Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves

Transcription

1 Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves Kimmo Grönlund, Åbo Akademi University, Kaisa Herne, University of Tampere, Maija Setälä, University of Turku, Paper prepared for the 7 th ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, France Section 19 Four Decades of Democratic Innovation Research: Revisiting Theories, Concepts and Methods, Panel 366 The Quality of Deliberation Abstract When like-minded people discuss with each other, i.e. engage in enclave deliberation, their opinions tend to become more extreme. This is called group polarization. A population based experiment with a pre-test post-test design was conducted to gauge whether the norms and procedures of deliberative discussion interfere with the mechanisms of group polarization. Based on a survey, people with permissive or restrictive attitudes toward immigration were identified, invited to the experiment, and randomly assigned to like-minded and mixed small groups. Each like-minded group consisted of only permissive or restrictive participants, whereas the mixed groups gathered both permissive and restrictive participants. The likeminded treatment represented enclave deliberation, and the mixed treatment a standard deliberative mini-public design. Our results suggest that deliberative norms curb group polarization. More precisely, people with anti-immigrant attitudes became more tolerant even when they deliberated in like-minded groups. Moreover, similar learning curves were observed in both treatments. 1

2 Introduction Theories of deliberative democracy provide normative criteria for the evaluation of processes of political discussion (Delli Carpini & al. 2004; Dryzek 2000). The epistemic and normative quality of public decisions can be expected to depend on the quality of democratic deliberation which precedes decision-making. Deliberation can be defined as free and equal communication based on the merits of arguments, such as the sophistication of justifications and the generalizability of moral principles (e.g. Steenbergen et al 2004). Recently, broader definitions of deliberation have been put forward. These definitions include other forms of communication such as rhetoric and narratives along with rational argumentation (see e.g. Mansbridge & al 2010). Despite these developments, the idea of public reasoning among free and equal individuals remains in the core of the concept of deliberation. Moreover, deliberative democrats agree that deliberation involves both intersubjective processes of exchanging of arguments and internal processes of reflection based on these arguments (Goodin 2001). One of the key features of deliberation is the inclusion of different viewpoints in the process of exchanging arguments. Indeed, the presence of conflicting viewpoints is often regarded as a necessary condition for deliberation. For example, Thompson (2008, 502) argues as follows: If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation. However, the term enclave deliberation has been increasingly used to refer to discussion among like-minded people. Cass Sunstein (2002; 2007; 2009) has emphasized the problems and risks related to enclave deliberation, most importantly group polarization. Other scholars (e.g. Karpowitz & al. 2009; see also Sunstein 2007, 76-77) have pointed out the importance of enclave deliberation for political articulation and mobilization, especially for those in disadvantaged positions. Indeed, Mansbridge (1994, 63), who was probably the first to use the term enclave deliberation, called for enclaves of protected discourse and action as an element of a just society. In this paper, we study how the outcomes of deliberation vary depending on whether the deliberative discussion takes place among like-minded people or among people who disagree on a political issue. Our analysis is based on an experiment where citizens drawn from a random sample deliberated on immigration. The experiment was held in Finland in the spring of We analyze the development of participants opinions and knowledge during the experiment in order to test hypotheses on group polarization. The paper is organized in the following manner. First, we discuss the idea and mechanisms of enclave deliberation and 2

3 formulate hypotheses based on this discussion. Second, we describe the experimental procedure and analyze the data gathered in the surveys during the experiment. Finally, conclusions are provided. Theory and hypotheses Cass Sunstein (2002, 2007) has raised the question of the future of democracy if people only listen and speak to the like-minded. He addresses the problems of group thinking which may arise when like-minded people discuss among themselves. Sunstein analyzes the negative outcomes of discussions among the like-minded, namely group polarization and the amplification of cognitive errors. Group polarization occurs when deliberation in a group of like-minded reinforces those attitudes and opinions which prevail in the group at the outset. Sunstein (2009, 3) defines polarization as follows: [...] members of a deliberating group usually end up at a more extreme position in the same general direction as their inclinations before deliberation began. Sunstein (2007, 80-95, ) points out that group thinking does not only lead to the polarization of attitudes but it may also affect people s factual beliefs. According to Sunstein, enclave deliberation may lead to the amplification of cognitive errors which means corroboration of biased or erroneous epistemic beliefs. He also points out that large-scale misconceptions, or informational cascades may come up in enclave deliberation because people just follow the cues provided by others in the absence of contrary evidence. There are different mechanisms which contribute to polarization when opinions in a group are biased at the outset. Overall, two different types of mechanisms behind group polarization have been identified; namely social comparison and persuasive arguments. (Farrar & al 2009, 616; Isenberg 1986; Sunstein 2002, ). Social comparison refers to various ways in which individuals act in order to win social acceptance from other members of the group. In order to be accepted, individuals need to process information of how other people present themselves and adjust their own behavior accordingly (Isenberg 1986, 1142). Individuals may act in different ways in order to be perceived favorable by other group members. First, they may try to adjust their opinions according to the view which seems to dominate in the group. 1 Social psychological experiments have also demonstrated that group pressures work in the way that people tend to conform to the views of the majority (Asch 1948). Second, social comparison may also make people to emphasize their difference from others to the valued 1 The so-called spiral of silence means that, in fear of social isolation, people who think that their political views are unpopular remain silent in the group (Noelle-Neumann 1984). 3

