Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council s post-tsunami response.

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2 Foreword This is an evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council s post-tsunami disaster response in the period 26. December 2004 July Data collection and analysis was conducted from June to September 2005 by a team from the Risk Management and Societal Safety Group at the. Bjørn Ivar Kruke has acted as Project Co-ordinator. Kine Brodtkorb has chaired the NRC reference group: Ragna Vikøren, Oddhild Günther and Patrik Ekløf. We sincerely thank all those who have contributed to the data collection and assisted in the practical and logistical aspects of it. We would also like to thank everyone involved for their generous help throughout. As the authors of this evaluation, we take full responsibility for its contents and conclusions. Inst of med and comm. journalism Stavanger, i

3 Table of contents Foreword... i Executive summary... v 1. Introduction Crisis management organisational dynamics in crisis ACTIVITIES AND PHASES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT THE DYNAMICS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT Headquarters preparedness and response NRC S CO-ORDINATING MECHANISMS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING NRC s Headquarters Structure Meeting structures Written plans, guidelines and directives NRC S MANDATE AND THE TSUNAMI OPERATION THE NRC HEADQUARTERS POST-TSUNAMI EFFORTS FIRST PHASE Management Abandonment/maintenance of normal organisational structures and routines Communications between headquarters and field operations: Too much and too little information at the same time Mobilising of resources Relevance of NRC s core activities in post-tsunami operations Development of strategies and plans for further operations THE NRC HEADQUARTERS POST-TSUNAMI EFFORTS SECOND PHASE Management Mobilising of resources Responsibility and decision-making The tsunami operation as a learning process Impact on other operations CO-OPERATION WITH EXTERNAL ACTORS AND PARTNERS SUMMARY: HEADQUARTERS PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE The tsunami response in Sri Lanka OVERVIEW OF EVENTS EMERGENCY PHASES IN SRI LANKA AFTER THE TSUNAMI STATUS AND RELEVANCE OF NRC PROGRAMMES Permanent shelter Temporary shelter School reconstruction Education ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance to IDPs) Camp management training DECEMBER END JANUARY Information Situation analysis Communication and co-operation with Headquarters Planning Responsibilities and co-ordination Mobilising of resources Decisions and management FEBRUARY - JUNE Information, co-ordination and co-operation Communication and co-operation with Headquarters Mobilising of resources Decisions and management SUMMARY: THE TSUNAMI RESPONSE IN SRI LANKA ii

4 5. The NRC tsunami response in Aceh, Indonesia OVERVIEW OF EVENTS EMERGENCY PHASES IN NRC ACEH TSUNAMI OPERATIONS STATUS AND RELEVANCE OF NRC PROGRAMMES Decisions about priorities Status and relevance of programmes in post-tsunami Aceh NRC AND CARDI The intended role of CARDI and the actual CARDI situation The partners and post-tsunami projects The consortium concept in emergencies MOBILISING OF RESOURCES AND ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Co-operation with the headquarters in Oslo Strategy-development and future projects Funding of operations CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD SUMMARY: THE NRC TSUNAMI RESPONSE IN ACEH, INDONESIA Media strategy and exposure PLANS STAFF ADEQUATELY, BUT NOT PEAKING BRILLIANT MOVES COMMUNICATION IN GENERAL WORLD WIDE WEB FLYKTNINGHJELPEN VS. FLYKTNINGERÅDET SUMMARY: MEDIA STRATEGY AND EXPOSURE Fund-raising: Strategy and outcome TOP FIVE LASTING RELATIONSHIPS BUSINESS SPONSORS DEMOCRATIC BASIS SUMMARY: FUND-RAISING - STRATEGY AND OUTCOME Conclusions and recommendations MAIN CONCLUSIONS NRC Headquarters response to the tsunami NRC responses in Sri Lanka NRC responses in Indonesia NRC, the media and fundraising RECOMMENDATIONS ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE (IN NORWEGIAN)... I ANNEX 2: LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS....V ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED... IX ANNEX 4: NRC ORGANISATION AS OF 26. DECEMBER XII ANNEX 5: INDONESIA PROGRAMME ACTIVITY CALENDAR...XIII ANNEX 6: SRI LANKA PROGRAMME ACTIVITY CALENDAR... XIV iii

5 Acronyms and abbreviations ANPAS... Associazione Nazionale Pubbliche Assistenze (Italian relief organisation) BAPPEDA... Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Indonesian District) BRR... Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi National Indonesian Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency CARDI... the Consortium for Assistance to Refugees and the Displaced in Indonesia (new title: The Consortium for Assistance towards Recovery and Development in Indonesia) CHA... Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies CNGS... Centre for Non-Governmental Sector CNO... Centre for National Operations (Sri Lanka) CRS... Catholic Relief Society DFID... UK Department for International Development Dinas Pendidikan... Education Department at district level (Indonesia) DRC... Danish Refugee Council ECHO... European Commission Humanitarian Office FAO... UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation FEMA... Federal Emergency Management Agency FIDA... Finnish foreign mission and development co-operation organisation (formerly the Finnish Free Foreign Mission) FYROM... Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia GA... Government Agent (Sri Lankan equivalent to 'Fylkesmann') GAM... Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) GoI... Government of Indonesia GoSL... Government of Sri Lanka IASC... Inter-Agency Standing Committee ICLA... Information, Counseling and Legal Assistance IDP... Internally Displaced Person IOM... International Organisation of Migration LTTE... Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MFA... Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoE... Ministry of Education MoU... Memorandum of Understanding NCA... Norwegian Church Aid NPA... Norwegian People s Aid NRC... Norwegian Refugee Council NRK... Norwegian Broadcasting Company RC... Red Cross SLMM... Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission TNI... Indonesian Military, (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) UNDAC... United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination UNDP... United Nations Development Programme UNFPA... United Nations Population Fund UNHCR... United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Unicef... United Nations Children's Fund WFP... World Food Programme WHO... World Health Organisation ZOA... Christian Dutch Refugee Care Organisation iv

6 Executive summary The main purpose of this report is to discuss whether NRC managed to perform as an emergency organisation after the tsunami. The evaluation highlights strengths and weaknesses in NRC s emergency organisation both at the headquarters (HQ) in Oslo and in the field operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. It is discussed to what extent NRC has the capability to work in the different phases of an emergency, and what actions are needed to improve NRC s performance in future disasters. In strategies and operational plans developed for 2004/05, NRC has emphasised its role as an emergency organisation. It has, however, not been able to identify a common understanding of what this means. Crises, emergencies, disasters or catastrophes (the various terms relate to scale and impact) develop differently depending on causes and consequences. The development of an instant developing crisis has been broken down to several phases in order to analyse NRC s performance. The phases are: - Pre-emergency phase - Acute emergency phase - Late emergency phase - Rehabilitation and recovery phase - Reconstruction and development phase By linking NRC s activities and programmes to the phases, it becomes easier to identify strategic choices NRC should address, and also where NRC s core activities fit into emergency responses. When the crisis hits, some almost universal mechanisms seemingly push the events and influence the behaviour of the main actors. Common reactions and behaviour in organisations are therefore presented as a framework for the evaluation. How involved organisations and individuals react, is heavily influenced by their preparedness and experience. During the first days after the tsunami, NRC reacted as a typical unprepared organisation. The initial reaction to the tsunami was delayed partly because of uncertainty about NRC s mandate, although there is nothing in the mandate itself restricting NRC from intervention. NRC's main target groups are, however, not necessarily victims from natural disasters. More importantly, NRC did not have the organisational structure or procedures to react in the acute emergency phase. NRC had inappropriate contingency plans, inadequate information management systems and resource mobilisation systems as well as an unclear strategy about how to contribute. Speed and action was prioritised at the expense of planning and deliberations. This resulted in improvised and ad-hoc information collection and dissemination, and the bypassing of existing structures when deciding about activities and resource mobilisation. When NRC was able to integrate post-tsunami activities in their normal structures, performance improved significantly. NRC is familiar with working in emergencies, but the core activities are less relevant in the acute emergency phase. Most of the NRC s programmes are actually directed towards the rehabilitation and recovery phase. NRC should therefore aim to improve deliveries in late emergency, rehabilitation and recovery phases. In hindsight, the hasty and improvised reactions to the tsunami were not necessary. NRC had enough time to organise operations and plan out activities before rushing to the field. v

7 NRC s present core activities related to phases in an emergency Emergency phase Main requirements NRC s present activities Pre-emergency phase Planning, resource allocation, organisational design, emergency or expert teams, networking, training Acute emergency phase Late emergency phase Rehabilitation and recovery Reconstruction and development Life-saving operations such as watsan, health, food, protection, logistics Temporary solutions concerning shelter, security, protection, watsan, health, food and community services, logistics Law and order (security), shelter, infrastructure, community services, economic activities, etc. As for rehabilitation and recovery Emergency rosters for secondment (individuals) Emergency rosters for secondment (individuals) ICLA, distribution, shelter, education, camp management, emergency rosters All NRC s activities are relevant depending on the situation As for rehabilitation and recovery The operations have also revealed some tension areas of overlapping or under-covered responsibilities, and potential contradictions between different activities. Some of the tension areas are: - A potential contradiction between appropriate project implementation and political strategies concerning fund-raising (tension between field offices and HQ Oslo). - A potential contradiction between the need for media exposure and political strategies concerning fund-raising (tensions between the communication department and other departments/units). - Overlapping/under-covered responsibilities between different units/departments concerning human resources and mobilisation of personnel. Even though NRC s post-tsunami operations can be described by ad-hoc and with an apparent lack of pre-planning, the organisation landed on its feet. The organisation and staff-members are flexible enough to improvise where that is required and roll up their sleeves to meet the challenges. Their effort could however be even better if the organisation developed a contingency plan for emergency management operations, conducted yearly training of key personnel based on realistic scenarios, recruited and trained expert teams for rapid deployments to emergency areas and prepared an financial foundation for initial emergency management operations. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in section 8. vi

8 1. Introduction When the tsunami hit and killed people in 12 countries early in the morning December 26 th 2004, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) operated a newly established (July 2004) programme in Sri Lanka and was a more or less sleeping partner in a consortium (CARDI) operating in Indonesia. This presence was, initially, an important argument for NRC engagements in the posttsunami relief work. In strategies and operational plans developed for 2004/05, NRC has emphasised its role as an emergency organisation. However, these plans did not clearly state whether NRC s mandate covered natural disasters. Although this issue has now been addressed, it is still unclear whether NRC really is organised adequately to act as an emergency organisation in instant developing and totally surprising crisis. Organisations aiming to deliver relief services in emergencies characterised by their total surprise (such as earthquakes, tsunamis etc.) require specialised organisational designs and competence. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for this evaluation focus on organisational aspects of NRC s post-tsunami responses 1. The main purpose of this report is to discuss whether NRC managed to perform as an emergency organisation after the tsunami. The evaluation highlights strengths and weaknesses in NRC s emergency organisation both at the headquarters (HQ) in Oslo and in the field operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. It is discussed to what extent NRC has the capability to work in the different phases of an emergency, and what actions are needed to improve NRC s performance in future disasters. The evaluation does not discuss the outcome and beneficiary satisfaction of projects implemented in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. This is not done partly because it is too early to conduct a fair judgement of the projects, but also because a judgement of output would require a different evaluative approach. For the same reasons, the two operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia are not compared. The NRC operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia are different and they face different challenges. Thus, they are also presented in different ways in the report. Extensive interviews have been conducted among headquarters staff in Oslo and in field offices/projects in Sri Lanka (field work period June 27 th July 8 th ) and Indonesia (field work period August18 th 30 th ). Representatives from the NRC office in Geneva, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), local governments in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, donors, UN organisations and other NGOs operating in the two countries have also been interviewed. Written material has been collected through visits to organisations mentioned above, and supplemented by public documents available on the Internet. 1 The ToR (in Norwegian) is enclosed in annex 1. Page 1

9 2. Crisis management organisational dynamics in crisis 2.1. Activities and phases in crisis management Crisis, emergencies, disasters or catastrophes (the various terms relate to scale and impact) develop differently determined by causes and consequences. They can also, as shown in figure 1, be distinguished based on speed of development and termination. Figure 1: A typology of crisis development and termination patterns (Rosenthal et.al. 2001). A fast burning crisis develops instantly and terminates very fast (e.g. plane crash) while a longshadow crisis develops instantly and terminates gradually (e.g. natural disasters, political and economic scandals). The instant development provides some guidelines as to how emergency organisations should structure their work. In order to adequately deal with an occurring crisis, all preparations have to be made in advance. A creeping or slow-burning crisis, on the other hand, starts slowly and terminates gradually (e.g. environmental crisis, famine, low intensity wars). Starting or termination points for such emergencies are actually defined politically. A cathartic crisis develops slowly and is terminated abruptly (e.g. some riots and conflicts, some technological disasters). When dealing with slowly developing crises, emergency organisations could more easily implement measures based on considerations under way. Crisis management 2 consists of four main activities: Mitigation: Sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects. Mitigation distinguishes actions that have a longterm impact from those that are more closely associated with preparedness for, immediate response to, and short-term recovery from, a specific event. Preparedness: Preparedness represents actions that are undertaken to reduce the negative consequences of events where there is insufficient human control to institute mitigation measures. Response: Activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emergency or disaster. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. Recovery: The co-ordinated process of supporting emergency-affected communities in reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of emotional, social, economic and physical well-being. 2 There are numerous definitions of emergency activities and emergency phases. In this report, we use definitions appropriate to NRC s roles and activities in an emergency. They partly correspond to UN terminology, and partly to the terminology used by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Page 2

10 These activities follow to some extent the different phases of any given disaster. There are, however, many views and definitions with regards to phases in emergencies. The United Nations uses several terms, such as: emergency and post-emergency phases. emergency, intermediate, and recovery phases (WHO April 2005). Acute emergencies, protracted/ chronic conflicts and repatriation phases are symbolized as the floor in the NRC house an illustration of NRC as an organization. These situations may overlap and developments may go in either direction (NRC Education Handbook 2003). These terms are far too comprehensive to be useful for our purpose. We therefore need to sharpen a definition to get a clear view on where NRC fits into this picture, and suggest the following phases: The acute emergency phase: The period where the crude mortality rate is substantially elevated because of deprivation of basic needs (i.e. food, shelter, security, water and sanitation, access to primary health care (PHC), management of communicable diseases). Relief organisations focus on life-saving activities and the coverage of basic needs. The late emergency phase: The situation is stabilised in the sense that crude mortality rate is coming down and immediate basic needs are covered. The affected population still face huge problems concerning permanent shelter, community services, social institutions and economic activities. Relief organisations focus on robust, but still predominantly on temporary solutions concerning shelter, security, watsan, health and community services such as education. The rehabilitation and recovery phase: Basic needs are once again secured either at the level prior to the emergency or at the level of the surrounding non-affected population. Recovery is the co-ordinated process of supporting emergency-affected communities in the rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure, and restoration of emotional, social, economic and physical wellbeing. Relief organisations focus on long-term solutions such as law and order, shelter, infrastructure, community services and economic activities. The reconstruction and development phase: This is the phase for long-term solutions, aiming for the reconstruction of private and public buildings, infrastructure, commercial activities and community services such as schools, health centres and public administration. It is often difficult to separate reconstruction from development in practical projects, although it plays an important role in fund-raising activities for relief and donor organisations. However, maybe the most important phase for emergency organisations is the pre-emergency phase. In this phase recruitment of personnel, training and team building, resource allocation, storage of emergency items and networking/ co-operation with other actors will lay the foundation for the performance in emergencies. The pre-emergency phase also encompasses strategic and detailed planning, and acquisition of good practice through drills and exercises. Page 3

11 2.2. The dynamics of crisis management When the crisis hits, some almost universal mechanisms seemingly push the events and influence the behaviour of the main actors. How involved organisations and individuals react, is heavily influenced by their preparedness and experience. 3 Mitigation and preparedness (pre-emergency phase): The main challenge in the mitigation of emergencies and in the implementation of preparedness measures to meet them, is to get key decision makers interested. Normally key decision makers in organisations are overloaded with their daily problems, and have little time to prioritise hypothetical future scenarios. In addition, almost all organisations are designed to handle normal activities. This implies routines and systems for handling expected tasks in a standardised way. The organisational systems will automatically guide attention towards daily operational problems and underestimate the importance of expecting the unexpected (emergencies and disasters). Hence, most leaders are not prepared for the next crisis. This problem is actually strengthened by the fact that most organisations have a tendency to prepare for the last crisis, and not for the next. When a crisis hits, it normally generates frantic activities in the affected community or organisation in order to learn from the crisis. Causes and consequences are analysed, and measures (emergency plans and manuals, technical means, rules and routines, training) are implemented to prevent that something similar will happen again. But an emergency is, almost by definition, an unexpected occurrence appearing in an unplanned fashion. The past crisis will probably never appear again. Hence, the key in planning for the next emergency is to identify where it is possible to pre-plan structures, decision authority, communication channels and logistics as a foundation for improvisation to meet the challenges of the next crisis. If nothing happens for a while, plans and manuals are forgotten or not upgraded, training and exercises are skipped, and the attention towards new emergencies vanish. Hence, when the new crisis emerges it creates chaos and improvisation. The result may be a slow and wavering start of emergency operations and inappropriate decisions that may become difficult to reverse. If the organisation is able to maintain a collective mindfulness 4 towards potential emergencies while continuing to allocate resources and conduct exercises, the probability to succeed in an emergency has shown to be higher. Mitigation and preparedness in the pre-emergency phase is a management responsibility. Response: Expectations to crisis management Victims, next of kin, media, politicians and the public expect that the crisis management teams will respond immediately in a planned and targeted manner when a crisis occurs. It is expected that the management knows exactly what is going on, and that management gives correct and trustworthy information about the emergency. Furthermore, it is of course expected that they will assist in the most efficient way and be able to provide the necessary support to victims, next of kin and public needs. If these expectations are not met, a lack of trust between the management 3 The main sources for this brief description are Kruke & Olsen (2005), Rosenthal et.al (2001), Schneider (1995), and Ursano et.al (1994). To simplify the presentation, distinctions and alternative theories always present in social sciences are kept to a minimum. 4 Through a strategy of collective mindfulness organizations are capable of making sense of planned and unexpected activities in order to remain reliable. Mindfulness preserves the capability to see the significant meaning of and to give strong response to weak signals. A well-developed capability for mindfulness catches the unexpected earlier, when it is smaller, comprehends its potential importance despite the small size of the disruption, and removes, contains, or rebounds from the effects of the unexpected. See Weick et. al (1999) Page 4

12 team, emergency personnel and victims may develop. If so, it could be extremely difficult to reestablish an efficient emergency response. Response: The milling phase (acute emergency phase) The quality of the emergency response depends on the quality of preparedness measures. An acute emergency will always start as a surprise, and create confusion during the first minutes or hours. Governmental and emergency organisations, local authorities, victims and next of kin are trying to find out exactly what is going on. Nobody has the overview or knows the causes and consequences. Information is fragmented, and media only brings bits and pieces of facts based on partial observations and rumours. Even for well trained emergency managers, one of the most difficult decisions is when to push the button and activate the whole emergency machinery. Are we in a crisis now, or should we try to get some more information? Often managers (and especially inexperienced emergency managers) will hesitate and delay operations for minutes or hours because they feel a strong need for more information. Without extensive training, it is difficult for emergency managers to respond quickly and adequately because the whole situation is confusing and stressing. If the actual organisation also has a department in the area where the emergency is developing, different perceptions of reality are likely to occur, calling for close co-ordination. If different organisations are responsible for different areas of operation, the complexity increases and calls for even more co-ordination. This is due to different organisational designs or procedures. However, and perhaps most importantly, organisations (and individuals) with different relations to the emergency and different physical (and mental) distances to the events, tend to develop different views and judgements concerning actual needs and appropriate actions. Response: The rumours phase (acute emergency phase) Very quickly, increasing amounts of inconsistent and confusing information is coming in from different sources and through different channels. Simultaneously, emergency management teams responsible for handling the crisis experience a strong pressure to give correct information to partners and colleagues, governmental authorities and superiors, victims and next of kin, and the media. Reliable information about the situation and needs is still not available. At the same time, unqualified rumours, stories and bits-and-pieces information contribute to information overload. It is almost impossible to distinguish between correct and incorrect information and emergency management teams find themselves with too little and too much information at the same time. Confusion is increasing, both among emergency management teams and among victims. At the same time the situation calls for immediate and clear-cut action, which is difficult and risky to implement when information is lacking or not reliable. In this extremely uncertain situation, emergency management teams may compensate by paying more attention to the sources of information than to the actual information given. Instead of collecting information from actors already at the site, they decide to send their own teams to collect what is regarded as reliable information. Or they collect and use information from sources they normally trust, even though these sources may suffer from the same lack of overview and the same restrictions to information as themselves. One strategy to reduce uncertainty in the decision-making process is to use analogies as a mean to create a better picture of the situation. Analogies mean that nobody has experienced exactly this emergency before, but they may contribute with bits and pieces of experience from other emergencies. They tend to compare directly what happened in the other emergency with the situation in the present emergency. This could of course be useful, but a serious problem arises if previous experiences and the current emergency are not compatible. At this stage in the Page 5

13 development of an emergency, it is hard to know whether the anecdotal experience is relevant. Out in the field where the disaster is developing, both victims, authorities and organisations will develop their own understanding of the situation depending on available information and their own perceptions. They will select and judge information according to what they see and observe. This may create only a partial view because it is difficult to have a full overview. The perception is also likely to differ from that held by for instance a headquarters located far away from the events. Competing interpretations about the situation within the organisation may add to the uncertainty and confusion. Response: Keynoting (late emergency phase) After the first confusing hours or days (depending on the scale of the crisis), some other characteristic response patterns develop within the crisis management team. First, rapid response is preferred at the expense of relevant measures. If there is no time to consider the better solution, measures easy to implement rapidly is prioritised. It is easier to send an assessment team compared to dispatching heavy equipment. It is easier to start doing what the organisation is good at or used to, compared to implementing relevant but unfamiliar operations. Focus is narrowed down to short-term solutions, without paying too much attention to consequences or strategic decisions. In this situation, it is easy to miss the overall perspectives on the situation and also tempting to skip normal procedures (they are regarded as working too slowly). Improvisation tends to replace planned action and formal procedures. The organisational hierarchy is bypassed. Decisions are taken in ad-hoc meetings where a selected group of persons participate independent of their formal position. Information about decisions is communicated randomly without using the ordinary information channels. The external pressure is increasing, due to information overload and external stakeholders interfering with decision-making processes and priorities. Media have managed to assemble bigger pieces of information, can present more comprehensive descriptions about the events, and they are now looking for their own exclusive presentation of the disaster. Neutral information available for everybody is not enough, and media look for the human faces of the disaster. They first identify and interview (desperate) victims in the middle of the disaster, and then they find the hero (who is saving lives and doing all the things that responsible emergency organisations don t manage to do). Later on the crook is identified (who is the responsible person for the tragedy, and for the lack of plans or inappropriate action). The internal uncertainty and external pressure may capture the emergency management team in a group-think situation. When the situation is unclear and the team is very much in doubt about appropriate actions, a strong person with good arguments may take the lead. If the person can present what is seemingly a consistent and logic picture of the situation and preferred actions, it will become very difficult for other people in the group to oppose. Often, the rest of the team will feel relieved that somebody finally can bring in a sense of order in the very stressing situation. Alternative views will not carry any weight. If the description of the situation is incorrect, it can lead to wrong and even dangerous decisions. And when the situation changes (and it will), it is very hard for the team to reassess the situation. The team members are trapped in a group-think situation that is likely to hamper and damage the emergency response. When improvisation replace planned action, decisions are either centralised or decentralised. It has been assumed that in real crisis, decisions are centralised. Superior staff or politicians may skip their own organisational hierarchy and move directly to the site giving orders and advises to the operators on the ground. Or they may interfere directly with decisions made by responsible managers. For them, it is a question of showing vigour and come in a favourable position as leaders. If their behaviour does not make complete sense in relation to the emerging situation, the Page 6

