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1 Florida State University Libraries Honors Theses The Division of Undergraduate Studies 2013 The Nature of Consultative Status: An Examination of the Relationship between NGOs and the UN Emily Lawrence Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact

2 Abstract: (UN, NGOs, consultative status, Amnesty International, Liberal International, Transnational Radical Party, Human Rights Watch) This thesis relates to the consultative status arrangement between NGOs and the UN. It explores the ability of NGOs to maintain consultative status when raising awareness for human rights violations that member states would prefer to keep hidden. The work focuses on an NGO s reputation, political ties and accreditation methods as the main factors of relevance. Internal dynamics within the Economic and Social Council s Committee on NGOs are also considered.

3 THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY THE NATURE OF CONSULTATIVE STATUS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOS AND THE UN By EMILY LAWRENCE A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in the Major Degree Awarded: Fall, 2013

4 The members of the Defense Committee approve the thesis of Emily Lawrence defended on July 22, Dr. Megan Shannon Thesis Director Dr. Will H. Moore Committee Member Dr. James Mathes Outside Committee Member

5 This thesis is dedicated to Mom, Dad and Bret. To me, you are the world.

6 Table of Contents Chapter Page I. Introduction...1 Research Question...3 II. Relevant Literature...3 III. Background of Consultative Status...7 IV. Theory...13 V. Hypothesis...14 VI. Case Selection...15 Amnesty International...15 Human Rights Watch...17 Transnational Radical Party...19 Liberal International...25 VII. Conclusion...27 VII. References...37

7 1 Introduction Since its creation, the UN has been a forum for states to convene and discuss matters of global importance. However, in current times, states are no longer the only significant actors on an international level. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been growing in number and influence since the mid-1900s. Their impact is felt worldwide as norm promoters, advocacy networks, and situation monitors. The liberal perspective in international relations theory recognizes the large impact of such groups and lauds them as a means for greater international communication and cooperation. While the impact NGOs have on international affairs is often studied, the impact of international arenas on NGOs is rarely brought to light. This will be the main area of exploration in this work. To narrow the area of interest, the UN s method of engaging with NGOs will be studied in particular to determine what factors are relevant in such a relationship. Further, the relationship between countries in the UN and human rights NGOs will be the main topic of research here. This is due to the fact that member states and NGOs will often necessarily be at odds with each other on these issues. Member states do not want their transgressions named and shamed in the UN, while NGOs want above all to present these issues and share them on an international stage to force people to take action to rectify the situation. In most situations, countries have no means to directly react against negative NGO claims because states have little power over NGOs. By their definition, the groups are non-governmental. The UN brings up an interesting problem because the states are given direct power over NGOs. NGOs are given consultative status which affords them many benefits such as access to the grounds, the ability to issue statements, and the opportunity to formally and informally address delegations. The states can revoke this status simply by bringing a complaint to the Committee on NGOs and taking a vote. This formal relationship between a political body and NGOs has an inherent problem then-

8 2 NGOs can be persecuted for doing their job well. Yet, not every NGO that offends a member state has its status revoked. This paper will examine why this is by determining what factors are relevant to an NGO maintaining its consultative status. To do this, four case studies of NGOs with consultative status will be assessed. Their role in relation to the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs will be the focus of this paper. Though the NGOs are able to address many different bodies with their status- not the least of which is the Human Rights Committee- the Committee on NGOs is the body that votes on recommending to the Council whether to grant or withdraw the status. This power makes it the body with the most authority over an NGO which is why it is necessary to examine its dynamics in detail to determine how an NGO might maintain its position as a consultant to the UN. The four NGOs that will be studied are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Transnational Radical Party and Liberal International. Liberal International and Transnational Radical Party will demonstrate that a combination of three variables is sufficient for an NGO to have its status revoked by the Committee. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will be used to show that without this combination of variables an NGO can carry out its work with little threat of loss of status. It is not the aim of this paper to determine every possible scenario for status loss. There are many instances in which an NGO has lost status, some of them resulting from the NGO violating the terms of its status. In such instances, the Committee is well within its rights to terminate a formal relationship with the NGO at fault. That is why the criteria for termination are outlined by UN doctrine. This paper seeks only to show that there are cases of the UN wrongfully terminating an NGO. There is a flaw in the UN mechanism that must be examined if it is to be corrected so that NGOs can efficiently work within the UN system. UN Secretary

