Organization of Operation of Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria. -The Case of Kalandia Checkpoint. Ariel Vainer and Ron Shatzberg.

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1 1 Organization of Operation of Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria -The Case of Kalandia Checkpoint Ariel Vainer and Ron Shatzberg Abstract Operation of checkpoints was one of the most common activities of the IDF during the period of Operation Ebb and Flow. In its physical and social aspect, the checkpoint is a buffer zone that separates the Palestinian and Israeli areas, between Israelis and Arabs, and between those who are authorized to pass and those who are not authorized to pass between these spaces. Thus, the checkpoint is an area where two worlds meet: different nationalistic, social and cultural worlds, and it is a hybrid area. One of the principal checkpoints operating in the Judea and Samaria region is the Kalandia checkpoint. This article is based upon ethnographic field job primarily observations and interviews and attempts to learn how the Kalandia checkpoint operates and which social dynamics characterize it. This article places the integration between the soldier and the Palestinian citizen at the focus of the social dynamics. This article takes note of the dysfunction of the checkpoint, expressed by the hostility of the soldiers towards the Palestinian citizens. This article describes how the checkpoint creates a process of blurring the image of the citizen passing through it, a process called depersonalization in this article. The continuous operation of the checkpoint is accompanied by many regulations, processes, and instructions that, in the final analysis, create an impersonal meeting. The bureaucratization of the checkpoint contributes to this situation, at whose basis is an attempt to catalog the population into a collection of clear categories, and to

2 2 enable making a quick decision as whether to allow a citizen to pass the checkpoint or not. However, the bureaucratization process is unable to catalog apriori the complicated reality, and each person that approaches to be checked at the checkpoint is a specific combination of categories and cases. This reality makes the handling of those passing the checkpoint only by means of the official, fixed and strict procedures difficult. Furthermore, these procedures are often changed. These two facts result in the soldiers at the checkpoint often having to decide independently concerning the person facing them and this leads to an interpersonal interface and close contact between the soldier and the Palestinian citizens at the checkpoint. At the same time, in order to prevent the difficulties that result from these personal interactions, and from the lack of control of the situation, rules, laws and standard military language are applied. Therefore, the soldiers attempt to fully control the checkpoint while relating to the Palestinian population that passes through as a potential enemy. The dynamics created at the checkpoint sometimes leads to violence and is characterized, at this article points out by a system of expectations similar to that existing between a commander and his recruits. In this situation, the checkpoints lead to interactions that are negative for both sides, and the mission distances itself from its police character and objective.

3 3 Introduction The checkpoints, as the principal military method used by the IDF in the Judea Samaria area, have received broad treatment in the Israeli public discussion as well as in the rest of the world. The discussion within the army, as in the public, deals with organizational aspects, issues of human rights, and the humanitarian implications of operating checkpoints as a conflict technique in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This work deals with the checkpoints as they are perceived, understood and operated by IDF soldiers in the Judea Samaria area. In a more specific manner, we shall attempt to analyze how the checkpoint activities are incorporated within the general arrangement of IDF forces, and its part in the operation of all the IDF forces in the area. We shall also analyze the manner in which the checkpoints are organized, and what types of relationships develop or are created at the checkpoints between the IDF soldiers and the Palestininians that pass through them. In a more general manner, we shall ask what can be learned from this about the activities of an army forced to perform nonbelligerent missions of a police character, in parallel with vigorous military actions which are frequently very belligerent. For this purpose, we shall focus on an in-depth analysis of one of the large and principal checkpoints that exist today in Judea Samaria the Kalandia checkpoint located between Jerusalem and Ramalla. In this article, we shall claim that the manner in which the IDF organizes and arranges the conduct of the checkpoints creates operational practices whose objective is to create depersonalization 1 of the contact between the soldiers that man the checkpoint and the Palestinians who seek to pass through them. This is by means of cataloging the Palestinian population into categories. For each category there are detailed instructions to allow or to prohibit from passing through the checkpoint. The process of depersonalization is augmented at the IDF checkpoints 1 That is: a situation in which the personal-sensitive and cognitive element is neutralized

4 4 when the soldiers engage in practices of distancing themselves and creation of alienation from the Palestinians by means of body language and specific organization of the physical area of the checkpoint. We will see that the method of checkpoints as a tool for controlling the movement of the Palestinian population breaks down or is at least not applicable many times, because, in accordance with the existing criteria, almost every Palestinian citizen is a special case and does not belong to any of the presently existing categories in accordance with the method of classification. The inability of the soldiers at the checkpoints to apply and operate in accordance with the instructions and the categories defined by the military system, brings about unavoidable creation of interpersonal contacts with the Palestinians. These contacts are friction points that are openings to various problems or charged and problematical encounters. Additionally, the breakdown of the present bureaucratic method in which the Palestinian population that wishes to pass the checkpoint is classified, creates an alternative control method, which essentially is reminiscent of the social system that is common within the IDF. The method of controlling the Palestinian population, which is essentially military, shapes and defines the character of the interpersonal meeting that exists at the checkpoints, which is unavoidably highly charged.