14 result may be confusion and hesitation among managers and operators within the organisation. Unplanned decentralisation may appear simultaneously. Due to lack of information, uncertainty or conflicts within the management team, decisions are not taken. Decisions can also appear as compromises difficult to act upon or totally irrelevant for operators in the field. As a consequence, managers and operators at lower levels have to make their own decisions driven by the events. They often do not communicate their decisions properly, and this also contributes to confusion and to making the emergency interventions slow and wavering. In the official guidelines for national Norwegian contingency planning to meet emergencies, three principles are established to avoid such developments: 1. The principle of responsibility emphasises that departments with a specific sector responsibility, are also responsible for contingency planning, mitigation and preparedness within their sector. 2. The principle of similarity emphasises that the organisational set-up should be more or less similar in normal and crisis situations. 3. The principle of subsidiarity emphasises that an emergency should be handled at the lowest possible level, and managed close to the event. These principles should ensure continuity, efficiency and appropriate response when a crisis hits. This keynoting phase is also an arena for professional positioning. Many promising careers have been aborted due to mismanagement in crisis situation while others are given a flying start. Both individuals and organisations make strategic considerations about their own opportunities and threats in a crisis. For individuals it is a question of future career, for organisations it is a question of future funding and responsibilities. Both individuals and organisations will try to position themselves according to own considerations. This may create conflicts between different actors. Conflicts could be positive when they stimulate to improved performance, and negative when they lead to sabotage of operations or decision criteria based on own career and not the needs present in the emergency. In the middle of the crisis the situation normally develops as follows: Headquarters struggles to establish a picture of the situation, handle the uncontrollable flow of information, satisfy superior interests and implement some actions. They try to rely on organisational procedures or introduce new and seemingly more appropriate procedures on the spot. At the same time, people at the centre of the emergency (victims and relief workers in the field) do not understand why the assistance does not show up, why management do not try to meet emergency needs, and why nobody understands the situation. Victims and relief workers will often create a robust picture of the situation based on observations, rumours and perceptions. This picture will guide their priorities and actions. Often, their priorities and actions are better suited to make a difference in the emergency situation than priorities made in a remote headquarters. Consequently, a perception gap between the headquarters and field workers and victims may develop. This perception gap may dismantle trust between a headquarters and the persons out in the field. If the trust is gone, it will be extremely difficult to conduct successful emergency operations. Moreover, the absence of trust will also make it very difficult to recover from the disaster. Nobody will forget how it all went wrong, and it will be hard to establish the necessary cooperation between the people in the field and the emergency management. If the gap between the headquarters and people in the field remain small, emergency operations will to a large extent be successful. Trust is intact, and the co-operation between different stakeholders in the emergency and in the aftermath may work on smoothly. Page 7

15 Recovery: Rehabilitation and recovery phase In a recovery phase the situation has become clear, time pressure has decreased and stress factors are at an acceptable level. It is time to plan recovery projects, analyse causes and consequences and learn from the crisis. Media is moving from the victim-hero-crook focus on individuals in the emergency, to a focus on systems failure and overall responsibility. Crisis management teams should organise a learning process among superior authorities, own staff, victims and local authorities in the crisis area. This process is often interrupted by politics. Crisis management is a hazardous business, and crisis managers will almost always make decisions during response time that they regret afterwards. If something went wrong due to these decisions, they may have good reasons to hide important lessons learnt. Moreover, organisations and individuals may have interests in defining the emergency operations in specific terms in order to benefit from the disaster (increased budgets for own organisation, increased responsibility in the next crisis, personal career etc.). Thus, the learning process is not a straightforward exercise, but requires a very open and confident organisational culture. But what is there to expect? At this point leaders in society are angry, grief-stricken and full of promises, promises concerning resources for recovery, reconstruction, mitigation and preparedness measures as we wait for the new crisis to come. Crooks are replaced by a formalised and impersonal responsibility where the system has failed (and will be improved). As time passes, and no serious incidents occur, budgets will shrink, awareness will decrease and the risk of new failures in a crisis situation will increase. Consequently, mitigation and preparedness must be a continuous activity for all members of an organisation. This brief presentation, and especially the different phases of emergencies, will guide the presentations and discussions about NRC s post-tsunami responses. Page 8

16 3. Headquarters preparedness and response Contingency planning and established structures in the pre-emergency phase will start the discussions about headquarters preparedness and response, followed by a short discussion about the relation between the mandate and the tsunami as a natural disaster. Then the headquarters response will be discussed in relation to the various emergency phases NRC s co-ordinating mechanisms and contingency planning NRC s Headquarters Structure An organisational chart of the main departments at the NRC headquarters is attached (annex 4). We would like to draw the attention to some aspects of the organisation: Differences in responsibilities between the Emergency Response Unit and the International Department. The emergency standby rosters for secondment to UN operations lie with the Emergency Response Unit while the International Department is responsible for NRC s own programme activities. The Director of Human Resources (Human Resources Manager) is affiliated to the Finance and Administration Department, while the Human Resources Assistants, the Human Resources Co-ordinators and the recruitment staff (recruitment advisor and recruitment officer) are located in the Emergency Response Unit. In accordance with the job description, the Director of Human Resources is responsible for recruitment, on behalf of the Secretary General. The recruitment staff conduct the actual recruitment of all personnel, recruitment for positions at the headquarters, for own programme activities and for the stand-by rosters. The technical advisors (distribution, shelter, education, legal aid and Camp Management) are now being transferred from Technical Support to the International Department Meeting structures There are several types of formalised meetings at the headquarters in Oslo. The board of directors, the management group and the various departments hold regular meetings. The board of directors meetings are mostly dealing with policy issues. The first board meeting after the tsunami took place on February 2 nd 05 according to the ordinary meeting schedule. The management group meetings take place on a weekly basis. Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General and all department directors; Advocacy Unit, Emergency Response Unit, International Department, Department of Communications, Finance and Administration and Technical Support, are represented in the management group meetings. Director of Human Resources is also present. The management group meetings are the main body for formal crossdepartmental co-ordination and a foundation for decision-making. The first management group meeting after the tsunami took place on January 3 rd 05 and was organised ad hoc. All departments have their own internal co-ordination meetings on a weekly or a bi-weekly basis. The purpose of these meetings is mainly internal information exchange. Many informal meetings also take place at the headquarters. These meetings form an important part of the headquarters co-ordination and information exchange structures. Most of these Page 9

17 meetings are however organised on an ad-hoc basis with no minutes. Special attention should therefore be given to raising important issues in formal meetings, for cross-departmental information exchange Written plans, guidelines and directives NRC s Crisis Management Plan outlines actions and responsibilities of those involved in handling incidents affecting NRC personnel worldwide. These incidents are related to medical evacuation, death and kidnapping of NRC staff members. The Crisis Management Plan specifies the responsibility of the Crisis Manager, the person holding the emergency telephone, which is passed between some key staff at the headquarters on a weekly basis. A Crisis Management Team is called together by the Crisis Manager when it is necessary to undertake different actions in order to handle a serious incident. The Crisis Management Plan also specifies responsibilities related to the media/press and the preparation of media strategies. The Crisis Management Plan was applied for the first and so far only time in 2001 in connection with the death of an NRCmember of staff in FYROM (Macedonia). The Policy Paper defines NRC s mandate, target groups and value statements. The policy paper also describes the organisation s areas of priority, such as Advocacy, the Emergency Standby Rosters and programme activities. Field handbooks and manuals describe NRC s programme activities (distribution, shelter, education and ICLA). A Camp Management Toolkit is also available. In addition there are various handbooks detailing start-up procedures, logistics, administration and finance. The Establishing presence (start-up) Handbook (2002) is however still only in draft format, to be tested in the field. Secondments are regulated through formal agreements. NRC has agreements with large UN organisations on providing specific categories of experienced personnel to be seconded on short notice to UN operations. The Emergency Response Unit maintains emergency rosters for this purpose NRC s mandate and the tsunami operation. The immediate reaction among most staff members at the headquarters in Oslo after the tsunami was that NRC would not get heavily involved in the tsunami operation due to its mandate. They saw the tsunami, as a natural disaster, as not for us. Two arguments, however, supported an active involvement for NRC: The size of the emergency and the impact in Norway, NRC was already present both in Indonesia and in Sri Lanka. Clarification of the reasons to start tsunami operations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka was required and welcomed by staff members, but also by board members. We do however not see limiting factors in the mandate for engagement in natural disasters. The mandate does not dictate type of emergency, only the requirement to promote and protect the rights of all people who have been forced to flee their countries, or their homes within their countries providing humanitarian assistance in emergency situations strengthening the capacity of the UN organisations to offer and co-ordinate international aid and protection provide viable, durable solutions with regards to both its spokesman activities and its emergency relief efforts (NRC Policy Paper 2002:2). Page 10

18 Another issue is how post-tsunami engagements fits with NRC s main target group: people who have been forced to flee their countries, or their homes within their country, due to war or conflict (NRC Policy Paper 2002:2). NRC s engagements in natural disasters do not conflict with the mandate, but may conflict with the organisation s target group. However, we do not see this as a problem in the post-tsunami operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, because both countries were conflict areas prior to the tsunami, with displaced populations 5. The tsunami was therefore just another burden on top of the problems already faced by many conflict-affected people, problems calling for increased assistance from humanitarian organisations. To distinguish between conflict IDPs and tsunami IDPs would be impossible in this setting and also be in conflict with the Humanitarian imperative 6. In the next sections, activities are divided into two phases. First phase corresponds roughly with the pre-emergency - and the acute emergency phases, while the second phase corresponds roughly with the late emergency and rehabilitation and recovery phases The NRC Headquarters post-tsunami efforts First phase The discussion of the first phase of the NRC Headquarters post-tsunami effort includes the following issues: Management, structures and routines; communications, mobilisation of resources, relevance of NRC s core activities in natural disasters, and the development of strategies and plans for further operations. Phase Period from to NRC activities Pre-emergency phase Before December 26 th 2004 Emergency standby rosters Acute emergency phase From December 26 th 04 to medio January 05 Information seeking and improvised mobilisation of personnel. Late emergency phase From mid-january 05 to Acquisition of financial resources, Rehabilitation and recovery Reconstruction and development ultimo March From ultimo March 05 to indefinite From July 05 to indefinite Table 1: Activities at the headquarters in Oslo recruitment of personnel. Routine based monitoring and passive supervision, acquisition of financial resources. Routine based monitoring and passive supervision, acquisition of financial resources. Planned redraw March 06 In table 1, we have plotted main activities at the headquarters in relation to emergency phases presented in the previous chapter. In the tsunami context, we discovered considerable overlapping of phases, especially between the late emergency phase and the rehabilitation and 5 In Aceh: The 30-year-old conflict between the Indonesian military and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) In Sri Lanka: The civil war that started in 1983 between the Sri Lankan Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 6 The humanitarian imperative:...the right to receive humanitarian assistance and a right to offer it... (UNICEF July 2003, ICRC 1995). Page 11

19 recovery phase. Learning forms an important part of the activity in all phases, but with particular focus after the emergency phases. More information about learning is found later in this chapter Management Initial situation analysis and perception of reality took a long time to trickle down in the organisation. NRC spent 35 hours to decide that NRC should mobilise resources and engage in the tsunami relief operations. The decision to be engaged in the tsunami operations was made in the afternoon on December 27 th The earthquake at 07:58 local time December 26 th 2004 unleashed the tsunami that hit Aceh minutes later, at approximately 0215 Norwegian time, Sri Lanka around 0820 (0320 Norwegian time) and several other countries in the region. Deputy of the International Department, as the duty Crisis Manager, received a call from SLMM in Sri Lanka around 0500 in the morning (Norwegian time), informing about a wave and that everything was okay with the SLMM team, including staff seconded from NRC. The Crisis Manager forwarded this information to some key staff members at the headquarters, in accordance with the Crisis Management Plan. The Crisis Manager also contacted the Resident Representative in Sri Lanka and received confirmation from him that no staff had been injured or killed. Until halfway through December 27 th there was a common agreement that NRC would not get involved in post-tsunami operations. Deputy of the International Department and Secretary General then agreed that NRC could not sit inactive as the devastating effects of the tsunami started to become clear and the other humanitarian organisations in Norway mobilised. Director of the Communications Department was then asked by Deputy Director of the International Department to contact the Norwegian Broadcasting Company (NRK) and TV2 to include NRC in the humanitarian fund raising campaign. No detailed decisions were however made concerning NRC priorities in the field. The information received from NRC s own people on the ground, the UN system, and through media, did not give clear guidelines for decisions. As in most huge emergencies, lack of information delayed decision-making, especially as long as no adequate contingency plans were in place. Assessment teams were therefore deployed to Sri Lanka on December 29 th, and to Indonesia on January 1 st Abandonment/maintenance of normal organisational structures and routines The key players initially involved in tsunami-related decision-making were the Deputy of the International Department, the Secretary General, the Director of International Department and the Director of Communications Department. Initially there was an unclear or vague division of responsibility and structuring of the activity at the headquarters, such as participation in the initial information exchange, planning and decision-making. We seem to witness both abandonment and maintenance of normal routine procedures: Existing work plans and holiday schedules were still respected to a great extent. Ad hoc structures were put in place to structure the activity at the headquarters, maybe due to lack of plans and directives on how to handle this situation. Even though the week between Christmas and New Years Eve was an ordinary working week, and many staff members therefore worked as normal, many other staff members were on Page 12

20 Christmas holiday. Some of them returned to work voluntarily due to the tsunami, while others called headquarters and were told to continue their holiday and that they would be called upon if required. A few staff members were called for, especially staff members asked to participate in assessment teams. Some staff members had routine tasks to fulfil, while others, such as staff members in the recruitment section, conducted planned interviews. Key personnel, such as the directors of the Emergency Response Unit, the Advocacy Unit and Finance and Administration Department, were allowed to leave for or to continue their holidays. Seemingly, pre-planned tasks, routine operations and the Christmas holiday schedule were to a great extent respected also after the effect of the tsunami became clear and the decision to launch a tsunami operation was made. Most staff members interviewed stated that the initial co-ordination at the headquarters appeared to be on an ad-hoc basis; ad-hoc meetings, ad-hoc information exchange, and ad-hoc division of responsibility. Co-ordination meetings were conducted spontaneously whenever deemed necessary. Staff members talked to people they met in the corridor. Both staff and board members sough information on an individual basis. No formal summons was issued during the first few days. Participation in meetings, such as the first meeting December 27 th, was random. Deputy of the International Department headed the meeting on December 27 th. Participants came from most departments, but only those who were at the office anyway. Staff members present at the headquarters were to some degree involved in the initial phase of planning and information gathering and information exchange. However, those staff members, and thereby functional areas, that did not voluntarily show up at these initial meetings, were to some extent left out. Key staff members, such as Director of Technical Support, volunteered to join the meeting on December 30 th after asking for two days if her presence was desired. Even though she did not receive a response, she voluntarily came in because she felt she had something to contribute 7. Another example is the recruitment section in the Emergency Response Unit. Both the Recruitment Advisor and the Recruitment Officer were present some of the days between Christmas and New Years Eve. They were involved in routine activities, and were not called upon for the upcoming ad-hoc recruitment campaign. We are aware that the decision to launch the ad-hoc recruitment campaign is still questioned at the headquarters. We do however also question why this campaign was not handed directly over to the recruitment section after the decision had been made. The ad-hoc division of responsibility is also reflected in the initial decision-making process. The decision to get involved in post-tsunami relief operations was taken by a few key staff members at the headquarters. But an emergency team, in accordance with the Crisis Management Plan, or the management group, was not called in for the decision-making process. Ad-hoc meetings and phone calls constituted the foundation upon which crucial decisions were made. Director of International Department headed an information exchange meeting just prior to his departure for Sri Lanka on December 29 th. The Secretary General called for another meeting on December 30 th. Both meetings were only for the staff members that were present. The first management group meeting after the tsunami, an ad-hoc meeting, took place on January 3 rd. This was the first formal cross-departmental meeting after the tsunami. A second ad-hoc meeting was organised on January 5 th. These meetings, more than a week after the disaster, are the first attempts to utilise existing organisational structures at the headquarters to handle post-tsunami operations. 7 She was the Crisis Manager in 2001 when the NRC staff member was killed in FYROM (Macedonia). Page 13

21 Communications between headquarters and field operations: Too much and too little information at the same time The country desks in the International Department are normally the place to ask for information with regard to NRC s programme activities. The Resident Representatives are almost daily in contact with their respective desks. The Resident Representatives provide formal reports on a routine basis in addition to ad-hoc reports whenever required. After the tsunami the initial flow of information was quite different: It was difficult to get accurate information about the situation in Sri Lanka from own staff due to the initial confusion in the affected areas. CARDI in Indonesia did not report to the NRC headquarters in Oslo and the acting Country Director was not allowed to enter the emergency areas in Aceh until December 29 th, three days after the tsunami. Information from the UN system in Geneva was submitted to NRC headquarters and the field offices through the organisations own representative in Geneva. After she returned to work January 3 rd, she provided much information from her network in Geneva and from the Tsunami Task Force. The Secretary General maintained his contact with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and in particular with one of the political advisors. MFA struggled with own constraints and did not have much additional information. Besides, MFA was initially fully occupied with the rescue of Norwegian citizens in Thailand. Extensive information through media did not provide appropriate guidelines for action. A simultaneous lack of information and information overload is typical in disasters. In order to collect reliable and relevant information, NRC reacted as most organisations (without preplanned operations in the disaster) do in similar situations. They decided to collect the information directly, which ultimately led to strong centralised procedures for handling information: The Secretary General and the Deputy Director of the International Department had become directly involved in the communication process. The deployment of the Director of International Department as chief of the assessment team to Sri Lanka changed the information exchange routine between the field and headquarters in Oslo. With the Director on the ground, it was natural for the Resident Representative to report to him. The Director of the International Department then reported back to the Secretary General. The result was a by-pass of the desk. A centralisation of information channels often initiates informal channels of information that are not part of the centralised network. Thus, available information at the headquarters was disseminated through informal channels, person-to-person dissemination, ad-hoc meetings, as well as meetings in the corridors, during lunch breaks, etc. Some information was also available through s. The Deputy Director of the International Department had a strong hands-on position with regards to information dissemination Mobilising of resources The mobilisation of resources started late on December 27 th. Resources mean in this context time, personnel, equipment and funds. Page 14

22 Time One aspect of emergencies is the time constraints. Emergency managers often feel that they do not have sufficient time for information gathering and decision-making. Most often there is however more time than expected, even during emergencies. The initial post-tsunami operations at the headquarters are characterized by time perceived constraints and the requirement for fast decision-making. We now know that the first implementation of projects in the field started 5-6 weeks after the tsunami. This should indicate sufficient time for planning and execution of the NRC post-tsunami operations. Mobilisation of personnel: Action before planning Mobilisation of personnel at the headquarters Some departments and units became heavily involved, such as the International-, the Finance and Administration- and the Communications departments as well as the Emergency Response Unit. Departments were initially stretched with regard to manning and post-tsunami operations came on top of planned activities. One desk was responsible both for Sri Lanka and Indonesia, since only minor programme activities had taken place in these countries prior to the tsunami. When the post-tsunami operations commenced, the desk suddenly faced a much larger workload. When NRC realised the increased burden, the desk was split in two, one for each country. The Programme Coordinator continued with the Sri Lanka desk, while another staff member took over the Indonesia desk. This staff member was soon replaced. In early April, the Indonesia desk was again merged with the Sri Lanka desk. And then in May the desks were once more split. Key personnel in Administration and Finance Department, and especially in Technical Support and the International- and Communications Departments were absent due to: Temporary transferrals from one department to another, Engaged in tsunami-related fund-raising activities, Field visits to NRC offices in Africa, Deployments as part of assessment teams to Indonesia and Sri Lanka and also later field trips to Sri Lanka by the shelter- and the education advisors and camp management staff. The improvised recruitment campaign could not be handled with existing personnel resources. The Deputy Director of the International Department and the Director of Human Resources therefore asked a former Director of Human Resources to assist in the recruitment campaign. Another previous staff member was called in to sort applications. Mobilisation of standby personnel Mapping of suitable candidates from the emergency stand-by rosters had already started when the headquarters received the early heads up-signals from the UN system. NRC did in this respect actively take part in early emergency operations through seconding personnel to UN organisations working in the emergency areas. In a report to the board of directors meeting February 2 nd, the Emergency Response Unit reported 11 secondments of emergency personnel from the stand-by rosters so far and secondments of an additional 8 by mid February. NRC seconded a total of 39 emergency personnel from the stand-by rosters the three first months 8. 8 To UN-OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP and SLMM. Page 15

23 The utilisation of personnel at the headquarters during the first week indicates that in areas were NRC already had established routines to handle an emergency, the organisation performed well and according to plan. In functional areas (and departments) designed to handle creeping crises, with time to plan underway, improvisation overran planned activities. Mobilisation of assessment teams After the decision to mobilise a tsunami response, short-term (1-2 weeks) assessment teams were formed and deployed to Sri Lanka and Indonesia on short notice. Their mandates were to identify areas and projects were NRC could offer assistance and start operations. These teams were therefore not ordinary assessment teams, as specified in for instance the Establishing presence (start-up) Handbook (2002): Deciding to do an assessment is not a decision to go ahead, but rather an attempt at seeking the necessary information to make an educated decision about further action (p. 14). For further information about assessment teams and mandates/terms of reference, we refer to the draft version of the Establishing presence (start-up) Handbook (2002) and other handbooks (USAID 1998, UNHCR 2000, WFP 2002). These teams were predominantly manned with personnel from the headquarters: Sri Lanka team: o Team leader (Director International Department) o Information advisor from Communications Department o A construction engineer o A logistician (already present in Sri Lanka) Indonesia team: o Team leader o Shelter advisor (from Technical Support) o Donor advisor (External relations in International Department)) The output from these assessments is questionable. The ad-hoc nature of this operation is reflected in the composition of teams, mandates/terms of references and lack of preparations. The mandates/terms of references were very open. At the same time, the composition of the teams indicates that it had already been decided to engage in rehabilitation and reconstruction of houses and public buildings. If that was the case, it is not very clear why the teams had to leave that early. In the first days after a disaster like this, life saving operations will have priority and occupy all energy and resources of relevant actors. Besides, sending key personnel from the headquarters to the field before the situation in the headquarters had been stabilised, is normally not a good strategy. When also the field situation is chaotic, the contribution of key decision makers will be more important if they remain at the headquarters. Mobilisation of emergency personnel for own programmes in Indonesia and Sri Lanka The post-tsunami operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia were at the headquarters in Oslo perceived as requiring a substantial amount of personnel, both seconded personnel to UN operations and for own programmes. Several strategies were used to recruit personnel for own programmes: Staff members at the headquarters planned an ad-hoc recruitment campaign in the period December st and publicised a request for emergency personnel on the Internet on December 31 st. The emergency standby rosters, predominantly dedicated to UN secondments, were screened for NRC employment candidates. Staff members personal networks were extensively exploited. Page 16