9 3 General Kofi Annan emphasized that a better working relationship was the goal of the UN when he said to NGO heads at a conference of the UN s Department of Public Information We shall continue trying to improve your access. We shall sometimes fall short of your expectations because ultimately, decisions about your level of participation will be up to member states. He praised NGOs as our best defense against complacency, our bravest campaigners for honesty and our boldest crusaders for change (Agence France Presse 2000). This paper seeks to examine a problem in the working relationship between the UN and NGOs so that a solution might be found. If such inefficiency can be eliminated, both the UN and NGOs will be one step closer to realizing a harmonious international working order. Research Question Why are some NGOs able to obtain and maintain UN consultative status despite tensions with member states, while others are not? Relevant Literature The current literature on the topic of NGO and UN interrelations mainly focuses on three themes. The first considers the consequences of expanding the role of NGOs in international organizations. These works tend to use the UN in a larger context, choosing to focus the topic of discussion on the ever-increasing numbers, size and influence of NGOs in international relations. They come from a liberal perspective, assuming that NGOs are particularly meaningful and useful international actors that promote cooperation and greater global interdependence. These types of studies take into account the ways that NGOs are now affecting global politics. One example of this type of work would be Peter Willets book The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System which examines the growing influence of NGOs. Such works are relevant in noting the growing international reputation and

10 4 public awareness for these groups, which will be brought up again later in this paper as one of the main factors that protect NGOs from negative backlash. These works also sometimes focus on the legality of NGO work since they cannot be treated as individual actors would. There is some question as to which international laws apply to NGOs, how they are to be dealt with and on what legal basis. This also is relevant to this work since the manner for revoking an NGOs status is unclear legally. The process for dealing with NGOs in the UN is still new and developing. The most detailed written resolution for dealing with NGOs in the UN was created in 1996 and since that time there have been many questions as to how to put those ideas into practice. The conflicting opinions of member states have made it difficult for NGOs to adapt to and keep up with changing regulations. It has also meant that in some cases NGOs are unable to fight challenges brought against them because there is no legal ground for them to stand on. However, these works do not fully explain the specific underlying causes for NGO status loss, instead focusing on the overall picture of NGO involvement on a large scale. The second broad type of work on the subject of consultative status focuses on the UN itself. This genre of research is centered on the inner workings of the UN. It seeks to depict the processes and procedures implemented at the UN as well as to identify the major actors. These works are mainly explanatory in function. They describe the UN as a whole, mentioning the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs briefly. Such works describe how to relationship with the UN works ideally, generally ignoring or failing to fully explain the challenges of implementation. Courtney Smith s book Politics and Process at the United Nations: The Global Dance is one such work. It describes the benefits that NGOs receive from working with intergovernmental organizations. She summarizes the benefits of an NGO relationship with the UN as being in three main parts:

11 5 (1) The political processes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can provide the international community with commonly accepted standards of behavior, which NGOs can then use as benchmarks to monitor state behavior; (2) IGOs can offer NGOs a forum to expose violations and confront recalcitrant parties; and (3) IGOs are multilateral meeting spots, allowing NGOs opportunities to interact with many states and other NGOs in one setting (Smith 110). The IGOs such as the UN benefit as well because NGOs can improve efficiency, provide information and resources, and encourage public support for UN programs by improving the public image (Smith 111). While this type of information is useful to the study of NGOs in relation to the UN because it illuminates the processes they are involved in, it is lacking in analysis of the NGOs themselves. The work that focuses most closely on NGO/ UN relations and the inherent problems is Jurij Daniel Aston s article entitled The United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations: Guarding the Entrance to a Politically Divided House. This work outlines the major issues NGOs face in the Committee. It notes the dangers of the status, saying It cannot be questioned that any NGO enjoying consultative status must abide by the rules of the game. However, the misbehaviour of an organization brought to the attention of the Committee is often merely a pretext for muzzling critical voices in the UN forum. In reality, it is on the grounds of having criticized the human rights record of a member state of the Committee that withdrawal or suspension of the consultative status of an organization is requested (956). He critiques the flaws of the system, but he does not specify if or why one NGO is more vulnerable to status loss than another. The third type of relevant literature focuses on what the growing impact of NGOs means for NGOs. These works tend to focus on the role of NGOs in international society, usually describing liberal ideas of improved cooperation and communication. They examine the relationships between NGOs oftentimes. When it comes to the UN, the main idea expressed is