5 5 Low intensity conflict and the checkpoint as a principal activity therein In order to examine the issue of IDF checkpoints in the Judea Samaria region it is appropriate to understand the character of the conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In accordance with the definition of military systems, the situation is defined as Low Intensity Conflict, which is: Hostile conflict between entities which do not activate their main power and do not activate their main strength at its full intensity. Low Intensity Conflict can stand alone but also can exist in sequence with a general encounter, either as a prior stage or a later stage. Moshe Yaalon, Maarachot , page 24 A principle characteristic of Low Intensity Conflict is the conspicuous lack of balance between the forces of the encountering sides. In Low Intensity Conflict, the weak side adopts guerrilla and terror combat tactics while attempting to exploit the local advantages: a better knowledge than the enemy of the battle zone, the ability to hide among the local civilian population, the ability to damage the visible strategic properties of the stronger side, perseverance resulting from strong belief in the justice of the cause. On the other hand, the strong side has a number of quantitative disadvantages that are imposed upon it by Low Intensity Conflict: first, the army of a state prepares itself for general warfare with the organized army of other states. This is expressed in the formulation of combat techniques, acquisition of weapons, structuring the combat disposition, and supporting the combat for general warfare, and so on. Putting an army with this kind of preparation into Low Intensity Combat requires a different type of expertise, different weapons and battle techniques different from those learned and required for general warfare. Today, all military struggle, including Low Intensity

6 6 Combat, also takes place in the communications arena and that of awareness. The explanation system of the weak side in our case the Palestinians attempts to emphasize the injustices of the strong side against the civilian population. This emphasis serves his purposes on several planes: on the international plane Israel is presented as a serial violator of human rights in the areas under its control; on the domestic plane the Palestinian explanation activities are aimed to create protest movements that call for the unilateral disengagement of the areas of Judea and Samaria as took place in the retreats from Lebanon and the Gaza region; and, finally, the explanation is directed to the domestic Palestinian public with the object of enlisting it for commitment and support of the struggle against Israel and to encourage its readiness to continue and to pay the costly price (financial, social, and human) of continuation of the struggle. In an unavoidable way, the character of Low Intensity Combat requires exposure and continuous friction of IDF forces with the Palestinian civilian population. In the reality of recent years, the checkpoints that the IDF operates in the Judea and Samaria region are one of the unique points of meeting between Israelis and Palestinians. Before the outbreak of the El Aksa intifada, Israelis and Palestinians were able to meet in a variety of situations and places. Now the meetings are almost exclusively at the checkpoints. Other friction points between IDF soldiers and Palestinians, such as IDF activities in the heart of Palestinian cities, are done with many cautionary steps whose purpose is to prevent face to face encounters (because of fear of injury) and create an intended distancing between soldiers and civilians. In contrast with the description of this activity, the situation at the checkpoints requires close interpersonal meetings between IDF soldiers and Palestinian civilians and this meeting shall stand at the center of the discussion of our research. The checkpoint is one of the principal operational techniques of the army in Low Intensity Combat. According to the IDF concept, the role of the checkpoint is to force attackers to lengthen and change their path of infiltration into Israel, to enable intelligence entities to locate these attackers (including at checkpoints) and to apprehend them before they reach their objectives. The checkpoints are static. The army activities at the checkpoints are mainly static, of a police character and not belligerent.

7 7 Non-belligerent tasks in an environment of a belligerent conflict For the soldiers, the first and prominent character of the checkpoint task is that it is an activity that does not characterize the core of the military profession, or at least, the core of the imaginary profession that is aspired to by the soldiers. While the core of the profession focuses upon belligerent activities, aggressive and initiated, the checkpoint is a passive task different from such focus. Within its framework, soldiers are required to stand and wait for the approach of Palestinian citizens without initiating and performing and to check them before allowing their passage into the area under Israeli control. Continuous standing in the sun and the stationariness that characterizes the task enhances the possibility of initiative by the potential attackers who want to harm the soldiers and the checkpoint. It is a monotonic and routine task that has a police rather than a military character. A checkpoint operates in a civilian environment and most of the time deals with an unarmed populace. In military terms, this is a low quality task whose characteristics are clear: static, routine, low chance of real combat, and trite preparations that repeat themselves before each shift. (Weiner, 2003; Weiner and Paker-Rinat, 2005). It can be said that a checkpoint is a unique task that is unnatural to an offensive army. Therefore, the subject of checkpoints requires treatment and analysis somewhat different from the usual ones in the classic literature on the subject of combat psychology and sociology. In recent decades, military sociology increasingly deals with activities of national armies and multinational forces which more and more and with varying levels of intensity deal with police tasks and roles and deal less with forms of combat. According to some investigators, the era after the cold war includes a requirement that armies of developed nations define a new their role and adjust their structure for new types of missions such as armies have been involved in lately and with which they will be increasingly involved in the future (see, for example, Dandeker 1994). In this era, missions include a broad variety of new military occupations such as: peacekeeping and

