India s African Relations: Playing Catch up with the Dragon

Transcription

1 India s African Relations: Playing Catch up with the Dragon Sanusha Naidu 1 The Commerce between India and Africa will be of ideas and services, not manufactured goods against raw materials after the fashion of western exploiters. Contextualising Indo African Relations Mahatma Gandhi India and Africa enjoy a long standing historical relationship. Contacts and trade between the two sides have been noted in history to extend beyond British colonialism. But it was during the Cold War that relations moved towards one of deepening political solidarity. Following independence India saw its role in the international system as championing the struggles of anticolonialism and anti-racism. Like China, India played a critical role in the Bandung Conference that led to the emergence of the non-aligned movement. Moreover, India used this opportunity to cement ties with African countries, which was also about strengthening Asian African solidarity. With India pushing for the independence of African states from colonial domination, India and Africa seemed likely to become strategic allies in the Cold War. Yet, India s role in the continent remained marginal. In part this was due to the border dispute in 1962 with China and the pending implications this had for Delhi as well as the regional dynamics of the Cold War in its neighbourhood, which pushed India to become more circumspect in its foreign policy. While China suffered from its own Cold War polemic with Moscow vis-à-vis Africa, India appeared to be more muted, which led to selective engagements with the continent during the 1970s and 1980s. In principle, however, India s international stance was geared towards promoting greater South-South co-operation and a greater voice for itself. But with the end of the Cold War, India s foreign policy also had to be revisited and shaped to take into account the new impulses in the global arena. Post-Cold War Relations: A Rediscovery For much of the Cold War India s own regional and domestic pressures made it inward looking. However, with economic liberalisation in the 1990s, India s mandarins realised the importance of a foreign policy that resonated with its economic ambitions. Opening up to overseas investment also meant strengthening external relations that could help to realise its political and economic potential. Like China, India s post-cold war foreign policy has been aligned to the principles of Non-alignment and South-South co-operation. Linked to the unilateral character of the post-cold war international order, India has pushed for a multilateral world order. And just as in the past, relations with Africa and the South are now based on shared mutual interests to fight against the inequities of the global order. This time directed against underdevelopment and poverty as a result of an unbalanced global economic system. Using the historical platform as a way to consolidate contemporary relations with Africa India s current foreign policy relations toward the continent is about reinventing and rejuvenating the old relationship. While 1 Ms Naidu is a research fellow based at the Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University in South Africa. She can be contacted at snaidu@sun.ac.za

2 China can make the claim that it has never enslaved or colonised Africa, India can also premise its relationship with the continent on the same moral high ground. According to official documentation India s contemporary Africa policy is aligned to a confluence of interests around justice in the global order levelled at increasing the leverage and influence of their respective global positions and promoting a new international order. While the political rhetoric behind India s Africa policy seems to mirror that of China s, the question that remains is how India s political and economic behaviour in the continent should be interpreted vis-à-vis China. Competing Interests versus Complementary Visions China s deepening engagements in Africa has eclipsed India s growing relationship with the continent. Contemporary mainstream media reports and commentators have consistently magnified China s economic activities in the continent, which has failed to recognise that India too has discovered that Africa is where the resources and future markets that will fuel its economic growth are 2. Even though India s corporate expansion and economic engagements in Africa cannot compare (at this stage) with China s rapid movement into the continent, it must be noted that India s current strategy towards Africa emulates several issues that needs further exploration and analysis. Addressing the Energy Security Question Since the 1970s India has not made any significant oil discoveries. With having only 0.4% of the world s proven oil reserves, India s oil needs have to be financed from the outside. Future projections are that by 2030 India is expected to become the world s third largest consumer of energy bypassing Japan and Russia 3. And if forecasts are accurate that India s economy is expected to grow at average rate of 5% a year over the next 25 years, then certainly India s energy demands are going to become ravenous. Compounding the situation is the projection that it will run out of coal, the primary source of its current energy needs, over the next 40 years. Therefore access to reliable supplies is critical in sustaining India s domestic growth trajectories as well as positioning it as a global economic power. But like the USA, China, and other oil importing nations India faces the following vulnerabilities: Volatility in oil prices, Instability in oil rich regions, and Geopolitical uncertainties that fuel possible supply disruption To avoid dependence on one region and the fact that the US s influence in the Middle East has effectively marginalised other nations from the region, India s strategy is simply about energy security based on an integrated set of policies to balance foreign policy, economic, environmental, and social issues with the rising demand for energy 4. At this critical juncture in India s development, the government has embarked on a policy of energy diplomacy. This footprint is becoming increasingly apparent in Africa..The Indian state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) has in recent years managed to secure exploration contracts and other related energy projects in the continent (see the table below). 2 India and Africa It s Old Friends, New Game and Rules, The Nation, 9 February See Tanvi Madan (2006): India, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series. 4 Ibid.