12 6 that as more NGOs gain access to the UN, fewer NGOs are actually taken seriously. Since it is easier to gain accreditation, the accreditation begins to lose its meaning. NGOs also have to compete amongst each other for the attention of the member states to get their issues brought to the forefront. There is also the issue of credibility when so many groups are allowed access. Some may not be as accurate in reporting as others, which leads governments to judge NGOs as a whole as unreliable. The effects of NGOs on each other are explored in current literature, but the effects of the power of UN member states over NGOs is overlooked. While Kirsten Martens study NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation falls into the third category, it is unique in that it connects the overall NGO trends to consultative status. Very little research has been done on which NGOs are able to obtain and maintain consultative status with the UN. Hers is perhaps the most extensive study in this area. She focuses on how the structure of an NGO affects how great or how little value the NGO places on its status. She states that the danger of losing the status depends on the function of the respective NGO (153). Advocacy NGOs will give the status more value than other NGOs because it is more necessary for them to have direct access to representatives for lobbying (153). Martens states For them therefore, consultative status also contains a negative fear of a possible loss. Advocacy NGOs must be careful not to provoke governments, giving them reason to withdraw status (153). This study identifies some of the major factors within an NGO that affect how that NGO functions in relation to the UN. Some of those factors will also be explored in this paper. However, whereas Martens study focuses on how these factors affect internal NGO dynamics, this paper will explore how these factors affect an organization s ability to withstand conflict with the UN, specifically whether that organization is able to maintain its consultative status when a member state is offended by its actions. This

13 7 paper will investigate the power that member states exercise over human rights NGOs in particular, as human rights tend to be very incendiary issues that cause reactions from the member states in question. Human rights are a major source of political tension in the UN system that give states motive to revoke an NGOs status. Whether they are able to revoke the status once motive has been determined depends on three variables which are outlined in detail in the case studies. To begin, it is necessary to give the reader some background information on the nature of the consultative status itself. Background of Consultative Status There is a long history of UN ties to NGOs. The relationship between the two is almost as old as the UN itself. The UN was officially created in During this time, the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom were seeking outside help regarding the issue of workers unions and the United States in particular was seeking to avoid a rejection of the UN body by the American public in the same manner as the League of Nations (Smith 114). NGO involvement solved both of these issues by providing a third party to help with the union negotiations and by improving the UN s reputation as a body that was open to public opinion. This led to the creation of Article 71 of Chapter X of the UN Charter during the conference in San Francisco that year. Article 71 is the basis of the consultative status. The full text simply states: The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. As this was insufficient to determine how the status would work practically, the idea was further developed by the Economic and Social Council (referenced further as either ECOSOC or

14 8 the Council) at the request of the General Assembly in 1946 (Smith 120). ECOSOC formed the Committee on Arrangements for Consultation with NGOs which issued the criteria determining NGO eligibility for consultative status. The criteria outlined were that the NGOs must be focused on issues that fall under ECOSOC s domain, must be in line with UN values and goals according to the UN Charter and that its authorized representatives should speak for a substantial proportion of the people in its field (Willets 32). The NGOs that may join may be described as international, regional, sub regional and national non-governmental, non-profit public or voluntary organizations (Civil Society Network). To be eligible an NGO must meet the following requirements: To be eligible for consultative status, an NGO must have been in existence (officially recognized by a government) for at least two years, must have an established headquarters, a democratically adopted constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate mechanisms of accountability and democratic and transparent decision-making processes. The basic resources of the organization must be derived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members (Civil Society Network). It would take the ECOSOC another four years to determine how the status would be implemented and how it would function in practice. This came in the form of Resolution 288B(X) in 1950 which divided NGOs into three groups (Stephenson 276). The first group would be made up of those NGOs with widespread interests in many Council activities. The second group would consist of NGOs with special competence in a limited number of policy areas of the Council. The final group was made up of NGOs whose main functions were to spread information about the UN to the public. In a later revision, the third group was transferred to the Department of Public Information and was replaced by a category of NGOs that were

15 9 highly specialized and to be consulted only on an ad hoc basis (Willets 32). The solidification of these categories came in 1996 with Resolution 1996/31 which outlines the eligibility requirements for consultative status, rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status, procedures for the withdrawal or suspension of consultative status, the role and functions of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, and the responsibilities of the UN Secretariat in supporting the consultative relationship (Civil Society Network). Resolution 1996/31 dubbed the first category as General Consultative Status, the second category as Special Consultative Status and the final category as simply the Roster. The general status is the one that applies to large international NGOS with widespread interests, such as groups like Liberal International. Liberal International and Transnational Radical Party both had general status because they had interests in human rights as well as broader political interests, a fact that ultimately worked to their disadvantage in the UN system. The special status applies to NGOs that are smaller and more specific in their goals. These include those human rights organizations that focus solely on human rights issues, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The roster status is associated with small NGOs that have a more technical focus, such as the American Fisheries Society. Of the 23,000 NGOs working with the UN, 3,743 have consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (Civil Society Network). Of those, 146 have general Status, 2,610 have special status and 987 are on the roster (UN icso). The status is granted based on the recommendation of 19 member states which form the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs. The Committee on NGOs does not decide whether the status will be granted, but it makes recommendations to the 54-member state Council, which has the final say. In the vast majority of cases, ECOSOC follows the recommendations of the Committee (Civil Society Network). This is an important distinction. Because the Committee is smaller, it is more vulnerable to the