24 NRC s routine programme operations have brought about a long-term routine recruitment strategy. In emergency settings there is no time for routine recruitment campaigns, while standby emergency personnel are not available for emergency settings involving the organisations own field operations. Without a pre-planned strategy for emergency recruitment, short-term improvisation may overrun long-term considerations. This happened in two ways during the tsunami operation: Direct recruitment based on staff members individual knowledge of feasible candidates. Ad-hoc recruitment campaign planned and executed by a few key personnel at the headquarters, not involving the recruitment section. The ad-hoc recruitment campaign was a failure in terms of expanding personal resources. Two reasons for that can be mentioned: Time pressure Deviation from established recruitment routines. A staff member in the recruitment section stated that time pressure entails recruiting people we know already. We have witnessed direct recruitment of emergency personnel to the operations in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia based on personal contacts among the staff in NRC, reduction of qualification requirements and deviation from the routine full-scale screening of candidates, to be able to provide personnel. The Emergency Response Unit objected to the recruitment campaign referring to experiences made prior to the planned Iraq campaign in The campaign still went ahead, but initially not with the recruitment section in charge. We recommend that NRC, even during emergencies, try to stick to established routines and structures where that is possible. The response to the recruitment campaign was overwhelming. More than 1800 people responded, still in the period when the headquarters was understaffed due to the holiday. A proper response to all enquiries and applications had however not been co-ordinated or standardised, and the available staff were not adequate to meet the response. When the recruitment section returned to work on January 3 rd, they were met by hundreds of s from persons wanting to work for NRC. Only some very few met the required standards: relevant international experience, and/or sufficient knowledge about NRC, and/or start-up experience, and/or critical professional qualifications. At the end of the day, only two persons were recruited from the campaign and deployed to the emergency area, while an additional two were trained and deployed to programme operations in Africa. The criteria stated in the advertisement were not accurate enough to filter out undesired or irrelevant applications. The campaign generated a heavy workload with an extremely marginal benefit. On the other hand, the campaign can be seen as a great media success (see section 6) illustrating the complex and also conflicting goals and sub-goals NRC has to relate to. Mobilisation of equipment The initial requirement for equipment came from the assessment teams. Prior to departure, there were particular requirements for laptops, cell phones and sat phones. NRC does not store emergency boxes containing technical equipment in case of emergency deployment of assessment teams. Technical and logistical expertise at the headquarters did however manage to provide the required equipment on short notice. Page 17

25 Mobilisation of funds NRC has some limited funds at the Secretary General s disposal for ad-hoc requirements during crisis, since early engagement in emergencies normally requires the tapping of own funds 9. The funds are only meant for the start up-phase, not for ongoing relief operations (e.g. early distributions, rehabilitation and reconstruction). NRC was therefore dependent on external donors for the implementation of large-scale post-tsunami relief operations. According to their tradition, NRC looked to MFA for funds, and did initially receive positive signals. However, it soon became evident that MFA was hesitant to financing NRC s tsunamirelated operations, especially in Indonesia. The Minister of International Development is in charge of allocating funds to development operations and also gap -operations such as the tsunami operation, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for funds related to natural disasters. Both countries, and in particular Sri Lanka, form part of Norway s foreign policy commitments. Eventually, NRC received funds for operations in Sri Lanka (NOK 30 million as expected), but only NOK 6 million for the Indonesia operations (early expectations were NOK 30 million). NRC looked for a number of different donors in both countries. A strategy in Sri Lanka was to obtain funding from different donors, based on pre-tsunami problems in funding the activity. The Indonesia operations have followed the same strategy, but basically due to limited support from MFA, causing a high-risk profile regarding financial coverage, and several projects have been started without sufficient funding. The post-tsunami operations illustrate the problems of engaging in large-scale fast-burning or long-shadow crises without a necessary financial reserve Relevance of NRC s core activities in post-tsunami operations NRC s core activities are all directed towards strengthening international protection of refugees 10 and IDPs 11. A strategy aiming for early engagements in fast-burning or long-shadow crises will also affect these activities. General phase Main requirements NRC s present activities Pre-emergency phase Planning, resource allocation, organisational design, emergency or expert teams, networking, training Emergency rosters for secondment (individuals) Acute emergency phase Life-saving operations such as watsan, health, food, protection, logistics Emergency rosters for secondment (individuals) 9 For 2005, this amount to NOK 2.75 million. 10 Refugee: A refugee is a person who is outside her or his country of origin and who is unwilling or unable to return there because of (Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 2003): A well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; or A threat to life or security as a result of armed conflict or other forms of widespread violence that seriously disturbs the public order. 11 Internally displaced person: Persons who have had to flee largely for the same reasons as refugees but have remained within the boundaries of their own country. Typically, IDPs have been displaced because of armed conflict and other types of violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters (Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 2003). Page 18

26 Late emergency phase Rehabilitation and recovery Reconstruction and development Temporary solutions concerning shelter, security, protection, watsan, health, food and community services, logistics Law and order (security), shelter, infrastructure, community services, economic activities etc As for rehabilitation and recovery ICLA (Protection) Distribution Shelter Education Camp management Emergency rosters All NRC s activities are relevant depending on the situation As for rehabilitation and recovery Table 2: Relevance of NRC s core activities in fast-burning and long-shadow crises NRC is presently (autumn 2005) not designed to engage in acute emergency operations due to the following reasons: NRC is not specialised in the core activities needed in the acute phase (except protection). NRC does not have adequate contingency plans or an organisation trained for acute emergencies. NRC does not have pre-organised teams or the necessary stockpiles of equipment. NRC does not have the necessary funds for acute emergency operations on its own. NRC s emergency rosters and ICLA s protection activities aimed at displaced populations are relevant with regards to acute emergencies, even though ICLA projects are normally established after the emergency phases and after thorough assessments (NRC ICLA Handbook 2004). NRC s programme activities are founded on a different set of logic compared to requirements for acute emergencies. The existing logic of the International Department is based on context specific planning, ample room for preparations and incremental build-up of programme activities. Engagement in the early emergency phases after unexpected natural disasters require that organisational structures, teams, tasks and activities, equipment, medium-term funding and the co-operation with complementary partners is established, tested and trained in the preemergency phase. Adequate response to fast-burning or long-shadow crises requires a speed of operations and immediate availability of resources that NRC does not currently possess. On the other hand, NRC is well equipped to meet needs and manage projects in the late emergency- and the rehabilitation and recovery phases. According to representatives for UN- OCHA, this is also the phases with the biggest assistance gaps. There are too many organisations trying to operate in the early emergency phases, probably because of the possibility of high media profile. This overload in the early phases creates bottlenecks, confusion, lack of coordination and inefficiency. Reliability in humanitarian operations, understood as best possible utilisation of funds directed towards the beneficiaries, will therefore in this case mean the involvement in the late emergency- and in the rehabilitation and recovery phases. In the wake of the tsunami, people and organisations already present in the emergency areas conducted most of the lifesaving during the first 72 hours. The added value of the first organisations coming in is difficult to specify, beyond the prevention of epidemics diseases, probably thanks to organisations providing clean drinking water and vaccinations. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and UN Emergency relief Co-ordinator, reported, sixteen days Page 19

27 after the tsunami hit Asia, excellent progress in averting a second wave of disease and suffering (UN-OCHA January 11 th 2005). The major requirement for assistance during the acute emergency phase centres on water and sanitation, food, health services and protection Development of strategies and plans for further operations We have found a lack of planning in the pre-emergency phase, resulting in ad-hoc improvisation of activities during the first phase after the tsunami. This improvised activity may also be due to the Christmas holiday, and related absence of key staff members from several departments. Most of the ad-hoc activity at the headquarters in Oslo during the first days of the post-tsunami period appeared to be replaced by more formalized activity in early January. People were coming back from holiday and also from the assessment trips and gradually got engaged in the tsunamioperation in a more systematic manner. Decisions were made to initiate tsunami-operations in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but the details were still to be finalized. Much of the planning from now on took place in the field, while the headquarters focused on providing personnel and fund-raising activities. A pre-planned change of logo and name was also underway The NRC Headquarters post-tsunami efforts second phase The tsunami operation was a main topic at the board of directors meeting February 2 nd, but at the next meeting, on April 6 th, the tsunami operation was only one of many topics. The minutes from the management group meetings reflect a similar pattern in the end of January and early February. This should indicate a step towards normalization of the tsunami activity at the headquarters. A key indicator for performance in long lasting emergencies is how fast operations can be normalised and incorporated into daily routines. We have found it difficult to accurately state when the second phase started at the headquarters and it may even differ from one department to another. We have however experienced a change in the overall operation around mid January. This also corresponds with a transition from an acute to a late emergency phase in the field, especially in Indonesia. Jan Egeland stated in a mail to the OCHA IASC members and working groups on January 18 th that a transition to recovery and transition was taking place in several countries (Egeland 2005) Management The centralisation of decision-making and information management that occurred the first couple of weeks were to a great extent replaced by more routine structures throughout January. January 3 rd marks the first steps away from ad-hoc structures back to formal structures: Most staff returned to work after the Christmas holiday. The manning of most departments went back to normal levels and key decision-makers in the different departments took hold of their responsibilities. The management group was called together on January 3 rd for the first formal meeting (an extraordinary meeting) after the tsunami. Another extraordinary meeting followed on January 5 th, before the management group meetings returned to the routine weekly schedule from January 11 th. When the first set of requests for personnel from the UN settled, the majority of the Emergency Response Unit returned to some sort of normalcy. The recruitment section, with the additional staff members, did however face a heavier workload all through the spring, even though they Page 20

28 soon moved away from ad-hoc recruitment to routine (+) operations. The Finance and Administration Department was stretched already prior to the tsunami especially with regard to the personnel section and the controllers. The International Department was involved mainly through the desks, the Head of Asia Section, the Advisor External Relations and the Director. The workload has been much heavier than prior to the tsunami, resulting in for instance a splitting of the Sri Lanka/Indonesia desk into two separate desks twice, and several rotations of the position as Indonesia Programme Co-ordinator. Director of the Communications Department was initially heavily involved in the tsunami operation and also in the change of name and logo. The department did also deploy one Information Officer as part of the assessment team to Sri Lanka. The Communications Department was however understaffed, both due to the tsunami and also because of long-term involvement in fund-raising activities. This is discussed in more depth in the media chapter Mobilising of resources Manning continued to be a hot topic also through January, and is still an area that requires special attention, both at the headquarters and in the field. A presentation at the Resident Representative seminar in June 5 th -10 th held by the Recruitment Advisor in the Emergency Response Unit, stress that recruitment to field is not working well enough, resulting in gaps between supply and demand and that it takes too long to recruit and deploy core personnel (Gjelten 2005B). To co-ordinate manning requirements, morning meetings between the Emergency Response Unit and the International Department took place during the first month. There have been several challenges with regard to manning: Continuity is a requirement for key positions at the headquarters, but the requirement for continuity is even more important in the field, with high-speed operations. We have found a lack of continuity during replacement of positions in the field. Responsibilities have temporarily been handed over to other field workers, but they are often already struggling with heavy workloads and may not be particularly experienced in the area in question. The system for handling replacement of personnel in the field should therefore be improved. We have seen a lack of available experienced personnel in the initial phase of the tsunami operation, but also later in the process, causing a requirement for temporary solutions in the field. Requests for personnel both from UN and from own programme activities have, together with limited personnel resources available, especially for programme operations, created some tension between the Emergency Response Unit and the International Department. Emergency equipment requirements are mainly an issue in the initial phase of an emergency. NRC has good routines for providing equipment on a routine basis. The tsunami does also distinguish itself from most of the emergencies where NRC is operating because the societies, except a narrow coastline, were intact both in Sri Lanka and in Indonesia, and it is possible to buy almost everything you need in both countries. The return to more routine operations during the second phase of the headquarters post-tsunami efforts did therefore not provide particular challenges with regards to emergency equipment. The responsibility for securing funding of the programmes in Indonesia rests with the headquarters and also with the Resident Representative. In a situation with lack of funding, we would like to see more headquarters involvement, both in planning of the scale of activities on the ground, in providing technical advice and finally with regard to donor contact. Abandonment Page 21

29 of the operations is often not a good solution, especially because the organisation already has invested much into administrative costs and also because of the unspoken promises towards the affected population through NRC s planning processes and field level assessments Responsibility and decision-making The strategy- and plan development concerning field operations is a co-ordinated effort between the field and the headquarters. Three issues are particularly important in this co-ordinated effort: responsibility, decision-making authority, and implementation. Delegation of decision-making authority does not automatically entail delegation of responsibility and vice versa. NRC Oslo retains overall responsibility for all financial matters in the organisation (NRC Financial Handbook 2002). Implementation of these responsibilities is delegated to for instance the resident representatives and the project managers. Resident representatives have decision-making authority with regard to the daily running of the operations. The field has the mandate to take the necessary decisions to establish the project, to recruit the national staff and make the necessary agreements and co-ordination with co-operating UN agencies and NGOs (NRC Shelter Handbook 2003). This is in line with management of emergencies at the lowest possible level, close to the event, as specified in the principle of subsidiarity. Even though the headquarters may delegate extended decision-making authority to the field level, this does not entail delegation of responsibility. The headquarter has the overall responsibility for the operations and must therefore maintain sensitivity to the ongoing operations, through attention to real-time information (Endsley 1997). Sensitivity to operations may also be called situational awareness, defined as the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future (Weick et.al. 1999). Trust is of course an important aspect in the relationship between the headquarters in Oslo and the field offices, but it is still necessary for the headquarters to follow up operations at field level, both in terms of technical aspects of the programmes and the overall activity. One of the reasons for field visits from the headquarters is in fact to get a more detailed overview of what is going on. This dual relationship between responsibility and decision-making authority is reflected in much of the activity in the late emergency phase, with the planning of future programmes, and later on the implementation in the recovery and rehabilitation phase, and it is especially important with regards to funding. Experiences from the two country programmes are different in terms of headquarter control, also during the different phases of the emergency. During the initial phase of the operations in Sri Lanka, NRC staff felt that some key decisions were forced upon them from Oslo. Personnel were for instance deployed without sufficient consultation with the country office. The operation in Indonesia had to start from scratch since CARDI was not operational. The Resident Representative in Indonesia reports that they basically feel free to conduct the operations without much involvement from the headquarters. Page 22

30 The tsunami operation as a learning process Even though the Shelter Handbook (2003) specify that NRC is an organisation aiming for a high ability to learn from its past and present work, we could not identify any structured overall system for handling lessons learned, such as collection, staffing, dissemination, integration and filing. Some learning activities take place, such as the mandatory appraisal forms being implemented and presentations by some field workers upon return. While one staff member told us about the satisfaction of being able to talk about and thereby hand over his experiences to headquarters staff, another staff member mentioned a reception where the headquarters were not particularly interested in the experiences, that the headquarters knew what they needed to know Impact on other operations Acute emergencies will always have an impact on ordinary operations. We have also witnessed that ordinary routine operations had an impact on the tsunami operation. Emergency organisations must in the pre-emergency phase agree on priorities during emergencies. The resources available are hardly ever adequate to maintain both routine- and emergency operations simultaneously. We have seen that the NRC headquarters maintained planned activity, such as the holiday plans, during the initial phase of the emergency, and have also stated that the emergency should bring about changes in planned activity. This is a matter of giving priority to the most pressing issues. The tsunami operation has in periods drained the organisation of resources: Large invested effort in the ad-hoc recruitment campaign, Advisors and other headquarters staff have travelled to the emergency areas especially in the start-up phase, but also in later phases, for assessments, but also to conduct camp management training (in Sri Lanka) and security and logistic inspections. Own funds have been allocated and spent. Especially during the initial phase of the post-tsunami operations, focus did to some degree shift temporarily from other programme countries to the tsunami operations, especially with regard to manning. Even though the headquarters initially stated that other programme countries should not suffer because of the tsunami operations, manning of positions in the other programme countries was delayed due to tsunami-related increase in workload. The headquarters stated that they would not transfer personnel from other operations, but were not entirely able to keep that promise. Some planned activity at the headquarters was delayed, for instance the work on establishing expert-teams and proposed internal seminars. Smaller-scale seminars were arranged later on, but the work on expert teams has still to commence. The Communications Department has struggled with reduced manning and delays in the repositioning activities Co-operation with external actors and partners NRC is usually co-operating with many external actors, both at headquarters level and at field level, so also during the tsunami operations. The field level will be detailed in chapter 4 and With reference to the board of directors meeting on April 6 th. Page 23

31 The co-operations between the headquarters and different donors organisations has been important both for NRC as an organisation, but especially for the beneficiaries in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The domestic fund-raising activity is mentioned both in chapter 4 and 5, but also in chapter 7 (Fund-raising: Strategy and Outcome). We have also mentioned the co-ordination with the MFA concerning funding/lack of funding of the activity in the field. NRC s office in Geneva was a focal point for contact with the Geneva-based UN organisations. The Geneva office managed to be invited as a member of the Tsunami Task Force established by the IASC. This proved to be a major source of information concerning what was going on in the tsunami areas. NRC did however not provide much information the other way and missed therefore a good opportunity to position and promote the organisation. The NRC Geneva office did also manage to get NRC into the Flash Appeal published by UN- OCHA January 6 th. In the Flash Appeal, NRC appeared as: One of UNHCR s partners in Sri Lanka with regard to shelter and non-food items, and transport and logistics. Implementing organisation in Indonesia with regards to family shelter and non-food items, and education Summary: Headquarters preparedness and response The co-ordination mechanisms (meeting structures, plans, guidelines, directives) only pay attention to emergencies striking the organisation directly (own losses and operational problems). The mechanisms are not designed to handle fast burning and long-shadow crises calling for external relief interventions. The emergency plan does not focus on such issues, the formal meeting structure is too slow to react adequately, and no additional structure in case of emergencies is in place. NRC headquarters has no adequate plans or organisational designs prepared in the preemergency phase. The result was: Abandonment of existing organisational structures during the acute emergency phase. Initial hesitation about involvement. Centralisation of decision-making and information management. Improvisation overrunning planning and long-term considerations. Inadequate personnel planning and utilisation. Arbitrary recruitment with consequences for project implementation. Priority to action rather than planning. Too much and too little info at the same time without the capacity to adequately filter and sort the information. Lack of or inadequate terms of reference, for assessment teams, deployment of programme officers and deployment of camp management trainers. Core activities are not appropriate for the early emergency phase, but well suited for late emergency and recovery phases where the big gaps are. Other issues: Good mobilisation of personnel from the emergency roster, which is specifically designed to operate in acute emergencies. Where NRC has plans and routines, they perform well. Page 24

32 An overall NRC emergency plan detailing the required actions in emergencies must be made. May be built on the existing Crisis Management Plan and contain as a minimum: o a notification overview (who is responsible for contacting who) o responsibilities and composition of a crisis management team. The Emergency plan must be exercised based on relevant emergency scenarios. A system for collection and dissemination of information is required: o Sources of information. o Responsibility for dissemination of information. o Storage of information (where and by whom). Since NRC is an emergency organisation, then pre-planned activities, such as holidays, travels and courses, must give way for more important requirements following acute disasters. Handling of instant developing crises requires contributions from all key players at the headquarters. Effective emergency management is founded on both planning and improvisation. NRC should increase planning where that is possible, in the pre-emergency phase. The work with the draft version of the Establishing presence (start-up) Handbook (2002) must be continued. Emergency personnel must be recruited and trained prior to deployment. There is no time to conduct ad-hoc recruitment campaigns when acute disasters occur. If NRC wants to be a first phase emergency organisation, then the emergency personnel must be ready to deploy on short notice. A pool of relevant, up to date and tested emergency equipment must be made available for deployments of assessment teams and expert teams on short notice. The personnel must be fully trained in utilising the equipment. The shift from routine- to emergency mode entails a shift in management, resource allocation and also in planning. We have tried to show the requirement to stick to inplace routine strategies where that is possible when moving from routine to emergency mode. The staff normally responsible for certain issues will also normally be the best in handling these issues during emergencies. This does however not entail that all plans and structures should be maintained as during routine operations. Handling of emergencies requires also a better utilisation of the resources available. This means that pre-planned activities must be reconsidered during emergencies to secure best possible utilisation of the resources (personnel, equipment and funds). Perceived shortage of time in the initial response. The practice, also confirmed through interviews, reveal a highly motivated staff at the headquarters with a strong dedication towards delivering humanitarian assistance in the tsunamiaffected areas in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Page 25

33 4. The tsunami response in Sri Lanka 4.1. Overview of events NRC started operations in Sri Lanka in July By December, the organisation had two international staff and one national: The Resident Representative and a driver in Colombo, as well as a small project team in Vavuniya headed by a Programme Manager who had arrived in November 13. Programme activities were long-term and encompassed the construction of permanent houses for returned conflict IDPs, whereof 20 had been constructed so far, under ZOA's (Dutch refugee care organisation) name in the district of Mannar. Programme activities in Mannar and Vavuniya were carried out in close co-operation with DRC (Danish Refugee Council) and ZOA. Setting up office in Sri Lanka involved certain challenges. More than two years had passed since the ceasefire agreement between GoSL and LTTE was signed and NRC found it hard to attract funding for its programmes. In addition, humanitarian work was often hampered by strong but inefficient state regulation coupled with an unpredictable political climate. When the tsunami hit Sri Lanka on December 26 th 2004, it caused nearly 40,000 deaths. Approximately 1 million persons were affected through the loss of relatives, home and/or livelihood. More than 12,000 wells and other freshwater sources were contaminated by seawater (salination). Infrastructure was destroyed or disrupted along two thirds of the Sri Lankan coastline. 10,400 acres of farmland and 27,000 kitchen gardens were ruined. Thousands of livestock were killed, including 148,000 chicken, 7,600 cattle and 14,200 goats. The majority of the affected population have had limited access to water, food and adequate health services, and this was particularly problematic for the 500,000 persons residing in IDP sites or with host families. Thousands of children suffer from traumatic experiences after the tsunami, the suicide rate has risen - especially along widowed men with children, and there has been an escalation of substance abuse and domestic violence. Political killings and difficult negotiations between GoSL and LTTE over the distribution of relief funds have affected the progress of the peace process. Discrepancies between announced plans and actual progress in national reconstruction have led to a general political unrest In Vavuniya, one national staff had started working while several more were ready to start on January 1st. 14 Sources: Sri Lankan authorities, UNHCR, IOM, FAO, Unicef, WHO, UNFPA, UNDP. Page 26

