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1 Chapter 1 : Auto & Automotive Trade Shows, Automobile Trade Fairs, Expos, Exhibitions Upcoming in / Get this from a library! United States-Japan auto parts trade: hearing before the Subcommittee on Innovation, Technology, and Productivity of the Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session. The measures include the following: The European Communities argues that, under the measures identified, imported automobile parts that are used in the manufacture of vehicles for sale in China are subject to charges equal to the tariffs for complete vehicles, if they are imported in excess of certain thresholds. The European Communities considers that the measures are inconsistent with: The European Communities also considers that China had nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the European Communities under the Accession Protocol, in particular para. The United States argues that the measures identified appear to penalize manufacturers for using imported auto parts in the manufacture of vehicles for sale in China. The United States considers that these measures are inconsistent with the following provisions: The United States also considers that China had nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the United States, directly or indirectly, under the cited agreements. Canada argues that the measures identified above impose different charges on vehicles manufactured in China depending on the domestic content of the automobile parts used in the manufacture, thus providing domestic manufacturers with an advantage if they use domestic parts. Canada also argues that the measure may also have an impact on foreign investments as they confer an advantage to enterprises, conditioned on the use in vehicle production of domestic instead of imported parts. China would also be applying the tariff for completed vehicles to completely-knocked down and semi-knocked down kits. The measures also seem to provide subsidies contingent upon export performance and upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Canada considers that the measures at issue are inconsistent with: On 15 September, the European Communities, the United States and Canada each requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 28 September, the DSB deferred the establishments of a panel. Subsequently, Brazil and Thailand reserved their third-party rights. On 29 January, the Director-General composed the Panel. On 16 July, the Chairman of the Panel informed the DSB that it would not be able to complete its work within six months due to the complexity of the issues presented in this case. The Panel expects to issue its final report to the parties by January On 24 January, the Chairman of the Panel informed the DSB that due to the complicated issues presented in this case, the Panel now expected to issue its final report to the parties by the end of March On 18 July, the Panel reports were circulated to Members. In light of its findings, the Panel recommended that the DSB request China to bring these inconsistent measures as listed above into conformity with its obligations under the GATT On 15 September, China notified its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the Panel reports and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel. On 15 December, the Appellate Body reports were circulated to Members. Page 1

2 Chapter 2 : Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts United States Trade Representative Item J, K (MF) Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. Shipping list no.: P. Also available in digital form on the Library of Congress Web site. President Donald Trump invoked a provision authorizing the president to restrict imports and impose unlimited tariffs on national security grounds. A person familiar with the discussions said the president has suggested seeking new tariffs up to 25 percent on automobile imports. The person spoke on condition of anonymity and was not authorized to speak about private deliberations. The move is seen as an effort to gain a bargaining chip in stalled talks with Canada and Mexico over the North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexico is the top exporter of passenger vehicles and light trucks to the U. Japanese and European automakers did not issue individual comments but some referred to Global Automakers, based in Washington, an industry group of international automakers. Thirteen, soon to be 14 companies, produced nearly 12 million cars and trucks in America last year. To our knowledge, no one is asking for this protection. This path leads inevitably to fewer choices and higher prices for cars and trucks in America," he said in a statement. Japanese officials also expressed unease about the move. Japan accounts for about 40 percent of U. Last week Japan went to the World Trade Organization to warn of possible retaliation for tariffs on steel and aluminum, which Trump imposed in March. Japan is the only major U. China is a relatively minor player in the U. In auto parts exports to the U. Critics fear other countries will retaliate with trade sanctions of their own and question whether the move would ever be effective given the lengthy review required and legal challenges ahead. Regarding EU car imports into the United States, Kaitainen said it "is very difficult to imagine it to create any sort of threat the national security. Eric Schweitzer said in a statement Thursday: Europe is also a big exporter to the U. Schweitzer said that the tariffs would cost another 6 billion euros a year. It fills me with great concern that the United States is moving steadily further away from free and fair world trade. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. The Associated Press contributed to this report. Page 2