16 10 influence of an offended state. Though it does not have the final say, it is responsible for investigating a claim, debating whether the actions of an NGO are grounds for dismissal and making a recommendation to the Council on status termination. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the Council follows this recommendation in the vast majority of cases, which means that the recommendation of the Committee carries serious weight in the UN. (The case study of Transnational Radical Party examined later is the exception to the rule. The case of TNR is utilized for the light it sheds on the UN relationship in other ways. Its inclusion should not lead the reader to the misguided conclusion that NGOs facing prosecution from the Committee can generally rely on the Council to correct any wrongful action, as generally the Council acts in accordance with the Committee recommendation.) The Committee is based on geographical representation and includes 5 African states, 4 Asian states, 2 Eastern European states, 4 Latin American and Caribbean states and 4 Western European states. The 19 member states for are Belgium, Bulgaria (Chair), Burundi, China, Cuba, India, Israel (Vice-Chair and Rapporteur), Kyrgyzstan (Vice-Chair), Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Russian Federation, Senegal (Vice-Chair), Sudan, Turkey, United States of America, and Venezuela (Civil Society Network). However, while not every country is on the committee, every member state has the right to be present at meetings as an observer state and to lodge complaints against particular NGOs in that capacity. Though the makeup of the committee is important in terms of voting rights, it must be noted that any country can bring a complaint against an NGO even when they are not on the committee. The three forms of consultative status each come with different levels of access. The general category NGOs have the most access. They receive copies of the Council agenda, attend Council meetings, issue written statements of no more than 2,000 words and make oral addresses

17 11 to the Council with prior approval. They can also propose items for the agenda of the Council through the NGO Committee. The same privileges are retained for all Council commission and subsidiary body proceedings. The special category NGOs have similar rights and privileges of the general category, except in regards to the agenda-setting privilege. Interestingly, though this is one of the main differences between special and general level NGOs, the right to propose items for the agenda is hardly ever exercised by the NGOs in general consultative status. The special category NGOs also have greater restrictions on their addresses to the Council and their written statements to the Council are limited to 500 words. The roster category NGOs are even more limited in that they can attend meetings only related to their field of interest and may only send out written statements when invited to do so, in accordance with the 500 word limit. Roster NGOs may not address the Council, but they may address subsidiary bodies at the request of that body (Ripinsky 24-27). The differences between general and special category NGOs are more clear on paper than in practice. Though general category NGOs may appear to have more power, this is not the case. For example, in the case studies it is clear that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (both with special status) are more greatly valued by the UN for their contributions than either Transnational Radical Party or Liberal International (both with general status). The status level has some minor implications for the method by which the NGO can impact the UN, but the slight limitations of special status do not seem to affect how much impact an NGO can have on proceedings in reality. The status of NGOs is more relevant because of its basis in the structure of the NGO itself. General level NGOs are those with wider interests. TNR and LI have broader political interests as well as human rights interests. This leaves them vulnerable to having their status revoked based on the excuse of their political goals when they bring up human rights

18 12 issues. Since AI and HRW do not have these political connections (and as such are limited in their scope to the point of being designated special status groups) they cannot be attacked on any basis except their human rights activities. The broader scope of TNR and LI afford states a larger target essentially, to bring down the NGO as a whole to remove its function as a human rights monitor by issuing a complaint centered on its political interests. There are three circumstances under which an NGO s status can be suspended or withdrawn. They are (1) if the NGO or any of its members misuse the status by committing a pattern of acts that go against UN objectives and values, particularly if they act aggressively towards Member States; (2) if the NGO accepts funding from criminal sources; and (3) if the NGO has not made any meaningful contribution to the UN in the past three years (UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1996/31). Though Resolution 1996/31 specifies that there must be a pattern developing to constitute suspension, in practice, consultative statuses have been revoked after only one offense (Aston 953). In the cases that this work will explore, the NGOs were criticized for one particular inciting incident. A pattern was not established in the arguments of the member states, which shows a disregard for the outlined criteria governing UN/NGO relations. To address these issues, the Cardoso Report was initiated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to investigate ways to facilitate NGO participation at the UN. A Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations/ Civil Society Relations sought to reform the system in place for working with NGOs (M2 Presswire June 2004). One section of the report focused on the issue of member states pursuing their own interests when it came to NGO accreditation. The recommendation of the panel was to streamline the process and shift the deliberations to Secretariat staff to increase transparency. The final say would remain with member states in the General Assembly.

