Welcome by the Chairman of the Study Group, Mr André MORDANT (Group II Employees, Belgium

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1 Report from Public Hearing on the Use of Security Scanners at Airports in the EU, Tuesday 11 January 2011, European Economic and Social Committee, Brussels This event was organised by the Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society (TEN) of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) as part of the second Study Group meeting for an Opinion on the use of security scanners at airports in the EU. Airport security is one of the priorities of the EU and the use of security scanners has provoked lively debate among EU citizens and stakeholders. Intended for the purpose of fighting terrorism and capable of detecting any potential weapons and explosives carried on the bodies of passengers, these security devices are criticised because of their possible implications for the health and privacy of passengers and air transport's employees. The EESC as the voice of organised civil society in Europe is taking these concerns very seriously and therefore wants to hear directly from representatives of various backgrounds about their views on the practical implications of a large-scale introduction of security scanners at airports in the EU. Welcome by the Chairman of the Study Group, Mr André MORDANT (Group II Employees, Belgium Mr Mordant states that terrorist activity requires us to think very seriously about security. There are, however, issues with security scanners, for example concerns over health problems. The scanners would have to be accepted by all those who travel if they were to be used everywhere. Moreover There must be protected the health of passengers and staff. Alluding to the near 'naked' images of people produced by certain types of security scanners, he also states that they must protect people's privacy. The TEN Section of the EESC is currently preparing an opinion on the Communication from the European Commission on this subject. The purpose of today's hearing is to allow the Study Group members to hear in more detail about the issues surrounding security scanners from a wide variety of viewpoints. Presentation of the Communication from the European Commission (COM(2010) 311) on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports by Ms Claudia FUSCO, European Commission, DG MOVE New threats to aviation security are constantly evolving and some of the traditional security methods might no longer be adequate to protect citizens. An important advantage of scanners is their good detection capability of non-metallic items. Scanners are currently not authorised as a routine security measure in EU airports, the European Parliament having rejected their use on the basis of fundamental rights and health issues. A European approach to this issue is required, as there is currently too high a degree of fragmentation. Responding to concerns about delays at security checkpoints due to the use of scanners, Ms Fusco states that their passenger throughput is acceptable and can be improved in future. She further reports that technology and operational practices have evolved in such a way that fundamental rights and health can be protected. Passengers 1

2 should of course be properly informed about the risks if indeed there are any. The Commission is currently working on its Impact Assessment and hopes to complete this in the coming weeks. It is hoped that legislation may be proposed by summer Mr Jörg LEICHTFRIED, Shadow Rapporteur for COM(2010) 311, Member of the European Parliament, Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats (S&D) The 2008 Commission proposal to introduce security scanners had met strict opposition in the European Parliament. Following this, however, certain member states began using them. Mr Leichtfried questions whether they are doing so within the existing legal framework. But in any case, their use means that European legislation must react, considering as well moves to develop a single European airspace and aspirations for 'one stop security'. An extremely important reason to enact European legislation is to implement equal security at all airports so that no weak points exist in the system. The use of security scanners must be subject to certain clearly defined conditions that are applicable across the EU. One principle is for him that scanners must not be compulsory and that member states can continue to decide individually on their use. This is broadly agreed in the Parliament. Scanners also must be absolutely safe, especially for young people, pregnant women and those with medical conditions. They must guarantee absolutely privacy, with no storage or delivery of images and no body pictures. Other passengers must not see the scan image. Scanners must be efficient: using a new technology which is not more efficient than the existing one makes no sense, and throughput of passengers must be higher than that of the current detectors. On the option of national opt-outs, Mr Leichtfried reports that this is not yet decided in the Parliament. But perhaps the biggest issue is who will pay for the introduction of these scanners, given that one machine costs approximately EUR 200,000. The Parliament cannot arrive at a position on the issue without a resolution of the question of who will pay. Ms Nathalie GRIESBECK, Member of the European Parliament, Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Ms Griesbeck is a member of the Committee on Civil Liberties and an alternate member of the Transport Committee. She speaks of the need to find a correct balance between security issues and human rights/the dignity of the person in the fight against terrorism. She points to the problem of costs and of the images produced by scanners. Even if 'stick people' images are produced, this is still a very important legal question. The simple fact of being seen like this has implications for fundamental rights. Images should therefore be destroyed immediately and systems must not fail, as we know they sometimes do. Any health risk for passengers and employees who will be subject to radiation from the scanners has to be excluded, no matter how small the doses. If reassured on these points she may be able to vote in favour of these measures. Another important point for her is that there must not be any weak points in the EU security system as otherwise there is little sense in imposing the use of scanners. Speaking about the 2

