The consequences of political innumeracy
|
|
- Brittney Ryan
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 545414RAP / Research & PoliticsLawrence and Sides research-article2014 Research Article The consequences of political innumeracy Research and Politics July-September 2014: 1 8 The Author(s) 2014 DOI: / rap.sagepub.com Eric D Lawrence and John Sides Abstract The prevalence of political innumeracy or ignorance of politically relevant numbers is well-documented. However, little is known about its consequences. We report on three original survey experiments in which respondents were randomly assigned to see correct information about the racial composition of the US population, median income and educational attainment, and the unemployment and poverty rates. Although estimates of these quantities were frequently far from the truth, providing correct information had little effect on attitudes toward relevant public policies. Keywords Public opinion, innumeracy, political information In Innumeracy (1988: 3), John Allen Paulos asserts that innumeracy, an inability to deal comfortably with the fundamental notions of number and chance, plagues far too many otherwise knowledgeable citizens. For many citizens, innumeracy means unfamiliarity with politically relevant numbers. Is this lack of familiarity consequential? Would creating numeracy change political attitudes? Investigations of innumeracy and political ignorance have done more to map their contours than demonstrate their consequences. But as Lupia (2006) argues, it is important to justify why any particular fact is important to know. One way is to show that learning facts changes opinions. We investigate the consequences of remediating innumeracy. The paper makes two central contributions. First, we extend previous studies by examining unexplored or under-explored topics, including knowledge of the racial composition of the United States population, the median income, educational attainment, the unemployment rate, and the poverty rate in the United States. Second, we conduct three original survey experiments to investigate whether providing individuals with correct information actually affects opinions. Some previous work on innumeracy has examined correlations among numerical estimates and political attitudes. However, there have been few tests of what happens when erroneous estimates are corrected. We find that correct information has little effect on related political attitudes, even when that information corrects serious misperceptions. However lamentable ignorance of political facts may be, our results suggest that remediating this ignorance may not affect actual opinions. Innumeracy and its (potential) consequences Although scholars debate the extent of the public s factual knowledge of politics (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Gibson and Caldeira, 2009; Lupia, 2006; Luskin and Bullock, 2011; Prior and Lupia, 2008), certainly a large proportion of the public does not know many different political facts, which in turns suggests that enlightening them could change their attitudes. This conclusion applies to political innumeracy in particular. Many citizens do not accurately estimate quantities related to population demographics (Alba et al., 2005; Citrin and Sides, 2008; Herda, 2013; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Morales, 2011; Nadeau et al., 1993; Theiss-Morse, 2003), macroeconomic statistics (Conover et al., 1986; Holbrook and Garand, 1996; Sigelman and Yanarella, 1986), and the federal budget and other quantities related to public The George Washington University, USA Corresponding author: John Sides, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, George Washington University, 2115 G Street NW, Suite 440, Washington, 20052, USA. jsides@gwu.edu Creative Commons Non Commercial CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 License ( which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (
2 2 Research and Politics policies (Berinsky, 2007; Gilens, 1999; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Kull, ). Why should these kinds of factual misperceptions affect attitudes? One reason is that attitudes may be distillations of relevant beliefs, where beliefs are all thoughts that people have about attitude objects (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993: 11). As Eagly and Chaiken put it: The assumption is common among attitude theorists that people have beliefs about attitude objects and that these beliefs are in some sense the basic building blocks of attitudes (103). For example, attitudes toward public policies depend on beliefs about the beneficiaries of those policies, such as their deservingness (e.g. Iyengar, 1991). Similarly, beliefs about the importance of social problems, as manifested in estimates of quantities like the unemployment rate, could affect attitudes about the government s response. If beliefs are the building blocks of attitudes, then changing beliefs could change attitudes. A variety of psychological theories speak to this possibility, but among the most successful and durable is Festinger s (1957) dissonance theory. Festinger argues that when people hold beliefs that imply divergent or opposite conclusions, they tend to change one or more of those beliefs to bring them into greater agreement. Correcting a factual misperception may induce dissonance and thereby lead people to change other attitudes. For example, after finding out that a social problem is more or less serious than you initially believed, you may think differently about how the government should respond to the problem. However, other theories suggest that attempts to correct misperceptions would not necessarily change attitudes. For one, misperceptions can be stubborn. The estimates of politically relevant numbers noted earlier are far from random guesses. They vary systematically with cognitive ability as well as contextual information (see Citrin and Sides, 2008; Herda, 2010; Hutchings, 2003; Jerit et al., 2006; Luskin, 1990; Nadeau and Niemi, 1995; Nadeau et al., 1993; Sigelman and Niemi, 2001; Wong, 2007) and are often held with considerable certainty (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Second, people tend to resist changing their attitudes. Festinger noted that people often avoid information that conflicts with existing beliefs. And when that information is impossible to avoid, people may ignore it, discount it, or rationalize it away (Lodge and Taber, 2013). For example, Gaines et al. (2007) describe how Democrats and Republicans correctly perceived that casualties in the Iraq War were increasing over time, but interpreted that fact differently with Republicans more likely to perceive the number of casualties as moderate or small. Correcting misperceptions can even backfire by worsening misperceptions among those least predisposed to believe the correct information (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). In these studies, beliefs are not so much building blocks of attitudes but consequences of attitudes. People shape their perceptions of fact to fit the opinions they already hold. These competing theories suggest that correcting information could be effective or ineffective. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the evidence is mixed. Misperceptions can be correlated with attitudes. For example, Nadeau et al. (1993: 343) find that people who overestimate the size of minority groups also perceive them as a greater threat (see also Citrin and Sides, 2007), but understandably qualify their conclusion: the connection may be one of cause or effect (see also Herda, 2010; Hochschild, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000: 801). Studies using experimental designs to correct innumeracy have found both that information changes political opinions (Gilens, 2001; Howell et al., 2011) and that it does not (Berinsky, 2007; Kuklinski et al., 2000). In the conclusion, we discuss our results in light of these studies to identify potential reasons for apparently divergent findings. Experiment #1: correcting estimates of average income and educational attainment The first experiment was conducted in the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Respondents (N=1,000) were asked to estimate the average household income in the United States and the percentage of Americans with four-year college degrees. Respondents entered a number in a textbox or checked a box that said I don t know. 1 In this and subsequent experiments, these items were designed to help respondents make quantitative estimates. The items avoided jargon (e.g. median income ), asked about relatively uncomplicated but still relevant categories (those with a four-year college degree ), and simplified the task of supplying a percentage (see Ansolabehere et al., 2013). Eighty-three percent of the sample provided an estimate of average income and 82% provided an estimate of the percentage with a college degree. Although the estimates varied, on average they were close to reality (Figure 1). The median estimate for income was US$40,000; the actual median household income at that time was US$49, The median estimate of the percent with a college degree was 3; the actual Census figure was 27%. The correlation between the two estimates was modest (r=.15; p<.001). After respondents estimated average household income, they were randomized into one of two experimental conditions. One condition was given the correct information under the guise of asking them whether they had heard of a new Census Bureau report a tactic used in similar experiments (Gilens, 2001). The treatment said that the Census Bureau has estimated that the average
3 Lawrence and Sides 3 15% 5% Estimates of average income Median estimate: US$40,000 Correct figure: US$49,000 Across the four experimental conditions, there were no significant differences in preferences for increased spending in these areas (Figure 2). For example, the percent favoring increased spending on aid to the poor ranged from 48 49% across the four conditions. Regressing respondents estimates on the treatment groups suggested no statistically significant differences across treatment groups (see Panel A of Table A-1 in the supplemental appendix). The experimental treatments had little direct effect. US$0 US$20K US$40K US$49K US$60K US$80K US$100K Estimated Average Income 15% 5% Estimates of educational attainment Median estimate=3 Correct figure=27% 27% Estimated percent with college degree Figure 1. The distribution of estimates of average income and the percentage with a college degree. Estimates of average household income and percent with a college degree. The actual figures and median estimates are noted. Source: 2007 CCES. household earned about $49,000 in The other condition asked whether they had heard of this report but provided no correct information. A similar experiment was carried out after respondents gave their estimates of educational attainment. 3 Immediately after these two experiments, respondents were asked whether government spending on various programs should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. The programs were: loans for college tuition, the war on terrorism, aid to the poor, national defense, and job training. We focus on student loans, aid to the poor, and job training, which are most relevant to national income and educational attainment. People who overestimated the median income or the proportion with a college degree should support more spending on these areas when they learn that conditions in the country are worse than they had presumed. Similarly, people who underestimated should support less spending, since the information would suggest that conditions in the country are better than they had presumed. Experiment #2: correcting estimates of the unemployment and poverty rates The second experiment was conducted in the pre-election wave of the 2010 CCES (N=1,000). Its structure varied slightly from the first experiment. Respondents were randomized into one of three conditions: 4 of respondents estimated the unemployment or poverty rate, 4 estimated these rates and were given the correct information, and did not provide estimates or receive this information. This randomization occurred separately for questions concerning unemployment and poverty, making the experimental design a 3 3 factorial. Eighty-eight percent of respondents provided an estimate of the unemployment rate; 82% estimated the poverty rate. Estimates of the unemployment rate were clustered around the actual rate at that time (9.6% see Figure 3). 4 The median estimate was 12%. Approximately 25% of the sample gave an estimate that was 15% or higher, accounting for the long right tail of the distribution. Estimates of the poverty rate were more variable, but on average higher than the actual rate ( vs. 13%). This dovetails with Kuklinski et al. s (2000) finding that the public overestimates the fraction of Americans on welfare. The correlation between these sets of estimates was r= 0.06 (p=0.23). The experimental manipulations were framed as questions about news or government reports, with one version of the manipulation including the actual unemployment or poverty rate. All respondents were then asked about the level of government spending on loans for college tuition, aid to the poor, job training, unemployment benefits, and food stamps which in theory should be more connected to these economic statistics than they were median income or educational attainment. Again, there is little effect of correct information on preferences for increased spending (Table 1). There are very small differences between those who guessed but did not receive information, and those who guessed and then received one or both pieces of correct information. Models of spending preferences also suggest no systematic differences across experimental conditions (see Panel B of Table A-1).
4 4 Research and Politics College loans 61 Aid to the poor 49 Job training 59 Income info 53 Income info 49 Income info 58 Education info 59 Education info 48 Education info 64 Both info 57 Both info 49 Both info % Increase spending % Increase spending % Increase spending Figure 2. The effects of correct information about income and educational attainment. Percentage of respondents in each experimental condition who said that spending should be increased for college loans, aid to the poor, and job training (with a 95% confidence interval). Source: 2007 CCES. Experiment #3: correcting estimates of the racial composition of the population The third experiment was conducted in the post-election wave of the 2010 CCES (N=844). Respondents were randomly assigned to three conditions: 4 guessed the fraction of the population in each of three racial groups ( white or Caucasian, black or African-American, and Latino or Hispanic ), 4 guessed those fractions and subsequently received correct information, and did not guess at all (the control group). As in previous studies (e.g. Nadeau et al., 1993; Theiss- Morse, 2003) respondents underestimated the percentage of the population that is white and overestimated the percentages that are black or Latino (Figure 4). The median estimate of the percent white was 55% (vs. 65% in reality), while the median estimates of the percent black and percent Latino, in both cases, were larger than reality (12% and 15%, respectively). Larger estimates of the percent white were associated with smaller estimates of the percent black (r= 0.55; p<0.001) and the percent Latino (r= 0.61; p<0.001). Estimates of the size of the two minority ethnic groups were positively correlated (r=0.24; p<0.001). The experimental manipulation involved a news story about Census Bureau estimates of the racial composition of the American population. Following this prompt, respondents were asked five questions about three policy areas relevant to black and Latinos: government spending to help blacks, affirmative action, and immigration. Correcting overestimates of minority group population size should create more willingness to support policies that would benefit these groups, while correcting underestimates of minority group population size should create less willingness to support policies that would benefit these groups. Once again respondents who received the correct information gave similar responses on average to those who provided guesses but did not receive the information and to those in the control group (Figure 5). The largest pair-wise difference was.04 on scales that range from 0 to 1. Additional analysis also found no statistically significant treatment effects (Panel C of Table A-1). Conclusion We find that correcting examples of a particular type of misinformation political innumeracy has little effect on political attitudes. These null effects emerged regardless of policy domain or the particular kinds of numbers provided. 5 This raises at least two questions. Why did correct information matter so little? And, across the scholarly literature,