4 direction (Isenberg 1986, 1142). In other words, individuals may take positions which are more extreme in comparison to views dominating the group at the outset. The other mechanism behind group polarization, persuasive arguments, is simply based on the idea that individuals are convinced by the contents of arguments put forward in the group. Consequently, if arguments heard in a group are biased in one direction, there is likely to be a further shift to this direction. Group polarization is likely to be reinforced by biases in information processing. Confirmation bias is a well-established phenomenon which means that people are inclined to seek information confirming their prior beliefs and to disregard information which is against them (Mercier & Landemore 2012, 251). More generally, motivated reasoning refers to a variety of cognitive and affective mechanisms which lead individuals to arrive at conclusions they want to arrive at (Kunda 1990). In a group of likeminded people, individual biases in information processing and reasoning are not checked by arguments put forward by individuals supporting conflicting views. Opinions are likely to polarize because individuals only hear arguments which support their own prior position in fact, they may even hear new arguments in support of it. The negative consequences of enclave deliberation have been confirmed by social psychological studies which do not, however, evoke the circumstances of deliberation. Sunstein himself (2007, 60-62) provides some experimental evidence on group polarization. He puts forward a summary of social psychological studies showing that groups tend to move towards the direction of the position which dominates the group initially (Sunstein 2009, ). The discussion topics of the described experiments range from jury decisions to risk taking and militarism and pacifism. In a recent study on political discussion, Jones (2013) founds evidence on polarization of opinions, especially among the Republicans, in a partisan workplace environment. 2 Some studies on group polarization have not even involved proper discussion. For example, Lee (2007) shows that group polarization is correlated to group identification in a study with computer-mediated communication not involving actual discussion between the group members. Sunstein s account for group polarization emphasizes the original dispositions of those who discuss and the biases in the argument pool which follow from it. However, as pointed out above, the studies he discusses do not represent experiments on deliberative talk. Experimental evidence on so-called deliberative mini-publics (Goodin & Dryzek 2006) provides an entirely different picture: groups de-polarize rather than polarize (e.g. Luskin & 2 Mutz and Mondak (2006), on the other hand, use survey evidence to demonstrate that commonly the workplace provides an environment for cross-cutting political discourse. 4

5 al. 2002; Setälä et al. 2010). The evidence from deliberative mini-publics also suggests that people learn during the deliberative discussion and that their misperceptions are corrected (e.g. Grönlund et al. 2010). Moreover, people learn about facts supporting views which they disagreed with (Andersen & Hansen 2007). These results may be due to the fact that the inclusion of different viewpoints is ensured in deliberative mini-publics which therefore do not represent deliberation only among the like-minded. This explanation suggests that group composition is a crucial determinant of the outcome of deliberation (Mendelberg & Karpowitz 2007). However, Farrar et al (2009), who focus on group composition effects in deliberative polls, observe contrary evidence. More precisely, they study the influence of the distribution of opinions in the group, but do not find much evidence of its effect on individual post deliberation opinions. In other words, participants of deliberative polls do not seem to conform to the mean opinion of their small group contrasting the earlier findings on group influence in psychological studies. Sunstein (2009, 48) argues as follows: "When groups contain equally opposed subgroups, do not hold rigidly to their positions, and listen to one another, members will shift toward the middle; they will depolarize. The effect of mixing will be to produce moderation". Mercier and Landemore (2012, 253) argue that in genuine deliberation, the biases present in individual reasoning are checked by biases in arguments of individuals representing different viewpoints. Moreover, without a clearly dominant view in the group, people are likely to accommodate their arguments in ways which could appeal to people representing conflicting viewpoints. Indeed, Mercier and Landemore argue that collective processes of deliberation are likely to be the most effective remedies for biases in information processing and reasoning. In this article, we analyze the impact of group composition on the outcomes of deliberation. More specifically, we compare deliberation in like-minded groups and in groups where the participants opinions are divided. The analysis is based on an experiment where citizens were invited to deliberate on immigration policy. Based on earlier theoretical and empirical findings, we test the following hypotheses which concern the development of opinions at the aggregate level. At the same time, we expect similar developments at the individual level. H i Deliberation in like-minded groups leads to a polarization of opinions. H ii Deliberation in mixed groups de-polarizes opinions. H iii Deliberation in like-minded groups amplifies cognitive errors. 5