3 interdependence of Europe and the rest of world in security terms, Ms Griesbeck questions the effectiveness of these measures if the EU is the only region in the world to adopt the wide use of airport security scanners. Panel debate Mr Ron LOUWERSE, Director for Safety, Security & Environment, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport Schiphol has been following the development of this technology and implementing it. This has been very successful and they believe that this is the future for security at the airport. They have dealt with privacy concerns by blurring passengers' faces and putting the scanner operator in a separate room. Images are of 'match stick' people, there are no pictures. This is what they call 'privacy by design'. Although they are dealing with the privacy aspect, Mr Louwerse accepts that as long as there are pictures or images there will be privacy issues. They are already experiencing better detection and equal throughput as with metal detectors, but the target in the short to medium term is an even greater throughput. The principal reason for the introduction of the scanners has been passenger friendliness: when using metal detectors, security staff had to do intrusive searches and passengers were very unhappy at being subjected to 'patdown' searches. The new machine also ends random searches and passengers can see on a screen what has been detected, allowing them to better understand why they are being searched. Mr Mike FAZACKERLEY, Product Director, Manchester Airport He believes that scanners should be a part of security processes as customers tolerate but do not appreciate current security, while having them stressed by an unpleasant experience is not good for business. Mr Fazackerley's team therefore asked themselves: 'What do customers want and what do they not want?'. They found out that their customers preferred security scanner checks to conventional security methods. Scanner introduction therefore represents a double opportunity: increased detection and customer satisfaction. Currently a security scanner is used on trial as an alternative to a 'patdown' for further search following the metal detector. This avoids customers having to be physically touched. A cartoon figure is shown on the screen at the checkpoint while at a remote location an operator watches a more revealing image. No communication between both locations is possible except through the computer screen to indicate areas for further search. Mr Fabio GAMBA, Deputy Secretary General, Association of European Airlines (AEA) Technology should be considered as one part of an overall, integrated approach and scanners should be viewed conditionally. Security must also take account of risk. He 3

4 speaks about the concept of unpredictability: airlines do not want people to be able to anticipate security measures. Measures that are purely reactive may allow terrorists to gain higher levels of predictability and eventually circumvent security measures. It is also still questionable whether scanners improve passenger throughput and the travel experience. Any measures must promote a level playing field between the EU member states, and between them and the rest of world, as well as between different transport modes, and they must be cost efficient. Mr Nico VOORBACH, IFALPA (International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Association) Security Committee Chairman, European Cockpit Association (ECA) IFALPA represents 110,000 pilots around the world. Mr Voorbach agrees with Mr Gamba that security must be risk-based and not only rely on technology. In terms of health, his organisation is satisfied that millimetre wave scanners are safe. The safety issues do however need further review, as the long-term health risks remain unknown. This is especially the case for scanners using backscatter technology, where the risks to health have not been adequately addressed. Doses are cumulative, and this is of particular concern to pilots. The privacy issues are being addressed as we have seen at Schiphol and Manchester Airports. In terms of effectiveness, 'patdown' searches are poor. Some studies have given them only a 30 per cent detection rate. Scanners are expected to significantly improve on this. Scanners which look inside the body must never be a routine measure. Professor John DAMILAKIS, European Society of Radiology He states that the health risk of X-ray backscatter scanners is very small but that due to the lack of information about their detection capability it is difficult to know if their introduction is justified. Studies have questioned the detection performance of backscatter technology. The risks to health are small, but can even a small health risk be accepted if the effectiveness of the system is not guaranteed? The following points about the technology were also made: Children and babies receive higher per screening doses than adults; Outer organs receive higher doses than deeper-lying organs; and The dose per screening varies according to the age of the person. Mr Niraj NATHWANI, Programme Manager, Freedoms and Justice Department, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights The Agency has several fundamental rights concerns regarding security scanners. Notably these are: Right to privacy revelation of nudity and visibility of certain medical conditions and physical attributes; Prohibition of discrimination if screening is not applied to everyone; Freedom of religion different positions of different religions regarding nudity; 4