34 4.2. Emergency phases in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami Phase Period from - to NRC activities Pre-emergency phase to December 26 th 2004 Start-up of programme activities construction of permanent shelters for conflict IDPs. Assessment teams, mobilising of personnel. Acute emergency phase December 26 th 04 to ultimo January 05 Late emergency phase February to June 05 Assessment, planning, organizational development, start-up of some tsunami related programme activities. Rehabilitation and recovery June 05 to June 06 Implementation and completion of planned tsunami-related programmes. Continuation of conflictrelated programmes. Reconstruction and development June 05 to December 2012 Table 3: Emergency phases and NRC activities in Sri Lanka 4.3. Status and relevance of NRC programmes Exit of tsunami-part of organisation. Continuation of conflict-related programmes. After the tsunami, no NRC activities in Sri Lanka involved any acute emergency relief to affected populations. Two existing programmes were altered in order to provide late emergency relief and rehabilitation and recovery assistance, while three new programmes were initiated to provide late emergency assistance. Only one of the new programmes was implemented, albeit on a limited scale, during the late emergency phase. The other two have been planned and designed throughout the spring and are due for implementation this autumn, well into the rehabilitation and recovery and the reconstruction and development phases. An overview of the programmes with implementation timelines and donor list can be found in Annex Permanent shelter The Programme was started in late 2004 to provide housing to conflict returnees in the north and northeast. After the tsunami, staff transferred to the Temporary Shelter project and new staff was recruited for the Permanent Shelter programme. This lead to a three-four month delay in the project progress, but plans remain unchanged and programme activities have now been resumed. Permanent Shelter is regarded as a long-term programme and is not tsunami related Temporary shelter After the tsunami, programme staff was transferred from Permanent shelter to Temporary shelter construction to allow programme activities to start as quickly as possible. The programme Page 27

35 activities were to be carried out in Vanni and near the town of Trincomalee. As plans to set up a sub-office in Trincomalee already existed, a sub-office was established there. The programme is seen as a one-off and is entirely tsunami-related with a limited timeframe. Many of the tsunami IDPs benefiting from the programme are however also conflict IDPs. NRC received funding from DFID to construct 2000 temporary shelters, but due to the high number of NGOs offering similar assistance, NRC s caseload was reduced to While NRC was ready to start temporary shelter construction fairly quickly, implementation was hampered by contextual constraints, such as land right issues related to the new coastal buffer zone 15 and GoSL regulation of all shelter assistance. The construction work finally started in March and was completed by the end of August. As part of the temporary shelter programme, 2000 kitchens and 15 transition schools were also constructed School reconstruction Having initially pledged to repair or rebuild all Sri Lankan schools that were totally or partially damaged by the tsunami, the current project MoU with GoSL encompasses 32 schools. Two of these schools are located in the south while the other schools are in the northeast and east. The progress of the programme has been severely hampered by a combination of contextual and internal problems: Prolonged negotiations with GoSL and a change of MoU Many NGOs and large funding involved, making co-ordination difficult and work environment unpredictable Changing requirements from local school authorities and communities Inadequate operational capacity among some staff members Co-operation problems between individual staff members Difficult negotiations with Sri Lankan partners due cultural issues Education Complementing School Reconstruction, this programme will provide psychosocial training to teachers to strengthen their competence in dealing with traumatised pupils. The training programme will be based on an assessment of the education standards in Sri Lanka with special emphasis on access and quality, and a Youth Pack/Rebuilding lives pilot will be conducted in the north and northeast. Involving MoE, local school authorities, UN, the Red Cross movement and other NGOs, the programme planning and preparation of material for the psychosocial training for teachers is well underway. NRC will run the first training modules as a pilot, and they are scheduled to start in October with an eight-month timeframe ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance to IDPs) The programme was planned prior to the tsunami but was considerably expanded because of it. NRC has partnered with local NGOs to provide legal advice and assistance to tsunami-affected families in the north, northeast and east. Much of the assistance concerns land ownership, land 15 After the tsunami, GoSL has prohibited all reconstruction of houses within 200 metres of the sea on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka and within 100 metres on the western coast. The reason given is that this will form a natural defence line against any future tsunamis, but the consequences have been severe for many fishing communities located on the outside of far-stretching lagoons. Page 28

36 rights and relocation, and many cases are related to the introduction of the coastal buffer zone. The programme also includes assistance with legal documentation and the legal rights of children who were orphaned by the tsunami. Offices have been established in six locations: Ampara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Jaffna, Puttalam and Vavuniya Camp management training An agreement was signed between Centre for National Operations (CNO) on behalf of Sri Lankan authorities and NRC, where NRC would provide training to government officials (such as Government Agents and NGOs that were involved in the running of tsunami IDP camps and welfare centres. The training would be based on NRC's Camp Management Toolkit and a team of four trainers visited Sri Lanka from January 27 th to March 8 th /31 st to conduct the training. 2 workshops took place while 3 more that were planned had to be cancelled due to the CNO suddenly closing down. ECHO funded a continuation of the project from April onwards. With the new term 'Site Management Training' emphasis will be put on designing and implementing training programmes that are more contextually appropriate. GoSL has indicated a need for such training and NRC sees this as a good opportunity to develop the competence and scope of its Camp Management Toolkit (primarily developed based on experiences in West Africa) December end January Information December 26 th was a public holiday also in Sri Lanka. Both of NRC's international staff were in Colombo that day. As the news about a giant wave emerged throughout the day, telephone contact was established between the Programme Co-ordinator in Oslo and the Resident Representative in Colombo. However, with limited access to the Internet and TV-stations, the Resident Representative felt that Oslo was better informed about the situation than himself. For Colombo-based NGOs such as NRC, Sri Lankan authorities became the most important source of information. With support from UN, a Centre for National Operations (CNO) was set up on December 29 th. CNO's situation reports were generated from information compiled by GAs at district level and they differed greatly in quality and coherence well into January. Other sources of information in Colombo during this time were word of mouth, meetings with partners (many of which were informal) and national news broadcasts, most of which were in Singhalese or Tamil. UN agencies with an established presence in Sri Lanka, such as UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF also gradually began to produce information reports from sectors relevant for the acute emergency, such as shelter, food distribution and water/sanitation. Within NRC Sri Lanka, most of the information sharing was informal. The Resident Representative briefed each new member of staff upon arrival. A handful of staff meetings were held but until the end of January most communication in the Colombo and sub-offices was informal. As the number of staff grew the need for formal communication grew, but the frequency of staff meetings remained unchanged, if not less. A general notion was that "everyone appeared to be busy with their own tasks". With very few exceptions, however, individual members of staff appeared to collect the necessary information relevant to their work from appropriate and available sources. Many of the NRC staff displayed a high degree of Page 29

37 awareness in terms of cultural sensitivity and contextual constraints, which was also noted by peers and partners in the local humanitarian community Situation analysis On December 29 th, an assessment team travelled from Oslo to Sri Lanka. The team was headed by NRC's Director of International Department and comprised an Information Officer from NRC's Department of Communications, a logistician already present in Sri Lanka, and a construction engineer. Upon arrival the team was given a short brief by the Resident Representative, and the following day the team and NRC's country staff travelled north to Vavuniya. During the journey to Vavuniya, the Director of International Department and the Resident Representative discussed how NRC should react to the tsunami in terms of assistance. Two particular projects were discussed: Temporary shelter construction School reconstruction At this point in time, apart from the Resident Representative's brief, the assessment team had not yet had access to any local information about the situation. Government statistics from the affected districts were still very incoherent and the extent of the damages was unclear. UN's disaster assessment team had started operations on December 29 th but the only reports available at this point in time related to management of communicable diseases and emergency supplies of food, water and basic shelter Communication and co-operation with Headquarters Until December 30 th, the Resident Representative primarily communicated with headquarters through the Programme Co-ordinator. While the Director of International Department stayed in Sri Lanka, the communication link between Colombo and Oslo was by and large moved from Resident Representative- Programme Co-ordinator to Director of International Department Secretary General. The Resident Representative also felt that many of the decision-making processes relating to Sri Lankan operations took place in Oslo without any considerable field input. Sri Lanka desk in Oslo Secretary General's Office Resident Representative Director of Int. Department Figure 2: Communication between Sri Lanka and Oslo When the Director of International Department returned to Norway, the Resident Representative- Programme Co-ordinator link was re-established, except on certain issues pertaining the school rehabilitation programme. Page 30

38 queries from Colombo to Oslo relating to finance, administration and logistics could sometimes go unanswered for a while and in Sri Lanka a feeling grew that staff at the headquarters were overworked or engaged in "other pressing matters" Planning The Resident Representative envisaged a three-month planning period in order to set up tsunamirelated projects that predominantly would fit in between the acute emergency- and the reconstruction and development phases. "We are not an emergency organisation, and the crises we are usually involved in don't happen overnight." While it was clear that "we have to do something", the Resident Representative and the Director of International Department disagreed on what type of assistance NRC Sri Lanka should provide. The Resident Representative regarded shelter construction as well suited with regard to NRC's existing activities, organisational capacities and competence, while the Director of International Department thought school reconstruction would constitute a more tangible project that could also serve as a fundraiser at home and strengthen NRC's visibility and reputation. The school reconstruction programme was also seen as a good way to attract media and public attention. Several members of staff perceive the decision to rebuild all tsunami-damaged schools as driven by a wish to create public attention in Norway, attract a wider range of donor funding, and play in line with the political strategies of Norwegian authorities. Many NGOs wanted to take part in the emergency and rehabilitation operation, and the School Reconstruction plans can be seen as a "competitive scoop" in this context. However, all of NRC's tsunami-related plans were within NRC's core operational areas. Apart from the School Reconstruction project, NRC's tsunamirelated plans in Sri Lanka have by staff been characterised as "sober" and "realistic". The expansion strategy (expanding existing programme activities) is by many staff in Sri Lanka seen as appropriate with regard to the situation on the ground, fieldwork efficiency and organisational development Responsibilities and co-ordination After the tsunami, areas of responsibility were shifted upwards in the organisation, in particular on the school rehabilitation programme. More decisions regarding NRC activities in Sri Lanka were made at Headquarters level, while the responsibility to implement remained at country level. There appears to have been a mismatch between Headquarter level ambitions and the resources available at country level - not financially but in terms of direction and timeframes in relation to contextual feasibility, appropriate staffing and the local field competence. At country level, it was deemed necessary to spend a considerable amount of time on project planning, "as we were not part of the emergency operation, saving lives with food rations". From a Sri Lankan perspective, it seemed like Oslo were recruiting and dispatching programme staff in a hastily manner "so that projects could get off the ground as quickly as possible, as if we were engaged in the actual emergency". While not considerably involved in the HQ recruitment process, the Resident Representative was responsible for all aspects of the new staff arrivals, from accommodation to briefs, office allocation and safety. In order to improve co-ordination at country level, the Resident Representative recruited a liaison officer directly through his local network. A financial officer, already present in Colombo, was also recruited. They started working for NRC Sri Lanka January 12 th and 28 th respectively. After the initial brief with the Resident Representative, new members of staff were given considerable autonomy in their work. "He trusted us to get on with our work and report if there Page 31

39 were particular issues we wanted to discuss". For those who had experience with or good knowledge of the field and/or NRC's operational culture, this seemed to function with good results. It provided "space for manoeuvring" in relation to the developments in the field and in accordance with the support functions available (or not available) in the organisation. A number of staff were also transferred or chose to transfer to other programme/project activities or operated from other sub-offices for periods of time, in order for NRC to operate more efficiently. Co-ordination and regular reporting routines were organised in fairly strict accordance with the organisational hierarchy Mobilising of resources Time Staff in Sri Lanka perceived Headquarter activities during the acute emergency phase as "hurried" and "hastily". There was a discrepancy between the 'mode' of operations at Headquarters and Sri Lanka level. Whereas Headquarters wanted NRC to respond to the tsuami in an emergency-type manner, Sri Lanka staff believed the organisation would be more efficient if time initially was spent on assessments and planning. "We kept thinking that the way to operate efficiently in this crisis is to hurry slowly." Personnel Between January 1 st and 27 th, the number of national staff grew from one to 39 and the number of international staff grew from two to 13. Nine of the latter were programme staff recruited by Oslo while one was recruited directly by the Resident Representative to strengthen the country office's support capacities. One international programme officer was recruited locally because he was in the country at the time of the disaster. Oslo's fast deployment of new international programme staff was in Sri Lanka regarded as problematic. The country office did not have sufficient time or support from headquarters to establish administration, finance and logistic capacities that could accommodate the high number of new arrivals. Funds In Sri Lanka, funding was not a problem after the tsunami. In addition to early pledges from the Norwegian MFA, NRC at country level attracted funding from new partners such as DFID and ECHO. Donations earmarked for Sri Lanka were also received from private initiatives in Norway, including the Scout movement, Choice Hotels and Rogalandshjelpen Decisions and management Until December 31 st, no decisions were made at country level regarding NRC's tsunami assistance in Sri Lanka. This was based on the assumption that NRC provides mid- and longterm assistance rather than acute emergency relief and the fact that very little information on damages and needs had so far been compiled at district level. For instance, UN's Flash Appeal, which is heavily based on UNDAC's initial assessments, was not ready until January 6 th. The day after the assessment team arrived in Sri Lanka, on December 31 st, a decision was made that NRC Sri Lanka would offer to rebuild all tsunami-damaged schools in Sri Lanka. On January 9 th, a contract was signed with CNO/MoE where NRC pledged to repair or rebuild a total of 82 schools along the entire affected coastline. Page 32

40 Although seemingly smart from a political and public relations point of view, the decisionmaking process behind the School Reconstruction project appears to have been centralised and adhoc. Facts and figures to back the decision were largely compiled after the decision had been made. Relevant members of staff had not been sufficiently consulted, and when they were their opinions were only given partial weight. The Resident Representative was among those who opposed the school reconstruction plans in favour of an expanded transitional shelter programme. As a 'spin-off' of the school reconstruction programme, NRC set up an Education programme to provide psychosocial training to teachers. A MoU was also signed between NRC and CNO where NRC pledged to provide training to government officials and other persons involved in IDP camp management in the affected districts. These two programmes were largely initiated at the Headquarters in Oslo. Decisions at country level involved the alteration of existing plans for shelter and legal assistance programmes in order to accommodate the needs of tsunami-affected populations in the areas where NRC already had established or planned to establish a presence. During the month of January, NRC's activities in Sri Lanka focused on the planning of activities and communicating with Sri Lankan authorities and with donors. Much on the initiative of the Director of International Department and the Information Officer from NRC's Department of Communications, there was extensive contact between NRC Sri Lanka and Norwegian media during the first part of January. This contact and its effects and consequences is discussed in further detail in part 6 and February - June Information, co-ordination and co-operation CNO abruptly ceased operations on February 4 th. This caused considerable confusion among NGOs on how to obtain information and which governmental body to relate to within the various relief sectors. So-called Task Forces for recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction were established, followed by government offices such as the Centre for Non-Governmental Sector (CNGS), but none of these offered the same degree of tsunami information and co-ordination for NGOs. By this time, however, UN and international NGOs had managed to form a wellfunctioning network of sector information sharing. Weekly sector meetings were held in Colombo and in most of the affected districts and by mid-february, all affected districts had appointed co-ordinating focal points. Throughout February, CHA's operational meeting every Friday established itself as the main weekly NGO meeting in Colombo. Within NRC Sri Lanka, the level of information sharing varied between the programmes but remained fairly hierarchical across the entire organisation. Field staff communicated with Programme Managers. Programme Managers communicated with the Resident Representative and other relevant staff at the Colombo office, and on rare occasions with the advisors in Oslo. The Resident Representative communicated with the Programme Co-ordinator in Oslo. Some changes affected this structure, but not to a degree where dynamics were altered: Merging and splitting of the Sri Lanka and Indonesia desks and the manning of the Indonesia desk periodically affected the workload of the Sri Lanka desk in Oslo. The Resident Representative left the country for a seminar and leave from early June till August 10 th. The Liaison Officer assumed his responsibilities during this period. Page 33

41 For NRC, the decisions to start new projects and expand others entailed recruitment of new programme staff and great strain were put on the administrative, financial and logistical capabilities of the Colombo office. Some new programme staff also lacked the required operational competence, and co-operation problems emerged between a few individual members of staff. This particularly affected the planning process of the School Reconstruction programme, which became subject to great delays throughout the spring and summer Communication and co-operation with Headquarters Over the first few months, much of the communication between Sri Lanka and Oslo concerned recruitment and administrative matters. Frustration in Sri Lanka grew with regard to what was perceived as inadequate quality in recruitment processes and the consequences of "Oslo's haste" in getting projects off the ground. In early March, however, the Programme Co-ordinator went on a two-week visit to Sri Lanka. There are varying views on the quality of communications between Sri Lanka and the headquarters in Oslo, especially during the initial operations Mobilising of resources Time From February onwards the Sri Lanka office concentrated on programme planning in relation to contextual circumstances and conditions, as well as the logistical aspects of establishing new programme activities. Table 4 displays the sheer scale of organisational growth between January and June 2005, compared to NRC Sri Lanka's activity level prior to the tsunami. Total cost per month NOK , , , , , , ,00 0,00 February 04 March 04 April 04 May 04 June 04 July 04 August 04 September 04 October 04 November 04 December 04 January 05 February 05 March April 05 May 05 June 05 Period Table 4: The monthly expenditure curve of NRC Sri Lanka reveals the sharp organisational growth after the tsunami. The fall in expenditure in April and May can be related to programme activities on hold or awaiting authority clearance/decisions. Page 34

42 Personnel In February, the Resident Representative asked Oslo to slow down the deployment of new programme staff. There were problems with the organisational accommodation of new arrivals and some programme officers had problems in relation to assigned tasks and/or field conditions. Between February and June, four staff assigned to the School Reconstruction programme returned to Norway. Three of these returned ahead of schedule while the fourth only had a onemonth contract as he was closely related to the Director of International Department. A new Programme Manager for the School Reconstruction Programme started in late June. Within other programme activities, staff were active and a sense of organisational dynamic seemed to develop throughout the spring. Delays in operations were often due to contextual circumstances. Discussions related to cultural sensitivity and to escalations of conflict-related violence appeared to become a common ground for exchanges of experience, know-how and ideas. In June, the Resident Representative hired an international administration consultant through his own network. No logistician had yet started working at the Colombo office at this point. 16 By the end of June, NRC Sri Lanka had a staff of 64 nationals and 14 internationals. Funds Funding was secured for all programme activities as well as for existing support functions in Colombo, and NRC has benefited through new or strengthened donor partnerships. Ironically, it was the sheer growth of budgets that was a challenge. In the six months following the tsunami, NRC Sri Lanka's total budget grew from NOK 3,5 million to NOK 65 million Decisions and management On February 15 th, a new MoU was signed with the Sri Lankan Ministry of Education, where NRC was contracted to repair or rebuild a total of 32 schools. All but two of the schools were located in the north or northeast of Sri Lanka. The new MoU was a result of GoSL wanting a higher number of partner NGOs involved. School reconstruction attracted "many organisations that were eager and had a lot more money to spend than NRC". By June, the planning, implementation and management of programmes appeared to be on track with one exception: The School reconstruction process. In addition to delays caused by staff problems, there have been serious contextual obstacles related to local and national negotiations over contracts, building standards and architectural design. A new local architect was recruited in July and new construction master-plans are now underway. One school in the south is completed while the other is near completion. The reconstruction of the remaining 30 schools in the north and northeast is now due to start in October. NRC staff in Sri Lanka who have had regular contact with Oslo was in June describing headquarters staff as "more understanding now" and "finally with their heads above water" in terms of communication, assistance and field involvement in decision-making processes. In late June, NRC Colombo moved to a bigger office. Colombo has been redefined as a family duty station and new contracts have been negotiated for international programme staff. 16 A national logistician was employed in mid-july. Page 35

43 4.6. Summary: The tsunami response in Sri Lanka NRC did not conduct any acute emergency relief operations in Sri Lanka: o Did not see itself as an emergency organisation o Did not have the capacity to start immediate relief o Focused on the planning of programmes and projects in relation to the contextual circumstances o Commenced implementation after the acute phase had ended o Organisational strains and operational delays were related to the handling of a large, HQ-initiated programme: School reconstruction. NRC Sri Lanka felt it received the 'wrong' type of support from HQ: o Decisions on major projects taken too hastily with limited information, assessments or consultations o International programme staff recruited too hastily with limited field involvement o Field staff felt HQ's reaction to the emergency was out of tune with the conditions in on the ground Programme activities grew quickly without due strengthening of support functions at the country office: o Resident Representative and programme staff spent a lot of time on conducting administrative and logistical tasks o Formal information sharing inadequate o Formal routines (such as budgets and procurement procedures) fell to the sideline o Internal co-operation problems were addressed relatively late During the Director of the International Department's stay in Sri Lanka, the communications structure between Sri Lanka and the headquarters in Oslo changed: o Led to an undue distance between HQ and country office o Created incoherence between decision-making, authority and implementation o Shifted decision-making authority upwards in the organisation while the responsibility to implement remained at country level. o No common understanding of reasons and motives for NRC's programme priorities in the wake of the tsunami Relied heavily on the individual skills, experience and flexibility of individual members of staff, with limited formal procedures at country office level: o Worked well when the individual members of staff had the sufficient professional capacity or were experienced with the NRC organisational culture o Has resulted in the development of good organisational dynamics throughout the spring o Leaves certain aspects of the operation to chance, but as was said by the field staff: "NRC tends to land feet first". Page 36

44 5. The NRC tsunami response in Aceh, Indonesia 5.1. Overview of events An NRC assessment team arrived in Banda Aceh the first days of January. This team was replaced during the second week of January. A third team arrived in March The intent of the first team was to assess the situation, identify operations NRC could engage in and to establish facilities to run programmes. The first team did only have very short contracts. The second team organised the NRC office in the province, and identified and planned projects. This team also started the distribution of non-food items (NFIs) and school-in-a-box kits for UNICEF. In addition, the team initiated some small reconstruction and clean-up projects while waiting for decisions regarding the reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. The third team that arrived in March has to a large extent tried to follow the present plans. Due to lack of funding, fund raising has become a prominent activity. Since arrival in early January, NRC has also played an active and constructive role in the efforts to co-ordinate relief and recovery operations between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and local governments, the UN system and the NGO community. In Indonesia, the catalogue of tsunami-related losses seems endless 17 : More than 150,000 persons died or are still missing; 127,000 houses were destroyed and a similar number damaged. Over 500,000 people are homeless, 2 hospitals were destroyed and 5 others badly damaged; 26 primary health care centres were destroyed as were 1,488 schools, leaving 150,000 children without a place to continue their education; 230 km of roads were destroyed as well as 9 seaports; 11,000 hectares of land was damaged, whereof 2,900ha permanently. It is likely that the economy of the affected regions will shrink by about 14 percent, including one billion US dollars worth of lost productivity (half of it in fisheries), 90 percent of surface coral and vast areas of mangroves were damaged. About 750,000 people, one in six of the population, were direct victims, but virtually everyone suffers palpably, through loss of friends and relatives, lost livelihood, or trauma Emergency phases in NRC Aceh tsunami operations Phase Period from - to NRC activities Pre-emergency phase to December 26 th Sleeping partner in CARDI 2004 Acute emergency phase December 26 th 04 to medio January 05 Assessment teams, mobilising personnel Late emergency phase medio January 05 to ultimo March Assessment, planning, organisational development, arbitrary small projects Rehabilitation and recovery Ultimo March 05 to 2010 Implementation of planned Reconstruction and development July 05 to 2015 Table 5: Emergency phases and CARDI NRC activities in Aceh projects Planned exit 17 Ref : Six Month Report: Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias. World Bank Report June 3, Page 37