3 Table 1: ONGC Investments in Africa Country Indian Company Type of Investment Size of Investment Nigeria Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Source: Various Newspaper articles Oil pipeline Oil production Oil refinery Multi-product export pipeline Oil pipeline (part of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company) Not stated (25% stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Oil Company (GNPOC) project Not stated (24% share in Block 5A & 24% share in Block 5B) US$ 1.2 bn US$ 200 mn US$ 750 mn ONCG has also entered into a joint venture with Arcelor Mittal Steel in a US6 billion industrial development deal in Nigeria, in exchange for oil exploration rights. Through its overseas exploration and investment division, ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) is also active in many African countries including: a 23.5% interest in Ivory Coast s offshore bloc CI-112; a 49% participating interest in two onshore oil exploration blocks in Libya; a concession agreement to explore for oil in Egypt s North Ramadan Block; and identified oil and gas properties in Gabon with potential investments of over US$500. Other Indian oil companies prospecting in Africa include: Table 2: Other NOCs in Africa Country Indian Company Type of Investment Size of Investment Côte d Ivoire Nigeria Unknown (various companies acting as a consortium) National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) Oil Prospecting Liquefied Natural Gas US$1 bn US$1.7 bn Nigeria Nigeria Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) Oil refinery Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant & Oil refinery US$ 3.5 bn US$ 2 US$ 4 bn (proposed) Sudan Videocon Group Oil Prospecting US$ 100 mn (76% stake) Source: Various Newspaper articles The impression one gets is that Indian oil companies are playing catch up with their Chinese counterparts and like the Chinese following a strategy of overseas equity acquisitions to reduce dependence on major oil companies from the developed countries as well as limit exposure to price volatility on the open market. While the official Indian view tends to downplay that it is competing with China for oil acreage in Africa and elsewhere, a recent media report noted that the Indian government concerned about losing important future

4 oil supplies to China is moving to put in place an energy panel on the lines of the cabinet committee on security to see how it can counter Beijing s policy of using financial and military aid to secure oilfields in Latin America and Africa 5. Even though it may appear that India is sleep walking in Africa, and that its trade with Africa is still a fraction of China s, signals are that Delhi is awakening to the reality that Africa is a strategic partner and a priority in its global commercial expansion. India-Africa trade jumped from US$967 million in 1991 to over US$9.5 billion in As the graph and table below shows Indian exports to the continent increased from US$2 billion in 2000 to over US$6 billion in During the same period Indian imports from Africa increased from US3 billion in 2000 to over US$4 billion in Graph 1: INDIA AND CHINA S TRADING RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA, (US$ millions) India: Exports to Africa China: Exports to Africa India: Imports from Africa China: Imports from Africa Source: World Trade Atlas (2006) Table 3: China and India Imports and Exports with Africa (Millions of US$) India: Exports to Africa Imports from Africa China: Exports to Africa Imports from Sanjay Dutta Govt to set up energy security panel to counter China Times of India, 7 March India and Africa It s Old Friends, New Game and Rules, The Nation, 9 February 2007.