8 8 humanitarian aid in distressed and disaster areas all around the world. Franke (1997) noted that the American army increased its involvement is this type of mission. Even if these types of missions are not completely new to armies around the world their scope and the intensity of their operations in recent decades are, without a doubt, a new trend. Similar to the checkpoint mission of the IDF, these non-belligerent missions as detailed above are in contrast to the military ethos based upon fighting spirit, combativeness, and leadership under fire. The new non-belligerent missions that armies are required to fill, demand different capabilities, understanding, and expertise from the commanders and soldiers than those acquired in the classic military training procedures. These missions are characterized by more complexity than the classic military missions. For example, they may simultaneously combine battle and non-battle activities, a phenomenon that requires sharp and frequent passage between diametrically opposed action statuses. Bellany (2001) and Winslow (1997) add an additional characteristic to the new nonbelligerent missions of the armies, in that they emphasize the activity arena in which they occur. They describe a region of many participants and players in which each one has an organizational culture, rules of conduct, language and different patterns of activity. This complexity, according to Franke (1997), requires integration of operational-fighting ability with capability of control, restraint, constraint and limitation on the use of force. Bellany (2001) describes the qualities required to perform non-belligerent missions that include: flexibility, much creativity, response to unexpected developments, responsibility, and emphasized human contact. The sharp contrast between the character of non-belligerent missions and the old classic military ethos and socialization and those customarily accepted by soldiers in most armies can bring about different responses and patterns of action. Winslow (1997) claims, in her research on Canadian forces that were sent to aid peacekeeping in Somalia, that the feeling of frustration caused by the situation in which the Canadian paratroopers found themselves in a foreign country led to violent actions against various target groups in the military operations area and against infiltrators that entered their camps. Another case is the multinational force in Sinai, stationed there after the

9 9 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Here the emphasis is on the problem of boredom that predominates among the soldiers of the force because there are almost no missions to perform. The boredom reinforces the feeling of lack of professional execution that the soldiers felt and the loss of the feeling of time because of the continuous occupation with the same type of task (Harris and Segal, 1985). Undoubtedly, most of the attributes reviewed above characterized as non-belligerent tasks exist in the checkpoints operated by the IDF. The special characteristics of the checkpoint mission raise a number of questions and issues that are worthy of clarification: it should be interesting to see whether, among the soldiers who perform these tasks, ways of thinking and acting that take into account the complexity involved in their tasks develop? What practices, if any, are created by this complexity? And we wish to propose the question: what is the way in which the IDF as a system supports this non-belligerent mission? What instructions regulate the military activities at the checkpoints? And how are these things interpreted and translated into ways of action by the soldiers stationed at the checkpoints? It appears that the existing literature in the field of military sociology, in general, and that which deals with the checkpoint mission in the IDF in particular, is not capable of completely explaining the social characteristics created by operating a checkpoint. This is because there are two very qualitative differences between non-belligerent missions treated in the existing professional literature and the IDF checkpoint mission: first, the IDF checkpoints are operated by one of the sides in the armed violent conflict, a fact which changes the manner in which the IDF sees, interprets, relates to, understands and acts in this mission. Contrary to this, most of the studies done on the subject of operating checkpoints deal with armies and multinational forces that perform the checkpoint mission far from their countries and are a third party and neutral 2 in the conflict. The additional significant difference is that most of the studies on the subject of non-belligerent missions were done in regions where the expeditionary corps served as a peace force, and therefore 2 On this subject, see studies that deal with peacekeeping missions, for example: Winslow, 1997; Harris and Segal, 1985; Miller, 1997; Miller and Moskos, 1995.