6 H iv Deliberation in mixed groups corrects cognitive errors. While group composition was subject to manipulation in the experiment, otherwise we applied the standard procedures of deliberative mini-publics. Deliberative mini-publics involve certain procedural features, such as information shared by all participants and the use of moderators that can encourage deliberation, understood as a process where people are exposed to different arguments and reflect on their own position in relation to them. Our aim is thus to look at the effects of group composition while holding the deliberative context constant. In this experiment, participants were provided with unbiased information on the issue and they discussed the issue in moderated small groups. Our study therefore follows the recommendation made by Mutz (2006, 61) as we aim to disentangle the effects of group composition from the other aspects of the deliberative package. We are interested in finding out whether the procedures of a deliberative mini-public can restrain the negative consequences of enclave deliberation. Although we assume that the dynamics and outcomes of deliberation differ depending on the group composition, it should also be acknowledged that the set-up of deliberative mini-publics may foster deliberative forms of communication even in groups of like-minded people. For example, Farrar & al (2009) found little impact of the group composition on deliberative outcomes in their randomized experiments. The authors point out several factors which can neutralize group composition effects, including the types of topics discussed and the presence of varying viewpoints. In deliberative mini-publics, information provided to participants can be expected to widen the set of arguments put forward in discussions. It may also create a common pool of arguments which may lessen polarization (see e.g. Isenberg 1986, 1148). Moreover, the use of moderators and the application of specific rules for discussion are likely to enhance a free and equal exchange of viewpoints as well as an evaluation of arguments based on their merits. As pointed out by Kunda (1990), individuals tendency towards motivated reasoning is constrained by their ability and willingness to construct reasonable justifications for their conclusions. The set-up of a deliberative mini-public which emphasizes processes of reasonable justification as the name of the game can be expected to encourage reasoning and arguing about pros and cons concerning the issue. This type of reasoning can be enhanced further if participants adopt argumentative strategies which help to compensate the biases in the argument pool, for example, by acting as devils advocates. Experimental procedure 6

7 The topic of the deliberation experiment was immigration policy, a contested and debated issue in Finland. The main purpose of the experiment was to compare deliberation in two types of small groups: 1) groups consisting of like-minded people, and 2) groups consisting of people who have different opinions relating to immigration. The participants of the experiment were randomly assigned to like-minded groups, mixed groups, and a control group. Subjects in the first two took part in the deliberation event, whereas the control group only filled in three mail-in surveys. The main comparisons are made between like-minded and mixed groups, but comparisons between the experimental group and the control group are also made. Participants opinions were measured before and after deliberation. This means that we are looking at differences both between subjects (the comparison of like-minded and mixed groups) and within subjects (pre-test and post-test measures of opinions). The experiment was not completely randomized because we stratified people into two enclaves based on their initial opinions regarding immigration. Respondents with negative attitudes to immigration formed a con enclave, whereas respondents with a positive view on immigration formed a pro enclave. A short survey (T1) was first mailed out to a simple random sample of 12,000 adults in the Turku/Åbo region. Of the addressed sample, 39 percent (n = 4,681) responded to the survey. T1 consisted of 14 questions whose aim was to measure the respondents attitudes about immigration. The questions were first pilot tested with students at two universities in order to measure their appropriateness for the purpose of the experiment. All survey items worked well both in the pilots and in the actual survey conducted among the random sample (T1). In the surveyed sample, all 14 items loaded on one single factor and Cronbach s Alpha of the sum variable reached Therefore, we were able to construct a sum variable of the 14 items. Each item was first recoded into a scale from 0 to 1 so that 1 indicates the most immigration friendly attitude. The questions are listed in Appendix A. Figure 1 shows the initial dispersion of attitudes among those respondents (n=3,232) who allowed further contact from the research group. Figure 1 about here The histogram shows that the initial opinions almost followed the normal distribution. Thus, we felt confident to use the sum variable as a ground for creating the con and pro enclaves. Since the design of the experiment required people with clear views on the 7