5 Africa Source: World Trade Atlas (2006) Not only about oil. India is also making strides into Africa s non oil resources. In Zambia Vendanta Resources has a US$750 million copper mining investment; in Liberia and Nigeria Arcelor Mittal has a US900 million management project of iron ore reserves and US$30 million (with 80% stake in Nigeria based Delta Steel Company) steel refinery respectively. The Tata Group has the most extensive presence in the continent. Operating in Ghana, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa Tanzania and Uganda, the Group claims to employ over 700 people in Africa. According to the Group s profile, their activities range from infrastructure development, energy and hospitality services to financial, communication and automotive outputs. The following are some of the investments made by the company: US$800 million renovation of the Taj Pamodji Hotel in Lusaka A vehicle assembly plant at Ndola in Zambia US108 million high-carbon ferrochrome plant at Richards Bay in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa Construction of a US12 million instant coffee processing plant in Uganda. Beyond oil and other natural resources, Indian companies have also begun to invest in Africa s infrastructure as a way of cementing their commercial and commodity presence in the continent. Rites and Ircon, the two large state-owned infrastructure and engineering companies, have been making inroads in Africa s rail and road development sector through projects and concessions for several years. Rites has refurbished and leased locomotives in Sudan and Tanzania, whilst supplying technical assistance to rail authorities in Kenya and Mozambique. Rites has also been involved in design and construction of roads in Uganda and Ethiopia. Ircon has constructed railways in Algeria and (currently) in Mozambique, and has also been active in the rail sectors in Sudan, Nigeria and Zambia 7. Indian companies are also queuing up to take advantage of Africa s significant investments in power transmission projects. Companies, like Kalapataru Power Transmission Ltd already have a presence in Zambia and is expecting to acquire a major contract worth US35 million from a North African country. According to the company s director Africa is an area for rich pickings: All these countries are rich in resources such as oil, gas and metals. Therefore when global prices of the resources increase, these countries make more money. Their investment in infrastructure projects has also increased exponentially 8. KEC International Ltd. Is another transmission company that has a presence in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. The overview below contextualises the outreach of Indian firms beyond the resource sector in the continent: Overseas Infrastructure Alliance Pvt Limited signed a contract with the Ethiopian government to supply US$65 million worth of electrical equipment; Mashuli Gashmani Ltd. Planning to open an US$18 million commercial prawn fishery in Uganda; 7 See Duncan Bonnett India in Africa: An Old Partner, A New Competitor in Traders Journal, Issue Rahul Wadke Indian power cos flock to Africa, Middle East, The Hindu Business Line, 20 February

6 A US$31 million contract awarded to Ircon International by the Ethiopian government for the construction of 120km of roads; A concession to Ircon International for the rehabilitation of the 600 km Beira railway system in Mozambique; A US$40 million contract to KEC International for the construction of a 132 Kv power project in Ethiopia; A US$11 million contract to Kamani Engineering Corp for the construction of a transmission line between Zambia and Namibia; and A Railway rehabilitation project by Rites International in Huila Province, Angola. The Export-Import Bank of India (EIBI) and other initiatives Through the EIBI 9, the Indian government has also stepped up its trade and investment relations with the continent as well as to boost its products in the African market. Under the Focus Africa programme launched as part of the EXIM Policy strategy, the Indian government provides financial assistance to various trade promotion organisations, export promotion councils and apex chambers in the form of Market Development Assistance. According to the Nation article, total operative LOCs extended to Sub-Saharan Africa by the EIBI is over $550 million. In May 2006 EIBI extended a $250 million LOC to the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, to finance Indian exports to ECOWAS member states 10. In November 2005 the EIBI together with Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) organised a Conclave on India-Africa Partnership Project entitled Expanding Horizons, which was aimed at economic ties with the continent. Approximately 160 delegates from 32 African countries where over 70 projects, estimated to more than US$5 billion were discussed. This was followed last year by another meeting which took place in October where over 300 African participants and 375 Indian business people attended and discussed over 300 projects worth US$17 billion. The Indian government has also embarked on a set of initiatives to enhance its economic and political cooperation with Africa. These include: US$200 million line of credit to NEPAD; US$500 million line of credit for Team 9 which is an initiative with 8 Francophone countries 11 ; US$1 billion investment in a joint venture with the African Union to build a Pan African e-network to provide telemedicine and tele-education through integrated satellite, fibre, and wireless connectivity. 12 More than Business Interests Apart from the business investments, India has also become a significant development partner to the continent. Under its Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation (ITEC) programme it has provided more than US$1 billion worth of technical assistance and training of personnel. Moreover in 2005 India became the first Asian country to become a full member of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and pledged US$1 million towards the foundation s sustainable development and poverty alleviation capacity building initiative. 9 Appendix One details the loans that the EIBI has given to Africa. 10 op cit. 11 Some of the projects established under this initiative include US$970,000 for the construction of the National Post Office in Burkina Faso, US$30 million for rural electrification in Ghana, US$4 million for a bicycle plant in Chad, US12 million tractor assembly plant in Mali and US$15 million for potable drinking water projects in Equitorial Guinea. 12 State Owned Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. (TCIL) will implement the network, which India will manage for five years before turning it over to the AU.