45 Only minor life saving activities was conducted by external organisations 18. The local population, Indonesian Red Crescent Society, the Indonesian Army and the GoI, saved lives during the first 2-3 days. Most of the external contribution from the beginning of January encompassed proactive measures to prevent diseases and to provide basic needs for the affected population Status and relevance of NRC programmes A detailed overview of the programmes, their time schedules and funding is found in Annex Decisions about priorities It has taken some time to commence the projects in the region. Some of the reasons are as follows: Local authorities were not operational during the first period after the tsunami. Many offices and archives were washed away and a significant number of civil servants perished. The tsunami washed away huge parts of the affected cities, making it difficult to state land ownership. The devastating effect of the tsunami has also made it necessary to plan the reconstruction of infrastructure prior to house building activities in some areas. Even though the Indonesian army provided very important assistance the first days after the tsunami, there was mistrust towards the Indonesian armed forces among the international community, both UN and NGOs. Many organisations are involved both in the recovery and rehabilitation phase and the reconstruction and development phase. A lack of co-ordination among these actors is causing delay. In Aceh, CARDI NRC appears to have worked along several parallel lines. The long-term projects have been planned and co-ordinated with the authorities. CARDI NRC has at the same time initiated and finalized other projects based on local requirements, projects that do not require a huge amount of planning and co-ordination. This has made it possible to utilize the resources the organisation has available in Aceh while waiting to commence the long-term projects Status and relevance of programmes in post-tsunami Aceh The relevance of CARDI NRC programmes must be seen in relation to the actual needs among the population, the constraints related to urban planning prior to reconstruction of larger areas, and the activities of other humanitarian organisations in the province. NRC did not provide assistance in the acute emergency phase. The organisation came in relatively early, but only to conduct assessments. The first programmes to deliver assistance to the displaced population commenced in February and March: Distribution of NFIs and school kits. Construction and reconstruction of schools. Repair and reconstruction of houses in a community close to Banda Aceh. 18 Following acute onset disasters such as earthquakes, 85-90% of those rescued alive are generally extracted by local emergency personnel or by their neighbours and families within 72 hours (The Sphere Project Handbook, 2004 Edition:286). Page 38

46 The initial distribution of kitchen sets, tools and mattresses was very relevant after the acute lifesaving phase was over, in the late-emergency phase. Through this NFI distribution, some of the displaced population was provided with items and tools that made it possible for many to move back home and start cleaning and repairing their houses, while others who received items became better prepared to handle the displacement. CARDI NRC has received good feedback from the population, the authorities and UN organisations because of the quality of the items distributed and because CARDI NRC s initial distribution came at a stage when most organisations were still conducting assessments. Initiating distribution of hardware at this stage was seen as a good signal to the authorities and turned out to be a door opener for other softer projects later in the process, such as teacher training (coined software projects ). The initial distribution of school kits was a priority issue for UNICEF as it enabled schools to reopen, even in temporary facilities. The distribution was important because schools serve as a structuring mechanism, and thereby as important protection for the children and also for the community as a whole. Reconstruction of schools is a priority issue for the same reason. The CARDI NRC school construction projects are located in Pidie and Meulaboh. Compared to other organisations, CARDI NRC started very early construction of schools, and in Sigli, CARDI NRC was the first organisation to start up the school construction project. The quality of the schools is good and in line with the standard applied by other organisations. They are made of bricks and in a traditional style. The school construction projects have also proven to attract donors and are examples of good co-operation between CARDI NRC and private donors. Repair and reconstruction of the houses in the community/village close to Banda Aceh came at a stage when large programmes were planned in the most devastated areas, programmes that needed extensive planning (also urban planning) and co-ordination 19. This programme was however relatively easy to plan and co-ordinate, because land-ownership was not an issue and it was easy to co-ordinate the programme both with the villagers and with local authorities. This small village did offer a good opportunity for an early start on shelter construction and is therefore an example on what to do when CARDI NRC has the resources on scene and is waiting for finalization of the planning of the larger projects. NRC is involved in software projects such as camp monitoring and teacher training. The camp-monitoring programme provides information about the particular needs among the displaced population in the region. Since the overall co-ordination of the humanitarian operation is hampered by the lack of such information, and NRC can provide competence and experience in camp management, CARDI NRC has initiated a camp-monitoring programme wherein all IDP communities in Aceh are or will be assessed. This is a high profile project welcomed especially by UN-OCHA. The teacher training has a particular focus on psychosocial issues. In a traumatized population, psychosocial awareness is important, especially among teachers in daily contact with affected children. This programme is conducted in the schools reconstructed by CARDI NRC, both in Pidie and in Meulaboh. Authorities, especially in Pidie, would however welcome an expansion of the programme to also include the rest of the schools, since the requirement for such training exists in all schools. 19 There are many reasons for delays in the major reconstruction phase. Available funds are not the only requirement for reconstruction. In accordance with Ingemar Saevfors, a construction delegate in IFRC, other issues, such as possible relocation, land issues (purchase, ownership, certificates), urban planning, design, building code, selection of beneficiaries, contractors, etc., are all delaying the construction phase (Saevfors 2005). Page 39

47 In addition to the schools, the larger CARDI NRC reconstruction/construction programmes are: Construction of an orphanage in Meulaboh. Construction of a village in Sigli, 190 houses. Construction of traders houses in Meulaboh. The community welcomes the reconstruction of the orphanage since the old orphanage was completely destroyed. The children are already vulnerable and do need a place to stay. Since the children are living in temporary quarters around in the city, the French Red Cross is constructing a temporary camp next to the construction site to gather the children in the area where they will settle down when the orphanage is finalized. There are not many examples of similar projects in the region, but, compared to other agencies in Meulaboh, CARDI NRC is early with this project as well, even though the construction commenced in August. The construction of the village in Sigli and the traders houses in Meulaboh are two of the many projects in the long-term reconstruction and development phase. The requirement is there and CARDI NRC contributes to the reconstruction along with many other organisations. The community building aspects distinguish the traders houses programme from many other reconstruction programmes. The traders houses can be seen everywhere and forms an important part of life in the province. These houses provide both housing and shops. This construction programme therefore contributes to the restart of local trade. The reconstruction and development phase is estimated to end sometime between 2010 and Organisations such as IRC and IFRC will remain operative in Aceh on a long-term basis whereas CARDI NRC plans to pull out after one year. Initiating small projects should therefore be co-ordinated with bigger organisations with a more stable presence, in order to avoid reconstructing only fractions of the devastated areas. This is a concern that will be more in focus when the major construction period commences late In Aceh, CARDI NRC has also become involved in networking, as well as protection and advocacy for affected persons. Networking has proven to be very important in this area, especially because there seems to be lack of co-ordination among the different actors. We do however, based on interviews with CARDI NRC staff and staff from UN organisations and also local and regional authorities, have the impression that CARDI NRC is one of the best organisations in contribution to the co-ordination structures. Protection and advocacy is an integrated part of the activity in Aceh and work is ongoing to strengthen the protection aspect in all programmes. Protection seems to be a sensitive issue in Aceh, probably due to the conflict. Initially it was difficult to use the term IDP, because Indonesian authorities refused to accept that there were IDPs in Aceh. CARDI NRC was denied to organise workshops on Guiding Principles in April. These workshops where then due to take place in September. Ten mini-seminars for local NGOs have been conducted and CARDI NRC has sponsored two issues of a local magazine, Care Aceh NRC and CARDI The intended role of CARDI and the actual CARDI situation It is not quite clear to what extent NRC intended to build on CARDI when the assessment team arrived in Indonesia in early January. At least the team expected logistical assistance from CARDI, only to discover that IRC had taken the lead and expropriated the CARDI structures for own purposes. Page 40

48 The Consortium for Assistance to Refugees and the Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) is a coalition of NRC, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Stichting Vluchteling (SV). CARDI was officially registered as a non-governmental organisation in January After a joint decision among the partners, IRC acted as the operational partner. CARDI uses IRC s financial systems and organisational procedures and IRC has been responsible for recruiting the (international) CARDI staff. NRC does not have any personnel working directly for CARDI. CARDI has been working more or less independently, with only minor interference from the member organisations. Prior to the tsunami, the partners had decided upon a strategy to transform CARDI from shortterm emergency assistance to longer-term development and post-conflict transition 20 (e.g. the name had been changed to the Consortium for Assistance towards Recovery and Development in Indonesia). When the tsunami hit, CARDI was in the middle of this transformation process. In Aceh, local staff conducted all operations because the martial law did not allow international staff to stay in the province. Moreover, the position as permanent country director was vacant. The effect by the tsunami on CARDI s local office in Banda Aceh was devastating and the office was not operational: The office was partly destroyed; two local employees died as a direct result of the tsunami; several staff members were hospitalized and others were searching for their relatives. CARDI was therefore weak compared to other organisations arriving in Aceh soon after the tsunami. These did not need to carry the heavy burden of own losses into the operations The partners and post-tsunami projects Like NRC, IRC is not normally involved with natural disasters. As NRC, IRC decided to engage partly because of the scale and impact, but also because of what IRC regarded as a presence in the area. Both NRC and IRC could benefit from CARDI s status in Indonesia prior to the tsunami. But when the tsunami hit, IRC had at least three advantages for utilising CARDI s structures: As the operational organisation in CARDI, IRC could easily adapt to CARDI s organisational structure and systems (and the other way round). IRC had their first emergency response team on the ground four days after the Tsunami (for life saving operations). At that time NRC still tried to find out what to do and had just sent the assessment team to Aceh. IRC soon after deployed five additional teams. Thus, IRC response capacity was far beyond NRC and IRC was therefore also able to utilise the CARDI structures more efficiently. IRC also had substantial financial resources (USD 20 mill) available early in the operations. IRC s use of the CARDI structures in the acute emergency phase seems reasonable and the only logical response to the situation. At the same time, both IRC and NRC could use the CARDI umbrella for their operations and thereby bypass the cumbersome and time consuming process of getting registered as an NGO in Indonesia (the names are CARDI IRC and CARDI NRC). It also seems reasonable that CARDI takes over some of the development projects CARDI NRC presently runs in Aceh, such as ICLA and software part of education programmes. Transfer of projects with a long-term perspective (and especially the low cost projects) to CARDI should therefore be a central part of CARDI NRC s exit strategy in Aceh. 20 Lexow, Janne (2004): Building a presence. Making an impact. Meeting new challenges : Review of the CARDI experience in Indonesia a report to the CARDI Steering Committee. July Page 41

49 The consortium concept in emergencies In our view, both IRC and NRC were right in skipping CARDI as the operational emergency body due to the following reasons: CARDI was not designed or staffed to handle an emergency like the tsunami. Furthermore, the emergency operations required after the tsunami had not been integrated in the MoU between the partners. The partners had not prepared for co-operation in fast-burning or long-shadow crisis. They had no plans for common actions, no resources had been allocated in advance nor had any training activities been conducted. It is too late to establish a complicated co-operation after the crisis has developed. The partners had very different starting points for their post-tsunami operations. This could make it very difficult to co-ordinate joint operations in the emergency phases. Still, the consortium concept could be an interesting way of organising emergency relief operations in the future for the following reasons: Cost sharing in preparedness and operations Efficient exploitation of complementary competence and resources A general contribution to a better overall co-ordination of emergency relief operations. The consortium could be a sleeping contingency organisation for the partners, to be activated in case of a new emergency. This requires however, that the partners work out common plans, allocate resources according to plans in the pre-emergency phase, conduct common training exercises and continuously update all partners Mobilising of resources and organisational development The build up of the NRC operations in Aceh took primarily place in February and March. The initial assessment and start-up team did not provide any significant contributions to later operations, except some useful links to donors, authorities and the Norwegian Embassy. The assessment team provided team 2 with links to for instance ministers in the government, the Norwegian ambassador and ECHO. The team was on the ground only for 1-2 weeks during the most chaotic period. This was far too short to get an operational focus. Since the situation in the province changed so fast over the first 2-3 weeks, the planning had to be changed several times. The change of staff and terms in early January also had a negative effect on efficiency since it takes some time for newcomers to get their feet on the ground. It was therefore the second team that actually established the CARDI NRC offices and wrote the project applications that laid the foundation for CARDI NRC s main activities in Aceh. 21 The second team started to arrive from January 6 th (Resident Representative and logistician). A complete turnover of staff between the two teams took place in a few days. The turnover between team 2 and 3, in March, followed a similar pattern. Team 2 rented offices and guesthouses, in Banda Aceh, Sigli and in Meulaboh, hired local staff and procured cars and stationery and established office routines. As shown in table 6, the percent of the administration costs compared to the overall costs in Indonesia fell from 100% in January to below 30% in February and below 10% in March due to commence of programmes directed 21 These applications have later been referred to as The Plan. As far as we know, there is no comprehensive plan covering all activities and steps for the NRC Aceh operations. Page 42

50 towards the beneficiaries. These data indicate that start-up of operations came in the acute emergency phase and project implementation in the late emergency phase. The percentage of administration costs out of total costs January February March April May June July Table 6: The percentage of administration costs out of total costs The team continued assessments of possible programme activities and in this process made contact with local authorities (where such authorities were operational), UN agencies and to some extent other NGOs. The team also started the work to get the programmes funded. This team also used the opportunity to commence limited project activities where that was possible. Distribution of NFIs and school kits as well as the reconstruction of houses in a village close to Banda Aceh are examples of early projects initiated by the second team. When the third team arrived in March, the facilities and planning (project applications) were all set, more or less ready for implementation. Funding continued however still to be a challenge Co-operation with the headquarters in Oslo Much of the communication between the field office in Banda Aceh and the headquarters in Oslo has been related to recruitment and administration matters. There has been some frustration among field staff due to what they have called inadequate quality in the recruitment processes. Replacement staff has not been deployed in due time for handover and there has been confusion concerning extension of contracts 22. Information-sharing There is almost daily contact between the offices in Banda Aceh and Oslo. Most of the contact is between the Resident Representative and the International Department, especially with the Programme Co-ordinator and the Head of the Asia section. Formal reports, both routine and adhoc are intended to document activities and resource allocations. The different programme managers forward their status-reports via the Resident Representative to the headquarters in Oslo. There is however not much two-way information sharing between the advisors in Oslo and 22 Such confusion is also reported in the Analysis of recruitment and follow-up of expatriate personnel in Darfur (Gjelten 2005). Page 43

51 their project managers in the field. Responses from the headquarters to the field workers are limited. Responsibility By and large, the responsibility for the operations in Indonesia seems to have been delegated from Oslo to the team on the ground in Aceh. Fund raising is a good example. Oslo points to the responsibility of the Resident Representative to provide and forward requests for funding to potential donors. In the field there is an expectation for more involvement from Oslo in this process. Resident Representative spends a considerable time on fund raising. At the same time he has a Terms of Reference stating RR contributes towards mobilizing the necessary resources to execute the activities through contact and negotiations with the donors representatives in the region. This should indicate a requirement for heavier fund-raising involvement from the headquarters in Oslo. Decisions and decision-making authority Most decisions are taken directly by the field office, based on the requirement on the ground. A decentralized decision-making authority in emergency settings is required to keep up with the pace of the operations. This does not mean that the NRC headquarters has completely delegated the responsibility. In this way responsibility and delegation of decision-making authority must be linked together through well-functioning information sharing system. The delegation of authority seems to rely on the unwritten rule of no-interference from the headquarters as long as operations work smoothly. This strategy appears to function well for the Aceh operations Strategy-development and future projects Two pillars guide planning and strategy development: The decision to redraw from Aceh after approximately one year. NRC s policy and the organisation s main areas of operations. Except for these pillars, detailed strategies and plans for the Aceh-operations have developed incrementally. Projects have been identified on an ad-hoc basis, and schedules set by the circumstances. This planning process is probably the only one that works in the tsunami-hit areas. GoI has not been able to implement a long term recovery and reconstruction plan (although they claim to), overall co-ordination of humanitarian organisations and projects is poor, funding of CARDI NRC projects is insecure, and the needs of the affected population are still overwhelming. According to all available information, CARDI NRC has been one of the most attentive and well-functioning organisations in Aceh when it comes to co-operation with UN and local authorities. Consequently, the incremental planning strategy seems to be adequate for the situation. The success of CARDI NRC s incremental approach relies on trust between the headquarters in Oslo and the country office, but also boils down to personal qualifications among decision-makers and field officers Funding of operations In January, NRC received signals from MFA that indicated sufficient financial support for the Indonesia operations. Based on these signals, an application for NOK 38 million was forwarded MFA February 3 rd. Total funding from the Ministry, however, finally turned out to be about Page 44

52 NOK 6 million (formal information received in June), whereas expectations were NOK 30 million. NRC had two options: 1. Scale down project activities. Then NRC would not be able to utilise its own investments in infrastructure and organisational development. 2. Strengthen fund raising activities towards other donors and run projects with a high-risk profile. In August, only 59 percent of projects implemented or planned implemented in the near future were financed. In other emergencies, this had probably been a financial disaster. This is due also because of the project portfolio, requiring high investments and extensive use of sub-contractors for construction etc. In the post-tsunami relief operations, the risk-profile is more acceptable. First, the total humanitarian operations are very well funded. The availability of financial resources has left ample room for serious organisations like NRC to finance projects from ordinary donors (like ECHO and SIDA), but also from untraditional donors like the French Red Cross. Still, projects in Indonesia must be considered as a high-risk portfolio. The financial situation for projects in Indonesia, however, reveals to NRC the need for own financial muscles if engaging in acute emergency relief operations. As shown in table 7, the administration costs amount to a fraction of the overall costs related to the NRC tsunami operations in Indonesia. Although these data are not 100% accurate because many of the projects are not finalized, the table shows that project implementation started in February and soon accounted for the majority of overall expenditure. However, the table also indicates that NRC needed some time to identify meaningful projects and commence implementation of these projects Program Administration January February March April May June July Table 7: Overview of administrative- and programme costs per month. NRC does however receive praise, from for instance the Dinas Bappeda in Sigli, a mayor in Meulaboh, and UN-OCHA and UNICEF in Banda Aceh, for their swift implementation of for instance distribution of NFIs/School kits, and school reconstruction programmes. Page 45

53 5.6. Co-operation in the field From all available sources, CARDI NRC is given the best references as a co-operative organisation. Representatives from UN-OCHA and UNICEF point to CARDI NRC as an organisation willing to share information, participate in co-ordination structures, taking initiatives to fill gaps (e.g. the camp monitoring project), and being attentive to priorities and requests from other organisations and beneficiaries. Similar comments are given by representatives from local and regional authorities. NRC has also actively initiated co-ordination structures (e.g. in Sigli) to avoid unnecessary competition and duplications. After a period with a relatively cold climate between NRC and IRC due to competition over available CARDI resources, problems have been sorted out. In general, co-ordination of humanitarian operations in Aceh has turned out to be very difficult due to the scale of the disaster and resource overload. Many of the 180 INGOs and more than 200 national NGOs present in Aceh (August 05) have sufficient resources to conduct their operations. As a consequence, they have more or less ignored co-ordination because they can operate independently. CARDI NRC (not having ample resources), has continued to be active in co-ordination structures and is presently acting as co-ordinator for shelter in Sigli, and has been asked by BRR to take a leading co-ordination role in Sigli. CARDI NRC is also one of the few members of the core co-ordination group in Banda Aceh, the IASC meeting, and central in shelter co-ordination in Meulaboh together with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and UN-OCHA. In some aspects, however, CARDI NRC could play a more active role. One is in standardizing the quality and design of houses for private purposes. The different standards can easily create tensions between different beneficiary groups as well as tensions between humanitarian organisations. Another challenge is to avoid relief overload. Few have addressed the problems of overload and perceived unfairness when people living next door to each other are defined differently in terms of relief eligibility Summary: The NRC tsunami response in Aceh, Indonesia Status and relevance of programmes: No acute emergency phase assistance Important to deploy start-up teams relatively quick: o Fast deliveries of emergency aid, such as initial distribution, gives the organisation a good reputation among the population as well as among the authorities and within the humanitarian community o Recruitment of high-quality local staff is dependent on early recruitment campaigns. NRC s core activities are relevant in the late emergency and in the reconstruction and recovery phases of the post-tsunami operation. NRC commenced relief operations early compared to other organisations, in particular distribution and reconstruction operations, as well as teacher training and camp monitoring. For early intervention, in the late emergency phase, funds must be made available for initial NFI distributions The delivery of hardware will later on serve as a door opener for other projects Lack of standardisation: o NRC is constructing brick houses while other organisations are constructing wooden houses. A lack of standardisation is creating tension within the displaced population. Page 46

54 Standardisation should therefore be a priority in the shelter working groups and also communicated better to peer organisations by NRC. Due to the sensitivity and also the complexity of protection issues, much closer professional co-ordination is needed between the protection experts in Oslo and the field workers in Aceh. Protection should increase in importance now when the armed conflict is over and conflict areas are made open to the international community. CARDI status and future: CARDI did not prove to be an effective emergency tool: o The consortium was in a transition phase from relief to a development mode. o CARDI did not have a Country Director. o CARDI s operational capacity was affected by severe losses in Aceh. o IRC and NRC have totally different strategies, approaches and resource allocation. o The conclusion is that it was the right decision for NRC to by-pass CARDI. If NRC looks for a consortium as an effective tool after unexpected events such as the Tsunami, then NRC must invest in the consortium. The handling of emergencies requires thorough preplanning and training. CARDI should be strengthen as the tool for taking over some of the projects (soft projects) when NRC pulls out of Aceh. Challenges in the initial operations start-up phase: Team 1 was not successful: o Uncertainty about the mandate and the situation o The team was rotated far too early in this turbulent environment of the acute emergency phase. The initial team should remain on site for at least a month to get a proper operational focus and all team members should not be replaced at the same time. Pre-organized and trained teams must conduct the initial operations. Funding and fund-raising: o Funding for initial operations (distribution, shelter, education) should be a part of a standby package (together with personnel and equipment) in addition to funds for NRC s own infrastructure. o Lack of a close relationship in fund-raising. CARDI NRC and NRC should conduct co-ordinated parallel operations to raise money. o The operations are currently conducted with a very high-risk financial profile. Manning and infrastructure: CARDI NRC is manned with competent and motivated personnel. o International staff: Good standard and few failures. Poor recruitment routines in main office (handover periods in the field are required and personnel should be provided with information about contract alterations or extensions as early as possible). o Local staff: Good professional standard. Important to start recruitment of local staff at an early stage. The organisational infrastructure seems appropriate for the operations but is so extensive that it can only be justified with relatively large programmes. Co-operation with Oslo headquarters: Page 47