8 immigration issue, we excluded moderates, i.e. respondents whose opinions on immigration were close to the middle on the 14 item scale (n= 631) 3. The second survey (T2) with 37 items and an invitation to take part in a deliberation (and a separate debriefing) event was sent to 2,601 people who qualified as members of either the con or the pro enclave. At this point, it was clearly stated that the deliberation event was an integrated part of the research project and that a response to the survey meant a preliminary agreement to take part in it. Further, it was clarified that only a part of those who volunteered could be included in the deliberation event and that the choice would be made by lot. Each participant who completed all stages of the project was compensated. A gift certificate worth 90 euros was given to each participant of the deliberation and debriefing events and fifteen euros to those whose task was only to fill in surveys (i.e. the control group). Eventually, 805 people volunteered, and 366 were invited to take part in the deliberation event. The final target sample was 256 participants, which would have allowed for 32 small groups of eight participants (eight pro like-minded, eight con like-minded and sixteen mixed groups). Stratified sampling was used in order to guarantee representation in terms of the pro and con enclaves as well as age and gender. Random sampling was used within strata. Unfortunately, the target of 256 deliberators was not achieved and only 207 people showed up. 4 Especially people in the con enclave tended to abstain at this final stage, even though there were no indications of this kind of a bias at the earlier stages of the recruitment process. Figure 2 shows the phases of the recruitment process. Figure 2 about here Since invited participants with anti-immigrant attitudes dropped out at the final recruitment stage, we wanted to check if the sample of people turning out to deliberate was skewed when it comes to attitudes. In table 1, comparisons between the preliminary invited sample (n=2,601), the initially volunteered respondents (n=805), the invited (n=366) and the actual participants (n=207) are made within the two enclaves. It can be seen that the participants in the con enclave were slightly more moderate, i.e. less anti-immigrant, compared to the whole enclave at earlier stages. In fact, the difference in opinions in the con enclave between the participants (n=86) and the ones who did not show up (n=97) is statistically significant at the 3 Those whose value for the sum variable was > 8.3 were included in the pro enclave, and those whose value was < 6.7 were included in the con enclave. 4 A more thorough analysis of the attrition process can be found in Karjalainen and Rapeli (2013). 8

9 0.01-level. Put in other words, it was harder to attract people with the most anti-immigrant opinions to present their views in a deliberative event. In the pro enclave, the participants were slightly more liberal than the mean of the whole enclave at earlier stages. This difference is not, however, statistically significant. Table 1 about here At the deliberation event, the small groups were randomly formed within the con and pro enclaves yielding ten pro like-minded groups, five con like-minded groups and eleven mixed groups. 5 The control group consisted of 369 people who were initially willing to take part and who returned each of the surveys T1, T2 and T4. The socio-demographics of the participants and the control group are represented in Appendix C. Table 2 displays the assignment into small groups. 6 Table 2 about here The deliberation event took place during one weekend, 31 March and 1 April Each participant took part only during one day, either on Saturday or Sunday. Each day, the event followed the same procedures and lasted from 9.30 am until 3 pm. The day started with a short 15-item quiz measuring knowledge related to immigration issues and general political issues. After the knowledge quiz, the participants were shortly briefed about some basic facts related to immigration in Finland. The briefing was designed to be unbiased and focused on basic facts, and was presented as a slide show in an auditorium with all participants. A copy of the information material was also handed out to each participant. After the briefing, facilitated small group discussions began in each group s own location. Each small group consisted of eight participants and a moderator. 7 The group discussions lasted for four hours, including a lunch break of 45 minutes. The group discussions ended with a survey (T4) repeating the questions in T1, T2 and T3, apart from socio-economic background variables. It also included questions related to the participants experiences of the 5 One of the mixed groups was a Swedish speaking group allowing participants to talk in their mother tongue. 6 See Appendix D for the socio-demographics of the participants according to enclave and treatment. 7 Because some individuals did not show up three groups consisted of nine participants, two of seven participants and one of six participants. All mixed groups, however, had eight participants, four from both enclaves. 9

