BACKGROUND CHECKS & INSIDER THREATS. Anton Olivier : Border Police

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2 BACKGROUND CHECKS & INSIDER THREATS Anton Olivier : Border Police

3 Anton Olivier 34 Yrs Policing Service 26 Yrs Commission Officer 2 x GM Award recipient (ACSA) FOUNDATIONS

4 THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VALUES & ETHICS

5 SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLICING SAPS with a clear and critical role in the NASP The work of policing demands maximum cooperation with stakeholders and Government departments Departments represented or operational at the airport Dept of Home Affairs Dept of Defence Dept of Agriculture & Fisheries Dept of Transport Dept of State Security Dept of Environment DIRCO SARS Dept of Health Dept of Communications Dept of Energy Dept of Tourism Dept of Public Enterprise Dept of Public Works Tourism Board Traffic Police

6 SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLICING KEY AGENCIES SACAA Regulatory agency Standards Practices NASP/LASC Reporting of Acts of Unlawful Interference Implementation and compliance to Annex 17 ACSA - Specific Aviation security arrangements as per NASP - Infrastructure& coordination of Aviation security role players

7 AIRPORT COMMITTEES OF NOTE Security at an airport is coordinated through various statutory committees which include among others: Local Airport Security Committee (LASC) Chaired by ACSA Security Joint Planning Committee(JPC) chaired by ACSA(Landlord) Joint Operational Coordinating Committee (JOCOM) Chaired by SAPS. Such collective functioning and approach plays a pivotal role in all measures put in place to counter insider threat in the environment.

8 SECURITY APPRECIATION & CONSIDERATIONS SAPS Border Police in its strategy had to consider: SAPS have a command and control responsibility during security related incidents and operations SAPS have a directing and managing responsibility during security related incidents and operations Irrespective of other security deployments SAPS operate in various critical areas

9 SECURITY APPRECIATION & CONSIDERATIONS SAPS Border Police in its strategy had to consider: Acknowledge the presence of both long term and short term security contracts taking care of a variety of safeguarding and processes A Variety of airlines utilising contract security to secure their aircraft and processes SAPS had to keep cognisance of their mandate pertaining to the illegal movement of goods and people

10 RECRUITMENT SAPS is present and deployed at airports that have international status. Categories due to their status - commercial values. The busier the airport, the higher the number of personnel is deployed. Police members recruited to be assigned with border policing functions are recruited by the broader SAPS and are subjected to security screening that includes their previous backgrounds; this recruitment will also include the minimum requirement on educational aspects.

11 SAPS PERSONNEL PLACEMENT All SAPS members deployed at airports - Undergo an induction program The induction program is conducted in conjunction with ACSA that includes all aspects of Aviation Safety and Security. Subjected to security checks - Z204 forms Committed offences or not conforming to the standards set, are either removed from sector /permits confiscated / removed from the environment Those found to have committed grossly misconduct are dealt either departmentally or criminally.

12 SAPS STRATEGY All operational areas in the airport have been demarcated into smaller and manageable areas, and this concept has been designed to cover the whole operational area to include access points, inner perimeter control, outer perimeter, terminals, land side and parking areas.

13 SAPS DEPLOYMENT Outer Perimeter Access control Baggage makeup area Cargo Area /Warehouses CSC(Crime Prevention) Terminal Contact points Valuable Cargo Passenger movements Firearm permits Air side Sector Land side Sector OTHER SERVICES Permit application checks K9 Intelligence gathering(cig) Specialised Investigations(DPCI) Explosives Ordinance Document specialists Firearm Officers Hostage negotiators Incident Investigators Response capacity

14 SAPS PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT All members charged with the functioning at air side are subjected to the same AVOB training in which all stake holders are subjected to. Aviation Learning Program -Understanding the ICAO security standards, Annex 17 understanding the corruption concept,risks & threats Subject specialist training

15 BACKGROUND CHECK A background check is the process of looking up and compiling criminal records, commercial records and financial records of an individual or an organization.