3 Chapter 3 : US: Motor Vehicle Trade Data- Vehicle & Automotive Parts Exports/Imports - blog.quintoapp.co Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Analytics, estimated that if partners do not retaliate, a 25 percent auto tariff would boost the size of the United States economy by percent a year. The motor-vehicle manufacturing sector is the second-largest employer among all U. This gain is nowhere near what is needed to erase years of losses: The United States lost more than, direct jobs in auto parts between November and November Auto sales since the depths of the recession have increased more than twice as fast as employment in auto parts in part because of the rapid growth in auto parts imported from Chinaâ the fastest-growing source of U. Many of these subsidies are prohibited by the World trade Organization Stewart, et al. Other Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, also manipulate their currencies and have used other unfair trade policies to illegally promote sales of auto parts. In addition, Japan is one of the most closed markets in the world to auto parts from the United States due to the influence of its Kieretsu groups of auto suppliers, interlocking networks of suppliers affiliated with each of the major Japanese auto assemblers. Such unfair trade policies and actions pose a threat to future employment in the U. While the United States and its North American Free Trade Agreement partners Canada and Mexico have trade deficits with China in auto parts, Japan, Germany, and South Koreaâ countries that actively manage trade in autos and partsâ have had trade surpluses with China in auto parts in every year since In contrast to the NAFTA countries, automakers from Japan, Germany, and South Korea have continued to rely on and nurture suppliers of auto parts from their own home markets. The United States needs to learn from and emulate countries such as Germany that have effective and legal trade and industrial policies. This report documents the magnitude of employment in the U. In particular, we find: Despite recent growth, the U. Heavily subsidized auto parts from China caused the U. In, the U. The rapid growth of imports of subsidized and unfairly traded auto parts from China puts at risk every job both directly and indirectly supported by the U. Potential job losses in the states are significant. The 10 most vulnerable states as measured by total auto-parts industry employment as of are Michigan, jobs, Ohio, jobs, Indiana, jobs, Illinois 98, jobs, Tennessee 79, jobs, Texas 74, jobs, California 70, jobs, Kentucky 58, jobs, New York 58, jobs, and North Carolina 54, jobs. For some states, auto-parts jobs are a significant share of overall employment. The 10 most vulnerable states as measured by auto-parts employment as a share of total state employment in are Michigan 6. The decline of the U. Total domestic car and truck sales of U. Total sales of motor vehicles in the United States composed of domestically made vehicles and imports were stable, averaging above 16 million units per year between and ; during the recent recession, however, sales dropped precipitously. Even with the recovery of the last two years, and total sales of The combined market share of U. Employment in the U. Since the auto-parts industry follows the trends of the overall motor-vehicle sector Office of Transportation and Machinery, 9, direct employment in the U. Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand, and refer to jobs directly supported by auto-parts production. Direct employment fell to a low of, in July, when the restructuring of GM and Chrysler dramatically lowered demand for parts. The industry lost a total of, direct jobs between November and July, a decline of Between the trough in mid and November, 60, jobs were recovered, an increase of However, total employment in the auto-parts industry remained, jobs The difference is explained, in part, by the rapid growth in imports of unfairly traded auto parts from China. Growing direct threats to employment in the U. Figure B Figure B continued U. The products included in U. This list was adapted from the U. Several factors explain the rapid growth of the auto-parts trade deficit. Second, the number of foreign-owned vehicle assembly plants in the United States has grown. Production in these plants increased from 2. While foreign-owned vehicle assembly plants produced 3. These transplant facilities use a higher share of imported auto parts in their production, so as they gain production share in the United States, auto-parts trade deficits tend to rise. This has deleterious effects on U. Department of Commerce notes that over the past 14 years, the number of workers in foreign-owned transplant facilities relative to U. A third factor contributing to the U. While exports of auto parts support domestic jobs, imports displace them. On balance, large and growing trade deficits in autos and auto parts are responsible for a substantial share of the auto-parts jobs lost in the past decade Scott a, 8. Figure Page 3