55 The quality and also the quantity of information sharing vary and is largely dependent on individuals in Indonesia and in Oslo. The programmes are incrementally developed and presented to a rather reactive headquarters in Oslo. General feeling of limited support or follow-up from Oslo, especially with regard to the headquarters advisors. Unclear whether this has had any influence on programme activities. In daily decision-making headquarters decisions are too slow. Co-ordination and co-operation at field level: Positive feedback on the CARDI NRC operations in Aceh, from local authorities, local population, INGOs and UN system: o Good on information sharing. o Good initiatives in co-ordination with local authorities and local aid authorities. o Sensitive to requirements and adaptable to the co-ordination structures in the region. Field co-operation is based on incremental and ad-hoc development of the activities and on personal initiatives. Page 48

56 6. Media strategy and exposure Luck favours the prepared mind The central issue of this evaluation is to verify whether the NRC was in fact ready and prepared when the tsunami struck countries bordering the Indian Ocean during Christmas of Secondly, how did the NRC cope on short and long term basis, and what effects did the management of the tsunami crisis have internally and externally on the NRC both long and short term? Finally, has the tsunami experience affected the Department of Communication and Fundraising in the NRC, and what should - or could be changed? 6.1. Plans If you want peace, plan for war said Napoleon. Did the NRC have plans to cope with a major natural disaster of this magnitude, or did it not? And if such plans existed, were they of any use? Disasters involving refugees are usually expected disasters, and proper planning may therefore be done before they occur. According to NRC documentation, most refugees and displaced persons are a result of wars, wished politics and potential natural disasters. These are all accompanied by lack of food, shelter and water, and all represent challenges that can be forecasted and accordingly prepare humanitarian relief organisation for action. The tsunami was different. It was first seen as a natural disaster striking without warning, affecting areas and population beyond the mandate of the NRC. At 01.59, December 26 th 2004, Norwegian time, the earthquake hit Sumatra. Norsk Telegrambyrå published the first notice in Norwegian media about the event at TV2 Nettavisen disseminated the first message of the tsunami at At 10 A.M. of the 26 th media discussed the possibility of 2500 casualties. Communication-wise, this is when it all began. The tsunami was at the very heart of the Norwegian Red Cross (Norwegian RC) and other relief organisations mandate. The Norwegian RC Secretary General, Jonas Gahr-Støre appeared on NRK television prime time, appealing for relief money. In effect he started the enormous fundrising campaign the very first day after the tsunami struck. While the NRC discussed what to do about the tsunami, eager fundraisers and even more eager Norwegian citizens, (who were willing and wishing to give money and help), turned to the RC, Save the Children and the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Reporters and media tuned their interest and search for stories or information towards the same organisations. NRC plans do not cover required action for this type of catastrophe. There is however, a general disaster plan called NRC Crisis Management Plan ready for spurting the NRC into action when needed. This plan was not executed during the tsunami campaign. There is no separate plan for the Communication and Fundraising Department on how to cope with the media, or how to start and support fundraising during a major campaign. Page 49

57 6.2. Staff The Communications and Fundraising Department was rather sparingly manned for normal communications work. The department was even more sparingly manned as it was Christmas holidays and a large part of the staff was on leave, when the tsunami struck. The former Communication Director was at the NRC headquarters in Oslo by 27 th December. One Information Consultant came the 28 th, the Press Officer was not called to the NRC headquarters until 48 hours later. While the Communication Director was involved in the internal discussion of whether or not the NRC should be involved in Southeast Asia and the post-tsunami relief campaign, the less experienced Information Consultant was coping adequately with communication dissemination and the demand for information and facts among the general public and the Norwegian media. The first press release regarding the tsunami and the NRC is dated January 3 rd although there was plenty of other communication going on before this. Staff of the Department of Information and Fund Raising worked day and night to interconnect with reporters and to spread information long before the first press release. And by December 27 th, The Webmaster was updating the NRC-webpage. The webpage disseminated information, pleaded for sponsors and provided space and time for the internal discussion and private conversations among officers at home, and the NRC-officers stationed in the disaster area. Thanks to the Fellesaksjonen (common fund-raising with the NCA, Save the Children and NPA) initiative by Secretary General (SG) and the Communication Director, and the quick reaction to humanitarian needs, the NRC is mentioned in newspaper articles 310 times throughout December, more than 6 times than in November. Despite the Christmas holidays, lack of proper plans, and internal discussion, the NRC managed a rapid, although somewhat reluctant start, both media wise and for the fundraising campaign. However, the NRC quickly profited by the fact that they were on location providing immediate humanitarian relief. And the NRC advanced further, by initiating the Fellesaksjonen December 27 th, on prime time television Adequately, but not peaking According to the communication plan, the main goal is to make the NRC better known to the Norwegian public, and thus build a foundation for fundraising campaigns and further a more democratic and broader operational foundation, ultimately giving the NRC more political leverage and more money to spend freely. The tsunami event was an optimal occasion to promote the NCR and make the organisation better known in Norway. A substantial strategicand long-term plan could have placed the NRC up and among the first and foremost humanitarian organisations in Norway. The NRC was among the five large relief organisations by December 2004, but in the public mind the RC, the NCA and Save the Children are still far ahead. When instant relief is needed, most people contact the RC with their donations not the NRC. Considering the referred goal, the NRC dealt adequately with the situation, but did not manage to capture the public mind and the media as a number one humanitarian relief organisation. However, as to the aim of being perceived as an operational organisation of doers on location, the NRC made headway in the public mind. Page 50

58 6.4. Brilliant moves The NRC made at least three extremely well placed moves during the first part of the posttsunami. By pointing out, through public communications, that the NRC was on location and already helping individuals hit by the tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the NRC moved from an organisation perceived by the Norwegian media as a long-term relief organisation with no central role in the ongoing and immediate relief work, to become the first organisation on location. This point was further rammed home on January 5 th on prime time television newscast, by publicly announcing the NRC aim to rebuild schools in Sri Lanka. Communication-wise this changed the NRC from being a not so easily understood and communicated long-term reconstruction agency, to a major contributor and operational humanitarian relief organisation. And the plan to rebuild schools gave the fundraisers a practical, readily understood, and communicated goal to put forward to the media and the public. At the point of time when most television viewers where following the news closely, the viewers where finally pointed to someone who was dealing with the aftermath of the tsunami in a practical down-to-earth way. The message gave the Norwegian public an instant understanding and recognition of schools as being a positive contribution to the upcoming problem of rebuilding society and helping children. Among the fundraisers in the NRC, it is common to divide the fundraising campaign between the time before and the time after the school construction project was made public. Funds were much more available after January 5 th. The second well-placed move was made by informing Norway s largest newspaper, Verdens Gang, of the need for recruits to NORSTAFF. This information caused the same jolt of excitement and relief among the general Norwegian public as the school project had done. The public announcement was both a message of a practical possibility for doing something constructive abroad, and a non-verbal announcement that the NRC is working so hard in Southeast Asia that new recruits are needed. Both messages are important. The non-verbal message is vital information to potential donors and opens pockets for fundraisers. The first message gives the NRC connection to potential recruits, and it connects the NRC to potential long-term donors. We are aware of the fact that in the NRC headquarters both the school-story and the recruit-story created discussions and confusion even frustration, and that the chaos and extra workload following the large number of callers (2000 callers all in all) and the relationship to the Norwegian Ministry of Development regarding Sri-Lanka policy, could have opened up for some negative publicity. However, seen solely from a communication- and media point of view, both moves were brilliant and in accordance with the strategic communication plan. The third brilliant move was to initiate the Fellesaksjonen. The initiative gave the NRC immediate and positive media coverage, and it further enhanced the public image of the NRC as a responsible and caring organisation of doers Communication in general It is the NRC s long-term plan to reposition the organisation in accordance with the organisational objectives and thus improve communication and create a far deeper penetrated understanding of the NRC mandate among the Norwegian public. This is to be done by; - Showing the public that the NRC is an organisation of brave doers and solution seekers Page 51

59 - Enforcing clear and straightforward messages, by keeping the communication ungarbled. - Renaming the NRC in Norway Flyktninghjelpen, thus clarifying the mandate and purpose of the NRC. - Keeping a clear operational profile. - Creating a more participating and involved general public. - Challenging the rival humanitarian organisations. - Ensure a deeply rooted internal understanding of the goals and means of the NRC. To what extent did the NRC follow the basic communication plan and gain the main goals? A huge crisis and disaster like the tsunami will normally start a common pattern of coverage in the media. Basically the pattern is as follows; first media and reporters will seek facts and factual information about the situation. At this point, the media and mediators will seek sources and information among public offices like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organisations involved in the crisis and public officers on location. This will go on until the questions of who, why, when, and how are all answered. The mediators will very soon turn to the general public to seek out storytellers. Even a factual story needs photos or video that can, if well done, tell more than mere words. Talking heads is bluntly not effective television. In modern media there is a deep belief in stories and personal cases. These are believed to glue the watchers, readers and listeners to the TV, radios or newspapers. Easily recognized humantouch stories are believed to make a larger impact and keep the readers or viewers longer on your channel than anything else. Human-touch stories make it possible to mediate more complex issues by letting hard-core news piggyback the human-touch story. The medias hunt for a good story will go on as long as the crisis is believed to be of interest to the general public. Very early the mediators will start seeking out the responsible, and they will try to explain the reasons or the forces behind the cause of the crisis. The media will immediately try to answer the natural call from the media users of what can we do to help. More than 30 percent of the coverage in the main newspapers in Norway of the tsunami is about the Norwegian fund-raising. This is in effect coverage about how Norwegians reacted to the tsunami. The pattern is predictable, and it enables communication officers to prepare and plan for how to impact the media and when to disseminate hard-core news or human-touch stories in order to maximize positive effect. Thus it is possible to win the rhetoric, i.e. in this case e.g. hammer in the message that the main problem in Sri Lanka was not the need for immediate relief, but the long-term efforts required to rebuild the society. By utilizing the pattern it is possible to become a major news and information agent. As mentioned earlier, the NRC did not conquer the editorial departments in Norwegian media as a central information resource the first few days following the December 26 th. This is understandable, as the tsunami was considered a huge humanitarian relief campaign, where short-term needs overshadow long-term reconstruction. Most reporters and the general public will possibly turn to the RC rather than the NRC in such conditions. According to the NRC strategic communication plan, a main goal is to change this misconception. To paraphrase the communication plan, it says that to gain public interest it is necessary to do something outside of expectations, something that startles mediators and/or the general public and in turn makes the limelight shine on the NRC. This was in fact done by the NRC. The school story showing the NRC on location, seeking and finding solutions, is such a surprise story. The same happened during the public argument about Fellesaksjonen, where the NRC braved the argument of common sense and common good in sharing the fund-raising campaign for the sake of people in Page 52

60 dire need. The credibility of the NRC is already very high among certain segments of the general public, according to the communication plan and research performed by Norsk Samfunnsbarometer. By arguing common sense and practical solutions such as one, instead of five common fund-raising bank accounts, the initiative further enhanced the credibility of the NCR. The message communicated to the Norwegian public was that the NRC champion common good and fast relief to victims. The school story opened the gates to the media. And a lot was made out of the fact that the NRC was on location and the search for recruits media stunt. The NRC was also given lots of coverage as part of the Fellesaksjonen, both commercially, through common ads, and in the news. More news coverage followed later as a by-product of fund-raising campaigns such as the Rogalandshjelpen, among teachers and the spontaneous campaigns by Norwegian scouts, musicians and private business donators. As the media coverage of the tsunami passed the point of mere factual information and mediators were running short of human-touch stories from beaches and devastated towns in Southeast Asia, the news and mediators started to concentrate on fund-raising in Norway and on criticising the government. At this point, most major broadcasting and newspapers in Norway had reporters in Thailand, Sri-Lanka and Indonesia. They were all looking for good stories and more information. The NRC had it all, but somehow the NRC-based stories did not make news in impressionable amounts. While the web pages of the NRC were boosted with fund-raising news, factual information, editorials, and banner adds for help, there were human touch stories coming in on the non-public area of the web. As mentioned, the website was used by former and active NORSTAFF to keep in touch and up-to-date on what happened on location. Some of these stories could easily have made the newspapers. These stories concern brave men and women of the NRC coping with everyday human problems and human-touch stories of normal Indonesians and Sri-Lankans coping with the aftermath of the tsunami. The communication plan states clearly that the NRC does not support or disseminate stories about victims and victimisation. Instead, the NRC supports stories about people coping at even extremely hard times. The stories mentioned on the non-public web, suit the plan. However, the Webmaster tells us the press officers were told and informed of this source of stories, while the press officers claim they never heard of it. It doesn t matter what is correct. Very few, if any, stories about the NRC officers coping in Southeast Asia actually reached the Norwegian general public. If the NRC wishes to support and disseminate this kind of human-touch stories to the media, NORSTAFF should be informed that such stories are relevant, and incentives should be given to potential storytellers. As far as we know, the media and media encounters are currently perceived in a rather negative manner during the NORSTAFF-preparation. There are strict rules, both formal and informal, as to what can be told reporters and who is to inform the media. Such strict rules are necessary when policy issues are concerned. However, many human-touch stories are private. They concern merely one private person, while the story itself would provide information about the NRC broadly. In order to broaden the media coverage, and to enhance the image of the NRC as being an operational organisation of brave doers on location, the NRC should be open minded when NORSTAFF contacts the media or is willing to function as eyewitness or storyteller, even when not strictly complying with the written and unwritten rules of media engagement. As mentioned, a large portion of the media coverage of the aftermath of the tsunami concerned fund-raising. After the NRC initiated the Fellesaksjonen, the NRC was mostly mediated as part Page 53

61 of the campaign, and briefly shown in fund-raising advertising. To a lesser extent, the NRC was extensively presented in editorial text. From interviews with central fund-raisers in the NRC it is clear that the NRC would have lost funds and political influence by remaining on its own. Fundraisers in the NCA give the same answers regarding how NCA officers perceived the question of standing alone or hauling together for a larger common good. However, as it seems to be a common agreement that the Fellesaksjonen was a moderate success fund wise, it is still an open question whether the NRC could have used the opportunity to go alone and thus achieved more publicity. As one aim of the communication plan is to gain more independence through free funds, a long-term result of going alone could be more publicity and in the end more public awareness of the NRC, which in turn makes it easier to raise funds. This is a policy question, which the Directors and Board of the NRC need to decide and be ready to answer as the next possible tsunami-like campaign starts. As a part of the agreement regarding the Fellesaksjonen, the organisations also agreed not to openly compete for donors. This agreement is strictly on collision course with the communication plan, which states competition as a means to repositioning the NRC and to climb further up the hierarchical ladder of leading humanitarian relief organisations. If the plan is to compete in order to gain public awareness, and this aim is further up the ladder of prioritised goals than common fund-raising, the NRC need to reconsider the decision of joining the Fellesaksjonen and make plans to stand alone before the next major fund-raising campaign. During the early stages of the tsunami, when the race for information among reporters and mediators reached its peak, the communication part of the Communication and Fund-raising Department, was down to two persons. The first three days the Communication Department briefly consisted of three people concerned mainly with media matters. Day four of the posttsunami management, one staff member was ordered to Sri-Lanka to assist the media and reporters. As soon as he returned in January, another staff member left on a long-planned trip to Uganda. One staff member was by then alone attending the day to day (or rather 24 hours a day, 7 days a week) media contacts and to follow up on his former contacts with the Norwegian scouts. During the absence of the Press Officer there were close to no press releases, media contacts and no major media stories presenting the NRC. The sheer number of press releases does not tell the full story of communication activity. One aim of the communication department is to follow up media contacts face to face. The media networking will not directly produce evidence of communication production. Later, the Communication Department has been much better manned, and the department is now ready to face another major disaster. However, with an operational disaster plan, following the lines of the communication plan, we would expect that media contacts would be given a very high priority coupled with a short term plan to quickly enable the department to cope with the everyday needs during a major disaster. The NRC should consider editing a disaster plan solely for the purpose of maintaining communication needs. In the pre-tsunami month of November 2004, the NRC is mentioned in 55 newspaper articles, less than a fourth of Save the Children and Norwegian People s Aid (NPA), and a mere fraction of articles mentioning RC (728). The numbers accelerate at high speed during December 2004, to 310 articles mentioning the NRC and 1768 the RC. The number of articles is even higher in January 2005, but dropping like a stone in February: 537 articles in January 37 in February. Numbers are better than normal in March and April, but not much, and the numbers are back to pre-tsunami state in May and June. (Ref. Norsk Samfunnsbarometer). These numbers are only useful as indications. The numbers do not tell anything of how important or how well or bad the Page 54

62 NRC is presented. In other words, a newspaper story presenting the NRC in colour windscreen only counts as much as an article mere mentioning the NRC as part of a project. It is a stated policy of the NRC that tsunami operations should not impact ongoing programmes in a negative manner. However, interviews reveal that the under staffing of the Communication and Fund-raising Department led to negative effects on operations not concerning the tsunami area. Even though all employees were stretching to cover the ever-increasing workload, it is a fact of life that when a bed sheet is too short you either freeze your nose or your feet. The nonegative impact policy was one of the reasons why the Press Officer left for Uganda. The trip achieved two major communication results. First, ultra-conservative/ultra-liberal politician Siv Jensen of FRP, with a rather limited interest in refugees and displaced persons in Africa, was invited to visit Uganda and the NRC. The story of her trip reached the newspapers and made headlines all over Norway. Jensen found to her surprise that the NRC was doing a good job and that helping refugees was not a waste of Norwegian taxpayer s money. Jensen was part of the eyewitness program. This programme is in general a success generating media coverage, and further understanding of the NRC programs. In the weeks before Jensen s trip to Uganda, the communication department tried to enhance media coverage of Uganda, with no success. The failure is primarily explained by the fact that the Norwegian media manages to cover only one disaster at a given time. This combined with a general tiredness of disaster-coverage in the general public and the Sudan conference was going on in Oslo at the same time, The second major result of the Uganda engagement was the magazine På flukt. The magazine was distributed in 20,000 copies to the Norwegian scouts, who donated a full day s work to fund-raising for Uganda. As a general rule, one copy is read by three people; the scout, her father and mother. The magazine gave thus excellent penetration of a rather important segment of Norwegian society. There are clear indications that the information hit home. Several of the NRC fund-raisers mentioned that scouts are well informed of the NRC and refugees/displaced persons. The co-operation with the scouts also resulted in the NRC participating in the national scout camp this summer. During the camp all scouts were invited on a two-day hike with a NRC refugee game. The camp and the hike was given broad media coverage. Generally speaking, free magazines and newspapers are not considered giving as valuable dissemination of information as purchased information. Free newspapers and magazines are not even counted in the Norwegian media owners (MBL, Mediebedriftenes landsforening) statistics. The credibility of free information is at best low. Strangely enough, this does not apply to the Internet where we expect and accept free information. Readers tend to regard free magazines and newspapers as less important and will accordingly spend less time reading them. The world of information and communication is highly competitive and harsh. På flukt does not only challenge other popular magazines among the fraction (29 percent) of readers who actually read a magazine during a year. And if På flukt captures the attention, all one can hope for is the full attention during the 5 minutes Norwegians statistically spend on magazines every day. (Norsk mediebarometer, Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2004 daily reading of popular magazines among all readers 9-79 years old, time spent all readers 5 minutes.) The numbers could be better if one only considered the age of scouts (9 to 15) and defines På flukt as an actuality magazine. 56 % in this aggregation read such a magazine during However, family magazines have lost readers by 20,000 each the last 4 years, while celebrity magazines like Se og Hør og Her og Nå are gaining readers. No matter how you read the statistics they are not favourable towards magazines. The NRC might consider moving resources from print towards the web, which is much less costly to produce and disseminate. Or NCR could consider changing På flukt to a subscription Page 55

63 magazine, increase the number and size of commercial information, and/or getting a commercial sponsor World Wide Web The NRC web site is attractive, but clearly under-utilised. The website disseminates practical and solid information about refugees and displaced people, about the NRC operations and it covers countries that normally do not make the front-page news in Norway. However, the site was at the time rather static. It has not become an obvious or central source of information for the news hungry. The web site sports few links between the co-operating organisations and the NRC. Enforcing a link between the organisation and the NRC and vice versa could enhance the two-way link between organisations outside the NRC and the NRC. It is also possible to give more pointed information concerning areas of particular interest. This is done for students today, but could be expanded to include information customised to particular ethnic groups, to donors supporting a particular operation, scouts and so on. This is in accordance with the NRC statement that the NRC partners should obtain positive gain and pleasure from the partnership. As an extra service towards connected organisations such as the Rogalandshjelpen, who did not make their own web sites, it should be possible to construct and edit a simple site and make it closely linked to the NRC main web site. The web site has a huge potential to connect users to the NRC as long-term donors and to get readers interested in the mandate and operations of the NRC. All stories should include a link giving answer to the simple question, How can I help? The point is, that readers who take the time to read about operations and issues concerning the NRC mandate, are already showing interest and should pointedly be invited to give a hand. There is a banner add pleading for sponsors today. But experienced web-users are increasingly turning blind to anything that even faintly resembles a commercial add. Interaction and public involvement could be further enhanced by including more open and easily found links at the web site for questions and answers, open public discussions, and comments. The NRC could arrange web meetings or open sessions with experts, the SG or other central and well informed NRC officers, during major campaigns, to make the web site less static and more involving. To augment news impact it is possible to include a daily or a weekly editorial commentary. This is in accordance with the communication plan where it is stated as an aim to bravely defend refugees and displaced people in public discussions. This is partly done today when the SG is commenting on the G8 meeting; Live Aid concerts and the Norwegian politics. However, the present editorials are not done regularly, and as a result they are not expected by reporters and the media, seeking sources and information with another and informed view of Norwegian or international politics. Open online sessions combined with commenting could enhance the media impact and public awareness of the four NRC media events planned yearly. During the tsunami, and possibly in the future, incorporating human touch stories and news from operations could arouse further interest. This is partly done, but the front page is mostly filled with press releases already dispersed to media, and the stories told are not particularly catching. Generally, the stories are rather heavy on information and facts. The NRC is full of stories that Page 56

64 should fascinate readers interested in down to earth, honest, and first hand tales from operations abroad. Personal storytelling through blogging is a fast growing communication trend. Blogs belonging to NRC officers could easily be facilitated, accommodated and connected to the NRC main web site. The web site was under reconstruction during spring of Flyktninghjelpen vs. Flyktningerådet During the post tsunami period, the NRC changed the Norwegian name to Flyktninghjelpen and renewed the logo. The change was planned long before December 27 th. Such changes are in general costly, and often viewed as empty policy making. In the case of Flyktningerådet versus Flyktninghjelpen, the latter more accurately reflects the NRC mandate. The name change was necessary, and in the long run it will be worth the expenses. The expected media interest drowned in the tsunami. On the other hand, a huge media event about renaming the NRC might have caused negative media exposure during a major disaster campaign. Even without the tsunami there is no reason to believe that an expensive and broadly based commercial campaign to make the new name known to the public, would have worked satisfactory. The best, and possibly most credible, way to make the new name publicly known, is in our view - through recurring use in media and by media exposure of the organisation - as was successfully done. 6.8 Summary: Media strategy and exposure - The NRC did not manage to capture the public mind and the media as a number one humanitarian relief organisation. But the NRC is currently closer than ever to be perceived as an operational organisation of doers on location in the public mind. - Christmas holidays, internal discussion, lack of plans and staff, all resulted in a rapid, although reluctant start on the repositioning and funding campaign. The NRC profited by the fact that the NRC was on location, by initiating the Fellesaksjonen, by using recruitment as a media stunt, and by focusing on rebuilding schools. - The NRC should consider a communication plan to cover human disasters, built on the positive experiences of what actually functioned during the post-tsunami period. - The NRC staff-based stories did not make news to its potential extent. - The NRC should seek to be tolerant and encourage staff as eyewitnesses and storytellers in order to position the organisation as doers and solution seekers. - The NRC should consider move resources from print towards web. Page 57