5 Lawrence and Sides 5 why are the effects of factual information so inconsistent? Based on our findings and other studies (Berinsky, 2007; Estimates of unemployment rate Median estimate: 12% Correct figure: 9.6% Estimated unemployment rate Estimates of poverty rate Correct figure: 13% Median estimate: Estimated poverty rate Figure 3. The distribution of estimates of the unemployment and poverty rates. Distributions of estimates of percent unemployed and percent living in poverty. The actual figures and median estimates are noted. Source: 2010 CCES. Gilens, 2001; Howell et al., 2011; Kuklinski et al., 2000) that also involve experimental treatments with correct numerical information, there is no clear answer. The inconsistencies do not appear to depend on several features of research design. Across these studies, the treatments all involved similar statements of correct numerical quantities, such as the number of American military casualties in Iraq (Berinsky, 2007), the average teacher s salary (Howell et al., 2011), or the percent of the budget spent on foreign aid (Gilens, 2001) or welfare (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Moreover, both Gilens and our experiments frame the correct facts as originating in a news story or government report, although Gilens finds significant effects of correct facts and we do not. In terms of the sequence of questions and information in the survey experiment, our design most closely resembles the second experiment presented in Kuklinski et al. (2000). Their study and ours first asked respondents to provide estimates and then directly corrected the estimates of a random subset. (The other studies did not ask for estimates first.) Kuklinski et al. liken this to hitting respondents right between the eyes with the correct information. In their study this was the only experiment that had a significant impact: directly correcting people s estimates of how much of the budget goes to welfare made them less opposed to welfare spending. But this same design did not elicit similar findings in our experiments. The types of issues examined in these studies also offer little insight into their divergent findings. One might expect that correcting information should matter less for attitudes about issues tied to durable and deeply rooted predispositions, such as partisan or racial identities. This might explain why our experiment involving the racial composition of the population and attitudes about affirmative action and immigration did not turn up a significant treatment effect. The same finding emerged from the first experiment in Kuklinski et al. (2000), which examined Table 1. The effects of correct information about the unemployment and poverty rates. Unemployment condition Poverty condition Tuition loans Percent supporting increased spending Aid to poor Job training Unemployment benefits Food stamps 42% 39% 54% 29% 24% rmation 44% 35% 51% 32% 25% rmation 45% 37% 49% 31% 26% rmation 41% 36% 58% 32% 3 rmation 41% 35% 6 36% 26% rmation 41% 34% 63% 24% rmation 38% 32% 49% 39% 21% rmation 41% 33% 63% 33% 26% rmation 41% 35% 62% 29% 24% Both the unemployment rate and poverty rate experiment had three conditions (control, no information, and information). The two experiments therefore generate 9 (3 3) distinct groups. Table entries are the percent supporting increased spending in those nine groups. Source: 2010 CCES.
6 6 Research and Politics 4 3 Median estimate: 55% Correct figure: 65% 4 55% 65% 8 10 Estimated % of US public that is white or caucasian 4 3 White/caucasian Correct figure: 12% Median estimate: 12% Estimated % of US public that is black or african-american 4 3 Black/african-american Hispanic/latino Correct figure: 15% Median estimate: 15% Estimated % of US public that is hispanic or latino Figure 4. The distributions of estimates of the racial composition of the population. Distributions of estimates of the percentage of the US public that is white, black, and Latino. The actual figures and median estimates are noted. Source: 2010 CCES. attitudes toward another racialized issue, welfare (see Gilens, 1999). The same finding also emerged from Berinsky s study of attitudes toward Iraq War, which was a highly polarizing issue for Democrats and Republicans (Jacobson, 2007). However, these studies mostly examine issues related to the budget, government spending, and taxes. Although attitudes about these issues are connected to durable predispositions such as partisanship and ideology, these attitudes also vary a great deal over time (Wlezien, 1995). But despite a similar focus on spending whether on foreign aid and prisons, on teacher salaries, on welfare (Gilens, 2001; Howell et al., 2011; and Kuklinski et al., 2000, experiment 2, respectively), or on spending on various programs, as in our experiments these studies still have divergent findings. This is true even though the relevance of the facts to the specific policy items seems comparable in these studies e.g., the crime rate and spending on prisons in Gilens (2001) and the unemployment and poverty rates and spending on unemployment benefits and aid to the poor in our studies. There is clearly much more we need to know about the conditions under which correct information affects attitudes. A promising direction for future research is to better understand people s willingness to incorporate factual information into their attitudes. In other words, although innumeracy may reflect an inability to deal comfortably with the fundamental notions of number and chance, as Paulos puts it, the willingness to draw upon correct numerical information may be more a matter of motivation than ability. For example, people appear more motivated to answer factual questions correctly when provided a financial incentive (Prior and Lupia, 2008) and to incorporate substantive information when polarizing party cues are not present (Druckman et al., 2013). Further research should elaborate on the factors that influence this motivation. Better understanding the connection between facts and attitudes has important stakes for both empirical and normative political inquiry. For empirical inquiry, the important question is the extent to which citizens function like motivated reasoners or are actually willing to update their beliefs and attitudes in the face of new and even dissonant information. The competing theoretical perspectives and empirical findings suggest that this question is far from resolved. For normative inquiry, the crucial debate is over how much citizens need factual information in the first place (see Lupia, 2006). And of course the two questions are related: the normative value of facts may depend on whether the public incorporates facts into their thinking. Conflict of interest The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest. Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Supplementary Material The online appendix is available at: content/by/supplemental-data