4 C provides a breakdown of the U. The countries responsible for the vast bulk of the U. Figure C Figure C continued U. Threats posed by imports of unfairly traded Chinese auto parts U. While trade deficits with all countries fell in, a more appropriate comparison is to examine changes in trade since the year leading up to the recession, Many of the subsidies China has provided to its auto and auto-parts industries violate its obligations to the WTO Stewart et al. In addition, China has imposed performance requirements on foreign investors, requiring them to transfer technology to local joint-venture partners; discriminated against imported goods; and imposed restrictions on the exports of rare-earth minerals and other critical raw materialsâ giving an unfair advantage to its domestic auto-parts producers. Klier and Rubenstein, 4 examined trends in U. Low-wage countries gained 25 percentage points in their share of total U. Additionally, total auto-parts imports as a share of material costs in light-vehicle assembly increased from 29 percent to 36 percent between and alone. It is important to recognize that simple measurement of the nominal dollar value of Chinese auto parts may underestimate their impact on U. If auto parts from China displace domestic goods or even auto parts from higher-cost trading partners such as Canada or Germany that have a much higher unit value, then trade flows will underestimate the impact of Chinese imports on the domestic auto industry. In, China became the fourth-largest exporter of auto parts in the world after Germany, the United States, and Japan Office of Transportation and Machinery, Table 9. Thus, except for trade in tires, the rest of the world had a substantial trade surplus in auto parts with China for most of the past decade. However, during this same period, China has maintained large and growing trade surpluses in auto parts with and without tires with the United States. Contrasting outcomes from managed trade in auto parts Due to its rapid increase in auto-parts exports, China has grown to play a major role as a supplier of parts for vehicles assembled in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. EPI analysis of data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database United Nations China, however, does not demand the same type of performance from its trade with Asian and European countries, many of which have employed managed-trade approaches and active industrial policies. Auto-parts deficits between China and its managed-trade partners have persisted since at least, as shown in Figure F. South Korea has also sustained trade surpluses, with the exception of a brief downturn in EPI analysis of data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database United Nations Auto suppliers from managed-trade countriesâ particularly Germany, Japan, and South Koreaâ place a high priority on maintaining employment in their domestic motor-vehicle sector, in part as a reflection of stakeholder relationships and of differences in the institutional governing structures of their private manufacturing corporations. The United States should, however, confront currency manipulation and illegal trade barriers wherever they occur, especially in auto parts, because of the large number of jobs at risk. German firms provide an alternative, positive example of supporting domestic manufacturers. German automakers have prospered despite paying high wages and providing excellent benefits to their workers. Additionally, Germany has a highly developed school-to-work job training system for non-college-educated workers that is much more effective than U. As a result, over the past decade Germany has maintained a large and growing trade surplus even relative to low-wage countries outside the eurozone. Furthermore, it has maintained its competitiveness in world export markets, and its exports are dominated by autos and other high-value, durable manufactured goods. This contrasts sharply with the U. Between and, the United States lost, jobs a decline of Job losses in auto parts and tire production were responsible for the vast majority of U. The advantages enjoyed by managed-trade countries are particularly apparent when contrasting U. With Germany that ratio exceeded percent; South Korea, more than percent; and Japanâ one of the most closed markets in the worldâ more than 1, percent. At the same time, the United States had a trade surplus in auto parts with Canada, with exports that were nearly twice as large as imports despite the fact that the United States had an overall trade deficit in vehicles and parts with Canada in Job-loss risks for every state In, 1,, jobs were supported directly or indirectly by the auto-parts industry formally known as the motor-vehicle parts and tire industries, report Hill, Menk, and Cooper The rapid growth of imports from China puts these jobs at risk. Tables 1, 2, and 3 list the total number of jobs directly and indirectly supported by the U. Table 1 ranks the states by the total number of jobs supported by the industry; Table 2 ranks states by the share of total state employment accounted for by the industry; and Table 3 lists the states alphabetically and provides the total Page 4