10 10 did not participate in combat events per se or they were prohibited at the outset from fighting. Contrary to these researches and places that were studied and recorded IDF checkpoints are an additional arena in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict an armed conflict for all practical purposes. Although the IDF checkpoint mission is a point location non-belligerent activity, it takes place in a region where incidents that are potentially operational and belligerent are occurring. If, for example, we compare this to the multinational force in Sinai (that is treated in the existing professional literature), and to other places where armies are engaged in non-belligerent missions, we discover that peace regions are characterized by: boredom, lack of activity, inspection tasks, policing, and peacekeeping. Checkpoints in these cases and places are conducted according to different patterns of activities than those conducted in a battle environment such as the IDF is in. A checkpoint requires tight and close contact with the local civilian population, something that is qualitatively contrary to the rules of classic military activities in which the soldiers avoid and distance themselves as much as possible from any contact with civilian population. On this qualitative difference, we shall dwell in the framework of this study. Thus, the IDF checkpoints appear to be a non-belligerent task that takes place in an environment in which a violent encounter is apt to take place between the army of a state and which is performed by an armed side in an armed dispute against the other side in the dispute. These unique characteristics of IDF checkpoints raise a number of questions that should be investigated: what are the concepts that are widespread among IDF soldiers that operate the checkpoints concerning the Palestinian population that passes through them? What are the practices by means of which the integration between the checkpoint soldiers and the Palestinian population takes place? How is the checkpoint organized and managed by the soldiers? How, if at all, are the nonbelligerent characteristics that exist at the checkpoints expressed? These and other questions will be dealt with in our attempt to describe and examine what occurs at the IDF checkpoints in Judea and Samaria.

11 11 Additional sources of knowledge that are relevant to our subject are the advanced researches in sociology and anthropology of disputes between states and certain population groups and particularly research that was performed on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a rule, it can be said that these studies focus on the asymmetrical situation that exists between the sides that take part in this kind of dispute and the manner in which the organized military force of the strong side acts against the weak side most of which is a non-combative civilian population. These studies analyze the implications of this situation upon the soldiers and, on the other hand, upon the weak side in our case, the Palestinian side. Ben Ari (1990) studied the relationship to the Palestinian population in the first intifada and described a process of naturalization that the army units underwent when exposed to this new situation. In the framework of the process, classic police tasks are imported (and a checkpoint is characterized by definite police elements: checking documents and certificates, checking items, persons, and so forth) into military activities. The increased contact of the army with the Palestinian population creates a transitional phenomena in which the police activities that are placed upon the army are resolved by classic combat tactics and the army contends with each problem placed before it in terms and technologies of an army organization. Thus, the IDF defines the problem of Palestinian opposition as a subject that can be resolved by exact and efficient application of combat techniques and appropriate technologies. The use of classic military forms of interpretation enables new definition of personal and moral problems as questions of classical military character (Ben Ari, 1990). At observation points that we set up at the Kalandia checkpoint, soldiers complained to us that that proper inspection equipment had not been provided to them, such as: gloves that identify explosive material and mirrors to inspect auto chasses. It can be estimated that the emphasis on complaints related to equipment and technology results from the fact that the IDF in general, and the unit operating at this checkpoint in particular, did not encourage discussion of the personal and moral dilemmas, and thus dealing with equipment served as an escape and a way to express their difficulties. An additional study focused on everything related to preparation and training soldiers for the checkpoint tasks. Already in the first intifada, complaints were raised concerning insufficient and inappropriate preparation. Reuven Gal

12 12 (1990) notes that at no stage in the preparation of soldiers were exercises and training included dealing with the subject of encounter and socialization with civilian population. According to Gal, the lack of training and preparation reinforces the difficulty of the soldiers to deal with complicated situations, and creates pressure in functioning opposite a civilian population. Kopperschmidt (2002) notes the characteristics of the manner in which the soldiers cope with the situation: understanding the task the degree to which the soldiers understand the task that they are required to perform; familiarity with the task the degree to which the soldiers are familiar with the orders and instructions and how well they deal with the situations that occur at the checkpoint. Another study focused on the fact that there is a wide scope for subjective interpretation of the orders and grey cases, as we will show examples later, in which the soldiers tend to interpret situations stringently. (Minke-Brand, 2002). Additional studies, such as those of Maoz (2001) and Bornstein (2002), focus on the suppression that the Israeli army conducts against the Palestinian population and also the implications of these asymmetrical military activities on the mind-set of the soldiers. In the frame of our study, we wish to focus attention on the uniqueness of the IDF checkpoint mission in Judea and Samaria. Additionally, we shall add a number of characteristics and variables which have not yet been treated in the existing literature on this subject: on one hand, dealing with the non-belligerent tasks that take place in a belligerent environment, and which are therefore qualitatively different from classic military missions in the large and intensive friction with the civilian population; on the other hand, bringing the viewpoint of an organized and strong army and the ways that it struggles with its weakness in the limited encounter of the type that is being waged against it (as was analyzed in the previous chapter). Our present research focuses on the attempt to evaluate the IDF checkpoints as locations at which a unique military mission exists, as it is consciously understood and defined by the army. Therefore, our major concern will be in how the soldiers understand, interpret, formulate and act in the checkpoint mission, and in this way try to see the manner in which the army as an organized system relates and treats the subject of checkpoints and the activities of its soldiers there.