7 Lawrence and Sides 7 Govt spending on blacks 0.32 Affirmative action Level of immigration 0.35 Immigrants take jobs 0.55 Immigrants threaten way of life Figure 5. The effects of correct information about racial composition. estimates in each experimental condition, with 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variables are all coded on the 0 1 scale, where 1 indicates the most favorable response (i.e. most support for government spending on blacks, affirmative action, and immigration). Source: 2010 CCES. Notes 1. The textbox for the income item had a dollar sign in front of it. The textbox for the education item would accept only numbers between 0 and 100. Exact question wordings for the items in all experiments are in the supplemental appendix, along with information about the CCES. 2. Figure 1 and all subsequent analyses exclude six observations with very high estimates of income (ranging from $200,000 to $6.0 million) and three observations with very low estimates ($0 to $9,000). This does not change the median estimate. 3. The vast majority of respondents, 9, reported that they had not heard of these (fictional) reports. 4. In this sample, 48% estimated the unemployment rate correctly, plus or minus 1 percentage point, which was similar to the rate (52%) reported in Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014). 5. Null effects could mask offsetting effects among underestimators and over-estimators, since correct information has opposite implications for the attitudes of each group. However, we found little evidence that the effect of correct information depended on people s original estimates of the quantities in question. We present these results in the supplementary materials. References Alba R, Rumbaut R and Marotz K (2005) A distorted nation: Perceptions of racial/ethnic group sizes and attitudes toward immigrants and other minorities. Social Forces 84(2): Ansolabehere S and Schaffner B (2014) Does survey mode still matter? Findings from a 2010 multi-mode comparison. Political Analysis 22(3): Ansolabehere S, Meredith M and Snowberg E (2013) Asking about numbers: Why and how. Political Analysis 21(1): Berinsky A (2007) Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict. Journal of Politics 69(4): Citrin J and Sides J (2008) Immigration and the imagined community in Europe and the United States. Political Studies 56: Conover PJ, Feldman S and Knight K (1986) Judging inflation and unemployment: The origins of retrospective evaluations. Journal of Politics 48(3): Delli Carpini M and Keeter S (1996) What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press. Druckman JN, Peterson E and Slothuus R (2013) How elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation. American Political Science Review 107(1): Eagly AH and Chaiken S (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Festinger L (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
8 8 Research and Politics Gaines BJ, Kuklinski JH, Quirk PJ, et al. (2007) Same facts, different interpretations: Partisan motivation and opinion on Iraq. Journal of Politics 69(4): Gibson JL and Caldeira GA (2009) Knowing the supreme court? A reconsideration of public ignorance of the high court. Journal of Politics 71: Gilens M (1999) Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gilens M (2001) Political ignorance and collective policy preferences. American Political Science Review 95(2): Herda D (2010) How many immigrants? Foreign-born population innumeracy in Europe. Public Opinion Quarterly 74(4): Herda D (2013) Innocuous ignorance? Perceptions of the American Jewish population size. Contemporary Jewry 33(3), Hochschild JL (2001) Where you stand depends on what you see: Connections among values, perceptions of fact, and policy prescriptions. In Kuklinski JH (ed) Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp Holbrook T and Garand JC (1996) Homo economus? Economic information and economic voting. Political Research Quarterly 49(2): Howell W, Peterson PE and West M (2011) Meeting of the minds. Education Next 11(1): Hutchings VL (2003) Public Opinion and Democratic Accountability: How Citizens Learn about Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Iyengar S (1991) Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Jacobson GC (2007) A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People. New York: Pearson Longman. Jerit J, Barabas J and Belson T (2006) Citizens, knowledge, and the information environment. American Journal of Political Science 50: Kuklinski JH, Quirk PJ, Jerit J, et al. (2000) Misinformation and the currency of citizenship. Journal of Politics 62: Kull S ( ) What the public knows that Washington doesn t. Foreign Policy 101: Lodge M and Taber CS (2013) The Rationalizing Voter. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lupia A (2006) How elitism undermines the study of voter competence. Critical Review 18: Luskin RC (1990) Explaining political sophistication. Political Behavior 12(4): Luskin RC and Bullock JG (2011) Don t know means don t know : DK responses and the public s level of political knowledge. Journal of Politics 73(2): Morales L (2011) U.S. adults estimate that 25% of Americans are gay or lesbian. Estimate-Americans-Gay-Lesbian.aspx. Nadeau R and Niemi RG (1995) Educated guesses: The process of answering factual knowledge questions in surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 59: Nadeau R, Niemi RG and Levine J (1993) Innumeracy about minority populations. Public Opinion Quarterly 57: Nyhan B and Reifler J (2010) When corrections fail: The persistence of political misperceptions. Political Behavior 32: Paulos JA (1988) Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences. New York: Hill and Wang. Prior M and Lupia A (2008) Money, time, and political knowledge: Distinguishing quick recall and political learning skills. American Journal of Political Science 52(1): Sides, John Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2007: George Washington University content. [Computer File] Release: February 2, Washington DC [producer] Sides, John Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2010: George Washington University content. [Computer File] Release: March 1, Washington DC [producer] Sides J and Citrin J (2007) European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interests, and information. British Journal of Political Science 37(3): Sigelman L and Yanarella EJ (1986) Public information on public issues: A multivariate analysis. Social Science Quarterly 67: Sigelman L and Niemi R (2001) Innumeracy about minority populations: African Americans and whites compared. Public Opinion Quarterly 65(1): Theiss-Morse E (2003) Characterizations and consequences: How Americans envision the American people. Paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 3 6 April Wlezien C (1995) The public as thermostat: Dynamics of preferences for spending. American Journal of Political Science 39(4): Wong CJ (2007) Little and big pictures in our heads: Race, local context, and innumeracy about racial groups in the United States. Public Opinion Quarterly 71(3):
Visualizing inequality: How graphical emphasis shapes public opinion
622073RAP0010.1177/2053168015622073Research & PoliticsHughes research-article2015 Research Note Visualizing inequality: How graphical emphasis shapes public opinion Research and Politics October-December
More informationEach election cycle, candidates, political parties,
Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion about Initiatives Cheryl Boudreau Scott A. MacKenzie University of California, Davis University of California, Davis
More informationUC Berkeley UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Previously Published Works Title The Muted Consequences of Correct Information About Immigration Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8nc847x1 Authors Hopkins, DJ Sides, J
More informationSupplementary/Online Appendix for:
Supplementary/Online Appendix for: Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation Perspectives on Politics Peter K. Enns peterenns@cornell.edu Contents Appendix 1 Correlated Measurement Error
More informationStories, Science, and Public Opinion about the Estate Tax. John Sides Department of Political Science George Washington University
Stories, Science, and Public Opinion about the Estate Tax John Sides Department of Political Science George Washington University jsides@gwu.edu June 2010 Abstract The majority of Americans opposes the
More informationPublic Awareness and Attitudes about Redistricting Institutions
Journal of Politics and Law; Vol. 6, No. 3; 2013 ISSN 1913-9047 E-ISSN 1913-9055 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education Public Awareness and Attitudes about Redistricting Institutions Costas
More informationCritical Events and Attitude Change: Support for Gun Control After Mass Shootings
Critical Events and Attitude Change: Support for Gun Control After Mass Shootings Jon C. Rogowski Harvard University Patrick D. Tucker Yale University October 5, 2017 Abstract When and to what extent do
More informationMisinformation or Expressive Responding? What an inauguration crowd can tell us about the source of political misinformation in surveys
Misinformation or Expressive Responding? What an inauguration crowd can tell us about the source of political misinformation in surveys Brian F. Schaffner (Corresponding Author) University of Massachusetts
More informationPolitics is local: State legislator voting on restrictive voter identification legislation
589804RAP0010.1177/2053168015589804Research & PoliticsMcKee research-article2015 Research Article Politics is local: State legislator voting on restrictive voter identification legislation Research and
More informationWe Spend How Much? Misperceptions, Innumeracy, and Support for the Foreign Aid in the United States and Great Britain
We Spend How Much? Misperceptions, Innumeracy, and Support for the Foreign Aid in the United States and Great Britain Thomas J. Scotto School of Government and Public Policy University of Strathclyde McCance
More informationLearning from Small Subsamples without Cherry Picking: The Case of Non-Citizen Registration and Voting
Learning from Small Subsamples without Cherry Picking: The Case of Non-Citizen Registration and Voting Jesse Richman Old Dominion University jrichman@odu.edu David C. Earnest Old Dominion University, and
More informationAre Citizens Receiving the Treatment? Assessing a Key Link in Contextual Theories of Public Opinion and Political Behavior
bs_bs_banner Political Psychology, Vol. xx, No. xx, 2013 doi: 10.1111/pops.12069 Are Citizens Receiving the Treatment? Assessing a Key Link in Contextual Theories of Public Opinion and Political Behavior
More informationWhat s So Amazing about Really Deep Thoughts? Cognitive Style and Political Misperceptions
What s So Amazing about Really Deep Thoughts? Cognitive Style and Political Misperceptions John Sides Department of Political Science George Washington University jsides@gwu.edu Abstract What helps partisans
More informationAppendix: The Muted Consequences of Correct Information about Immigration. August 17th, 2017
Appendix: The Muted Consequences of Correct about Immigration August 17th, 2017 Appendix A: Manipulation Check Census Estimate: 13% 10% 20 30 40% Perceived Pct. Immigrant Figure 1: This figure depicts
More informationRECOMMENDED CITATION: Pew Research Center, July, 2016, 2016 Campaign: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction
NUMBERS, FACTS AND TRENDS SHAPING THE WORLD FOR RELEASE JULY 07, 2016 FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES: Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director, Research Bridget Johnson,
More information1. The Relationship Between Party Control, Latino CVAP and the Passage of Bills Benefitting Immigrants
The Ideological and Electoral Determinants of Laws Targeting Undocumented Migrants in the U.S. States Online Appendix In this additional methodological appendix I present some alternative model specifications
More informationOnline Appendix 1: Treatment Stimuli
Online Appendix 1: Treatment Stimuli Polarized Stimulus: 1 Electorate as Divided as Ever by Jefferson Graham (USA Today) In the aftermath of the 2012 presidential election, interviews with voters at a
More informationNon-Voted Ballots and Discrimination in Florida
Non-Voted Ballots and Discrimination in Florida John R. Lott, Jr. School of Law Yale University 127 Wall Street New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 432-2366 john.lott@yale.edu revised July 15, 2001 * This paper
More informationHIGH POINT UNIVERSITY POLL MEMO RELEASE 9/24/2018 (UPDATE)
HIGH POINT UNIVERSITY POLL MEMO RELEASE 9/24/2018 (UPDATE) ELEMENTS Population represented Sample size Mode of data collection Type of sample (probability/nonprobability) Start and end dates of data collection
More informationPerceived Unemployment
100 international journal of sociology International Journal of Sociology, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2012 13, pp. 100 123. 2013 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com ISSN 0020
More informationPartisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance
Polit Behav (2016) 38:383 411 DOI 10.1007/s11109-015-9318-4 ORIGINAL PAPER Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance Kevin J. Mullinix 1 Published
More informationVermonters Awareness of and Attitudes Toward Sprawl Development in 2002
Vermonters Awareness of and Attitudes Toward Sprawl Development in 2002 Written by Thomas P. DeSisto, Data Research Specialist Introduction In recent years sprawl has been viewed by a number of Vermont
More informationPOLITICAL CORRUPTION AND IT S EFFECTS ON CIVIC INVOLVEMENT. By: Lilliard Richardson. School of Public and Environmental Affairs
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND IT S EFFECTS ON CIVIC INVOLVEMENT By: Lilliard Richardson School of Public and Environmental Affairs Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis September 2012 Paper Originally
More informationPublic Opinion and American Politics
Public Opinion and American Politics Political Science 4204: CRN 87367 Fall 2013 (T TR : 2:00-3:20pm at GS 111) Instructor: Dukhong Kim Office Hours: T R:1:00-2:00, and by appointment Contact Information
More informationModeling Political Information Transmission as a Game of Telephone
Modeling Political Information Transmission as a Game of Telephone Taylor N. Carlson tncarlson@ucsd.edu Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA
More informationThe. Opportunity. Survey. Understanding the Roots of Attitudes on Inequality
The Opportunity Survey Understanding the Roots of Attitudes on Inequality Nine in 10 Americans see discrimination against one or more groups in U.S. society as a serious problem, while far fewer say government
More informationA Report on the Social Network Battery in the 1998 American National Election Study Pilot Study. Robert Huckfeldt Ronald Lake Indiana University
A Report on the Social Network Battery in the 1998 American National Election Study Pilot Study Robert Huckfeldt Ronald Lake Indiana University January 2000 The 1998 Pilot Study of the American National
More informationBY Rakesh Kochhar FOR RELEASE MARCH 07, 2019 FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:
FOR RELEASE MARCH 07, 2019 BY Rakesh Kochhar FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES: Rakesh Kochhar, Senior Researcher Jessica Pumphrey, Communications Associate 202.419.4372 RECOMMENDED CITATION Pew Research Center,
More informationJeffrey M. Stonecash Maxwell Professor
Campbell Public Affairs Institute Inequality and the American Public Results of the Fourth Annual Maxwell School Survey Conducted September, 2007 Jeffrey M. Stonecash Maxwell Professor Campbell Public
More informationCase Study: Get out the Vote
Case Study: Get out the Vote Do Phone Calls to Encourage Voting Work? Why Randomize? This case study is based on Comparing Experimental and Matching Methods Using a Large-Scale Field Experiment on Voter
More informationGrowing Number Sees U.S. Divided Between Haves and Have-Nots KATRINA RELIEF EFFORT RAISES CONCERN OVER EXCESSIVE SPENDING, WASTE
NEWS RELEASE 1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel (202) 419-4350 Fax (202) 419-4399 For Immediate Release: October 19, 2005 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION Andrew Kohut, Director Growing Number
More informationIDEOLOGY, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT RULING, AND SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 4, Winter 2014, pp. 963 973 IDEOLOGY, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT RULING, AND SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY Christopher D. Johnston* D. Sunshine Hillygus Brandon L. Bartels
More informationMapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion Across International Issues
Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion Across International Issues Alexandra Guisinger Temple University alexandra.guisinger@temple.edu Elizabeth N. Saunders George Washington
More informationMarist College Institute for Public Opinion Poughkeepsie, NY Phone Fax
Marist College Institute for Public Opinion Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 Phone 845.575.5050 Fax 845.575.5111 www.maristpoll.marist.edu POLL MUST BE SOURCED: McClatchy-Marist Poll* Majority Wants Immediate Action
More informationWhat is The Probability Your Vote will Make a Difference?