10 deliberation event. The phases of the experiment are listed in Table 3. In each small group, trained moderators facilitated the discussion. A written description of the rules of the discussion was handed out to the participants in the beginning. It emphasized respect for other people s opinions, the importance of justifying one s opinions and openness to others points of view. The moderators also read aloud these rules. In the beginning of the group discussion, each group member put forward a theme related to the immigration issue which they wished to be discussed. The moderator wrote these themes down on a blackboard. The proposed themes covered issues such as, work-based immigration, humanitarian based immigration, acculturation, multiculturalism, unemployment, crime and security, language and education, immigration attitudes, and the costs of immigration. There were no major differences between the themes put forward by the pro and con immigration participants, except that none of the con participants suggested the immigration attitudes, referring to prejudices and racism, as a theme to be discussed. After this, a free discussion on the themes followed. The moderators interfered only if any of the group members dominated or completely withdrew from the discussion. Further, the moderator could put forward a theme for discussion from those written down on the board in case the discussion paused, and interfere if crude or disrespectful utterances were made. Table 3 about here. Results The statistical significance of potential differences and changes is determined through t- tests.we also look at multivariate regressions in order to gain a better understanding of the determinants of opinion change at the individual level. We compare both the development of opinions and knowledge according to the four groups achieved by the combination of enclave and treatment (see Table 2). The comparisons are mainly done within samples (pre- and posttest), and through between samples testing when applicable. First, we test the hypotheses on the effect of treatment on opinions. H i states that a polarization of opinions occurs in the like-minded groups, whereas H ii assumes that the opposite occurs in the mixed groups. Figure 3 demonstrates the development of opinions in the course of the experiment. We compare opinions before (T1) the event, after deliberation (T4) and in the follow-up survey (T5) three weeks after the event. Figure 3 about here 10

11 There were three statistically significant opinion changes during the experiment. All of these were in the direction of a more liberal attitude towards immigration. The most prominent change occurred among the participants of the con mixed groups. Here, the initial mean on the sum variable was 4.33, and it increased to 6.12 after the experiment. The increase of 1.8 units is significant at the level and corroborates H ii. On average, the pro mixed group participants did not, contrary to H ii change their opinions when deliberating with the other side. Thus, depolarization in the mixed treatment was unilateral, only persons with anti-immigrant attitudes shifted towards the mean. Those initially permissive towards immigration did not alter their opinions. Moving on to the like-minded treatment, figure 3 shows that the con like-minded groups did not polarize in comparison with their initial opinions. On the contrary, these people became more permissive toward immigration as a result of deliberation. The change of 0.67 units is not as large as among the con participants in the mixed groups, but still significant at the 0.01 level. This development works against H i. In the pro enclave, only the like-minded groups show a barely statistically significant (0.05) mean change of opinions. These groups polarized slightly, according to the assumption in H 8 i. How persistent were the opinion changes? Looking at the follow-up survey T5, we can see that the only statistically significant change between deliberation and the follow-up survey was a continued tendency among the con like-minded groups to become more tolerant towards immigration. This, again, is contrary to hypothesis i). The results show a somewhat unclear picture. There is a clear de-polarization of opinions among the anti-immigration participants who were subject to the mixed group treatment, but also their peers in likeminded groups show a more permissive post deliberation attitude. Moreover, the latter continued to become more tolerant after deliberation. Among the participants in favor of immigration, there were almost no opinion changes at the aggregate level.. 8 The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test repeats the result about the opinion changes, T1 T4, in the four groups (for con like-minded p = 0.005; for con mixed p = 0.000; for pro like-minded p = 0.032; for pro mixed p = 0.899). Likewise, the Man Withney test repeats the overall pattern about the differences between treatments at T1 (for the difference between con participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.021; for the pro participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.087), and at T4 (for the difference between con participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.294; for the pro participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.002). Furthermore, the overall patterns found at the aggregate level were confirmed in a separate group-by-group analysis. It turned out that none of the small groups behaved in a deviant manner. In 9 (out of 11) of the mixed groups, in 4 (out of 5) of the con like-minded groups, and in 7 (out of 10) of the pro like-minded groups the change was positive from T1 to T4. 11