65 7. Fund-raising: Strategy and outcome One ultimate goal of the NRC is to become more independent of government controlled funding and projects, and propel the organisation towards a more operational on location relief organisation, helping refugees and displaced persons in acute crises. To claim such a position, the NRC needs to expand the amount of free funding. The locomotive for free funding is private donations and fund-raising campaigns. The instruments by which the NRC can implement this vision are found in the communication plan as paraphrased above. Private independent sponsor funding has declined from NOK 10 million in 1999 to close to NOK 3 million in (Notat: Status, Reposisjonering av Flyktningehjelpen, 1. april 2005). According to the NRC Annual Fiscal report 2004, the NRC netted NOK 20,994 million in 2003 and NOK million in 2004 as independent funds. The gross number grew close to NOK 1,8 million in 2004, but the cost of fund raising raised by more than NOK 4 million. In 2005 the NRC budget shows that Norwegian governmental money is 70 % of the funds, the UN, EU and international governmental funding combines to 20 % of the total funds, while 5 % of the budget is based on private fund-raising. The NRC budget for free funding in 2004 was NOK 16,6 million, and one hoped for NOK 30 million independent in 2005 with new private sponsors. (Notat: Status, Reposisjonering av Flyktninghjelpen) Top five To get into the limelight, and to claim the position as one of the top five relief organisations in Norway, it all boils down to strategy, a good trademark and marketing. The NRC has it all. The strategy is to build the fund-raising campaigns brick by brick through partnership with friendly organisations, trade unions and commercial businesses. In due course this will build a broader financial base and the NRC will become a well-known organisation to the general public. Among governmental workers, academics and relief workers the NRC has an outstanding reputation as honest, trustworthy and hard working. In the general public the credibility score, given by Norsk Samfunnsbarometer April 2004, was as high as The score probably reflects the fact that the NRC received no negative media exposure like e.g. corruption or abused funds, the fact that the old name Flyktningerådet gave the general public wrong associations. In addition, the former Communication Director provided the NRC with extra credibility. However, the credibility score is more than 25 percent lower than the RC (4,99) and it is the lowest of all the large organisations in Norway. According to the communication plan the NRC will not use expensive commercial adds to spread the word. Basically, marketing is done by word of mouth in friendly and co-operative organisations as among the scouts and teachers, through positive editorial news and presentation in the mass media, by producing magazines, and through the web site. The NRC is not alone among Norwegian relief organisations wishing for free funding. The market for fund-raisers is highly competitive, and particularly tough for all organisations living in the shadow of the RC. The task is not made easier by the fact that the NRC is not among the most known of the top five relief organisations in Norway. Further, it is hard for anyone to get past the gatekeepers of mass media. The notion that the tsunami crisis was as made for the Red Page 58

66 Cross (RC) with the acute need for shelter, medical supplies and food which, after all, is what the RC is world wide known for delivering, opened the editorial departments in the media to the RC in particular. In 2004 the RC is referred to in 9827 newspaper articles, as of June 2005 the RC is mentioned in 7318 articles, while the NRC is mentioned in 837 which comes to less than 12 % of the total number of articles mentioning the RC. (Norsk Samfunnsbarometer, June 2005). The RC s equity is more than NOK 1,1 billion. The combination of solid economy, solid position as the number one relief organisation with more than 200,000 members, the number one source reporters will seek out to get information concerning disasters, and close connection to a number of celebrities and public figures - makes the RC a recognised political lobbyist and hard to beat. The RC s strong standing in Norway strengthens the previous arguments and the NRC s decision to participate in the Fellesaksjonen and not go alone Lasting relationships The strategy to build lasting relationships with large organisations has proved right. Most fundraising campaigns, both spontaneous and planned ones, have resulted from former relationships. Central members of Rogalandshjelpen knew and endorsed the NRC before the NRC was chosen as their main co-operative organisation. Rogalandshjelpen is also an example of one of the NRC s best selling points; the fact that the NRC is not ethnically or religiously biased. This made the NRC the obvious choice for the ethnic and religious dispersed campaign in Rogaland. The teacher s campaign evolved as a result of direct contact between the NRC and Utdannelsesforbundet. At the time the NRC was already planning a long term contract with the teachers. NRC had collaborated with The Norwegian Guide and Scout Association for more than 6 months before the scouts volunteered to do spontaneous fund-raising for the NRC operations. This summer the NRC has tested direct mail, web ads and face-to-face street campaigning. Individual level face-to-face marketing has produced a substantial new number of private donors (close to 50 % new donors), while the two other campaigns did not prove productive. This underscores the theory that the NRC has a good and saleable product, but a campaign must be based on close encounter, each possible supporter must be given time to understand and endorse the mandate of the NRC. In general, when someone takes the time to read the information dispersed by and about the NRC, comprehends the mandate and is told about accomplishments achieved on location for refugees and displaced persons, it takes a hard heart not to endorse the NRC. Long time care for refugees is not an easily dispersed message compared to saving children, or immediate humanitarian relief. The main challenge for the NRC is to get potential donors and fund-raisers informed. This is where the arduous work of building a solidly based relief organisation really begins. By reaching out broadly throughout the NRC it should be possible to come up with new membership based organisations with personal connections to individuals in the NRC that can be made into NRC fund-raisers and partners. It is also possible to build further on the commercial businesses like Choice Hotels and Wilh.Wilhelmsen, organisations already in a partnership like Human-Etisk forbund, Postkom and Statoil, and organisations on the fringe of becoming partners like sports clubs and medical students, in order to construct long term donors. These are connections that should be followed up closely in a personal face-to-face manner to ensure longterm broad collaboration. This, combined with deep interconnection on individual level and by organisational partnership, should make the marriages lasting and culminate into long-term donors. This strategy is in accordance with the communication plan. Interviews with NRC Page 59

67 employees and co-operating organisations indicate that the NRC is following up on contacts and keeping the contact close and individual; totally in accordance with the communication plan Business sponsors There is no long tradition for private or business sponsorship in Norway. There are few impressionable economic incentives to encourage corporations to become humanitarian sponsors. The competition for sponsorship is hard as sports clubs and local organisations base their economy on sponsorship. Most commercial businesses will only sponsor one defined project at the time, which can be followed closely with detailed instructions. The company must be able to utilize sponsor projects to expose the company internally and externally. It is a common experience among fundraisers that recruiting commercial sponsors requires long time networking, a lot of follow-up, in depth knowledge about the type of business one approaches, and updated information about current business thinking. And if you succeed, the sponsor company will meticulously follow most funds given. The effect is that funds from commercial sponsors are often less independent than governmental controlled funding. However, the quest for commercial sponsors is well worth doing as there are lots of funds to be gained. If the input is larger than gain, the NRC could consider outsourcing a fundraising campaign among corporations to experts. It is also possible to combine the hunt for corporate sponsors with building a broader democratic basis for the NRC, as shown below. However, as free funding and independence of governmental projects are NRC goals, long term fund-raising campaigns among private citizens and collaborating organisations are probably the best source to build totally independent funds. The partnership strategy proved right in the case of Fellesaksjonen. There are no indications that more funds or more media coverage could be gained by staying outside the Fellesaksjonen. According to the agreement with the other participators, the names and addresses of private donors were divided among the organisations. Individuals from the list are invited to become private donors of the NCR. However, these people donated money to the Fellesaksjonen, and did not show a particular interest in the NCR. This might be a reason why the positive yes rate is very low the address list is what fund-raisers in the NRC call cold. The argument is the same as above; the public need time to understand the information given in order to act. The most effective way to achieve long-term donors would be by customised information disseminated face to face and through organisations. Without well-placed and well-planned communication, there will be few new donors. However, disseminating solid information is not always in accordance with the constant search for free funds. Communication officers are thus riding two horses, i.e. one cannot be expected to disperse true and in depth information about an operation, and at the same time be a fund-raiser. At least no reporter will fully trust a communication officer both concerned with fund-raising, and connected to ongoing operations. A fund-raiser will worry about the consequences or policy regarding big business donors, Norwegian or international politics, for the operation and staff on location or possible negative impact towards the NRC, while talking to reporters or making a press release. This can give the department a credibility handicap. The former Communication Director possessed a high degree of public credibility. He is publicly regarded as an honest idealist who left his highly profiled position in the Norwegian Broadcasting Company (NRK) for a less profiled, but more, in accordance with his idealism, position in the NRC. He is the most known person connected to the NRC. A well-known name, combined with credibility and popularity, Page 60

68 could easily be used as a branding tool for marketing purposes. His idealistic standing made him a powerful communicator. The NRC should consider protecting the credibility of the Director of Communication, by leaving communication concerning funds and fund-raising to the SG. Further, there is an inherent breach between an outgoing operative Communication Director/Communication Department seeking public recognition through news releases, catchy news and pr- or media stunts, and the more covert lobby type of actions towards the Government. In the first case the more media coverage one can accomplish the better, as it will open the gates to free funding. In the latter solid facts and results combined with as little conflict as possible, will make it easier to get to an agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of International Development. More or less 90 percent of the NRC funding comes from governmental pockets. So what may look like a successful media story, like the schools in Sri- Lanka story, might not be perceived as good news at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words it is a problem when you both seek public recognition through media, and governmental funding. As nine out of ten NOKs are governmental funding, NRC should consider a more strict information policy as to avoid all public policy breaches. In that case most information dispersed by NRC would not be of much interest to the general public. The NRC would then be better off with the old name of Flyktningerådet as it would to a great extend function as a part of the government. That would be a negative circle away from the goal of independence and free funding. Instead of considering a more strict information policy, the NRC could consider the possibility of a sharp division between fund raising and information. As mentioned earlier the connection between fund-raising and the web site could be further utilised. All fund-raising campaigns and plans should consider the possible potential of connecting users through the world-wide-web, and the potential of saving work by utilising the web should be part of the planning. In the case of the fund-raising and renaming concert by Oslo Kammerorkester (Oslo Chamber Orchestra), tickets and invitations could have been dispersed and sold solely through and the web page. After the concert, all participants could be invited to become long-term donors Democratic basis There is no particular plan to spurt spontaneous fund-raising during a vast humanitarian catastrophe in the NRC. The NCA has the churches to lean on, the NPA can appeal to the unions, the RC has 200,000 members ready to hit the streets with collecting boxes. The NRC is not a membership organisation, but can appeal to private citizens, scouts, teachers and students, labour or employee organisations as potential fund-raisers. A communication and fund-raising plan should include a routine for organising fund-raisers and how to propel them into action. The plan should also include a high level meeting in the NRC to point out practical and easily communicated relief aims for the fund-raisers. The sooner such a plan can be implemented, the more free funds can be raised. During the tsunami campaign funds were readily available the first few days and weeks. As time went by, funds dwindled. Rogalandshjelpen had a rather slow start, and as a fund-raiser it was a moderate success. NOK 1,2 million is not much from Rogaland. Particularly when considering the solid backing by both the church and politicians, and the many sponsored commercial adds by local newspapers. By June 2005, the RC had raised NOK 410 million alone. If one could restart and refund the NRC today, it could be made into a membership organisation. This would have given the NRC the political backing and the free funding the organisation Page 61

69 wishes today. However, it is hard to see how one could build a membership organisation now. There are few, if any, examples of organisations that have grown from the top and down and not the other way around. There is a third possibility that might be a compromise between the current organisation and a membership organisation. The NRC could build a representative board. This is done by several public foundations like SKUP (Stiftelsen for en fri og uavhengig presse). The representative board is elected, or rather pointed out, by the SKUP general assembly - which in turn consists of every reporter who wishes to attend. The representative board has no formal power, but it is meant to be someone the elected board can talk to and test out ideas. Thus, the large representative board is given the role of active and involved members of an organisation. The NRC could use its general assembly to point out members of the talsmanngruppen, thus securing experienced members, invite well known individuals and celebrities, members of the royal family, potential and actual donors, and key note politicians to join the representative board. The representative board would at least partly make up for the missed democratic foundation, and it would open up new doors and possible trails to potential fund-raisers. The representative board is just another form of networking. Professionals are always looking for possible meeting places to mingle and make new acquaintances. (A possible interesting example of this is the Oil museum in Stavanger. Top officers of the oil companies made the museum possible. It is hard to conceive that these hard-core, hard working businessmen had much interest in museums. On the other hand, it is easy to perceive that they enjoyed the best possible networking conditions among fellow officers of the Norwegian petroleum industry and a rather informal meeting place at the board meetings. A substantial donation to the museum might be considered a small price to pay for the right connections.) A representative board is not as formal and demanding as a formal membership of the elected board, but it involves, interconnects individuals and enforces responsibility. Humanitarian efforts give a certain positive status in Norway. While membership of board of directors is quite demanding, the informal board of representatives give members the status without formal responsibility and should thus be attractive Summary: Fund-raising - Strategy and outcome - The strategy of building lasting relationships with large organisation is proved right. All the fund-raising campaigns, both the spontaneous ones and the planned ones, came as a result of a former relationship. - Individual level face-to-face marketing has given a substantial new number of private donors (close to 50 % new donors). This substantiate that the NRC has a good and saleable product, but a campaign must be based on close encounter as it takes time to understand and endorse the mandate of the NRC. - Funds from commercial sponsors do not always come through as much more independent than governmental controlled funding. As the aim of the NRC is to get freer funding to get more independence, the long-term fund-raising campaigns among private citizens and collaborating organisations are probably the best source to build totally independent funds. The NRC should consider outsourcing the quest for corporate sponsors. - The NRC should consider protecting the credibility of the position as communication director, by leaving communication concerning funds and fund-raising to the SG or the press officer. - The NRC should consider building a representative board to give the organisation a broader democratic basis, and thus making a breeding ground for possible private and commercial sponsors. Page 62

70 8. Conclusions and recommendations Terms of reference for this evaluation focus on organisational aspects of NRC s post-tsunami responses. The main purpose has been to discuss if NRC really managed to perform as an emergency organisation after the tsunami. The evaluation highlights strengths and weaknesses in NRC s emergency organisation both at the headquarters in Oslo and in field operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia Main conclusions NRC s overall performance in the post-tsunami response has been good. The competent and motivated staff is one of NRC s strong points. NRC s weakness lies in organizational structures and routines. The initial ad-hoc handling of the emergency shows that NRC does not have adequate organizational systems to handle an instant developing crisis in the acute emergency phase. When NRC was able to integrate post-tsunami activities in their normal structures, performance improved significantly. NRC s programme activities are less relevant in the acute emergency phase. NRC should therefore aim to improve deliveries in late emergency and early reconstruction and recovery phases of such crisis. Most important, NRC needs to strengthen contingency planning, distribution of responsibility and a pre-planned emergency response capacity NRC Headquarters response to the tsunami 1. NRC was not prepared to engage in the acute emergency phase when the tsunami hit. As a consequence, NRC a. needed too long time to decide to engage at all, b. had no contingency plans appropriate to the situation, c. had inadequate systems for information collection and resource mobilisation, d. did not have a clear strategy on where and how to contribute, e. improvised information gathering, resource mobilisation (including personnel) and decision structures. 2. NRC is currently not organised to operate in the acute emergency phase. Moreover, NRC has a limited capacity for engagement in the late-emergency phase. NRC does not have the necessary: a. Funds available for rapid response and continued activities in instant developing emergencies. b. Pre-organised and pre-trained emergency response teams. c. Prepared equipment stockpiles and logistics. 3. In general, NRC s programme activities are best suited as contributions in the rehabilitation and recovery phase after an instant developing disaster. The most appropriate programme areas for the late emergency phase are distribution and the protection aspect of ICLA. NRC does not possess core capacities (i.e. life saving capacities) for the acute emergency phase. 4. Today, the emergency rosters are the tools best suited to provide experienced emergency personnel as a basis for rapid responses. This requires a reorientation of where and when personnel on the rosters should be mobilised. 5. Whether NRC intends to specialise in acute emergency response or not, there is a need to improve the rapid and targeted response systems. This implies: a. Develop and maintain a contingency plan covering issues such as the crisis management team, response criteria, distribution of responsibilities, information Page 63

71 collection and dissemination, mobilisation of resources, co-ordination, information and management. b. A responsible unit/manager for contingency planning. c. Drill all involved personnel both at the headquarters and in the field. d. Pre-plan deliveries and operations in an emergency area. Improvisation should be planned for, and limited to the final adaptation of own activities to local contexts, coordination and unforeseen events. e. Mobilise resources in the pre-emergency phase including funds for own independent operations. f. Organise and train at least one emergency assessment and start-up team including a team leader with start-up experience, logistics, communication, and programme expert(s). The team should be supplemented with local expertise according to needs. g. Clarify responsibility of all headquarters units and departments in case of instant developing emergencies particularly in relation to recruitment and personnel, information management and decision authorities. 6. After the first hectic weeks, NRC s post-tsunami operations became part of the normal organisational activities - although at a higher pace than normal. By doing so, NRC showed its strength as a late emergency and rehabilitation organisation: a. NRC returned to established routines for information gathering, informationexchange, co-ordination of activities and decision-making. b. Ad-hoc recruitment strategies were replaced by formalized routine recruitment. c. The initial haste in finding out what to do was replaced by standard field-based project procedures. 7. Also in this phase, there is room for significant improvements: a. Reliable two-way information exchange between country offices and the headquarters in Oslo is no satisfactory. b. Time constraints lead to ad-hoc recruitment strategies: o Reduction of mandatory qualifications requirements o Search for people already familiar to NRC and to individual NRC employees. c. Replacement personnel were not recruited early enough, resulting in gaps and lack of handover and field officers have in some cases received confirmation of extensions very late NRC responses in Sri Lanka 8. The NRC response to the tsunami in Sri Lanka was improvised: a. Assessment team and initial decision-making at headquarters level sidelined important input from the field: o Disrupted established communication lines between country office and the headquarters o Overran contextual considerations in favour of headquarter preferences o Final programme decisions had great implications for NRC's internal dynamics, both at field, country and headquarters level as well as NRC's initial relief capacity. 9. During the first phase, decision-making authority was shifted upwards while responsibility to implement remained at field level, causing undue strain on the organisational capabilities of NRC Sri Lanka: a. Programme activities instantly outgrew support functions b. Country office forced to improvise more to accommodate headquarter decisions Page 64

72 c. Some flawed recruiting at headquarters level made an impact on vital programme progress. 10. From January to June 2005, NRC Sri Lanka underwent an unparalleled organisational expansion, which has demanded an incredible degree of flexibility, creativity and improvisation at country office and field level: a. NRC Sri Lanka staff have handled the developing situation and the extra workload extremely well b. Communication structure remained underdeveloped and probably too hierarchical, leaving an insufficient amount of information through the formal channels and too much reliability on informal channels c. Resident Representative has focused on the individual capacities of each member of staff in order to meet the challenges with the necessary creativity, flexibility, practical experience and cultural sensitivity. This has been largely successful. 11. Contextual challenges, albeit causing considerable delays, have by NRC Sri Lanka been handled well and in line with UN and other relevant policies and strategies. 12. NRC Sri Lanka acted upon the post-tsunami attention from the international community and has managed to establish a dynamic and viable donor network NRC responses in Indonesia 13. NRC s (initial) response to the tsunami in Indonesia was improvised: a. The first assessment and start-up team was a waste of resources 23 as a result of its improvised composition; vague terms-of-reference, and very short-time contracts in the rapidly changing situation. The team did not have any chance to really start up NRC operations or to set up the organisation. The rapid changing situation made their observations and efforts of less value for the second team. b. The second team performed well in building up the NRC organisation, identifying possible projects and establish co-operation with local authorities and the UN-system. NRC s basic programme portfolio within rehabilitation and construction is very difficult to implement in the acute- and late-emergency phases due to the need for strong co-ordination and authorisation. c. It was a correct decision to bypass CARDI in the situation faced by both CARDI and the partners in January 05. CARDI was not prepared to meet a disaster like the tsunami. In addition, CARDI had also suffered severe losses of personnel and equipment. The partners were not prepared or trained to engage in joint emergency operations. It is too late to change or revive an organisation after a crisis has developed. d. NRC has managed to build up a viable and well performing organisation. CARDI NRC is manned with competent and motivated staff. Project implementation (relevance and speed) is good compared to other organisations. e. NRC has been very good at communicating and co-ordinating with other organisations, and has been sensitive to local authorities and local priorities. In some areas NRC has taken a lead as the main co-ordinating body. f. NRC has acquired a high standing among authorities, UN organisations and other NGOs. g. Projects are run with a high-risk profile due to lack of funding. In post-tsunami Aceh this strategy may work due to ample resources available in the humanitarian 23 Except maybe the contact network. Page 65

73 community. In normal operations, this strategy can lead to financial problems and the abortion of projects. h. MFA did not perform as a reliable donor for CARDI-NRC. The case emphasises the need for a broader financial base for NRC. i. Co-operation and information sharing between CARDI-NRC and NRC Headquarters in Oslo has been insufficient, particularly with regards to programme officers in the field and advisors in Oslo, but also with regards to funding and search for donors. The role of the headquarter based advisers is unclear for field officers and has not been communicated to them in a consistent way NRC, the media and fundraising 14. NRC did not manage to capture the public mind and the media as a number one humanitarian relief organisation. But NRC seems to be closer than ever to be perceived as an operational organisation of doers on location in the public mind: a. NRC staff-based stories did not make news to its potential extent. b. NRC profited by the fact that NRC was on location, by initiating the Fellesaksjonen, by using recruitment as a media stunt, and by focusing on rebuilding schools. c. NRC is presently not exploiting the potentials of the web. In instant developing crisis, where the situation is changing very rapidly, the paper-strategy is too slow to attract attention from other media or the public. 15. Christmas holidays, internal discussions, lack of plans and staff, all resulted in a relatively reluctant start on the repositioning and funding campaign compared to other emergency organisations: a. The long-lasting strategy of building stable relationships with large organisations has proved to be right. All the fund-raising campaigns, both the spontaneous ones and the planned ones, came as a result of a former relationship. b. Individual face-to-face marketing has given a substantial new number of private donors (close to 50 % new donors). This substantiate that NRC has a good and attractive product. A campaign, however, must be based on close encounter and that it takes time to understand and endorse the mandate of NRC. c. Funds from commercial sponsors are, as funding from the Government (MFA), normally attached to defined projects. Long-term fund-raising campaigns among private citizens and collaborating organisations are probably the best strategy to build up independent funds. 16. There is an inbuilt contradiction between a successful media strategy and internal organisational priorities. This contradiction is not resolved in NRC: a. Both the media recruitment stunt and the very early announcement of plans to rehabilitate schools in Sri Lanka were successful media stunts. b. Such media attention generates internal work (e.g. the media recruitment stunt) and may create political tensions (e.g. the very early announcement of the school reconstruction programme in Sri Lanka). This was not properly considered before the media releases. c. There is a need to clarify roles and responsibilities between media exposure activities, fund-raising campaigns and objective information. Page 66