Berkeley Law From the SelectedWorks of Aaron Edlin 2009 What is The Probability Your Vote will Make a Difference? Andrew Gelman, Columbia University Nate Silver Aaron S. Edlin, University of California,
More informationIn the final chapter of Voting, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) make
Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship James H+ Kuklinski, Paul J+ Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F+ Rich University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Scholars have
More informationReanalysis: Are coups good for democracy?
681908RAP0010.1177/2053168016681908Research & PoliticsMiller research-article2016 Research Note Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy? Research and Politics October-December 2016: 1 5 The Author(s)
More informationThe Sudan Consortium African and International Civil Society Action for Sudan. Sudan Public Opinion Poll Khartoum State
The Sudan Consortium African and International Civil Society Action for Sudan Sudan Public Opinion Poll Khartoum State April 2015 1 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 3 1.1 Background... 3 1.2 Sample
More informationSupplementary Materials for Strategic Abstention in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Countries)
Supplementary Materials for Strategic Abstention in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Countries) Guillem Riambau July 15, 2018 1 1 Construction of variables and descriptive statistics.
More informationFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DATE: August 3, 2004 CONTACT: Adam Clymer at or (cell) VISIT:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DATE: August 3, 2004 CONTACT: Adam Clymer at 202-879-6757 or 202 549-7161 (cell) VISIT: www.naes04.org Fahrenheit 9/11 Viewers and Limbaugh Listeners About Equal in Size Even Though
More informationThe Persuasion Effects of Political Endorsements
The Persuasion Effects of Political Endorsements Cheryl Boudreau Associate Professor Department of Political Science University of California, Davis One Shields Avenue Davis, CA 95616 Phone: 530-752-0966
More informationStudy Background. Part I. Voter Experience with Ballots, Precincts, and Poll Workers
The 2006 New Mexico First Congressional District Registered Voter Election Administration Report Study Background August 11, 2007 Lonna Rae Atkeson University of New Mexico In 2006, the University of New
More informationMarist College Institute for Public Opinion Poughkeepsie, NY Phone Fax
Marist College Institute for Public Opinion Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 Phone 845.575.5050 Fax 845.575.5111 www.maristpoll.marist.edu POLL MUST BE SOURCED: McClatchy-Marist Poll* Nearly Half of Americans Support
More informationMost opponents reject hearings no matter whom Obama nominates
NUMBERS, FACTS AND TRENDS SHAPING THE WORLD FOR RELEASE FEBRUARY 22, 2016 Majority of Public Wants Senate to Act on Obama s Court Nominee Most opponents reject hearings no matter whom Obama nominates FOR
More informationProposal for the 2016 ANES Time Series. Quantitative Predictions of State and National Election Outcomes
Proposal for the 2016 ANES Time Series Quantitative Predictions of State and National Election Outcomes Keywords: Election predictions, motivated reasoning, natural experiments, citizen competence, measurement
More informationTHE GOVERNOR, THE PRESIDENT, AND SANDY GOOD NUMBERS IN THE DAYS AFTER THE STORM
For release Monday, November 26, 2012 8 pp. Contact: Krista Jenkins Office: 973.443.8390 Cell: 908.328.8967 kjenkins@fdu.edu THE GOVERNOR, THE PRESIDENT, AND SANDY GOOD NUMBERS IN THE DAYS AFTER THE STORM
More informationMichigan 14th Congressional District Democratic Primary Election Exclusive Polling Study for Fox 2 News Detroit.
Michigan 14th Congressional District Democratic Primary Election Exclusive Polling Study for Fox 2 News Detroit. Automated Poll Methodology and Statistics Aggregate Results Conducted by Foster McCollum
More informationKansas Policy Survey: Fall 2001 Survey Results
Kansas Policy Survey: Fall 2001 Survey Results Prepared by Tarek Baghal with Chad J. Kniss, Donald P. Haider-Markel, and Steven Maynard-Moody September 2002 Report 267 Policy Research Institute University
More informationPEW RESEARCH CENTER. FOR RELEASE January 16, 2019 FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES:
FOR RELEASE January 16, 2019 FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES: Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director, Research Bridget Johnson, Communications Manager 202.419.4372
More informationPSCI4120 Public Opinion and Participation
PSCI4120 Public Opinion and Participation Micro-level Opinion Tetsuya Matsubayashi University of North Texas February 7, 2010 1 / 26 Questions on Micro-level Opinion 1 Political knowledge and opinion-holding
More informationYoung Voters in the 2010 Elections
Young Voters in the 2010 Elections By CIRCLE Staff November 9, 2010 This CIRCLE fact sheet summarizes important findings from the 2010 National House Exit Polls conducted by Edison Research. The respondents
More informationYG Network Congressional District Poll: December Topline Results
YG Network Congressional District Poll: December 2013 Topline Results Methodology: This YG Network Congressional District Poll was conducted from December 13-17, 2013, among a sample of 1,652 likely voters
More informationPercentages of Support for Hillary Clinton by Party ID
Executive Summary The Meredith College Poll asked questions about North Carolinians views of as political leaders and whether they would vote for Hillary Clinton if she ran for president. The questions
More informationThis analysis confirms other recent research showing a dramatic increase in the education level of newly
CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES April 2018 Better Educated, but Not Better Off A look at the education level and socioeconomic success of recent immigrants, to By Steven A. Camarota and Karen Zeigler This
More informationFOR RELEASE APRIL 26, 2018
FOR RELEASE APRIL 26, 2018 FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES: Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director, Research Bridget Johnson, Communications Associate 202.419.4372
More informationMEDICAID EXPANSION RECEIVES BROAD SUPPORT CHRISTIE POSITIONED WELL AMONG ELECTORATE IMPROVES UPON FAVORABLES AMONG DEMOCRATS
For immediate release Tuesday, March 12, 2013 8 pp. Contact: Krista Jenkins Office: 973.443.8390 Cell: 908.328.8967 kjenkins@fdu.edu MEDICAID EXPANSION RECEIVES BROAD SUPPORT CHRISTIE POSITIONED WELL AMONG
More informationBY Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking and Elizabeth Grieco
FOR RELEASE SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 BY Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking and Elizabeth Grieco FOR MEDIA OR OTHER INQUIRIES: Jeffrey Gottfried, Senior Researcher Amy Mitchell, Director, Journalism Research Rachel
More informationSTEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE NEW CONGRESS: What Americans Think