16 BACKGROUND CHECK A background check will investigate an individual`s background based on criteria determined by their prospective or current employer. A check of an individual`s background may include previous employment, education, criminal record, credit history, vehicle and license record checks. Each type of check will reveal different information pertinent to that check and it forms part of the employment process It again becomes part of the permit process The check is limited to a criminal background check

17 ADVANCED FORMS OF BACKGROUND CHECKS & INVESTIGATIONS Banking business All forms of communication data Tracking Lifestyle Audit Advanced Linkages Polygraph Forensic Investigations Cloning

18 INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS ID number,surname and date of birth. The information that the system retrieves and displays, will determine as to what is depth the applicant will be scrutinised. The information submitted by the applicant i.e. his/her home address can also be used when scrutinising the information the systems retrieves and displays to confirm or reject criminal convictions.

19 INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS On the crim system the 1 st phase check is running by entering the applicants surname, date of birth, population group and gender. (The population group is a mandatory requirement). Again the information that the system retrieves and displays, will determine as to what is depth the applicant will be scrutinised. The information submitted by the applicant i.e. his/her home address can also be used when scrutinising the information the systems retrieves and displays to confirm or reject criminal convictions.

20 INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS THE 2 ND PHASE OF THE SEARCH IS THE APPLICANTS ID NUMBER ONLY. Often the applicants do not supply their ID numbers during their arrests. Spelling and typing errors also play a crucial role. Applicants do not always provide their given names, but nick names or street names. Regional and local spelling of names and surnames. Applicants do not always provide their correct dates of birth during arrests. False ID documents have been presented, male person with female persons ID number. ID fraud has on occasion found, the applicants ID number and/or names have been used by someone else. If necessary conduct and interview with the applicant. The police official whom is conducting the checks might have a sense which's alerts him/her to conduct an in depth scrutinising of the applicant.

21 INSIDER THREAT An insider threat is a malicious threat to an organization or industry that comes from people within the organization, such as employees, former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information concerning the organization's security, practices, data and procedures and systems In the aviation environment it alludes to the core of aviation security and safety from within

22 CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES INSIDER THREAT DETECTION APPROACH People working for or within our environments are aware of the mechanisms in place and use this knowledge to circumvent our systems There is a gap between initial background checks and the time the threat is unexpectedly materialise We need an approach to address these challenges by delivering these capabilities in an solution that does not require a long-term data analysis project. We need to know what to do when the warning signs are there Law enforcement structures historically focused on `successful` criminal prosecution We need parallel solutions to close the gap between initial background checks

23 CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES INSIDER THREAT DETECTION APPROACH We need to develop a purpose-built program that speak to the heart of the insider threat, We need to detect multi high-risk activity, access, and events(activities) in the aviation environment associated with insider threats. There should be room for Insider Risk Intelligence within the framework There is a need for visible rapid matrix indicator that can be populated to indicate potential insider risk and threat levels We need to consider a to develop a multi dimensional program that can be multi populated though suspicious activities witnessed

24 CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES ADVANTAGES It serves as an Insider threat intelligence tool to monitor, investigate and report on risks in the aviation environment It serves as a predictive threat detection(early detection) It serves as a contingency to mitigate the impact of a threat It serves as a program to close security gaps in a proactive manner It address comprehensive threat response and investigation It serves as a quantified, non-subjective threat and risk reporting tool It clean the industry / Mitigating threats It address both risk & loss management Industry Claim Credit / Earn respect

25 INSIDER THREAT CASE STUDIES Insight in to insider threat incidents: Human smuggling/facilitation Contravention of Part 108 Baggage manipulation(ctia & ORTIA) Collaboration between staff SAPS Insider threats Syndicate linkages

26 WHEN SAPS & INDUSTRY WORK TOGETHER

27 THANK YOU