sen, A. (2007). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Penguin Books India. Thévenon, O., & Solaz, A. (2013). Labour market effects of parental leave policies in OECD countries. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 141, OECD, Paris. UN Women (2011). Progress of the World's Women In Pursuit of Justice. UN Women, New York. World Bank (2011). World Development Report: 2012 Gender Equality and Development. World Bank, DC. World Bank & IFC (2011). Women, Business and the Law 2012: Removing Barriers to Economic Inclusion. World Bank, DC. For more information on our work please visit: