Deliberative Capacity of Societies: A Critical Discussion

Transcription

1 Deliberative Capacity of Societies: A Critical Discussion Krister Lundell Åbo Akademi University Paper presented at the general research seminar, Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, 17th October 2012 Introduction The dynamic field of deliberative democracy has now entered a third generation. The normative assertions of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls defined the first generation, whereas secondgeneration deliberative democracy made the theory of deliberative democracy more realistic and practically achievable by reconciling the first-generation theories with the empirical realities of social complexity. Third-generation deliberative democracy has been occupied with institutionalization in order to achieve this reconciliation in practice (Elstub 2010). Part of the third generation is the systemic approach of deliberative democracy, which allows us to think about deliberation in large-scale societal terms; as a whole system. The systemic aspect had been there earlier but was brought into light with Jane Mansbridge s idea of a deliberative system reaching from everyday talk among ordinary people to formal debate in the legislature (Mansbridge 1999). The systemic approach got a prominent position within the field through the works by John Parkinson (2006), Carolyn M. Hendriks (2006) and Robert E. Goodin (2008), and one of the latest developments is the concept of deliberative capacity within the deliberative system (Dryzek 2009; 2010). This essay is a critical discussion on deliberative capacity and deliberative capacity building, both terms introduced by John Dryzek (2009). Naturally, therefore, it largely focuses on various aspects of Dryzek s conception of deliberative capacity and the way it is dealt with in the article Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building, published in Comparative Political Studies 1

2 in After a presentation of Dryzek s model of deliberative capacity and the deliberative system, three points of critique are brought out the first one concerns the theoretical-empirical connection, the second one reflects upon the consequentiality dimension, and the third one deals with Dryzek s exposition of determinants of deliberative capacity. In the fourth section, the discussion on favorable and unfavorable conditions for deliberation is elaborated further, and in a fifth section, the role of institutional design as a means of building deliberative capacity is discussed. In this context, a fourth point of critique is made: ambiguity between the account of deliberative capacity and the definition of deliberative capacity in Dryzek s aforementioned article. Dryzek s Model of Deliberative Capacity and the Deliberative System Dryzek defines deliberative capacity as the extent to which a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic, inclusive and consequential (2009, 1382). In the article, a framework is described for locating and analyzing the contributions of its components and so evaluating the degree to which a polity s deliberative system is authentic, inclusive and consequential (2009, 1379). Authenticity implies that deliberation has to induce reflection without coercion, claims have to be connected to general principles, and the process has to be reciprocal. Domination via propaganda, manipulation, threats, indoctrination, deception, expressions of mere self-interest, and the imposition of ideological conformity needs to be absent (Dryzek 2000, 8). Inclusiveness means that a wide range of interests, opinions and preferences has to be taken into consideration. Without inclusiveness, deliberation cannot be democratic. Thirdly, a deliberative process that is consequential has an impact on collective decisions and social outcomes. The impact does not have to be direct; it may take the form of recommendation or play an advisory role with regard to elected officials. A polity with a high degree of authentic, inclusive, and consequential deliberation will have an effective deliberative system (2009, 1382). In a deliberative light, the higher the degree of deliberative capacity the more democratic the political system is (2009, 1380). The deliberative system of states and societies consists of five elements: (1) the public space, (2) the empowered space, (3) transmission and (4) accountability between these two spheres, and the extent of (5) decisiveness in the system. Deliberative capacity can be distributed in different ways in the deliberative system. The public space consists of the media, social movements, activist associations, locations where people gather together, the Internet, public hearings and designed citizen forums. The empowered space is found in institutions that produce collective decisions; 2

3 e.g. legislatures, cabinets and constitutional courts. However, the institution does not have to be formally empowered. Transmission stands for the means by which the public space can exercise influence on the empowered space. Such means may involve political campaigns, social movements that manage to pervade actors in the empowered space, or personal links between the two spaces. Channels for transmission are not enough, however some means through which the empowered space is accountable to the public space is also needed. Without accountability, deliberative legitimacy of collective outcomes is not generated. Lastly, decisiveness is determined by the extent to which the first four elements affect collective decisions and social outcomes. The degree of authenticity also varies in the first four elements, whereas inclusiveness is concerned with the two kinds of spaces (Dryzek 2009, ). This is largely similar to Habermas two-track model of democracy where deliberation proceeds on two levels: opinions are formed in the public sphere and transmitted through channels of public communication to the state level where more formal deliberation takes place for the purpose of will formation (Habermas 1996, ). A Critique of Dryzek s Model The theoretical-empirical connection Deliberation can be found in central state institutions such as legislatures, cabinets, courts, councils. Moreover, deliberation occurs in designed forums such as citizen juries and assemblies, deliberative polls or mini-publics, and consensus conferences. Deliberative democracy is also found in governance networks that transcend formal political institutions that may cross state boundaries. Externally, these networks overshadow the states decisive policy actions nevertheless, they may contribute to the deliberative capacity of states (Dryzek 2009, ). Deliberative capacity, conceptualized as authenticity, inclusiveness and consequentiality, is present to a varying extent in these institutions, forums and networks. The degree of authenticity in a specific setting is measurable by means of the discourse quality index developed by Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli and Steenbergen (2004), or some modified version of the index (see e.g. Himmelroos 2012), considering that the original DQI was created for the purpose of measuring the deliberative quality in parliamentary debates. The level of inclusiveness may be measured by some other techniques in a deliberative setting. By contrast, to measure the degree to which deliberation is consequential poses some serious difficulties but let us, for a moment, suppose that we are also able to empirically capture the third dimension. A critical question is: how do we 3

4 establish the link between the deliberative capacity in various institutions and forums, on the one hand, and the deliberative capacity of the specific society that these institutions and forums are part of, on the other? Dryzek points out that the deliberative quality varies between different locations in the political system (2009, 1388) at the same time, however, he talks about the deliberative capacity of society and argues that political systems (including states) can be arrayed on a continuum according to the extent of their deliberative capacity (2009, 1380). Theoretically, it appears as fascinating. Empirically, it is hard to imagine how it could be done. Essentially, it is a matter of the difficulty in combining normative deliberative theory with empirically testable theories. Too often theorists and empiricists have talked past each other. Dennis Thompson maintains that theorists and empiricists need to take measures to bridge the gap between normative and empirical inquiry (2008, 498, 516). Diana Mutz asks the following question: How can we take what has been, by its origins, a normative theory and turn it into an empirically testable theory? (2008, 522) She advocates transformation of deliberative theory into middle-range theory by replacing vaguely defined entities with more concrete, circumscribed concepts, and by testing theoretically and empirically grounded hypotheses about specific associations between these concepts. A middle-range approach can be described as a means of bridging the gap between theory and empirical evidence (ibid.). The third dimension: consequentiality Furthermore, deliberative theories often involve a great deal of conceptual ambiguity as to what should qualify as deliberation. They frequently conflate defining criteria of deliberation and its beneficial consequences; thus the independent variable is defined in terms of its hypothesized effects. Deliberative theorists often seem to assume that good deliberation will automatically result in good things such as greater levels of trust, public-spirited attitudes, opinion consistency, faith in democratic processes, greater interest in political participation, and even better citizens. This circularity often makes it impossible to empirically test the allegedly positive claims of deliberative theory (Mutz 2008, 527). Dryzek s model does not involve predictions about political trust and interest, the development of good citizens or similar positive assumptions concerning the effects of deliberation. It does, however, involve an element that should be regarded as a consequence of rather than as part of the capacity, namely the third dimension which stipulates that the deliberation must have a direct or indirect effect on collective decisions and social outcomes. Consequently, according to the model, authentic and inclusive deliberation is lacking in capacity if the outcome does not have a 4

5 bearing on collective decision-making or if it does not reach elected representatives. Deliberative capacity should be regarded as a resource in the deliberative process rather than as a consequence of deliberation. In other words, the deliberative capacity may exist in society, even though the link between deliberation and political decision-making is deficient. Determinants of and obstructions to deliberative capacity Dryzek (2009) presents some factors that are favorable to deliberative capacity as well some factors that may obstruct deliberative capacity in political systems. The determinants are (1) literacy and education, (2) shared language, (3) voting system design, (4) state structures and institutions, and (5) political culture. Unfavorable conditions are (1) religious fundamentalism, (2) ideological conformity, and (3) segmental autonomy. Similarly as literacy and education enhance the deliberative competence of citizens, they also have a positive effect on the deliberative capacity of the society as a whole. By shared language, Dryzek does not imply that the deliberative capacity is necessarily lower in plural societies rather, what is meant here is that the elite and the masses need to communicate in such a way that they understand each other. This may also be related to the connection between the public and the empowered space: transmission and accountability benefit from a shared language. The role of voting system design pertains to an electoral method that is sparsely applied around the world: preferential voting. The system provides politicians and parties to campaign and appeal for second and third preferences across party lines and different groups. Therefore, it promotes reciprocity: making arguments in terms that others can accept. Regarding state structures and institutions, Dryzek only says that they may be more or less conducive to deliberation, depending on how they are combined. Political culture may influence deliberative capacity in several ways. Among other things, Dryzek puts forward that the deliberative capacity may be high (although by no means for certain) in the Confucian culture because of its emphasis on reasoned consensus, and in the Islamic culture because of its emphasis on consultation. There is also a difference between analytical and indexical cultures. In the latter, examplified by Italy, it is important to have strong opinions on virtually everything and not to admit uncertainty or lack of knowledge, which works against mutual respect, reciprocy and other elements that are conducive to deliberation (Dryzek 2009, ; see also Gambetta 1998). Turning to the obstacles, an official ideological doctrine of the state induces ideological conformity that impedes deliberative capacity. In particular, religious fundamentalism has a detrimental effect on deliberation, because fundamentalists are not interested in reflecting upon values and beliefs of different people or even communicating with nonbelievers. If there is a high 5

6 degree of deliberative capacity in consociational systems, it is most likely restricted to the elite level. Segmental autonomy does not encourage communication between members of different blocks and ethnic groups; rather, it promotes enclave deliberation which implies interaction with like-minded people (Dryzek 2009, ; see also Thompson 2008, 511). Evidence from psychological experiments suggests that deliberation among like-minded has negative consequences such as group polarization and amplification of errors (e.g. Sunstein 2009). 1 The variables that are said to promote and mitigate deliberative capacity seem to be rather arbitrarily introduced without much argumentation. Moreover, the determinants and obstructions are of different kinds which call for some categorization as well as reflection upon other explanatory variables. Some of them (voting system design, literacy and education, and religious fundamentalism) are clearly related to the deliberative discussion, pertaining to specific cognitive and attitudinal abilities, whereas others are very broadly defined. Political culture as well as state structures and institutions consist of a multitude of variables, some of which have positive effects on deliberative capacity, whereas some are detrimental to deliberation. The variables shared language, ideological conformity and segmental autonomy pertain to the society as a whole and the deliberative climate rather than to the cognitive and attitudinal capacity that may exist under the surface. On the whole, the exposition of determinants is rather superficial and not elaborated well enough; one could argue that it is out of the context and should be the focus of another study. For one thing, it is not difficult to think of other possible determinants of deliberative capacity for example, a democratic form of government and socio-economic development. Dryzek briefly deals with the former, maintaining that deliberative capacity may exist in non-democratic settings as well. It requires that we look beyond the central state institutions and focus on the local level or oppositional public spheres. Especially when an authoritarian regime breaks down, a democratic transition may follow if deliberative capacity has been present in the old regime or among the oppositional forces (2009, 1383, ). However, though recognizing that there could be a fair share of deliberative capacity in non-democracies, we may assume that the deliberative capacity is higher in democratic political systems than in authoritarian ones. Experience of democratic rule should matter in this respect. Democratic procedures and democratic thinking is something that people and the society learn over a long time. Trust in other people, reciprocal communication between individuals and appreciation of the common good is difficult to create in societies that have been under authoritarian rule for a long time. 1 However, recent findings from a deliberative experiment indicate that enclave deliberation does not have these detrimental effects (Grönlund 2012). 6

7 We may also assume that the more developed a country is in a socio-economic sense, the better prepared for deliberative democracy the society is. Modernization has many positive effects, which, in turn may affect the deliberative capacity of individuals and societies: e.g. education, a democratic culture, tolerance for other people, a rational attitude toward politics, more spare time and more societal activitites. Let us take a closer look at the human development index which is frequently used as a measure of socio-economic development. The index consists of three dimensions: life expectancy at birth, education measured as mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling, and standard of living measured by GNI per capita. The latter two are particularly relevant to deliberative capacity education provides people with many of the cognitive abilities that are needed in deliberation, whereas a decent standard of living does not only include material goods and welfare but also cultural resources and social life. Institutional Conditions for Deliberative Capacity Dryzek is not the first to deal with favorable and unfavorable conditions for deliberation. The topic takes a prominent position in bringing deliberative theorists and empiricists together (e.g. Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010). Thompson argues that The most promising approach for empirical research would seem to be to continue trying to discover the conditions in which deliberative democracy does and does not work well, while paying more attention to the question of to what extent the unfavorable conditions could change (2008, 500). Some may be dependent on legislative measures and political action at different levels, some may be products of the social and economic structure, whereas others may be essential elements of democratic systems (ibid.). In their work on discourse quality in national legislatures, Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli and Steenbergen (2004) hypothesize, among other things, that consensus systems, presidentialism and second chambers promote a more deliberative mode of policy-making. Arendt Lijphart s (1999) distinction between consensus and competitive systems stems from Althusius theory of the covenant or consociatio. In the covenant, people would live together in mutual benevolence striving for consensus by means of open communication. The existence of grand coalitions lies at the heart of deliberation, because in order to succeed actors need to adopt a cooperative attitude towards their coalition partners, argumentative rationality is necessary for coping with differences, and it requires willingness to communicate in a constructive and respectful way. In competitive systems, by contrast, the governing party can safely ignore the opposition; it has little to gain from discussing its policies with the opposition (Bächtiger et al. 2007, 83-84). However, whereas consociational democracy may be favorable to deliberation at the elite level, the opposite 7

8 may prevail at the societal level, because such systems are usually designed for societies that are divided along ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages. Segmental autonomy for different groups a basic element of consociational democracy hardly provides any opportunity for members of different blocks to communicate with one another (Dryzek 2009, 1397). In a parliamentary system, where the government and the legislature are in a confidence relationship, legislators need to defend the proposals of their government, which means that argumentative lines often have been fixed before the debate. A presidential system, by contrast, is more open to discussion and argumentative change across party boundaries, since the executive is not dependent on legislative confidence and party discipline is lower (Bächtiger et al. 2007, 82-84). In upper houses, policy problems can be given more thorough consideration, because members usually have more experience, they are elected for longer terms, and they work in a smaller assembly than members of the lower house. They are also said to be characterized by a civility norm that is favorable to deliberation (Loomis 1990). Steiner and his author team (2004) found a positive effect of all these institutions on the respect dimension of deliberation, whereas the findings with regard to the other three (participation, justification, constructive politics) dimensions was somewhat mixed (Bächtiger et al. 2007, ). In an analysis of deliberative quality in the Swiss and German legislatures, Bächtiger and Hangartner (2010) report a positive effect of two institutional variables at the context level, namely a coalition setting as opposed to a government-opposition setting and a non-public arena as opposed to a public arena. The point of departure with regard to the former is Lijphart s distinction between consensus and majoritarian systems. Consensus systems are characterized by coalition arrangements, which produce a logic of joint decision-making. Deliberation often becomes necessary in order to successfully carry through policy negotiations and to cope with disagreements of various kinds (Holzinger 2004). Also, expectations from the voters that things get done promote a constructive attitude from coalition parties towards other coalition partners (Müller 2007, 205). In government-opposition settings, by contrast, the stakes are losing or winning power positions, and a constant striving for demonstrating that the other part is incompetent and/or irresponsible. Consequently, in such a setting, there are few incentives for respectful deliberation. Non-public parliamentary arenas are more conducive to deliberation than public ones, because without external interference and the pressures of following constituent demands it is easier for legislators to reflect upon different solutions, to change their opinion, and to show respect for the claims of others (Stavasage 2007). 8

9 Institutional Design and the Deliberative System The institutions dealt with above have one thing in common: they can, to a varying extent, be designed for the purpose of creating and enhancing deliberative capacity. First of all, what is needed is a liberal democratic system with experience of free and fair elections and the right to freedom of expression as well as other human rights. Even though deliberation certainly exists in non-democratic countries, it is hard to imagine how a high-capacity system of deliberation could be built in societies where a multitude of interests, opinions and preferences is not allowed to flourish, freedom of speech is limited, and propaganda, manipulation or even threats from the authorities are part of citizens everyday life. A deliberative society is, after all, a democratic society. Moreover, deliberative capacity is a demanding and time-consuming process in newly democratized countries even more so than in advanced democratic societies. New democracies suffer from the effects that years of authoritarianism have had on society, and a more democratic culture needs to take root in order to build deliberative capacity. Since there are favorable and unfavorable conditions for deliberation, one way of enhancing deliberative capacity is to introduce institutional reforms. Much of the literature on deliberative democracy assumes that deliberative institutions should be introduced alongside existing democratic institutions. Deliberative reforms might call for substantial changes such as introducing nationwide deliberative polls (Ackermann & Fishkin 2004), compulsory deliberative jury duties (Leib 2004) or deliberative assemblies (Elstub 2008), which, in turn, requires constitutional reform. However, deliberative capacity does not necessarily need to be built from above. It may be developed at the grass root level through village assemblies or by the local authorities in the form of town hall meetings. In this way, the deliberative competence of citizens may be developed from below through efforts that eventually could be implemented and institutionalized by the central government (Chappell 2007, 24-27). Alternatively, deliberative capacity may be built through constitutional engineering. Legislatures are already deliberative institutions but the deliberative elements could be strengthened. As mentioned above, earlier research suggests that the quality of deliberation is higher in consociational and presidential systems, where the number of veto players is large, and in second chambers as well as in non-public arenas. Hence, legislatures could be made more deliberative through electoral system and chamber structure design, which, hopefully, might also have a positive influence on the deliberative culture of society in general. Deliberative elements may be strengthened in other political institutions as well. As Chappell points out, deliberation is already 9

10 present in judicial systems. As for the executive branch, citizens could be invited to conduct debates on its behalf, in the form of citizen juries (Chappell 2007, 30). Now let us recall Dryzek s definition of deliberative capacity: Deliberative capacity may be defined as the extent to which a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic, inclusive and consequential (2009, 1382). This can actually be interpreted as if deliberative capacity existed in the structures, some of which have been discussed in the last two sections. If this is the case, the elements presented as determinants (1) literacy and education, (2) shared language, (3) voting system design, (4) state structures and institutions, and (5) political culture (Dryzek 2009, ) constitute the capacity, whereas the dimensions authenticity, inclusiveness, and consequentiality are effects that vary in different institutional and cultural settings. Three points of critique were made earlier: the theoretical-empirical connection, the consequentiality dimension, and the rather arbitrary and underdeveloped treatment of determinants of and obstructions to deliberative capacity. Now we may add a fourth point: ambiguity between the account of deliberative capacity and the definition of deliberative capacity. On the one hand, authenticity, inclusiveness and consequentiality are treated as components of deliberative capacity; on the other hand, they may be interpreted as effects of deliberative capacity, which, in turn, is inherent in the political structures and the culture. However, it seems more reasonable to consider the institutional and cultural context as independent variables that provide prerequisites of deliberative capacity to a varying extent, and that institutions can be designed for the purpose of enhancing deliberative capacity. The term deliberative capacity building is used by Dryzek several times, in the title of the article (2009) for instance, but never properly defined. According to one definition, political institutions provide rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals (Hall 1986, 2). Consequently, appropriate institutional design can build deliberative capacity of societies which, in turn, fosters high-quality deliberation between the deliberating actors in different venues. Depending on the conditions, the deliberative capacity varies in deliberative macro and micro venues, or discursive spheres (Hendriks 2006, 499). The informal macro discursive sphere manifests itself in e.g. activism, protests and mobilization of discourses with typical actors such as social movements, NGOs and interest groups. The formal micro discursive sphere consists of e.g. expert committees, conferences and commissions of inquiry, typical actors being parliamentarians, judges and government officials (Hendriks 2006, 500). 10

11 Some attempts at integrating the heterogeneous world of deliberation have been made Dryzek s scheme for a deliberative system was presented earlier. Mansbridge (1999) suggests that we consider the deliberative system as a spectrum with the informal everyday talk among citizens and social movements at one end, and the formal decision-making that takes place in public assemblies and legislatures at the other end. In a similar vein, Hendriks (2006) argues that the conception of deliberative democracy as entirely micro or macro enterprise is unrealistic and exclusive. Rather than seeing it as a continuum, she proposes that the deliberative system should be conceived of as an integrated system with a multitude of venues connected to each other. Mixed discursive spheres, combining formal and informal modes of deliberation and manifested in e.g. deliberative designs, facilitated town meetings and public seminars, play a crucial role in this integrated system by encouraging diverse actors to come together and cross-fertilise macro and micro public conversations (Hendriks 2006, 503). Conclusion Different actors in all venues, especially in the informal but also in the formal ones, vary in their capacity (and propensity) to engage in different kinds of discursive practice. The multitude of deliberative venues in the deliberative system possesses deliberative capacity, which is dependent on culture, tradition and the institutional context. Since some conditions are favorable and others are unfavorable to deliberation, the deliberative capacity of society can be enhanced by means of institutional reforms and constitutional design. The capacity of different locations may certainly vary within a political system yet, as Dryzek points out, low capacity in one venue may be compensated by higher capacity in another. Conversely, high deliberative quality in one forum may undermine the quality in another (2009, 1388). Still, since the venues interact with each other within the system, it is plausible that there is a spill-over effect, i.e. high capacity in one location inspires other locations in a positive way. They are, after all, part of one deliberative system. We may certainly focus on the deliberative capacity of different locations or elements yet, while observing single units, we should always keep our eye on whole systems (Dryzek 2009, 1388). I agree that authentic, inclusive and consequential deliberation is central to democracy. I have raised objection, however, against the claim that consequentiality should be an indicator of deliberative capacity. Without consequentiality democracy may be imperfect but deliberative capacity may still exist. 11

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