13 13 Activation of checkpoints in Operation Ebb and Flow Within the framework of the IDF involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and as part of its methods of action in this limited dispute, checkpoints are operated on a permanent basis in the Judea and Samaria region. The checkpoints have become a pattern of the military activity in the struggle as conceived by the military with terror activities by Palestinian organizations. Similar patterns of activity, which have been widespread for years, have been operated by other armies, including the British army during the entire Mandatory period in Eretz Yisrael. In this part, we shall describe various types of IDF checkpoints in Judea and Samaria, and in doing so, we shall attempt to accentuate the main characteristics. In general, the IDF classifies its checkpoints into three main types: Encirclement Checkpoint this checkpoint is intended to surround cities or areas in which Palestinians live by command and control of the movement of people and vehicles in all the roads leading to and from the surrounded area. Encirclement Checkpoint is manned by different compositions of forces and is operated for fixed periods of time in accordance with the estimate of the military situation in which they will be required. In certain instances, Encirclement Checkpoints are operated for many months continually. For the most part, they are set up in an improvised manner, their physical infrastructure is poor and they are manned by three or four soldiers. Isolation Checkpoint these are the checkpoints that are located on the seam line between Judea and Samaria and the area of sovereign Israel. The purpose of Isolation Checkpoints is to prevent entrance of terrorists to the area of the State of Israel. In most cases, these are large checkpoints, more well-based and organized than the Encirclement checkpoints, both from the perspective of the physical infrastructure and that of manning. For example, in an Isolation Checkpoint there are a number of driving lanes, shelters, direction signs, guides, and

14 14 water spigots for the convenience of those passing through. For the most part, this type of checkpoint is manned by a large group of soldiers, sometimes integrated with police units, as well as other control and enforcement entities. (for example: control of passage of agricultural products, customs, etc.) Initiated Checkpoint - set up ad hoc in various places, at differing times by a group of soldiers assisted by their vehicle in order to establish the checkpoint. The uniqueness of Initiated Checkpoints compared to Isolation Checkpoint is its initiative and novelty it is never fixed and therefore can surprise those who wish to pass through. The core of the checkpoint mission is to separate between different regions: between a settlement and its surroundings, between areas that are under Israeli control and those under Palestinian control, between settlements. The mission of the checkpoint is realized by its being set up on a critical traffic axis and inspection of all that wish to pass through it. Thus, a checkpoint is set up between regions and enables passage between them only for those approved who have been inspected by IDF soldiers. According to the IDF concept, the operation of the checkpoint is related to operational weakness: first, it is a static and visible activity that enables the enemy to gather information about the place in order to attack it. Second, soldiers are stationed there in shifts of six to seven hours during which they must be on maximum operational readiness. Third, the checkpoint creates an especially active friction point with the Palestinian population. The difficulty in distinguishing between innocents and enemies creates difficult decision dilemmas for the checkpoint team (see Lessons of Ebb and Flow, 2002, page 7). An additional problem associated with the IDF checkpoints is the lack of clarity that often exists concerning the necessity of this or other checkpoints. A not insignificant number of IDF checkpoints in Judea and Samaria can be bypassed by foot and sometimes also by vehicles. This phenomenon creates frustration among the soldiers which is expressed in difficulty to identify with their task.

15 15 The surroundings in which the checkpoints are activated are the zone of events for the soldiers doing the inspection and the inhabitants passing through. Isolation Checkpoints are not standard neither in the conduct of their activity nor in their physical structure. Conduct of their activity is different, when in actuality each unit activates its checkpoints to the best of its understanding. Also the physical structure is a versatile variable. For example, not all isolation checkpoints have a lane for pedestrians; in most of the checkpoints there are no signs and means of directing neither to pedestrians nor vehicles. In general, no special attention is paid to the convenience of the passage through the checkpoint. Similarly, many of the checkpoints and their surroundings are unclean since there is no entity that supervises, enforces and takes care of sanitation problems. The neglected surroundings affect the quality of the activities of the soldiers in them and influence the relationship to the Palestinians passing through them. Various committees have found that the quality of the security activities at the checkpoints is faulty. For example, consider the 2002 report of the State Controller concerning the seam region, which determined that: From IDF documentation it can be deduced that most of the suicide terrorists and booby trapped vehicles crossed the seam region into Israel by way of the checkpoints, where the inspection was faulty and worse it is found that the checkpoints are manned by available forces that were posted for checkpoint activities in the framework of operational employment of IDF and Border Patrol forces. As a result of the high turnover of manpower at the checkpoints, the professional expertise in the areas discussed is not acquired page 35. Controller s Report on the subject of the Seam Region, Report Number 2, July 2002,

16 16 An additional report of the Committee for Investigating Checkpoints established by the Ministry of Defense 3 details the problems of activating IDF checkpoints in the following manner: Lack of clarity, interpretation and uniformity in the management of traffic and passage. Problems of behavior, discipline, ethics and morals. Lack of response to lessons learned, to rapid inquiry, timely enforcement and punishment. Faulty provision of set response in the area of training and practice (practice before combat/operational activity), coaching and supervision Attrition of soldiers and commanders Lack of required manpower to provide a proper professional response (particularly during busy hours). Lack of sufficient physical, organizational, technological infrastructure that harms the efficiency and current function for passing through people and vehicles. Lack of means of inspection, identification, and discovery. Lack of uniformity, continuity of activity, defined times and orderly regulations at the gates of the fence. Attrition in credibility and image of the IDF by the international community and foreign entities that are active in the area. 3 Ron Schatzberg participated as a member of the investigating team that included two additional IDF representatives and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Areas.