7 In addition, India has also contributed to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, India is the largest contributor of peacekeepers to the continent with 3,500 troops in the DRC 13 while the 1400 Indian military contingent constitutes the largest contribution to The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Apart from providing peacekeepers India has also supplied its peacekeeping missions with helicopters, medical and communication equipment. India has also joined the HIPC II initiative and to date has written off debts totalling US$24 million to Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and Zambia. Other aspects of India s humanitarian assistance to the continent include: Food donations to Namibia in 2003 as well as to Chad and Lesotho in , 000 mosquito nets to the Republic of Congo Construction equipment and materials to Seychelles as part of the reconstruction process following the Tsunami. In addition, given India s comparative advantage in the pharmaceutical sector, industry stakeholders and companies are looking toward the continent as an important sphere for collaborative exchanges. Considering the continent s battle with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases (like Malaria) linkages with Indian pharmaceutical companies will be critical in finding a vaccine and other medical breakthroughs in combating such illnesses. For Whom the Bell Tolls I now return to the question raised earlier in this paper, namely, how India s African relations are being expressed in a post-cold war era. Reflecting on the quotation at the beginning of this article the question that needs to be asked is to what extent Gandhi s belief is being realised in India s contemporary engagements with Africa. Or is it that India s courting of Africa masks a more muted character of political expediency and economic pragmatism that is engineered to satisfy Delhi s self-interests and domestic demands? Whereas much of the current discourse has been about China s engagements in Africa and the mixed perceptions of China being Africa s new colonialists, while also complementing Africa s development trajectory, not much has been said about India in this context. The answer to this question is more complex than anticipated. While India s Africa policy seems to mirror much of what China s Africa policy is, the nuances of its political and economic engagements suggest that, like China, there are inherent risks to the relationship. Chris Alden argues that China s contemporary relations with Africa are driven by four factors. These are: resource security; the need for new markets and investment opportunities; symbolic diplomacy, development assistance and co-operation; and forging strategic partnerships 14. It would appear that India s strategy is not that different. And like the Chinese, India is aware that it needs to acquire key energy and commodity assets if it is to lessen its dependence and limit the risk on the open market. Therefore plying African governments with concessional loans and other economic incentives tied to its development assistance not only provides market traction for Indian exports but also enables India to gain leverage through what has been identified as a critical weakness in the continent- infrastructure investments. And it is rather open about the rationale that underpins its development assistance. 13 See 14 Chris Alden, China in Africa, Survival, 47, 3, Autumn 2005.