74 8.2. Recommendations A. NRC should concentrate their emergency response activities to the late emergency and early recovery phases because: 1. Too many organisations show up in the acute emergency phase (the cowboy syndrome) creating bottlenecks and confusion. At the same time, too few organisations move in with a clear focus on the recovery and rehabilitation challenges. In a broader perspective, these activities are the most important in order to assist society to recover from a crisis. 2. NRC is specialised in handling late emergency/recovery projects through its existing programme activities and organisational design. Moreover, NRC has proved to be a well functioning organisation within its specialities. Hence, NRC should focus on late emergency and early recovery phases in order to fully utilise its present strengths and programme activities. B. NRC should develop a contingency plan for involvement in different types of crisis. This plan should at least include co-ordination structures, design of a crisis management team, response criteria (e.g. type of crisis, scale and impact), decision authority and distribution of responsibility in an emergency, information management, resource mobilisation, media- and fund raising strategies. C. NRC should pre-plan and organise early response resources such as: 1. An emergency response team for assessments and start-ups (4 to 10 weeks contracts). 2. Work out and finalise relevant handbooks and instructions for emergency personnel (e.g. finalise the Establishing presence (start-up) Handbook from 2002). 3. The emergency rosters should be re-organised to meet needs for rapid mobilisation of personnel to own programmes in addition to UN requests. The rosters could also serve as a basis for the set-up of emergency response teams. 4. Acquisition of independent start-up and programme funds securing stop-gap measures when mobilising additional funds (at least 6 months of operations). Furthermore, NRC should clarify the division of labour and responsibility for fundraising between the headquarters in Oslo and field offices. 5. Establish some stockpiles of rapid response equipment. 6. Consider to extend the experience from the CARDI consortium and to initiate a sleeping emergency consortium with the capacity to intervene in different types of crisis at a very short notice. D. NRC should conduct regular exercises in rapid response including top management and all relevant units /departments. This also includes regular upgrading of contingency plans. E. NRC should work out a strategy to handle the contradicting needs embedded in media exposure, fund-raising and information activities: 1. NRC should develop a communication plan to cover instant developing crises. The plan could build on the positive experiences of what actually functioned during the post-tsunami period. 2. NRC should work out a clear division of labour and distribution of responsibilities between media exposure, fund-raising and objective information. The Communications Director should only have the responsibility for media exposure and information, while the Secretary General should be responsible for communication concerning funds and fund-raising. Furthermore, NRC should consider outsourcing the quest for corporate sponsors. 3. NRC should seek to be tolerant and encourage staff as eyewitnesses and storytellers in order to position the organisation as doers and solution seekers. Page 67

75 4. NRC should upgrade and improve the web pages and move resources from print to the web. 5. NRC should consider building a representative board to give the organisation a broader democratic basis, and thus prepared the ground for possible private and commercial sponsors. F. NRC should pay attention to maintaining the enthusiasm and motivation among staff both at headquarters and in the field. Page 68

76 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Annex 1: Terms of Reference (in Norwegian) Final Terms of Reference Evaluering Flyktninghjelpens Tsunami-innsats Bakgrunn 26. desember Flodbølgen gikk over hele det indiske hav. Bølgen drepte mennesker i Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Burma, India, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Maldivene, Kenya, Tanzania og Sør- Afrika. I følge de siste anslagene ble over mennesker drept og 1,5 millioner mennesker husløse som følge av flodbølgen. De to hardest rammede områdene Sri Lanka og Indonesia er også områder rammet av konflikt. Flyktninghjelpen sendte på et tidlig tidspunkt to team til Sri Lanka og Indonesia i forbindelse med kartleggingen av katastrofen og mulighet for oppstart av prosjekter. I tillegg ble det sekondert en rekke personer til området, satt i gang en ekstra innsats vedrørende rekruttering av personell, innsamlingsaksjoner, det ble informert om situasjonen i media og på Flyktninghjelpens hjemmeside. Flyktninghjelpens innsats i forhold til flodbølgekatastrofen innebar en intern diskusjon rundt organisasjonens mandat i forhold til flodbølgekatastrofens ofre. Det ble konkludert med at..selv om Tsunamiofrene faller utenfor Flyktninghjelpens mandat bør denne gruppen likevel inkluderes. Dette fordi Flyktninghjelpen var til stede med programvirksomhet i Indonesia og Sri Lanka før flomkatastrofen og har av den grunn både kunnskap og erfaring fra operasjonell virksomhet i området. I tillegg har organisasjonen ekspertise fra nødhjelpsarbeid. Flyktninghjelpen har av den grunn et ansvar og en humanitær forpliktelse til å hjelpe disse to landene. Videre ble det presisert at organisasjonens virksomhet (bør) begrenses til ett år når det gjelder aktiviteter i forhold til flomofrene. Utvidelse av dette ekstraordinære engasjementet må eventuelt vurderes på nytt. Det ble også presisert at all operasjonell virksomhet vil som vanlig være i tråd med Flyktninghjelpens mandat dvs. innenfor de fire kjerneaktiviteter + Camp Management. Flyktninghjelpen skal evaluere organisasjonens håndtering av flodbølgekatastrofen. Dette blant annet på bakgrunn av at organisasjonen gjennom strategier samt mål og delmål for 2004/2005 har understreket viktigheten av Flyktninghjelpen som en nødhjelpsorganisasjon. Det blir således viktig å se på om Flyktninghjelpen virkelig har opptrådt som en nødhjelpsaktør i forbindelse med Tsunamien. Videre er det viktig å se på Flyktninghjelpens arbeidet i felt i relasjon til profil og målgrupper. Hensikt Ved å systematisk fremstille erfaringer fra Flyktninghjelpens Tsunami-arbeid skal evalueringen belyse sider ved Flyktninghjelpens organisering som eventuelt bør videreutvikles eller endres. Evalueringen skal også gi innspill til organisering av organisasjonens arbeid i store kriser. Omfang Evalueringen skal vurdere gjennomføringen av Flyktninghjelpens Tsunami innsats sentralt (i Norge) og i de flodbølgerammede områdene i Sri Lanka og Indonesia i perioden Datainnsamling vil foregå i Norge og i programlandene. I 24. June 2005

77 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Målsettinger Evalueringen skal studere organisasjonens respons på Tsunamien og med utgangspunkt i dette belyse sider ved Flyktninghjelpens organisering som eventuelt bør videreutvikles eller endres, og komme med anbefalinger til organisering av organisasjonens arbeid i store kriser. Evalueringen skal se nærmere på: Flyktninghjelpen sentralt 1. Fase 1: Den innledende fasen (26. desember -15 januar): Flyktninghjelpens håndtering sentralt (inkludert ledelsen) og samarbeid mellom de ulike avdelingene ved hovedkontor samt hovedkontor og felt: Situasjonsanalyse (perceptions of reality) Varsling av kontor/avdelinger/nøkkelpersonell/ pårørende Ledelse - beslutninger og beslutningsmyndighet - ansvarsfordeling / koordinering/involvering Mobilisering av ressurser - tidsbruk - personell - midler Personell til Sri Lanka/Indonesia (inkludert assessment team) - rekruttering - briefing/forberedelse - stillingsinstruks (ToR) Kommunikasjon mellom HK og felt inkludert oppfølging av felt Kommunikasjon/samarbeid med eksterne aktører, norske og internasjonale (Utenriksdepartementet, FN etc) Vurdering av innsats/aktiviteter opp mot Flyktninghjelpens mandat Relevans av FHs kjerneaktiviteter i en slik situasjon Utvikling av strategi og planer for videre arbeid 2. Fase 2: 15 januar- 1.juni: Flyktninghjelpens håndtering sentralt (inkludert ledelsen) og samarbeid mellom de ulike avdelingene ved hovedkontor samt hovedkontor og felt: Samme som ovenfor, bortsett fra kulepunkt en og to (situasjonsanalyse og varsling) 3. Presse-, informasjon- og innsamlingsarbeid i hele perioden ( ) Sentralt (HK) I felt Innsamlingsaksjoner og nettverksarbeid (Speiderne, Utdanningsforbundet, Rogalandshjelpen) - Effekten av tsunami-krisen på Flyktninghjelpens videre inntekstbringende arbeid. - Oppbygging av varige kontakter for verving av faste givere og utvikling av innsamlingsnettverk 4. Flyktninghjelpen Indonesia (i hele perioden ) Varsling Situasjonsanalyse Kommunikasjon og samarbeid med Flyktninghjelpen sentralt (HK) Ansvarsfordeling / koordinering Mobilisering av ressurser, inkludert lokale - tidsbruk II 24. June 2005

78 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council - personell - midler Beslutninger og beslutningsmyndighet Identifisering av partnere og prosjekt CARDI å være i et konsortium i en nødhjelpssituasjon Samarbeid med andre aktører (nasjonale myndigheter, internasjonale non-governmental organisations (INGOs), nasjonale non-governmental organisations (NGO er) og FN) Utvikling av strategi og planer for videre arbeid (aktiviteter, eventuell utfasing) 5. Flyktninghjelpen Sri Lanka (i hele perioden ) Samme som Indonesia bortsett fra CARDI (det å være i et konsortium i en nødhjelpssituasjon) Metode Evalueringen vil være ekstern, men vil samarbeide med FH ansatte ved hovedkontor og i felt. Evaluator skal konsultere og innhente informasjon fra ulike kilder. Evalueringen vil basere seg på samtaler og intervjuer med stakeholders - Generalsekretær - Ledergruppa i FH - Utlandsavdelingen - Beredskapsavdelingen - Kommunikasjonsavdelingen - Rådgivere Kompetanse- og utviklingsavdelingen - Stedlige representanter - Andre uteansatte - Samarbeidspartnere feltreise i ett eller begge de berørte programland (Indonesia og Sri Lanka) Dokumentgjennomgang (FHs prinsipprogram, beredskapsstrategi, strategi for oppstart og utfasing, donorstrategi, kommunikasjonsstrategi, landstrategier, søknader, samarbeidsavtale med CARDI og andre med mer). En presentasjon av foreløpige funn vil ikke være nødvendig før et utkast til rapport foreligger. Tidsplan Juni : Koordineringsmøte med referansegruppen og annet forarbeid juni. Intervjuer i Sri Lanka juni Intervjuer ved hovedkontor august Intervjuer ved hovedkontor august Intervjuer Indonesia (tentativt) 15. september Utkast til rapport oversendt Flyktninghjelpen 1. oktober Kommentarer fra Flyktninghjelpen 8. oktober Rapport går i trykken og oversendes Flyktninghjelpen 15. oktober Presentasjon av evalueringsrapporten ved FHs hovedkontor Output En skriftlig rapport på engelsk om Flyktninghjelpens Tsunami-innsats som ser på om Flyktninghjelpen var i stand til å levere nødhjelp, hvor mye tid og ressurser organisasjon brukte på å få i gang slike aktiviteter, hvordan arbeidet var ledet og koordinert, aktivitetene i forhold til organisasjonens mandat, presse-, innformasjons- og innsamlingsarbeid og planer for videre arbeid i felt belyser sider ved Flyktninghjelpens organisering som eventuelt bør videreutvikles eller endres III 24. June 2005

79 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council anbefalinger til organisering av organisasjonens arbeid i store kriser. Flyktninghjelpen vil i forbindelse med evalueringen nedsette en styringsgruppe, som ledes av Kine Brodtkorb, evalueringskoordinator, Flyktninghjelpens hovedkontor. Medlemmer i gruppen er: Ragna Vikøren, leder Talsmannsavdelingen Oddhild Günther, leder Kompetanse- og utviklingsavdelingen Patrik Ekløf, nestleder Utlandsavdelingen Evalueringskoordinator vil være focal point vedrørende Flyktninghjelpen sentralt (hovedkontor) mens organisasjonens programkoordinatorer for Sri Lanka og Indonesia vil være konsulenten(e)s focal point for Sri Lanka og Indonesia. En utkast til rapport skrevet på engelsk skal leveres innen 15 september Endelig rapport på engelsk skal leveres Flyktninghjelpens hovedkontor 8. oktober. En presentasjon av evalueringsrapporten ved Flyktninghjelpens hovedkontor skal skje innen 15. oktober Rapporten skal også presenteres for Flyktninghjelpens styre. Budsjett For detaljert budsjett, se kontrakt mellom partene. IV 24. June 2005

80 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Annex 2: List of reference documents. Camp Management Project (2005): The Camp Management Project s Training Mission to Sri Lanka final report. Consortium for Assistance to Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) Memorandum of Understanding. Dated 29. January Consortium for Assistance Towards Recovery and Development in Indonesia (CARDI) Amendment to Memorandum of Understanding and addendum for purposes of responding to the Aceh tsunami disaster. Dated 7. July Egeland, Jan (2005): Analysis of the Tsunami Response. Mail dated January 18 th. Endsley, M.R (1997): The Role of Situation Awareness in Naturalistic Decision Making. In Naturalistic Decision Making, C.E. Zsambok and G. Klein, Editors New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Grant Agreement for NRC's ICLA programme (not dated). Gjelten, Jan Olav (2005): Analysis of recruitment and follow-up of expatriate personnel in Darfur Gjelten, Jan Olav (2005): Recruitment in NRC. A presentation held at the Resident Representative seminar June Helgesen, Leif Magne (2005): Rogalandshjelpen hjelp til flodbølgeofrene. Sluttrapport juni ICRC (1995): The Code of Conduct: Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes. September 15 th Kruke, Bjørn Ivar & Olsen, Odd Einar (2005): Reliability-seeking networks in complex emergencies. The International Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 4, No 1. Lexow, Janne (2004): Building a presence. Making an impact. Meeting new challenges: Review of the CARDI experience in Indonesia a report to the CARDI Steering Committee. July Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Disaster Strategy, NRC Sri Lanka Operation January 3rd Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Job Description for The Human Resources Manager. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Norwegian Refugee Council. January 9th V

81 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Norwegian Refugee Council. February 15th Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Memorandum of Understanding between the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation and the Norwegian Refugee Council. February 3rd Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Notat: Kommunikasjonsavdelingens kampanjer for frie midler. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Notat: Lønnsgiverordninger, produktutvikling. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Notat: Status, reposisjonering av Flyktninghjelpen. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): NRC's strategy in Sri Lanka. April Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Oppsummering av aktiviteter et halvt år etter flodbølgekatastrofen. Juli Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Rebuilding of Schools partially damaged by the tsunami. A Concept Paper. February 12th Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Reposisjonering i media NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Security and Health Manual (DRAFT). Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Security briefing note - NRC operations in S.E. Asia. January Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Security Plan for Norwegian Refugee Council Sri Lanka. April 6th Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Terms of reference: Evaluation of Norwegian Refugee Councils tsunami operation. Dated June 24th NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council Board of Directors minutes spring NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council Management group minutes spring NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2005): Årsrapport NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council: The Norwegian Refugee Council s Communications Strategy for the period NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2004): Emergency Personnel Vacancy Announcement. NRC. Oslo. 31. December Norwegian Refugee Council (2004): The Norwegian Refugee Council s Crisis Management Plan. NRC. Oslo. Dated 27. July VI

82 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Norwegian Refugee Council (2004): The Camp Management Toolkit. NRC. Oslo. April 16th Norwegian Refugee Council (2003): NRC Distribution Handbook. NRC. Oslo. Dated 15. June Norwegian Refugee Council (2003): NRC Education Handbook. NRC. Oslo. Final draft June- December Norwegian Refugee Council (2003): NRC ICLA Handbook Edition. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2003): NRC Shelter Handbook. 2. June NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2002): Establishing Presence. Draft Version. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2002): NRC Financial Handbook. May 2002 Edition. NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2002): Policy Paper. Dated June NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council (2001): Personnel Handbook for NRC Country Offices. September NRC. Oslo. Norwegian Refugee Council and The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005): Contract between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("Norway") and the Norwegian Refugee Council regarding the Rehabilitation of Tsunami Affected Schools. June 1st NRC CARDI (2005): NRC CARDI Security Instructions. Dated 22. April NRC. Aceh. Indonesia. Rosenthal, Uriel; Boin, Arjen R.; Comfort, Louise K. (2001): Managing Crisis: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas. Saevfors, Ingemar (2005): The Reconstruction Operation in Indonesia. Dated 27. August Schneider, Saundra K. (1995): Flirting with Disaster. Public Management in Crisis Situations. London: M.E.Sharpe. The Sphere Project (2004): Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response Edition. Sphere Project: Geneva. Tuniewicz, Mateusz (2005) : Four Months After The State of Advocacy and Protection Activities. 19. August NRC CARDI, Banda Aceh. Indonesia. United Nations (2003): Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations. December UN-OCHA (January 6 th 2005): Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Flash Appeal 2005 for VII

83 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Geneva. UN-OCHA (January 11 th 2005): Highlights of press briefing by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator before donor meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to tsunami-affected Communities. Geneva. UN-OCHA (March 3rd 2005): District Stocktaking Exercise, Sri Lanka Tsunami Response. Colombo. UN-OCHA (April 2005): Mid-Term Review of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka. Colombo. UNHCR (2000): Handbook for Emergencies. Second Edition. June UNHCR, Geneva. UNICEF (2003): UNICEF s Humanitarian Principles. July Ursano, R.J., McCaughey, B.G., Fullerton, C.S (1994): Individual and community responses to Trauma and Disaster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. US Agency for International Development (1998): Field Operations Guide: For Disaster assessments and Response. August Washington. Weick, Karl.E.; Sutcliffe, Kathleen M; Obstfeld,, David (1999): Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior, : p World Bank (2005): Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Preliminary stocktaking of the reconstruction efforts six months after the earthquake and the tsunami. Dated June 25, World Food Programme (2002): Emergency Field Operations Handbook. UN WFP. Rome. Italy. World Health Organization Sri Lanka (Apr 2005): Health System in the Tsunami Affected areas of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, Colombo. VIII

84 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Annex 3: List of people interviewed Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC): Brekke, Toril Christophersen, Eirik Gjelten, Jan Olav Giæver, Benedicte Günther, Oddhild Holtedal, Jan Petter Høvring, Roald Jacobsen, Svein Johansen, Raymond Kristensen, Tom B. Kvalberg, Kari Ledezma, Marcos Lyster, Anneli Midttun, Eldrid Kvamen Mjaugedal, Jens Mæhlum, Marit Nohr, Catrine Nome, Petter Nordlie, Øyvind Nyhaug, Gretha Pedersen, Bjørn Falck Petterson, Heidi Solstad, Inger Samsel, Grazyna Schjetlein, Peter Sevrin, Eric Skjetne, Toril Solstad, Inger Storm, Jannicke Torjesen, Lars Vik, Kari Knutsen Vikøren, Ragna NRC/Switzerland: Rasmusson, Elisabeth Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Kubberud, Tor Deputy Secretary General Information Officer Advisor Recruitment Director of Emergency Director of Strategy and Development Dept. Programme Coordinator Indonesia Head of Public Relations Advisor Networking Secretary General Marketing Consultant Human Resources Coordinator Head of archives/librarian Recruitment Officer Advisor Education and Human Rights Director International Department Programme Coordinator Sri Lanka IT Consultant Former Communication Director Advisor - Shelter Human Resources Assistant Director of Finance and Administration Dept. Marketing Consultant Private Funding Head Human Resources Advisor External Relations Logistics Manager Head of Section Europe, Asia and Latin America Publications Coordinator/Editor Head Human Resources Human Resources Coordinator Information officer/webmaster Human Resources Coordinator Head of the Advocacy Unit Head of Office Counsellor of embassy, Colombo, Sri Lanka A representative from The Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta has also been consulted. NRC Sri Lanka Abrahamsen, Taran Bleers, Chris Administrative Consultant Programme Manager, Shelter IX

85 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Drabløs, Bjørn Edquist, Ulf Elverland, Siri Espenes, Gunnar Hansen, Tor Arne Kristensen, Jørn Larsen, Oddbjørn Moi, Rolf Robinson, Isaac Sandal-Aasen, Bente Svendsen, Ove Donors in Sri Lanka Miguelez, Borja Sandvik, Monika Upson, Philip Consultations in Sri Lanka: Bessuges, Pierre Chaiban, Ted Chaya, Mona Gatzinski, Valentin Ghelani, Reena Kaijser, Cecilia Ofstad, Ingrid Ratnaweera, Lal Taft-Dick, Jeff Tveiten, Arthur Whaley, David CARDI: de Baillenx, Hervé Kocher, Michael Lacomba, Aitor S. Programme Manager, School Rehabilitation Programme Manager, ICLA Liaison Officer/ Acting Resident Representative Project Coordinator Chied of Finance and Administration Resident Representative Project Coordinator, Shelter Project Coordinator, Shelter Project Coordinator, ICLA Programme Manager, Education Programme Manager, School Rehabilitation Technical Advisor, ECHO Protection Officer, UNHCR Senior Humanitarian Adviser, DFID Deputy Head of Office, UN-OCHA Head of Office, Unicef Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator, FAO Head of Office, UN-OCHA Deputy Head of Office, UN-OCHA Humanitarian Aff. Officer, UN-OCHA (Ampara) Special Advisor, Royal Norwegian Embassy Director, Planning, Ministry of Social Welfare Country Director, World Food Programme SLMM (Trincomalee) Senior Consultant, Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies Country Director Secretariat Deputy Director CARDI-NRC: Bennike, Christina Louise Distribution NFIs Manager, Sigli Bergh, Rune Project Coordinator, Meulaboh Fornes, Wenche Finance and Admin. Manager Gjertsen, Elin Education Manager Nusraddin, Arief Local education employee Nygaard, Jon Erik Resident Representative (March -) Olsen, Ingar Falck Project Manager Shelter, Sigli Solberg, Atle Resident Representative (January March) Tuniewicz, Mateusz Protection & Advocacy Vogel, Veit Project Manager Shelter, Meulaboh X

86 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council UN and NGOs in Aceh: Hall, Oliver, L. Ray, Steve Saevfors, Ingemar Sayo, Aoki Head of Office, UN-OCHA/Banda Aceh Head of Office, UN-OCHA/Meulaboh International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Head of Education Unit, UNICEF Authorities in Aceh: T. Ahmad Dadek Sub District Head of Johan Pahlawan, Aceh Barat District. Bukhari Tahir Dinas Bappeda, Sigli Ibrahim Husin Dinas Bappeda, Sigli A. Iskandar Dinas Bappeda, Sigli Nasir Sarong Dinas Bappeda, Sigli Ifalsim Maimun BRR, Sigli Mahfus Rizal Sekretaris Bappeda, Sigli Ishak Salman Head Secretariat Satlak Pidie Representatives from The Norwegian Guide and Scout Association, Rogalandshjelpen, P. Stordalen and Wilhelmsen & Klaveness have also been consulted. XI

87 The Tsunami-effort by the Norwegian Refugee Council Annex 4: NRC organisation as of 26. December 2004 XII