5 Cultural and religious diversity again different cultures have different views on nudity. Each of these rights is relative and can therefore be limited in the interest of security but the measures representing the limitation must be proportionate. Mr Nathwani asks those present to consider whether the same level of security could be achieved without scanners. A more comprehensive opinion paper on the scanner issue is available on the FRA website: Mr Giovanni BUTTARELLI, Assistant Supervisor, European Data Protection Supervisor His office supports a European approach to body scanners as long as they are shown to be necessary. This should first be assessed in a global context, considering all other possible measures. Mr Buttarelli considers that the use of scanners will not guarantee security by itself and says that he would prefer less-intrusive measures, questioning why these are not suitable or whether they have not been properly implemented. Passing through airport security can be a humiliating experience, and scanners have a significant potential to be privacy and dignity intrusive. At the same time, it cannot be said that the use of scanners is contrary to EU privacy law. 'Privacy by design' must be integrated into every instance of their use, whether this is assured by remote operators or automatic detection algorithms. Privacy is a precondition for the exercise of many other fundamental rights. Consent does not justify a measure for which there is no legal basis. If the alternative to passing through the scanner is waiting in a longer line and being made to look or feel like a criminal, this is not real consent. An Opinion from 2009 on this issue can be found on the office's website. Professor Douwe KORFF, Digital Civil Rights in Europe The potential use of scanners affects many fundamental rights. Building on the point made by Mr Nathwani, Professor Korff stated that the right to non-discrimination is not relative and cannot be limited. He is concerned about the term 'security scanners': body scanners can be acceptable, but 'security scanners' includes hostile intent and nervousness detection machines that are currently being developed in the United States. The use of such machines should not be allowed in the EU as they will lead inherently to discrimination against marginal groups. More information on the medical aspects of body scanners is required. Citizens' fears about medical risks must be taken seriously. He also addresses the prospect of possible variations in staff training and practices between airports: will passengers receive a higher dose of radiation in airport A than in airport B? There must be a privacy assessment and stringent monitoring to guarantee that the use of scanners is developed in a way that is compatible with fundamental rights. Professor Korff believes that body scanners can be developed in this way and that all stakeholders should work together to achieve this goal. 5

6 From the General Debate The Rapporteur for the opinion on this subject in the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament, Judith Sargentini (Greens/European Free Alliance)reminds that scanners will not only be used at airports. Metal detectors are not currently limited to airports, but form part of security arrangements in European institutions, for example. She further states that there it is her belief that there will never be European legislation allowing X-ray technology in body scanners. The following points were made by EESC members: If scanners are introduced but their use is not compulsory, what is the effect on overall aviation security in Europe (terrorists will surely choose to board flights at security 'weak points')? What implications will this have for aspirations of 'one-stop security'? Moreover, what will be the effect on security if passengers can opt-out? Can scanners 'see' inside the body? Terrorists may carry explosives inside their bodies. How will these be detected? Given the cumulative effect of radiation, what are the implications for frequent flyers and those already exposed to radiation in other settings? The panel responds to these questions as follows: Mr Louwerse The equipment used at Schiphol emits no radiation, and there are therefore no health issues. Their scanners detect all prohibited articles on the body. He is against national opt-outs as terrorists should not be allowed to choose the least effective security procedures. We must remain practical as we discharge our duty to arrange secure flights. Arrangements will never be the same everywhere but we should allow the use of scanners if they are safe and respectful of rights. Perhaps we do not even need to call them body scanners if the name is unpopular but we must be practical. Ms Fusco It is up to the member states to decide whether to use scanners and how to control their use. It would not be proportionate to impose their use on all member states and airports. In terms of opt-out, this situation is evolving and could change at any time. Mr Damilakis Regular business travellers may be exposed to less than half the radiation per year that airline pilots receive. Airline pilots' risk of cancer is very low. Background radiation and doses received from medical procedures are not included in these figures. Mr Voorbach Flying must be safe, but it must also be safe health-wise and any increase in cancer risk should be avoided if scanners are not effective. 6

