DEVELOPING POLICE CRIME PREVENTION: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Transcription

1 DEVELOPING POLICE CRIME PREVENTION: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE VALERIE JOHNSTON JOANNA SHAPLAND PAUL WILES POLICE RESEARCH GROUP CRIME PREVENTION UNIT SERIES PAPER NO. 41 LONDON: HOME OFFICE POLICE DEPARTMENT Editor: Gloria Laycock Home Office Police Research Group 50 Queen Anne s Gate London SW1H 9AT

2 Crown Copyright 1993 First Published 1993 Crime Prevention Unit Papers The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to carry out and manage research relevant to the work of the police service and Home Office Policy Divisions. One of the major Police Department divisions which acts as customer for the PRG is the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit which was formed in 1983 to promote preventive action against crime. It has a particular responsibility to disseminate information on crime prevention topics. The object of the present series of occasional papers is to present research material in a way which should help and inform practitioners, whose work can help reduce crime. ISBN (ii)

3 Foreword The last five years have seen a considerable change in the approach the Police Service take towards crime prevention. Some forces now devote far more time to planning effective crime prevention measures and these are increasingly being incorporated into an overall crime reduction strategy combining both prevention and detection. The role of the Crime Prevention Officer (CPO) in this new order has been the subject of much discussion. It is now generally accepted by the Home Office, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) that the majority of the time of specialist crime prevention staff cannot be devoted to purely reactive tasks such as domestic security surveys and burglar alarm problems. The work of CPOs must be directed towards supporting a local strategy for crime reduction. The Home Office Police Research Group, with consultants from Sheffield University, have been working with the Metropolitan Police in Enfield to examine ways in which the work of the CPO might become more creative and proactive. With the support of senior management within the Division a transition has been accomplished moving the CPOs from a largely reactive role, little known or appreciated by most other officers, to being an integral part of the process of managing crime. By the end of the project crime prevention had become far more visible and influential, many more officers contacted CPOs for advice and crime prevention was addressed regularly at crime management meetings. The result was a greatly increased sense of status and worth amongst Crime Prevention officers and a more effective contribution from them to the work of the Division. I hope that the lessons outlined in this report will be of benefit to the many forces now undergoing or considering this type of organisational change. I M BURNS Deputy Under Secretary of State Home Office December 1992 (iii)

4 Acknowledgements This study, of course, owes its existence to the officers of the Division in which it took place. They were not only constantly helpful and co-operative, but also took a deep interest in the project and went to great trouble to ensure its success. Particular thanks are due to the Chief Superintendent, the Detective Chief Inspector and the Sergeant and Constables of the Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit. It is, however, the Crime Prevention Officers themselves who deserve the most thanks. They were always helpful and always cheerful, despite the numerous demands made on them. Thanks must also go to the staff of the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre at Stafford who provided a great deal of information and an insight into the training of Crime Prevention Officers. The Home Office Police Research Group provided both funding and partnership for the project and we would like to thank them for this, especially George Houghton who spent a great deal of time dealing with computers and computer companies. We would also like to thank the Steering Committee who provided new ideas and guidance. The Authors Valerie Johnston is Senior Research Officer, Joanna Shapland is Senior Lecturer and Paul Wiles is Professor of Criminology in the Centre for Criminological and Legal Research, Faculty of Law, The University of Sheffield (iv)

5 Contents Foreword Page iii Acknowledgements List of Figures 1. Introduction 2. The Work of the CPOs Prior to the Project The structure of crime prevention CPO work before the research began Time spent on each activity 3. Developing CPO work Pre-requisites for new CPO structures Different possible models The Organisational Initiatives 4. The Work of the CPOs at the End of the Project The structure of the crime prevention office The specialisations Types of work done More CPOs: greater quantity or greater quality of work? Devolution of crime prevention work CPOs move into the mainstream 5. The Development of Crime Prevention CPOs and the CPO team Crime prevention in the Division Organisational factors Project factors How significant was the change? The role for criminologists Specialists within the police service Annex: The Crime Prevention Design Advisors Evaluation and expansion of CPDA work Demand for CPDA advice The growth in demand Types of plans considered iv vii (v)

6 What the CPDA does Back-up Conclusion References Crime Prevention Unit Papers (vi)

7 List of figures Figure No. Caption Page 1 Crime Prevention Activities at the Beginning of the Project. 4 2 Divisional Crime Management Structure. 8 3 Crime Prevention Activities at the Beginning and End of the Project. 12 (vii)