12 Figure 3 also shows a comparison within enclaves at T1which helps to trace possible initial differences between the subjects that were randomly allocated into the two treatments within both enclaves. Despite random allocation, the participants in the like-minded treatment were in both enclaves closer to the middle point than the participants who deliberated in mixed groups. In the con enclave the difference was 0.73 and in the pro enclave 0.48, both statistically significant at the 0.05-level. This means that the participants in the like-minded treatment were more moderate than the participants in the mixed treatment. It is impossible to establish if this initial division had any influence on the outcome within the treatments. In order to understand the scope of opinion change at the individual level, table 4 shows people who changed sides as a result of deliberation. The threshold for changing sides is set at 7.5 on the sum variable, i.e. in the middle of the cut-off points for the con and pro enclaves. If a person in the con enclave moved above 7.5 after deliberation, (s)he is considered to have changed sides; a person in the pro enclave should have moved below 7.5 in order to have changed sides concerning opinions on immigration. Table 4 compares the participants pre and post deliberation attitudes. Moreover, the post deliberation attitudes are analyzed both at the end of the deliberation event (T4) and in the follow-up survey (T5). Table 4 about here Changing sides occurred almost exclusively among persons who were initially critical towards immigration. This corroborates further the finding that major opinion changes took place among the participants with anti-immigration attitudes. At the end of the deliberation day (T4), 20 persons belonging to the con enclave had become permissive towards immigration; the sum variable for immigration attitudes had for their part exceeded the value of 7.5 on the 0 to 14 point scale. A majority of these, 14 people, were subject to the mixed treatment. When people with anti-immigrant attitudes faced counter arguments, many of them became clearly more positive toward immigration. However, also six people in the con likeminded groups changed sides at T4. No one in the pro enclave became restrictive toward immigration as a result of deliberation. Moving on to the follow-up survey, the trend to more permissive attitudes continues among the participants of the con like-minded groups. In the period between the experiment and the follow-up survey, five additional people in con like-minded groups had become supporters of more immigration. To sum up, 14 out of 44 con participants in mixed groups changed sides as a result of deliberation (13 at T5 as one person shifted back), and 11 out of 12

13 the 42 anti-immigrants deliberating in like-minded groups had changed sides at the follow-up survey. Altogether 24 of the total of 86 participants in the con enclave changed sides as a result of the experiment. More than every fourth participant with anti-immigration attitudes became clearly permissive toward immigration as a result of deliberation. Table 5 shows how the control group performed during the same time period. It can be seen that within the control group, attitudes toward immigration changed as well. The con enclave became slightly more permissive, whereas the pro enclave became slightly more critical. Put in other words, participation in a three wave panel study on immigration led to a de-polarization of opinions among the control group. It may be the case that people who responded to the survey became more aware of the immigration issue and probably reflected upon it even though they did not participate in deliberation event. They may have, for example, sought more information on their own and reflected on it. It is notable that there is a clear difference between the experimental and control groups in terms of their opinion changes. This gives further confirmation to our observations about the influence of the deliberative discussion on opinion changes. It is also important to notice that the experimental and control groups were formed randomly from those willing to participate in the deliberation event indicating that a self-selection bias cannot account for the differences observed between the two groups. Table 5 about here Next, in order to test H iii and H iv we analyze knowledge change in the course of the experiment. H iii suggest that deliberation in like-minded groups amplifies cognitive errors, whereas H iv anticipates that deliberation in mixed groups corrects cognitive errors. The knowledge questions were grouped in three subsets. First, there were six questions pertaining to immigration on which information was given in the beginning of the deliberation event. Second, there were four questions on immigration on which information was not given by the organizers. Third, there were five questions measuring general political knowledge. In figure 4 we look at the learning effects by treatment and enclave. The table only includes the ten items related to immigration knowledge (for a detailed development of all knowledge items, see appendix B). Figure 4 about here 13

14 All participants learned a lot during the experiment. The learning effects were large and similar in all four groups. Neither treatment nor attitudes toward immigration had an effect on the learning curve. In fact, the pre-event knowledge shares were quite similar across the four groups as well. For all participants, the mean share of correct answers increased from 43 per cent to 63 per cent, and the information gains were recorded for questions on which information was given at the event (see Appendix B). This indicates that the correction of erroneous beliefs occurred both in mixed and like-minded groups to a similar degree, backing up hypothesis iv) but working against hypothesis iii). Initially, there were small differences within enclaves between the subjects who were randomly assigned to the like-minded vs. mixed treatments. These differences were not statistically significant, neither were the differences within enclaves at T4. Within the set of questions relating to immigration where no information was provided by the organizers there were two open-ended questions (questions 9 and 10 in Appendix B) 9. They can be used to examine the hypothesis concerning cognitive errors. These questions pertained to the level of unemployment among immigrants (correct answer 27 per cent) and the level of a social security benefit received by an unemployed immigrant per month (correct answer 757 euros). It can be assumed that negative attitudes towards immigration are, especially, related to people s perceptions of social problems and costs caused by immigration. Therefore, it may be assumed that those who have negative attitudes towards immigration might overestimate both the level of unemployment and social security benefits, and the opposite could be the case among supporters of immigration. Whereas the coding of the open-ended questions in table 6 followed the binary logic of correct and non-correct 10 answers, we also examined the distance of the respondent s answers from the correct answers. When looking at the responses to the open questions before deliberation (T3) it turns out that both those for and those against immigration tended to underestimate the unemployment rate and the level of social security. Among the participants in the con enclave, 42.2 per cent underestimated the unemployment rate. In the pro enclave, the share of people underestimating the unemployment rate was even higher: 53.3 per cent. The level of social security benefits for unemployed immigrants was underestimated by 67.5 percent in the con enclave and 68.1 percent in the pro enclave. However, overestimation was more common among those against immigration than among those for immigration as All other knowledge items were put forward as multiple choice questions with four alternatives. 10 The intervals of acceptance for correct answers were defined as follow: per cent for the unemployment rate, EUR for the integration assistance. 14