8 Unlike the West and China to a less extent who tend to shy away from the fact that their development cooperation might be a geo-strategic bargaining tool, the Indian government explicitly emphasises that the goal of its development work is to further Indian interests abroad and to promote its own economic situation 15. Another area where the Indians depart from the Chinese is the influence that Beijing gains through its frequent flyer Africa programme and the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). In three years President Hu Jintao has visited 14 African countries, while the New Year pilgrimage to the continent has become an annual event in the Chinese foreign affairs calendar. Yet, for India, the last visit by President Manmohan Singh was only to South Africa, which incidentally is India s largest trading partner on the continent. In Africa symbolic diplomacy is important and the Chinese have learnt this well, especially now where aid promises from the G8 Gleneagles Summit have not been fulfilled and the West is no longer the single geostrategic influence in the region. Not only have the Chinese managed to harness this to a fine art but have also applied it equally to the way it hosted last year s FOCAC Summit with grandeur and fanfare never to be seen before. Of course India has hosted the Conclave meeting on Indian African Partnership but this is still in its embryonic stages. Perhaps the recent visit by the head of the African Union to India, suggesting an institutionalization of the partnership into something along the lines of FOCAC would be beneficial in cementing ties and paving the way for more frequent visits by India s executive to the continent. Although in principle the Indian Minister of External Affairs agreed, it seems that discussion on this front has remained at its infancy for several years. Supplementing the symbolic diplomacy the Chinese are well renowned in Africa for building or refurbishing public infrastructure, whether it is government ministries or sport stadiums as part of making strategic inroads into the Africa s commodity markets. This is something that India will do well to craft if it wants to make strategic in roads into Africa and are incorporating such a strategy in its Africa policy. But the Indians see telecommunication as their comparative advantage over the Chinese in Africa. Aiming to firmly plant their footprint in Africa s nascent ICT sector, the Indian s want to restrict the growth of Chinese firms like Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation. In fact the PAN project is seen as the first towards strengthening the ICT partnership before losing out to the Chinese. Even though, China seems to have a greater share of and leverage in the African market compared to India, India s future role in the continent should not be dismissed. Unlike China India s global image is not overshadowed or marred by negative reporting. Where China has to battle with criticism leveled against its policy of non-interference and respect for sovereignty when it comes to its commercial interests vis-à-vis human right issues and relations with less than democratic governments in the continent (i.e. Sudan), such denigration is less muted in the Indian context. Emboldened by its democratic tradition India s behaviour in the continent is seen in a less confrontational way compared to China. This, indeed, enables India to take the moral high ground when it comes to advocating good governance and pushing the democratic agenda in Africa. Something that bodes well for Delhi in its relations with the West. Moreover with India being, increasingly seen as strategic partner in Asia by the US this could lead to positive outcomes for it in its African relations China s approach to business in Africa has been labeled as mercantilist and being led primarily by its staterun corporations which, seemingly, are less cognisant of risk than their western counterparts. Whereas Chinese SOEs answerable to political stakeholders rather than private shareholders enjoy a comparative advantage over foreign multinationals when investing in African economies because of the strong, no-strings attached political relations fostered by their government, Delhi s oversight role has been more about promoting the right image mainly because of an informed domestic opinion and a robust media. 15 Matthias Jobelius New Powers for Global Change? Challenges for the Development Cooperation: The Case of India, Dialogue on Globalization, Briefing Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin, 5 March 2007.

9 But, there are exceptions like the case of the ONGC investment in Sudan and how this impacts on India s image of pursuing global social justice. Nevertheless, India may prove to be more of a strategic partner to Africa, considering that both are seeking a permanent seat in the reformed United Nations Security Council and the fact that China sees its seat and itself as the voice of the global South in the Security Council. In addition, access to the Indian market maybe less of a barrier for African MNCs considering that language and cultural dynamics are more favourable than in China. While, much of the discussion so far has been about how China s deepening presence in Africa and the threat this poses to Western interests in Africa, the debates have failed to recognize that India is also becoming an important partner to African countries. Trying to contain the China Challenge ignores that the new competition in Africa is actually going to be between China and India. And India is going to be a harder partner to contain considering that Delhi represents what the West would like China to be.