17 17 It is unnecessary to note that the Central Command, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Areas and the Civilian Administration deal with and draw lessons concerning the control points/checkpoints and fence gates in a current and continuous manner From the report of the Committee and it appears in the website NRG Maariv, 23 August Now we shall attempt to intensify the understanding concerning the checkpoint technique as part of the IDF activity in Judea and Samaria. This attempt will be done, as noted, by means of evaluating one of the principal checkpoints operating in Judea and Samaria the Kalandia Checkpoint located between Jerusalem and Ramallah.

18 18 The Kalandia Checkpoint A principal IDF checkpoint operated on a fixed basis in Judea and Samaria is the Kalandia checkpoint. The Kalandia Checkpoint is located close to the Atarot Airport, north of Jerusalem, and is intended to control the passage of Palestinian population from Ramalla and its environs to Greater Jerusalem. This checkpoint is not located on the municipal boundary of Jerusalem, which forces Israeli citizens or those holding Israeli identity cards that live in Samaria to pass through the checkpoint every time they wish to come to Israel. This is in contrast to other Isolation Checkpoints in which there is physical separation between populations of differing legal status mostly between those holding Israeli identity cards and those holding identity cards issued by the Palestinian Authority. The Kalandia checkpoint is located at this specific point since it enables optimal control and supervision of the north-south passage. There are quarries east of the checkpoint and the fence of the Atarot Airport is on the west, which together prevent any possibility of local circumvention of the Kalandia checkpoint. In the past, the Kalandia checkpoint was located on the Jerusalem municipal boundary and was called the Arak checkpoint. However, because of its inferior topography and difficulty of operation, the checkpoint was removed from its place and relocated in its present location at Kalandia. This checkpoint is located on the road leading from Ramalla, through the Kalandia refugee camp to north Jerusalem. The road is two directional at this point. There are two lanes for vehicles on each side separated by a concrete barrier that was set up by the army in order to divide between the opposing direction traffic. On the north side of the checkpoint there is a point for inspecting vehicles that approach from the direction of Ramalla which wish to pass through the checkpoint to Jerusalem. On the south side, at a distance of about 50 meters from the northern inspection point, an additional inspection point is located for inspecting the vehicles going in the other direction from

19 19 Jerusalem to Ramalla. The section of the road between the two vehicle inspection points is closed to vehicle traffic and in this part of the road three lanes were built to inspect pedestrians. Vehicles that pass the checkpoint inspection make their way north and south through local bypass roads located on the two sides of the pedestrian inspection section. The lanes for inspection of pedestrians are separated by concrete partitions ( betondas ) and a concrete position standing chest high and covered with a tin roof is located at the end of each lane. A soldier carrying a weapon and wearing a combat vest stands behind each position. The weapon, pointed toward the floor in the direction of the people coming to be inspected, rests on the wall of each position. It is worth noting that examining those passing from south to north, that is, from Jerusalem in the direction of Ramalla, is not continuous and only occurs when there is there is a warning about an attack. The Kalandia checkpoint is manned by a group of soldiers that serve in changing shifts that are six to eight hours long. The checkpoint is manned by soldiers of three types: military policemen from the checkpoint company who are responsible for checking the Palestinians who pass through the checkpoint; soldiers from combat battalions who are responsible for security of the checkpoint; and volunteer reservists whose role is to resolve humanitarian problems 4 as explained by the platoon commander from the checkpoint company: the checkpoint includes an officer plus four of our inspectors security here must be accomplished by infantry patrolling at night and if it is gate guard at night then of course the checkpoint is also secured by infantry, that is why they are here besides, there are three volunteers who watch the pedestrian position. These are all the reservists that stand only at the pedestrian inspection position where all the humanitarian problems are. They handle these problems because of their age and life experience, that is essentially the idea 4 The volunteer project for checkpoints began at the beginning of At first, reserve officers participated, then enlisted men, whose role is to assist the regular checkpoint team to make decisions on humanitarian issues and to allow passage of Palestinians on the basis of local discretion.