15 per cent in the con enclave overestimated the unemployment rate (23.3 per cent in the pro enclave) and 21.7 per cent overestimated the level of benefits (10.1 per cent in the pro enclave). This gives some support to the assumption that attitudes towards immigration are related to the perceptions of the costs of immigration. However, the responses to the openended questions in T4 do not support the hypotheses on amplification of cognitive errors. The differences in the under- or overestimation of the unemployment rate and the social security benefit are not statistically significant, when comparing the four groups of enclaves and treatments with each other. Finally, we analyze immigration attitudes in a multivariate setting. For this purpose, table 6 shows results of three separate regression models. The dependent variable in each model is the sum variable measuring attitudes toward immigration in the course of the experiment. The first model analyzes the baseline determinants of immigration opinions (T1), whereas the second column looks at the post deliberation attitudes (T4), and the third measures the attitudes at the follow-up survey (T5). In each model, the dependent variable is the sum variable (varies between 0 and 14) for immigration attitudes. At T4 and T5 the baseline value of each person s attitudes at T1 is included in the model as an independent variable. We only list parsimonious models with significant variables. The non-significant variables which are not included in the models in table 6 are listed under the table 11. The results of the displayed OLS regression models in table 6 were verified through generalized linear models with Hubert-White estimators for robust standard errors. The obtained results were identical. Table 6 about here. First of all, looking at the baseline attitudes, we can see that the most powerful predictors are external political efficacy, generalized social trust and education. They are all positively associated with liberal attitudes toward immigration. Considering the scale of the dependent variable (0 to 14), we see that a person with a master s degree, who is trustful, and has a high level of external political efficacy, is at the very liberal end of the scale concerning immigration attitudes. He scores almost 11 points higher than a person without these characteristics. Values and ideology have an impact too. The more right a person places himself on the left-right scale, the less tolerant he is of immigrants. The difference between the extremes on the scale is 2.6 points on the dependent variable. Religious persons are also 11 For the model at T5 we replicated the significant independent variables from T4 in order to see how persistent they are. 15

16 less liberal than non-religious persons, the coefficient being When we look at the sociodemographic and attitudinal control variables, we see that many are not related to immigration attitudes. Gender, age, marital status, political interest nor interest in immigration policy explains how the participants view about immigration. 12. Moving on to the post deliberation event attitudes at T4, we see that only social trust prevails as a predictor, controlling for the baseline attitudes of each respondent. The model itself performs much better than the first model, but this is naturally explained by including the T1 attitudes in the model. We first controlled for 18 additional variables pertaining to knowledge, treatment and enclave as well as attitudes regarding the participants views on discussion in general and the small group deliberations in particular. Only four of them were statistically significant in a stepwise regression. People, who claim to be are ready to understand the other side, i.e. agree with the statement that a person who disagrees with them on immigration might have good arguments for their view, are more permissive after the deliberation. Also participants in groups where at least one of the participants had an immigrant background, have a slightly higher (0.40) level of post-deliberation opinion. Regarding the items that measure how the participants evaluate the discussion in their group, dominance becomes significant. Participants, who, regardless of treatment or enclave, felt that some individuals dominated the discussion in their group too much, score almost one point lower in their post-deliberation opinions toward immigration. Even more negative (-1.47) was the effect of a feeling of dominance among participants who belong to the con enclave and were in the like-minded treatment. The final model, where the follow-up survey at T5 provides the dependent variable includes the independent variables of the model at T4. This is done in order to control for how persistent they are in explaining attitudinal change at the experiment. Expectedly, the baseline attitudes from T1 still explain most of the opinions at T5. Besides it, only generalized social trust (positively) and the interaction between the feeling of group dominance and con likeminded groups (negatively) remain statistically significant. The importance of social trust has increased compared to T4, whereas the feeling of some participants dominating has diminished in the almost three weeks between the event and the follow-up survey. Also the positive effect of having an immigrant in the small-n group vanished during this time. Conclusions 12 The results obtained for the immigration attitudes at T1 are very similar to those in a recent comparative European study on attitudes towards immigration (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom 2012). 16