5 number of auto-parts jobs in each state. As shown in Table 1, the 10 most vulnerable states as measured by total auto-parts industry employment in are Michigan, jobs, Ohio, jobs, Indiana, jobs, Illinois 98, jobs, Tennessee 79, jobs, Texas 74, jobs, California 70, jobs, Kentucky 58, jobs, New York 58, jobs, and North Carolina 54, jobs. Table 2 shows that the 10 most at-risk states, as measured by auto-parts employment as a share of total state employment in, are Michigan 6. The jobs reported in the tables include both jobs directly supported by the auto-parts industry, and jobs indirectly supported by the industry for example, jobs that it supports in related industries such as steel, aluminum, plastics, electronics, accounting, engineering, and other manufacturing, service, and commodity-providing industries. As a result, all 1. These countries emphasize balanced growth designed to maximize employment, output, and innovation at homeâ and they are not falling prey to the same job losses in the auto-parts industry as the United States, which lost, auto-parts jobs between November and November In short, these other countries face the same unfair trade practices emanating from China but appear to be doing a much better job of dealing with them. Some countries, such as Japan and South Korea, have responded with unfair trade policies that should be confronted by the United States. Germany, on the other hand, has successfully used industrial and labor market policies to better manage its trade with China and the world, which suggests that the United States has significant room for improvement in the development of more-effective policies to support the manufacturing sector. The most important first steps are to fight unfair currency manipulation Scott b and illegal subsidies and other unfair trade barriers erected by China and other countries. Our definition of the auto-parts industry for international trade purposes is composed of electrical and electronic equipment, parts, engines, tires, belts, seats, clocks for vehicles, and speed indicators. All trade data reported in Figures B through F are in nominal not price- or inflation-adjusted dollars. Also notable is the inclusion of tires in our analysis. We include four six-digit codes for tires, which include tires for personal vehicles, buses, and new tires with and without Herring-bone tread. We include motor cars; vehicles used to transport people, such as station wagons; public transit vehicles; motor vehicles used to transport goods; and fire-fighting vehicles. These countries are chosen because they have the highest volume of auto-parts trade with the United States and best demonstrate the relationships between the United States and the rest of the world in this sector. Page 5

6 Chapter 4 : United Arab Emirates - Automotive blog.quintoapp.com Furthermore, there is a sharp contrast between the impacts of China's practices on the auto-parts industry in the United States, and how they affect the auto-parts industries in countries that manage their trade, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. This update to the rules of origin will provide greater incentives to source goods and materials in the United States and North America. Increasing Regional Value Content Rule This deal encourages United States manufacturing and regional economic growth by requiring that 75 percent of auto content be made in North America. Help to incentivize up to billions annually Help to preserve and re-shore vehicle and parts production in the United States. Transform supply chains to use more United States content, especially content that is key to future automobile production and high-paying jobs. Close gaps in the current NAFTA agreement that incentivized low wages in automobile and parts production. Support better jobs for United States producers and workers by requiring that a significant portion of vehicle content be made with high-wage labor. Ensure that United States producers and workers are able to compete on an even playing field, and incentivize new vehicle and parts investments in the United States. Encourage more investment by auto companies in research and development in the region. This includes new cooperation and enforcement provisions that help to prevent duty evasion before it happens. The new rules will help ensure that only producers using sufficient and significant North American parts and materials receive preferential tariff benefits. Specifically, the Market Access chapter: Maintains duty-free treatment for originating goods. Maintains the prohibition on export duties, taxes, and other charges and the waiver of specific customs processing fees. Adds new provisions for transparency in import licensing and export licensing procedures. Prohibits Parties from applying: Updates provisions for duty-free temporary admission of