19 13 Concerns remained that countries would be able to exercise their authority to pursue their own agendas in the same manner in the General Assembly as in ECOSOC. The panel recognized these concerns but stated that transparency and legitimacy of decisions could be increased by incorporating more actors in the process (M2 Presswire June 2004). This may be one solution which will be explored in greater detail later. Theory There is seemingly an inconsistency in which NGOs are able to pursue an incendiary agenda without incurring a backlash from a country that results in a loss of consultative status. Many NGOs bring issues against countries who could take actions to have the status of those NGOs revoked, yet not every case ends in a loss of status or even a movement for suspension. The theory to be tested in this work is that the NGOs with a stronger international reputation will be less likely to lose their status. This is because of the high level of public awareness of these groups. Revoking the status of such an eminent organization would simply draw more attention to the issue that the NGO had brought up. In effect, revoking the organization s status would put a greater spotlight on the transgressions of the country pursuing the revocation. Other organizations do not command the same levels of publicity. Revoking their status would not cause a stir and would go largely unnoticed by the general public. For the purposes of this paper, the cases of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will be used as examples of two large, well-established NGOs that are able to pursue an incendiary agenda without fear of losing their status. The cases of Transnational Radical Party and Liberal International will be used to demonstrate that less-established NGOs face the threat of a loss of status if they cross a member state. The independent variable in this research is the reputation of the organization. The dependent variable is whether the status of the organization was revoked. The theory is that the

20 14 weak reputation of an organization is a contributing condition, but not a sufficient condition for status revocation. A weak reputation, when combined with reporting incendiary issues will result in status revocation. The manner in which an issue is pursued is important as well. It seems that reporting an issue is not enough to warrant a reaction from a member state. If a weak NGO uses its status to allow someone from a disputed territory to address the UN, then its status will be revoked. If a human rights NGO also has a political affiliation it will be in even greater danger because the member state can blame its actions as being politically motivated. This combination of factors is sufficient for a loss of status. This is the case even if none of the three outlined causes for suspension are fulfilled, meaning there has been no pattern of acts that go against UN objectives, no questionable funding and no lack of meaningful contribution. The NGO will be suspended simply because it has offended a member state and has combined the three variables that give the member state opportunity to react. Hypothesis The hypothesis is that the stronger the reputation an NGO has, the less likely it will be to lose its status when it reports on issues that damage a country s reputation. The weaker an NGO s reputation is, the more likely it will be to lose its status when reporting on these issues. The NGO will be in greater danger if it has political affiliations and reports on issues by giving credibility and access to a speaker from a disputed territory.

21 15 Case Selection Group Founding Date Status Date Recommended for Status Revoked suspension Amnesty (Special) No No International Human Rights (Special) No No Watch Liberal International (General) Yes Yes: Suspended for 1 year Transnational (General) Yes No Radical Party Amnesty International Amnesty International is the largest human rights NGO in the world. Amnesty International has had special consultative status since 1964 and has been the major source of human rights lobbying and information to the UN. This organization has submitted more reports by number than any other NGO (Korey 260). It has more than 1 million members and supporters in over 140 countries and territories (Welch 90). Claude Welch notes that In terms of budget, staff, global reach, apparent impact, and related criteria AI towers above others (86). AI s main goals are to end extrajudicial imprisonment, execution and disappearances; torture and cruel treatment of prisoners; the confinement of prisoners of conscience; and prolonged and unfair trials (88). AI focuses its work on human rights on particular issues or