17 The results from the experiment do not show systematic patterns of group polarization in the like-minded groups. Hypotheses i) and ii) concerning attitude changes gain only partial support. Those people in the con enclave who deliberated in like-minded groups did not become more extreme. On the contrary, they became more permissive towards immigration. In this respect our results are similar to those received by Sanders In the mixed groups, participants in the con enclave became more permissive, whereas people in the pro enclave did not become more critical towards immigration. Depolarization therefore occurred to some extent in the mixed groups but it concerned the con enclave only. It is also notable that we did not find any indication of the amplification of cognitive errors. Overall, participants who were assigned to mixed groups did not learn more than participants in like-minded groups. All participants learned to a substantial degree but this was mostly a result of the information given to them in the beginning of the deliberation event. There were no differences in the average learning curves between the two enclaves and treatments. It is worth pointing out that some of the opinion changes within the control group were significant suggesting that people may reflect on an issue just because they are participants in a panel study. However, the fact that the opinion changes in the control group did not follow the same patterns as the opinion changes in the experimental group suggests that deliberation as an intersubjective process has logic of its own. Our results support the view that deliberation is different from other forms of talk. For students of democracy in general and deliberative democrats in particular, the implication is that discussion procedures can have a strong impact on outcomes. The results of the experiment suggest that polarization is not by any means an automatic consequence of biases in group composition or, more precisely, in the initial dispositions of the group members. In our experiment, the group composition had an impact on the development of attitudes, but this impact was asymmetric. Arguments in support of immigration were more influential in the course of deliberation since all significant opinion changes were to the direction of more permissive attitudes towards immigration. The follow-up survey indicates that the development of the opinions to this direction continued even after the experiment. The regression analyses suggest that opinion changes during the experiment were at least partially driven by arguments put forward in the groups. However, also other group dynamics, such as group tensions (in a negative manner) as well as the presence of an immigrant in the group (in a positive manner), affected the development of attitudes. The development of more permissive opinions in mixed groups may be explained by the established mechanism that exposure to differing political views increases awareness of 17

18 rationales for differing viewpoints and thus increases political tolerance (Mutz 2006, 68). However, the increase in tolerance in con like-minded groups can still be regarded as somewhat surprising. Our experimental treatment which included two elements of what Mutz (2006, 61) calls deliberation package, i.e. information and discussion procedures, was not designed to disentangle their respective effects. However, the fact that knowledge gains do not explain post deliberation opinions in the regression model does not lend support the view that information provided in the briefing material was crucial. Sunstein (2002, ) points out the importance of affective factors, identity and solidarity as factors which might increase or decrease group polarization. Affective ties can be expected to diminish dissent in groups. When people identify themselves as members of a group with a degree of solidarity, they are likely to reinforce the initial tendency prevailing in the group and, consequently, the group becomes more extreme. The participants of our experiment were subject to random allocation into small-n groups, and no affective ties should have been eminent. The (seemingly) ad hoc nature of the groups made it difficult for the participants to develop a within-group solidarity based on some common denominator (e.g. being anti-immigrant) in the given time frame of four hours. Perhaps the most likely explanation for our results is the nature of deliberation. Despite the initial like-mindedness of the con enclave groups, there seems to have been a sufficient degree of disagreement on the issue to trigger deliberation where arguments are assessed by their merits. Following Sunstein (2002, 180), polarization may have not taken place in the con like-minded groups because the participants who defended the prevailing tendency of the group were particularly unpersuasive, and the outliers (in the con like-minded groups, people with the most liberal immigration attitudes) were especially convincing. Furthermore, because individuals in the con like-minded groups did not know the composition of their group, they may have tried to argue in ways which would appeal also to people with conflicting viewpoints As pointed out by theorists of deliberative democracy, all arguments should not have an equal weight in processes of public reasoning. Most notably, reasonable arguments appealing to generalizable moral principles should be powerful whereas arguments based on attitudes such as prejudice should be laundered in the course of deliberation (see e.g. Goodin 1986).. Liberal tendencies may have been reinforced in our experiment because certain arguments against immigration were such that they could not be put forward or sustained in the deliberative process. 18

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23 Figure 1. The dispersion of initial attitudes on immigration among the respondents. 23