20 20 The function of the checkpoint is explained to us by the commander of the checkpoint company: our function is to prevent passage of explosive loads. We ourselves inspect. When a vehicle approaches, the soldiers take their places at their stations. The vehicle approaches, the identity card of the driver is taken, it is checked whether he is allowed to enter Israel this is a more stringent inspection. It is checked whether he has documentation and approval. The car is inspected, the trunk, under the hood, the glove compartment, all that is possible to see including the baggage that they are carrying with them Gathering information for research Our study is based upon three primary empirical sources: the first, in-depth interviews (fifteen interviews during about a year) of major players that recently took part in daily operation of checkpoints in Judea and Samaria soldiers, commanders, and volunteers; the second, a number of observation points of three to five hours each, that were done during 2004 in an attempt to directly understand what happens at a checkpoint; the third, study of documentation and IDF publications relating to various aspects associated with operating checkpoints in the areas under our control. The checkpoint as a locale Before beginning to evaluate the manner in which the checkpoint is perceived in the view of the soldiers and officers that operate it on a daily basis, we shall first examine the checkpoint as a locale in the physical and social sense. In this framework, we shall examine the manner in which a checkpoint is organized and constructed, and the implications of these methods of organization on the social plane and seeing the checkpoint as an arena (or stage ) on which various players come into contact, create and shape the checkpoint as a social activity locale.

21 21 The most outstanding characteristic of Kalandia checkpoint (and perhaps all the IDF checkpoints in Judea and Samaria) in our view, is its being an intermediate locale, or more correctly, a hybrid locale that serves as a partition and a separating factor between differing categories. First, the checkpoint is a separating body between geographic regions of differing status Israel on one side and Palestinian areas on the other. Thus, the checkpoint separates between differing law systems. Second, the checkpoints are a factor that separate between areas populated almost completely by Palestinians and geographic areas almost completely populated by Israeli citizens. Third, for many Palestinians, the checkpoint is a locale where those allowed to pass to the Israeli area, that is, those that are found fit and suitable to pass from one area to the other, are sorted and separated from those whose passage to the neighboring area is prohibited. A deputy commander of the company responsible for the Kalandia checkpoint describes this in the simplest manner: there are Palestinians and there are Jews and I am guard in the middle The division into Palestinians and Israelis serves as the ordering principle for the soldiers that serve at the checkpoints. In this connection, it is interesting to understand how these separations are made. By what processes behavioral, legal, basic assumptions, activities, and organization of the checkpoint do these separations come to be expressed in this buffer zone? The checkpoint is a locale in which distinction and separation is made between populations, categories, population groups and geographic regions. It is also a locale in which, in a paradoxical manner, populations, categories, and differing regions meet and in which integration takes place between various factors. In general, although there are different and distinguishable social, cultural, ethno-national worlds on the two sides of the checkpoint, the checkpoint is the physical area where these worlds meet in different ways and create reciprocal relationships and power relationships between them which we will detail further.

22 22 Thus, an additional and primary uniqueness of the checkpoint is its being a locale of meeting between different populations, categories, classes and ethnicities, different and diverse cultural and social worlds. First, the checkpoint is the place where, in a direct and frequent way with no intermediaries, the forces of an organized army on one side meet with unarmed citizens, that is, inhabitants of Palestinian areas and also representatives and employees of international organizations that operate in the areas. There is also the presence of the organization Checkpoint Watch and various Israeli citizens and organizations. All this, in a military location where the IDF is the sovereign, the initiator, the operator and the ruler of all that happens. In this connection, it is interesting to dwell on the manner in which the army forces manage citizens and interfaces with them. This is the place to ask: what are basic assumptions, processes, and practices used by the IDF to maintain the interaction with the civilian population, a large part of which is hostile to it? Do the common and daily patterns of action, as an organization that uses violence in an organized way, change when it acts in a civilian environment? The meeting between the IDF and the Palestinian citizens is, of course, more complex than any other meeting between an army and citizens. The Palestinian citizens are an inseparable part of the ethnic-national group that belongs to and is defined as the enemy that engages in hostile terror attacks against the IDF and Israeli citizens. Here also, the general IDF concept is of interest. This issue revolves around the questions: Is the IDF as a system, and its soldiers that implement its policies, distinguish between innocent Palestinian citizens and the terrorists that fight us? What kinds of distinctions are used by the soldiers to distinguish between innocent citizens and terrorists? Do the checkpoint soldiers undergo changes of behavior, fix their action patterns at the checkpoint and control their reactions, and if so by which ways? What are the images by which the Palestinians are described in the consciousness of the soldiers? What kind of interactions develop between checkpoint soldiers and the citizens that belong to the ethnic group with which Israel is engaged in a bloody conflict?