7 Privacy is very important, but if the system is proven not to damage passengers' health and does not show body images, how is this different from metal detectors? The example of a passenger with a metal pin in his/her leg illustrates this point. Mr Nathwani Passengers' ability to choose would make the use of scanners more proportionate and therefore more acceptable from a fundamental rights point of view. Professor Korff Serious studies into scanners' effectiveness are required by people who have no conflict of interest. The problem is however that often for supposedly commercial and security reasons information will not be disclosed. Thought must also be given to the difference between laboratory performance and live performance of technology and systems. We should remember that intelligence by some states is gathered in a questionable manner. This makes sharing problematic. He accepts that there are reasonable ways to profile passengers but this must be done very carefully. Mr Fazackerley As airport operators, our vision must be that as long as individuals are not carrying prohibited articles, they come to the airport, simply put their bags through and walk through. Scanners can be a part of this, and Manchester Airport thinks that they will.in the end, passengers and customers will decide. No detection effectiveness tests or radiation tests have so far been undertaken on their scanners as the European Commission has the role of technical testing. But there have been tests that showed detection improvements when compared to 'patdown' searches. Mr Buttarelli Work must be done to reinforce consent; simply working on opt-out options is not satisfactory. Full information about passengers' options must be available. Simply having a default option (to pass through the scanner) and opt-out options is not sufficient. There must also be no negative impact of saying 'no'. Consent must be given freely; it can only ever be a positive action to give consent. There will be problems regarding data protection if a legal framework that includes proportionality and necessity tests as well as concerns over information processing is not created for the use of body scanners. Mr Gamba Reacting to the methods used in the last serious terrorist incident leads us to miss the bigger picture about what we want for sustainable security. Better technology can be one component of this, while other parts of the picture include profiling, intelligence and information sharing. This was key to solving the recent cargo security problems, but the different methods must all be used in conjunction with each other. 7

8 Conclusions by the Rapporteur, Mr Bernardo HERNANDEZ BATALLER The Rapporteur states that there has not been enough public debate on this issue, and there was a need to go further into the topic. Today's debate has shown that the question of security scanners is composed of many layers and can have serious impacts upon human and citizen rights. He continues by saying that there will always be some sort of conflict between security and civil rights. But we need to have a European legal framework ensuring that in case of doubt we proceed cautiously. The Rapporteur concludes by warmly thanking all participants for their input. 8

9 Annex: agenda of the public hearing European Economic and Social Committee PUBLIC HEARING on the "Use of security scanners at EU airports" Brussels, Tuesday11 th of January 2011 Venue: EESC, JDE 62 conference room 6th floor rue Belliard Brussels Programme 9:00 9:30 Registration of the participants 9:30 9:35 Welcome by the Chairman of the study group, Mr André MORDANT (Group II Employees, Belgium) 9:35-9:40 Presentation of the COM(2010) 311 on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports by Ms Claudia FUSCO, European Commission 9:40-9:50 Mr Jörg LEICHTFRIED, Shadow Rapporteur for COM(2010) 311, European Parliament, S&D Group 9:50-10:00 Ms Nathalie GRIESBECK, Member of the European Parliament, 10:00 11:30 Panel debate Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Mr Ron LOUWERSE, Director for Safety, Security & Environment, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport Mr Mike FAZACKERLEY, Product Director, Manchester Airport Mr Fabio GAMBA, Deputy Secretary General, Association of European Airlines (AEA) Mr Nico VOORBACH, IFALPA (International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Association) Security Committee Chairman, European Cockpit Association (ECA) Prof. John DAMILAKIS, European Society of Radiology Mr Niraj NATHWANI, Programme Manager, Freedoms and Justice Department, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Mr Giovanni BUTTARELLI, Assistant Supervisor, European Data Protection Supervisor 11:30-12:50 General debate Prof. Douwe KORFF, Digital Civil Rights in Europe 12:50 13:00 Conclusions by the Rapporteur, Mr Bernardo HERNANDEZ BATALLER 9

10 (Group III Various interests, Spain) Interpreting will be available from FR/EN/ES/PL/BG into FR/EN/ES. 10