March 2000 STEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE NEW CONGRESS: What Americans Think Prepared for: Civil Society Institute Prepared by OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION January 4, 2007 Opinion Research Corporation TABLE
More informationThe Impact of Immigrant Remodeling Trends on the Future of the Home Improvement Industry
The Impact of Immigrant Remodeling Trends on the Future of the Home Improvement Industry Abbe Will Remodeling Futures Conference September 22, 2009 Why Study Immigrant Remodeling Trends? Immigrants have
More informationNovember 2017 Toplines
November 2017 Toplines The first of its kind bi-monthly survey of racially and ethnically diverse young adults GenForward is a survey associated with the University of Chicago Interviews: 10/26-11/10/2017
More informationRisk Tolerance and Support for Potential Military Interventions. David L. Eckles. Terry College of Business
Risk Tolerance and Support for Potential Military Interventions David L. Eckles Terry College of Business Department of Insurance, Legal Studies, and Real Estate University of Georgia 206 Brooks Hall Athens,
More informationAn in-depth examination of North Carolina voter attitudes on important current issues
An in-depth examination of North Carolina voter attitudes on important current issues Registered Voters in North Carolina August 25-30, 2018 1 Contents Contents Key Survey Insights... 3 Satisfaction with
More informationSupreme Court s Favorability Edges Below 50%
JULY 24, 2013 Blacks Views of Court Turn More Negative Supreme Court s Favorability Edges Below 50% FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS Michael Dimock Director
More informationA Not So Divided America Is the public as polarized as Congress, or are red and blue districts pretty much the same? Conducted by
Is the public as polarized as Congress, or are red and blue districts pretty much the same? Conducted by A Joint Program of the Center on Policy Attitudes and the School of Public Policy at the University
More informationFar From the Commonwealth: A Report on Low- Income Asian Americans in Massachusetts
University of Massachusetts Boston ScholarWorks at UMass Boston Institute for Asian American Studies Publications Institute for Asian American Studies 1-1-2007 Far From the Commonwealth: A Report on Low-
More informationCalifornia Ballot Reform Panel Survey Page 1
CALIFORNIA BALLOT RE FORM PANEL SURVEY 2011-2012 Interview Dates: Wave One: June 14-July 1, 2011 Wave Two: December 15-January 2, 2012 Sample size Wave One: (N=1555) Wave Two: (N=1064) Margin of error
More informationPatterns of Poll Movement *
Patterns of Poll Movement * Public Perspective, forthcoming Christopher Wlezien is Reader in Comparative Government and Fellow of Nuffield College, University of Oxford Robert S. Erikson is a Professor
More informationBIG PICTURE: CHANGING POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES IN SEATTLE
BIG PICTURE: CHANGING POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES IN SEATTLE January 218 Author: Bryce Jones Seattle Jobs Initiative TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Executive Summary 2 Changes in Poverty and Deep
More informationThis journal is published by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
Article: National Conditions, Strategic Politicians, and U.S. Congressional Elections: Using the Generic Vote to Forecast the 2006 House and Senate Elections Author: Alan I. Abramowitz Issue: October 2006
More informationMotivations and Misinformation: Why People Retain Some Errors but Quickly Dismiss Others
Motivations and Misinformation: Why People Retain Some Errors but Quickly Dismiss Others D.J. Flynn* Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science Northwestern University (847) 491-7450 dj.flynn@u.northwestern.edu
More informationWho Votes Now? And Does It Matter?
Who Votes Now? And Does It Matter? Jan E. Leighley University of Arizona Jonathan Nagler New York University March 7, 2007 Paper prepared for presentation at 2007 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
More informationNational Latino Leader? The Job is Open
November 15, 2010 National Latino Leader? The Job is Open Paul Taylor Director Pew Hispanic Center Mark Hugo Lopez Associate Director Pew Hispanic Center By their own reckoning, Latinos 1 living in the
More informationRECOMMENDED CITATION: Pew Research Center, July, 2015, Negative Views of Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by Republican Dissatisfaction
NUMBERS, FACTS AND TRENDS SHAPING THE WORLD FOR RELEASE JULY 29, 2015 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS REPORT: Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research Bridget Jameson, Communications Associate 202.419.4372
More informationReport. Poverty and Economic Insecurity: Views from City Hall. Phyllis Furdell Michael Perry Tresa Undem. on The State of America s Cities
Research on The State of America s Cities Poverty and Economic Insecurity: Views from City Hall Phyllis Furdell Michael Perry Tresa Undem For information on these and other research publications, contact:
More informationTHE GREAT MIGRATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY: A MONTE CARLO MARKOV CHAIN MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE WAGE GAP IN NEW YORK CITY, CHICAGO, PHILADELPHIA
THE GREAT MIGRATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY: A MONTE CARLO MARKOV CHAIN MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE WAGE GAP IN NEW YORK CITY, CHICAGO, PHILADELPHIA AND DETROIT Débora Mroczek University of Houston Honors
More informationRising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor
Social & Demographic Trends Wednesday, Jan 11, 2012 Rising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor Paul Taylor, Director Kim Parker, Associate Director Rich Morin, Senior Editor Seth Motel,
More information8 5 Sampling Distributions
8 5 Sampling Distributions Skills we've learned 8.1 Measures of Central Tendency mean, median, mode, variance, standard deviation, expected value, box and whisker plot, interquartile range, outlier 8.2
More informationR Eagleton Institute of Politics Center for Public Interest Polling
2002 SURVEY OF NEW BRUNSWICK RESIDENTS Conducted for: Conducted by: R Eagleton Institute of Politics Center for Public Interest Polling Data Collection: May 2002 02-02 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS
More informationThe University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs Department of Political Science
The University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs Department of Political Science POLS 8790 Special Topics in American Politics: Political Behavior Fall 2017 Tuesdays 3:30-6:15 Baldwin
More informationHCEO WORKING PAPER SERIES
HCEO WORKING PAPER SERIES Working Paper The University of Chicago 1126 E. 59th Street Box 107 Chicago IL 60637 www.hceconomics.org Now You See Me, Now You Don t: The Geography of Police Stops Jessie J.