goods to cover shipping containers or other substantial holders used in the shipment of goods. TEXTILES The new provisions on textiles incentivize greater North American production in textiles and apparel trade, strengthen customs enforcement, and facilitate broader consultation and cooperation among the Parties on issues related to textiles and apparel trade. Promote greater use of Made-in-the-USA fibers, yarns, and fabrics by: Requiring that sewing thread, pocketing fabric, narrow elastic bands, and coated fabric, when incorporated in most apparel and other finished products, be made in the region for those finished products to qualify for trade benefits. Establish a Textiles chapter for North American trade, including textile-specific verification and customs cooperation provisions that provide new tools for strengthening customs enforcement and preventing fraud and circumvention in this important sector. Page 6

7 Chapter 5 : Automotive Parts Exports by Country United States/Japan auto parts trade: hearing before the Subcommittee on Innovation, Technology, and Productivity of the Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, first [i.e. second] session, on United States/Japan auto parts trade, April 20, Export policies[ edit ] For many years, export promotion was a large issue in Japanese government policy. Government officials recognized that Japan needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed to generate exports to pay for those imports. After, Japan had difficulty exporting enough to pay for its imports until the mids, and resulting deficits were the justification for export promotion programs and import restrictions. Nations grow stronger economically by moving up the industrial ladder to produce products with greater value added to the basic inputs. Rather than letting markets accomplish this movement on their own, the Japanese government felt the economy should be guided in this direction through industrial policy. The first was to develop world-class industries that can initially substitute for imports and then compete in international markets. The second was to provide incentives for firms to export. During the first two decades after World War II, export incentives took the form of a combination of tax relief and government assistance to build export industries. After joining the International Monetary Fund IMF in, however, Japan had to drop its major export incentive â the total exemption of export income from taxes â to comply with IMF procedures. It did maintain into the s, however, special tax treatment of costs for market development and export promotion. Once chronic trade deficits came to an end in the mids, the need for export promotion policies diminished. Virtually all export tax incentives were eliminated over the course of the s. Even JETRO, whose initial function is to assist smaller firms with overseas marketing, saw its role shift toward import promotion and other activities. In the s, Japan continued to use industrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated industries, but direct export promotion measures were no longer part of the policy package. The s and s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in certain industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries created a backlash in other countries, either because of their success per se or because of allegations of unfair competitive practices. Quotas violate the guidelines, and raising tariffs goes against the general trend among industrial nations. Instead, they have resorted to convincing the exporting country to "voluntarily" restrain exports of the offending product. In the s, Japan was quite willing to carry out such export restraints. Postwar era[ edit ] Japan began the postwar period with heavy import barriers. Virtually all products were subject to government quotas, many faced high tariffs, and MITI had authority over the allocation of the foreign exchange that companies needed to pay for any import. Beginning in the s, the government adopted a policy of gradual trade liberalization, easing import quotas, reducing tariff rates, freeing transactions in foreign exchange, and admitting foreign capital into Japanese industries, which continued through the s. The main impetus for change throughout has been international obligation, that is, response to foreign, rather than domestic, pressure. Japan has been a participant in the major rounds of tariffcutting negotiations under the GATT framework â the Kennedy Round completed in, the Tokyo Round completed in, and the Uruguay Round completed in As a result of these agreements, tariffs in Japan fell to a low level on average. Upon complete implementation of the Tokyo Round agreement, Japan had the lowest average tariff level among industrial countriesâ 2. From items under quota in, Japan had only twenty-seven items under quota in the mids, and that number dropped again late in the decade to twenty-two with further agreements scheduled to come into effect in the early s, which would reduce the number again. But those products still under quota proved to be highly visible and were the object of complaints by exporting countries. In addition, heavy pressure from the United States led to an agreement that Japan would end import quotas on beef and citrus fruit in The one restricted product that continues to prompt objections from other countries is rice, imports of which until were prohibited. Rice has traditionally been the mainstay of the Japanese diet, and farm organizations played upon the deep cultural importance as a reason for prohibiting imports. Farm organizations also had a disproportionate political voice because of the shift of the population to the cities without any significant redistricting for seats in the Diet. Many complaints revolved around Page 7