22 16 countries (87). Though it often focuses its campaigns directly on particular member states, those states have not acted to revoke its status. This is because to do so would simply draw more attention to the situation. Martens states that As the major non-governmental organization for human rights, AI is simply too credible, too high profile, and has too good a reputation (Interview AI-2) to be expelled from the UN in response to criticism by governments (137). She also states that Although many countries with a record of human rights violations would prefer to see AI s accreditation withdrawn, the NGO is confident that these states do not dare to launch any accusations against it. Due to AI s good overall reputation, an attempt to remove its status at the UN would create media attention which could only be counterproductive for the country aiming to undermine AI s credibility (137). However, since AI was not always the powerhouse that it is today, this was not always the case. Amnesty at one point in time did have to fear the revocation of its status. When it was lesser known it faced the same trials that smaller NGOs face in the UN today. This supports the theory that weaker human rights NGOs are at risk of losing status. When AI was smaller, it too was at risk. One major trial came when it angered Argentina and the USSR in 1978 and was accused of engaging in political attacks against those states (Martens 137). At the time, the NGO was what former AI secretary general Martin Ennals called a small body (86). The nations on the ECOSOC committee called for a long ignored requirement of the consultative agreement that NGOs submit quadrennial reports to account for their actions of the past four years (137). The USSR accused AI and other organizations of political attacks, demanded that the quadrennial reports be investigated to determine the groups legitimacy and stated that the status could be withdrawn if the reports showed that said status had been abused (137). The NGO was forced to comply, and struggled to compile the intricate documentation in time. AI went so far as to send

23 17 its secretary-general to the Council meeting to defend itself (137). Its status was not withdrawn, but since then the agency has adhered strictly to the guidelines of the status, following all procedural requirements. AI has also been careful not to give the member states an excuse to revoke its status. It does not accept any government funding (138). Most significantly, unlike many other NGOs, Amnesty does not lend its name to non-members. According to an interview with an official of AI, the NGO does not provoke the UN by accrediting non-amnesty members to speak on behalf of the NGO at the sessions of the Commission on Human Rights (138). This gives the NGO added protection. Amnesty International is also careful to remain separated from party politics, unlike some other human rights NGOs. AIs reporting, based on careful research and political neutrality became a hallmark of Amnesty s modus operandi (Welch 92). This shows that Amnesty lacks all three variables that are sufficient for status loss. It is reputable, politically neutral and does not accredit non-amnesty members to address the UN. The protection afforded Amnesty International today supports the theory that large, politically neutral NGOs that refrain from accrediting non-member speakers can pursue a charged human rights agenda with virtually no threat to their consultative status. Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch is the second largest human rights NGO in the world after Amnesty International. Their mission statement claims that We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice (Human Rights Watch). With an income in 2010 of roughly $48 million, the group commands international attention and respect (Better Business Bureau 2012). Bertrand G. Ramcharan confirms this in his book by calling both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch long established and professional with solid human

24 18 rights credentials (39). Human Rights Watch is an excellent example of how a solid international reputation can protect human rights NGOs who face opposition in the UN. Human Rights Watch applied for consultative status in 1991, though the group was formed in 1978 (Martens 148). This delay was caused by the group s lack of conviction that the UN had the ability to affect meaningful change (Martens 148). The application was blocked however by a group of states who HRW had criticized in the past. Those states were Cuba, Iraq, Syria, Liberia, Algeria and Sudan (Korey 1978: 352). These countries were embarrassed in such newspapers as the New York Times, which published an article calling them the Gang of Six (Martens 148). Following a restructuring of UN procedure, the admission criteria allowed status to be granted despite some member states votes against a group. This allowed HRW to gain status after reapplying in 1993 (Martens 149). Since gaining consultative status, HRW has been in little danger of losing the status. Though the group continues to report damaging information, the countries on the panel are reluctant to target it. Martens states The media attention attached to the first denial of status to HRW has shown how it can be counter-productive for states to seek the exclusion of well-known organizations. Thus, centralist advocacy NGOs like AI and HRW generally do not have to fear losing their consultative status (153). Despite these similarities, HRW is in some ways dissimilar to AI. Specifically, while Amnesty International has a large base of members who pay dues, HRW has no comparable member support base (Welch 108). This suggests that the international reputation of an NGO cannot be reflected in numbers of members. Rather the factor to be considered has less to do with formal size than with reputation. Size is only important so far as it relates to the attention a group can command. The political neutrality of HRW is not as well defined as with AI. Human Rights Watch focuses on a wider range of human rights than Amnesty International, but does so for fewer