10 APPENDIX ONE: Lines of Credit by EXIM Bank of India to Africa S. No. Borrower Amount Tenor (Years) Terminal Dates for Utilization Opening of L/C Disbursement Eastern and Southern African US$ 10 mn. Up to 5 years Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank) (covering 17 countries in the eastern and Southern African region) 16 Seychelles Marketing Board, US$ 5mn. Up to 5 years Seychelles Government of Ghana US$ 15mn. Up to 7years Banque Ouest Africaine US$ 10mn Up to 7 years DeDevelopment (West African Development Bank) ( equivalent Euros) Government of Zambia US$ 10 mn. Up to 5 years Government Of Sudan US$ 50 mn. Up to 11 years (including moratorium of 3 years) (Under Extension) Government of Angola US $ 5 mn. Up to 5 years Government of Angola US $40 mn. Up to 20 years Eastern and Southern African and Development Bank 9 (PTA Bank) (covering 17 countries in the eastern and southern African region) US $10 mn. Up to 5 years Government of Mozambique US $ 20mn. Up to 20 years Government Of Lesotho US $ 5mn. Up to 15 years Government of Senegal US $ 15mn. Up to 20 years Government of Senegal US $ 17.87mn. Up to 20years Government of Mauritius US $ US 10mn. Up to 10 years To be made BMCE bank, Morocco US $ 10mn. Up to 7 years Government of Cote d Ivoire US $ 26.8 mn. Up to 20 years - Max 4 yrs. For project exports from complying date of contract and 5 yrs. For supply contracts from date of Ag. (2.8.05). Government of Mali US$ 27mn. Up to 20 years - Max 4 yrs. For Proj. date of contract from date of Ag.(7.8.05). Government of Ghana US$ 27 mn. Up to 20 years Max 4 yrs. For proj. exports from compiling date of contract and 5 yrs. For supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ). Government of Ghana US$ 60mn. Up to 20 years. Max 4 yrs. for proj. date of contract and 5 yrs. For supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ). 16 PTA Bank covers Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and

11 Government of Congo US$ 33,50mn. Up to 20 years Max 4 yrs. for proj. exports from compl. date of contract and 6 yrs. for supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ). Government Of Chad US$ 50 mn Up to 20 years Max 4 yrs. for proj. date of contract and 6 yrs. for supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ). Government of Equatorial US$ 15 mn. Up to 15 years To be made Guinea Government of Senegal & Mali ( combined ) effective US$ 27,7 mn. Up to 20 years Max 4 yrs.for proj. Date of contract and 6 yrs. For supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ) Government of Burkina Faso US$ 30,97 mn. Up to 20 years To be made effective Government of Gambia US $6,7 mn. Up to 20 years Max 4 yrs. for proj. date of contract and 6 yrs. for supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ). East African Development Bank,Uganda US $5 mn Up to 5 years To be made effective Government of Sudan US $ 350 mn Up to 12 years To be made effective Government of Sudan US $ 41,90 mn. Up to 13 years Max 4 yrs. for proj. date of contract. Government of Senegal US$ 27 mn. Up to 20 years - Max 4 yrs. for proj. date of contract and 6 yrs. for supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ). Government of Niger US$ 17mn. Up to 20 years To be made effective Eastern & Southern African Trade and Development Bank ( PTA Bank) (covering 17 countries in the Eastern and Southern African region) US$ 5mn Up to 5 years Government of Ethiopia US$ 65 mn. Up to 20 years Max 4 yrs. for proj. export from compln. date of contract and 6 yrs. for supply contracts from date of Ag. ( ) ECOWAS Bank for Investment & Development (EBID) US $ 250 mn. Up to 15 years To be made Government of Angola US$ 10mn. Up to 6 years To be made Government of Seychelles US$ 8 mn. Up to 8 years To be made Government of Mozambique US$ 20 mn. Up to 20 years To be made Eastern & Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank) US $ 10 mn. Up to 5 years To be made

12 Government of Senegal US$ 11 mn. Up to 20 years To be made Government of Sudan US$ 48 mn. Up to 20 years To be made Government of Guinea Bissau US$ 25 mn. Up to 20 years To be made

13 Draft: Not for Citation