8 non-tariff barriers other than quotas â standards, testing procedures, government procurement, and other policy that could be used to restrain imports. These barriers, by their very nature, were often difficult to document, but complaints were frequent. In the United States government initiated intensive talks with Japan on four product areas: The negotiations lasted throughout and achieved modest success. Supporting the view that Japanese markets remained difficult to penetrate, statistics showed that the level of manufactured imports in Japan as a share of the gross national product GNP was still far below the level in other developed countries during the s. Under the "Super " provision, nations were to be named as unfair trading partners and specific products chosen for negotiation, as appropriate, with retaliation against the exports of these nations should negotiations fail to provide satisfactory results. Japan was named an unfair trading nation in, and negotiations began on forest products, supercomputers, and telecommunications satellites. By the end of the s, however, some internally generated changes in import policy appeared to be under way in Japan. The rapid appreciation of the yen after, which made imports more attractive, stimulated a domestic debate over nontariff barriers and other structural features of the economy impeding imports. Greater openness in policies and structures began to be sought in response to domestic pressures rather than in response to foreign pressure and international obligation. External pressure for change also increased when the United States initiated a series of bilateral talks in parallel to negotiations under the "Super " provision. These new talks, known as the Structural Impediments Initiative, focused on structural features in Japan that seemed to impede imports in ways outside the normal scope of trade negotiations. Issues raised in the Structural Impediments Initiative, and by the Japanese themselves in domestic discussions, included the distribution system in which manufacturers continued to have unusually strong control over wholesalers and retailers handling their products, inhibiting newcomers, especially foreign ones and investment behavior that made it very difficult for foreign firms to acquire Japanese firms such as that of the management of Koito Mfg. Boone Pickens despite the fact that he had become the majority stockholder. These discussions highlighted some of the fundamental differences in the Japanese and United States economies. Pressure to raise imports peaked in the late s and early s when the US pushed for quantitative targets for more imports in semiconductors, autos and auto parts. In general, these policies tended to have negative welfare effects and usually higher prices in theory Greaney, and in practice Dick, or little effect at all Parsons, Discount markets opened the distribution chains, and several companies turned to foreign trade and investment to avoid losses and even bankruptcy. Products of Japanese companies that were manufactured in South-Asian countries were reimported at lower prices. The Japanese consumer also changed: Economic problems forced many Japanese to look for cheap prices first and care about national pride or superior quality later. This proclamation raised an unusual controversy among Japanese, not only those policy people and media people, but among wide range of people in industry, agriculture, medicine and even writers. The controversy continued until prime minister Noda decided that the Government would start to negotiate with TPP countries on November 11, Mass media stopped covering the question on a daily basis but the opposition movements continued. Noda revealed that he will not discuss TPP question at the coming talk with U. President Obama on April In theory, the economy would be left to the management of the Japanese government. In practice however, the economy was largely influenced by the Occupation policies of the Allied Powers. During the early phase of post-war Japan, private foreign trade had been prohibited by SCAP, and all trade was state conducted. Imports were only allowed when they were judged to be indispensable to the sustenance of the Japanese economy. Trade was still heavily regulated; as a foreign buyer would need to submit a purchase and sale agreement, and the Japanese exporter also needed to file an application to the Board of Trade, which would then be forwarded to SCAP for final approval. Over these decades, both the composition and the reputation of products from Japan changed profoundly. Because of the success of certain exports, Japan is often viewed as a heavily export-dependent nation. As an example, just under half of all automobiles produced in Japan were exported. The growth of Japanese exports during the s and s was truly phenomenal. From to, however, export growth averaged The growth in exports can be viewed in terms of both pull and push factors. The pull came from increasing demand for Japanese products as the United States and other foreign markets grew and as trade barriers in major market countries were reduced. Another pull factor was the price competitiveness of Japanese products. This record enhanced the international price Page 8