25 19 countries. Because HRW focuses on more political and social rights, such as freedom of expression, it may seem that they violate the basis of the theory in which political groups are at greater risk. However, HRW still fits with this theory because they are not a political party like the other NGOs outlined in this case study. Furthermore, the theory stated in this work posits that a group is at risk when it has a weak reputation and combines that factor with the other contributing factors of accrediting a speaker and having political ties. Human Rights Watch does not combine all three factors, which accounts for its ability to maintain its status. Human Rights Watch has not accredited a non-member speaker, it does it have overt political ties and it has a strong reputation. Thus, though it reports damaging information, it has not been brought to trial by a member state. Transnational Radical Party The Transnational Radical Party is one group that has had its status repeatedly threatened. TRP has focused its efforts on issues like establishing the International Criminal Court, ending the death penalty and promoting the liberal ideals of universal human rights (Transnational Radical Party 2013). The group is a nonviolent Italian political party that was successful in gaining NGO accreditation at the UN. Claudio M. Radaelli and Samuele Dossi describe this peculiar circumstance as follows: This demonstrates the party s flexibility: it is an NGO in the UN context, a movement in other contexts, a member of broader advocacy and discourse coalitions in yet other contexts (75). The NGO is no doubt focused mainly on the issue of human rights however. The analysis by Radaelli and Dossi describe the group as being suicidal because it focuses on winning its policy objectives over winning office (77). The group is much less well-known than either AI or HRW. It does not command the same level of international acclaim or recognition. Radaelli and Dossi state that Membership campaigns have been very

26 20 expensive in terms of human and economic resources and even when the party has increased its membership (in Italy or in countries like those of Central and Eastern Europe during the democratic transitions) it has found it impossible to maintain the increased levels subsequently (78). Although the group has managed to maintain its status, it has done so despite attempts by multiple member states to revoke it. The Committee even voted in favor of recommending to the Council that the status be revoked (Transnational Radical Party). The Council decided not to follow the recommendations, the first time it has ever gone against the Committee s decision (Transnational Radical Party). The group has used this fact as a badge of honor, a way of showing that it is moving in the right direction with its work. This group has been included as a case study though they have managed to maintain their status because their trials have been many and because they lost the battle in the Committee on NGOs, the inner workings of which is the focus of this study. It was recommended that the group be dispelled from consultative status though they had done nothing to violate the terms of their formal relationship with the UN. TRP exemplifies the three factors that when combined are sufficient for loss of status: a weak reputation, accrediting a non-member speaker and having political ties. Furthermore, TRP was chosen as a case study because it demonstrates that the recommendation of the Cardoso Report to include more actors in the NGO process may be wise. In the Committee the motion was passed to muffle the group, but when it was brought to the larger Council this recommendation did not stand. The fact that the Council protected the NGO shows that including more actors may increase legitimacy and transparency. TRP used its role in the UN to give speakers from Chechnya and Degar access to an audience. This incited a response from Russia and Vietnam respectively. It is not merely the act

27 21 of reporting on human rights violations but also bringing up disputed territory that triggers a response from member states. It seems that if a NGO accredits those who have advocated for the independence of a claimed territory, the relevant member state will feel threatened and react to silence the disputers. This allows the member state seeking to discredit the NGO to gain support from other nations with equally disputed territories and allows them to do so under the banner of protecting their sovereignty. If a country can blame the reporting as being politically motivated to destabilize the government, their opposition to an NGO will be taken more seriously. In this way, the Transnational Radical Party faced two major threats to its status. The first was in an encounter with Russia over the area of Chechnya, which had gained its independence after a peace treaty in 1997 only to lose it two years later when fighting resumed and Russia again took control of the territory. The area has historically been a center of human rights abuses. Amnesty International s recent report on Russia stated that while the stifling of dissent is widespread, it is arguably most pronounced in the North Caucuses region, home to violent insurrections against Russian rule for centuries. (Amnesty International 2013). In Chechnya, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly were limited and law enforcement officials violated human rights through enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, torture and other ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions (Amnesty International 2013). In 2000, TRP allowed Ahkiad Idigov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chechen government to speak to the Commission on Human Rights (UN News 2000). The Russian delegation called for the suspension of the group s status immediately following this. They stated that the NGO was engaged in an aggressive campaign to oppose the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation (UN News 2000). The United States and other member states defended the organization, trying to minimize the damage by saying the member of the Chechen Parliament