23 23 And finally, we shall claim that, since the checkpoint locale is inter-hybrid where, on one hand, different categories, groups and individuals meet, and on the other hand there is continual prominent and noted separation between them, a unique military mission is created whose character should be dwelled upon. Operating a checkpoint is combat operational task of the first magnitude since it is intended to prevent, or at least, hamper the ability of terror groups to infiltrate into Israel in order to attack the country and its citizens. Thus, the checkpoint is a mission that requires activating trained military forces that are the buffer between potential attackers and Israel and its inhabitants. However, the quality of the daily continuous tasks at the checkpoints are militarily passive, not heroic, that amounts to inspection ( inspect - as it is often called) of persons and things and making decisions to allow the one inspected to pass to checkpoint or not. An experienced commander in a checkpoint company explained it thus: At this checkpoint, it is somewhat boring. The job is static and repetitive all day. The population is also very difficult to handle so it is exhausting of the soul and exhausting in general the physical exhaustion to stand six or seven hours depending on which shift you do. You stand with the special protective vest ( kerami ) on you and the weapon, the only break you get is maybe twenty minutes to eat and that s it. It is to stand all the time, to deal with vehicles, to get up on the vehicle. This is physically wearing part. The mental wearing is that the whole population comes and tells you its troubles it is many hours, intensive dealing with a population that is really not easy I am sure that if you stood at the checkpoint for one hour you would understand what I am talking about Depersonalization of the nature of the meeting at the checkpoint Administering a checkpoint, as we hinted above, appears to be a very simple process. As was previously said, the function of the soldiers at a checkpoint is to prevent passage of terrorists and

24 24 hostile elements and to prevent smuggling of weapons (weapons and explosives) that can cause much damage if they are activated against citizens and infrastructures of the State of Israel. The nature of the task of the checkpoint soldiers is, seemingly, to make simple decisions as to whether to allow a Palestinian to pass the checkpoint or prevent his passing. The words of a soldier of the company manning the Kalandia Checkpoint are thus, perhaps, understandable: at the checkpoint that we man there are north, south inspection stations, people go from Ramalla to Jerusalem, they have to be inspected we check the people that go from Ramalla to Jerusalem, then there is a more stringent inspection of the vehicles the hood, glove compartment, trunk. At the south inspection station people enter then there we check only the trunk and the identity card, no more than that As a rule, the words of the soldiers and officers in the company responsible for operation of the Kalandia checkpoint reflect the perception of their task as a job (see also above quotation on page 205), as a collection of clear and defined tasks to perform, known and unchanging, almost automatic. But a deeper look at the ongoing function of the checkpoint will disclose that it is possible to identify a collection of broad and varied functions, processes and organizing instructions that regulate and direct the activities of the soldiers. The function of all these is to assist those who man the checkpoint to make decisions whether to allow or disallow the passage of each of the Palestinians that reaches the checkpoint. It can be said that these activities and processes are aimed at making it easier for the soldier to decide, by dictating rules and instructions that obviate the need for the soldier to exercise his personal judgment. The soldier s descriptions of their tasks at the checkpoint as brought above are an expression of the fact that the laws and regulations on the site do indeed direct the ongoing activities, greatly reduce their area of doubt and simplify the decision processes at the checkpoint.

25 25 A more detailed evaluation of the activities and steps of those manning the checkpoint show that they create a central dynamic that characterizes the reciprocal relationship between the soldiers at the checkpoint and the Palestinians. At the base of this dynamic is the effort (conscious and intended or unconscious and not intended) to depersonalize the meeting between the soldier and the Palestinian citizen in a way that removes the expected essence of the meeting. It is not a personal meeting, close and intimate rather a meeting between those with a function to perform and those who are categories therefore it is distant, alienated and not personal. In this part of the article, we shall focus the discussion on the attempt to show how this effort is created and strengthened, both by activities and moves of the military organization as a system, and by the personal activities and behavior of the soldiers at the checkpoints. The depersonalization process finds it expression through a number of activities that are performed by that part of the IDF that is in charge of the checkpoint activities and which determines the ir regulations. One of the principal ways that the depersonalization is created is to convert the Palestinian population that passes through the checkpoint into a collection of categories that are created, determined and defined by the Israeli security staff. These categories are created on the basis of personal data some general background data such as age, place of domicile, business, family relationship, health; some of the data are related to the behavior and actions of certain inhabitants such as involvement in terror activities, any kind of relationship to terrorists, past arrests, additional security considerations. In one of the presentations that was prepared by a group of reserve volunteers that serve at checkpoints, as an aid for briefing new soldiers who come to serve at checkpoints, we found that the army catalogs the Palestinian population into no less than four main sections as defined in the presentation and to another forty (!) subcategories. Instructions for action are provided for each of the categories, and permission to pass the checkpoint or not, even if some of the instructions overlap at least in part. The following can be found among the categories: Palestinians with blue, orange, and green identity cards, residents of the areas