9 competitiveness of Japanese products. During the s, Japanese export products had a reputation for poor quality. However, this image changed dramatically during the s. Japanese steel, ships, watches, television receivers, automobiles, semiconductors, and many other goods developed a reputation for being manufactured to high standards and under strict quality control. The Japanese were the acknowledged world leaders for quality and design in the s for some of these products. This rise in product quality also increased demand for Japanese exports. Many recognized that to reach efficient levels of production they needed to adopt a global approach. Manufacturers concentrated on the domestic market often protected from foreign products until they reached internationally competitive levels and domestic markets were saturated. Often helped by the large general trading companies, manufacturers aggressively attacked foreign markets when they felt able to compete globally. This push factor partially accounted for the extraordinarily high level of export growth in the s, when the domestic economy slowed; increasing exports was a way for manufacturers to continue expanding despite the more sluggish domestic market. Japanese manufacturers were part of larger conglomerates, the zaibatsu, which provided financing of activities. Thus, they could concentrate on gaining high market shares, without the need to achieve high profits in the process. Exports included a wide variety of products, virtually all of which were processed to some degree. After the war, the composition of exports shifted through technological progression. Primary products, light manufactures, and crude items, which predominated during the s, were gradually eclipsed by heavy industrial goods, complex machinery and equipment, and consumer durables, which required large capital investments and advanced technology to produce. After the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster in concerns were expressed about the safety of Japanese food exports. Factory output was also badly affected by power supply problems. In a sense, import growth over much of this period was constrained by exports, because exports generated the foreign exchange to purchase the imports. During the s, however, import growth lagged far behind exports, at an average annual rate of only 2. This low level of import growth led to the large trade surpluses that emerged in the s. In general, Japan has not imported an unusually large amount as a share of its GNP, but it has been highly dependent on imports for a variety of critical raw materials. Japan has by no means been the only industrialized nation dependent on imported raw materials, but it has depended on imports for a wider variety of materials, and often for a higher share of its needs for these materials. The long-term growth in imports was facilitated by several major factors. The most important was general growth in the Japanese economy and income levels. Rising real incomes increased demand for imports, both those consumed directly and those entering into production. Another factor was the shift in the economy toward greater reliance on imported raw materials. Primary energy sources in the late s, for example, were domestic coal and charcoal. The shift to imported oil and coal as major energy sources did not come until the late s and s. Chapter 6 : Trump's auto tariff threat sparks unease with allies, carmakers - CBS News The Trans-Pacific Partnership was unveiled Monday among the United States, Japan, Canada, Mexico and eight other nations. The tariffs on auto parts, ranging from percent to 5 percent, have. Chapter 7 : Trade policy of Japan - Wikipedia In, the market for original equipment in the United States was $ billion, up percent from, with the increase in vehicle production. Pressure was further exacerbated by global competition in the parts industry. Chapter 8 : Car parts Trade Shows in United States many U.S. and other international auto parts companies opened plants and expanded their Chinese production in order to supply the international automakers' Chinese joint ventures, and to use their operations in China to export to the global automotive OE and aftermarket, including. Page 9

10 Chapter 9 : Exclusive: Commerce head Ross wants Japan to shift more auto production to U.S. Reuters Auto & Automotive - United States trade shows, find and compare expos, trade fairs and exhibitions to go - Reviews, Ratings, Timings, Entry Ticket Fees, Schedule, Calendar, Venue, Editions, Visitors Profile, Exhibitor Information etc. List of upcoming automobile expos in United States 1. Page 10