28 22 had misrepresented himself. They stated, Through the intervention of a Russian Federation point of order, Mr. Idigov corrected himself and advised that he was speaking on behalf of TRP. He then delivered a statement which was critical of actions of the Russian Federation in Chechnya. He also called for negotiations to achieve a peaceful settlement. Beyond the error of misrepresentation, it is the view of my delegation that TRP has committed no act to warrant any sanction by this Committee (UN News 2000). The Committee recommended to the Council that the group be suspended for the maximum penalty of three years (UN News 2000). Though at the time the member states on the Committee realized an error was being made, an attempt to reconsider the recommendation was voted down with 12 against (Algeria, Bolivia, China, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Lebanon, Russian Federation, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey), 5 in favor (Chile, France, Germany, Romania, United States) and 2 abstentions (Pakistan and Senegal) (UN News 2000). The voting record indicates that there is an alliance of countries with poor human rights records voting against NGOs. This is a major reason why NGOs are vulnerable even if the accusations against them are weak. Aston explains it as follows: If, as happened in the 2000 session, four complaints are put forward by four different member states of the committee, each of the complaining states can be sure of the support of the other three regardless of the merits of its complaint As a consequence, they support the complaint on the table in order to receive support of their own complaints in the future. This alliance of states that are themselves targeted by Human Rights NGOs forms the majority of the Committee (955). Cuba and China in particular frequently vote against human rights NGOs. The strength of the argument is therefore not a factor that contributes to status loss. The claim need not have any foundation in fact. It is solely the weakness of an organization combined with a speaker and a political persuasion that matters. Ultimately, the pressure from Western democratic countries in

29 23 the Council led to the dismissal of the Russian motion, marking the first time the Council had ever gone against the Committee (Transnational Radical Party). However, the Transnational Radical Party s trials were not over. In 2002, the group allowed Kok Ksor to speak on the issue of the Degar people in Vietnam (M2 Presswire 2003). The Degar people, also known as Montagnards, are the native population of the Central Highlands of Vietnam who have suffered gross violations by the Hanoi regime. Tensions had been rising in the region as ethnic Vietnamese continued to flow into areas previously occupied only by the Montagnards, resulting in disputes over land (Human Rights Watch 2002). The Vietnamese government has called the ethnic and religious minority Montagnards a threat to national unity (Human Rights Watch 2002). Human Rights Watch published a report in 2002 naming the primary violations of arbitrary arrest, detention and interrogation, excessive use of force, lack of freedom of religion, torture, lack of freedom of assembly and restrictions on travel (Human Rights Watch 2002). Kok Ksor is the president of Montagnard Foundation Inc. aimed at peacefully ending the violence against Montagnards. His speech was interrupted by the Vietnamese delegation which accused the man of being a terrorist and member of the CIA (M2 Presswire 2003). The Vietnamese government called for the dismissal of the Transnational Radical Party for associating with Montagnard Foundation Inc., which it had labeled as terrorist; a label that was not supported by either the UN or the EU (M2 Presswire 2003). The claim from the Vietnamese delegate was that this threatened the sovereignty and national integrity of his country (M2 Presswire 2003). By using this defense, he was able to gather support from such countries as China, Cuba and Russia. The representatives from Cuba, Sudan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Russian Federation and Zimbabwe argued that a member state s sovereignty and territorial integrity was threatened and used these arguments as the basis for supporting the

30 24 proposal (M2 Presswire 2003). Vietnam called for the maximum three year suspension period. The German and French delegations pointed out that the nature of the Montagnard Foundation was not definitively a terrorist one and it was necessary to investigate further before taking action (M2 Presswire 2003). Other members of the Committee argued that no claim had been made that violated the terms of the consultative status agreement and as such, the status could not be revoked. This was the position of Germany, the United States, Chile, Cameroon, and Peru (M2 Presswire 2003). Though the vote was close, with nine in favor (Sudan, Zimbabwe, China, Cote d Ivoire, Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russian Federation), eight against (Turkey, United States, Cameroon, Chile, France, Germany, Peru and Romania), and two abstentions (Senegal and Colombia), the motion passed and the Committee recommended the status be revoked (M2 Presswire 2003). Germany explained their vote afterwards, stating that the Committee had no place to label individuals as terrorists, especially when the UN and the EU had not (M2 Presswire 2003). The observer state Italy noted that it felt that the Committee had lost a great deal of credibility by taking such action (M2 Presswire 2003). Two years later, the motion came to a vote in the Council. It was rejected by a vote of 29 against suspension, 22 in favor, 11 abstentions and 1 absent (UN DPI). It is important to note that by this time the events had picked up traction, with both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issuing statements encouraging the Council to vote against sanctions on TRP (UN DPI). There was also an online petition signed by 4000 people encouraging the Council to dismiss the charges (UN DPI). This indicates that though the organization did not have enough support to prevent a case being brought against it in the first place, it was able to pick up support with the aid of time and larger NGO backing. This support arguably played a major role in the Council s ultimate rejection of the suit.