More informationWhat Goes with Red and Blue? Assessing Partisan Cognition Through Conjoint Classification Experiments
What Goes with Red and Blue? Assessing Partisan Cognition Through Conjoint Classification Experiments Stephen N. Goggin John A. Henderson Alexander G. Theodoridis Ph.D. Candidate Assistant Professor Assistant
More informationTHE WORKMEN S CIRCLE SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS. Jews, Economic Justice & the Vote in Steven M. Cohen and Samuel Abrams
THE WORKMEN S CIRCLE SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS Jews, Economic Justice & the Vote in 2012 Steven M. Cohen and Samuel Abrams 1/4/2013 2 Overview Economic justice concerns were the critical consideration dividing
More informationBOOKER V. RIVERA AND THE POWER OF CABLE NEWS OBAMA APPROVAL DOWN SLIGHTLY
For immediate release Wednesday, March 13, 2013 Contact: Krista Jenkins Office: 973.443.8390 Cell: 908.328.8967 kjenkins@fdu.edu 8 pp. BOOKER V. RIVERA AND THE POWER OF CABLE NEWS OBAMA APPROVAL DOWN SLIGHTLY
More informationPublic Opinion and Political Action
Edwards, Wattenberg, and Lineberry Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy Fourteenth Edition Chapter 6 Public Opinion and Political Action Introduction Public Opinion The distribution of the
More informationSupporting Information for Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment
Supporting Information for Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment Alan S. Gerber Yale University Professor Department of Political Science Institution for Social
More informationHIGH POINT UNIVERSITY POLL MEMO RELEASE 10/13/2017 (UPDATE)
HIGH POINT UNIVERSITY POLL MEMO RELEASE 10/13/2017 (UPDATE) ELEMENTS Population represented Sample size Mode of data collection Type of sample (probability/nonprobability) Start and end dates of data collection
More informationPew Research News IQ Quiz What the Public Knows about the Political Parties
Pew Research News IQ Quiz What the Public Knows about the Political Parties Most Americans can correctly identify the relative positions of the Republican and Democratic parties on the major issues of
More informationSwing Voters in Swing States Troubled By Iraq, Economy; Unimpressed With Bush and Kerry, Annenberg Data Show
DATE: June 4, 2004 CONTACT: Adam Clymer at 202-879-6757 or 202 549-7161 (cell) VISIT: www.naes04.org Swing Voters in Swing States Troubled By Iraq, Economy; Unimpressed With Bush and Kerry, Annenberg Data
More informationFAVORABLE RATINGS OF LABOR UNIONS FALL SHARPLY
NEWS Release. 1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel (202) 419-4350 Fax (202) 419-4399 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Tuesday, February 23, 2010 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: Andrew Kohut, Director
More informationSeptember 2017 Toplines
The first of its kind bi-monthly survey of racially and ethnically diverse young adults Field Period: 08/31-09/16/2017 Total N: 1,816 adults Age Range: 18-34 NOTE: All results indicate percentages unless
More informationViktória Babicová 1. mail:
Sethi, Harsh (ed.): State of Democracy in South Asia. A Report by the CDSA Team. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008, 302 pages, ISBN: 0195689372. Viktória Babicová 1 Presented book has the format
More informationThe Contextual Determinants of Support for Unilateral Action
The Contextual Determinants of Support for Unilateral Action ANDREW REEVES, JON C. ROGOWSKI, MIN HEE SEO, and ANDREW R. STONE Recent scholarship shows relatively low public approval for the president s
More informationExtrapolated Versus Actual Rates of Violent Crime, California and the United States, from a 1992 Vantage Point
Figure 2.1 Extrapolated Versus Actual Rates of Violent Crime, California and the United States, from a 1992 Vantage Point Incidence per 100,000 Population 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200
More informationTHE PRESIDENTIAL RACE: MIDSUMMER July 7-14, 2008
CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES POLL For release: Tuesday July 15, 2008 6:30 P.M. EDT THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE: MIDSUMMER July 7-14, 2008 Democrat Barack Obama now holds a six-point edge over his Republican rival
More informationPUBLIC SAYS IT S ILLEGAL TO TARGET AMERICANS ABROAD AS SOME QUESTION CIA DRONE ATTACKS
For immediate release Thursday, February 7, 2013 Contact: Peter J. Woolley 973.670.3239 or Krista Jenkins 908.328.8967 6 pp. PUBLIC SAYS IT S ILLEGAL TO TARGET AMERICANS ABROAD AS SOME QUESTION CIA DRONE
More informationProblems in Contemporary Democratic Theory
Kevin Elliott KJE2106@Columbia.edu Office Hours: Wednesday 4-6, IAB 734 POLS S3310 Summer 2014 (Session D) Problems in Contemporary Democratic Theory This course considers central questions in contemporary
More informationTruman Policy Research Harry S Truman School of Public Affairs
Dr. David Konisky is a Policy Research Scholar at the Institute of Public Policy, and an Assistant Professor at the Harry S Truman School of Public Aff airs. James Harrington is a graduate student at the
More informationThe Future of Health Care after Repeal and Replace is Pulled: Millennials Speak Out about Health Care
March 17 The Future of Health Care after Repeal and Replace is Pulled: Millennials Speak Out about Health Care A summary of key findings from the first-of-its-kind monthly survey of racially and ethnically
More informationPartisan Perceptual Bias and the Information Environment
Partisan Perceptual Bias and the Information Environment Jennifer Jerit * Jason Barabas ** Florida State University 531 Bellamy Building Tallahassee, FL 32306 850-644-5727 February 4, 2011 Abstract Perceptual
More informationGender preference and age at arrival among Asian immigrant women to the US
Gender preference and age at arrival among Asian immigrant women to the US Ben Ost a and Eva Dziadula b a Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan UH718 M/C144 Chicago,
More information