8 1. Introduction In early 1990 three researchers at the Centre for Criminological and Legal Research of the University of Sheffield began talks with the Home Office which led to the development of a project on the Role of the Crime Prevention Officer. The Metropolitan Police expressed interest in the project early on and eventually it was decided in spring 1990 that a project would be carried out by three partners the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, the Centre for Criminological and Legal Research and the Metropolitan Police. A division of the Metropolitan Police ( Enfield ) was selected as the site for the project. The role of the Sheffield researchers was to undertake action research both to stimulate the project and to evaluate it. However, it has remained a joint project involving all three organisations. The goals of the project, as part of a more general aim of developing a new more creative and proactive role for the Crime Prevention Officer, were: to encourage the use of Crime Prevention Officers (CPOs) as consultants to police management and other agencies on all aspects of crime prevention; to develop a framework by which crime prevention might become a standard factor in police decision making about crime problems; to devise a model by which police forces might design, run and evaluate crime prevention initiatives, with the prime measure of effectiveness being to reduce crime; to test this model by implementing a series of initiatives; to initiate this change and to consolidate it within the Division so that it became routine and would continue to develop after the project finished. Two sorts of activities were encompassed within the project: (a) Crime Prevention Oriented Initiatives: to set in motion crime prevention activity and to evaluate that activity in terms of its potential for reducing crime, i.e. to test out the new structures and new ideas: (b) Organisational Initiatives: to develop, implement and evaluate organisational change in respect of the CPOs and crime prevention in the division in general. This report describes and evaluates the second set of activities, the Organisational Initiatives. Other reports in this series describe the progress of the crime prevention orientated initiatives (Johnston et al, 1992a) and the implementation for a model of designing crime prevention initiatives through crime analysis (Johnston et al, 1992b). 1

9 2. The work of the CPOs prior to the project The aim of the project was to change both the work of the Crime Prevention Officers (CPOs) and the way in which crime prevention was organised in the Division. To evaluate this, it is necessary to have a picture of crime prevention within the Division before the project started. The structure of crime prevention Within the Metropolitan Police, crime prevention falls under the general heading of Community Involvement and is administered by a unit at headquarters. This is the source for some of the materials used by CPOs on division and it also organises conferences and force training for Crime Prevention Design Advisor (CPDA) work. Within divisions, however, CPO work is organised within the CID. The project Division had three police stations. The Crime Prevention Office and thus CPOs were sited at one of these, though Divisional CID and the Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit - DIIU (computers) and the Crime Desk (CID Administration) were at another, due to a major lack of office space. There were, therefore, potential logistical problems in ensuring day-to-day contact and planning between CPOs and CID. At the time research began there were two CPOs in the Division. As divisional Crime Prevention Officers they came under the general heading of CID and reported to the Detective Chief Inspector in charge of Divisional CID. However, they were also required to work certain Saturdays as ordinary uniformed officers at football matches etc. and thus also came under the Chief Inspector Personnel and Operations for these occasions. In general, however, they were left much to themselves as regards day to day business. One of the two CPOs had trained for a year with a CPO who had since retired. He had also attended the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre at Stafford and had taken a one week course given by the Metropolitan Police on Crime Prevention Design. The other CPO was new in the job and, at the time the research commenced, had yet to take the Stafford course. CPO work before the research began The research began with an analysis of the work done by the CPOs. This was based primarily on observation, supplemented by analysis of the worksheets filled in daily by each CPO. Basically the workload of the CPOs during this period fell into the following categories: O residential surveys Q commercial/industrial surveys 2

10 l alarm problems l firearms l displays l talks l designing out crime l initiatives l crime panels l training. Most of these tasks are well known enough to those interested in crime prevention not to need detailed description here except for a few particular aspects of the work in the Division. Most surveys, both domestic and non-domestic, were done in response to a request from a member of the public, frequently after a burglary had occurred, and as a result of contact with the reporting officer. Given the similarity in house construction, advice in domestic surveys was fairly standard. Many of these interviews also required a degree of reassurance for the victim and the CPO would give further advice about personal safety etc. Problems with alarms fell into three categories - warnings, withdrawal of response and restoration to the alarm response system. Warnings were given to companies which had five false alarms in 30 days. Companies which continued to have false alarms had the police response to their alarm withdrawn. The withdrawal notice was delivered personally by the CPO, who tried in most instances to arrange a date for a reinstallation survey as soon as possible after the obligatory three months withdrawal of response. Finally CPOs were present at re-installation meetings along with representatives of the Alarms Inspectorate, the company involved and the alarm company. The procedures for alarms work were, therefore, prescribed in terms of personal attendance of a CPO and could be very time-consuming, without necessarily needing much new input by the CPO. Firearms made up a relatively small part of the daily workload. Normally firearms inquiries were handled by Home Beat Officers or the Firearms Inspector. However, the CPO might be called in to advise if the HBO had problems with storage of weapons or if several weapons were being stored. The senior of the two CPOs had been trained as a Crime Prevention Design Advisor and acted as the advisor for the Division. This involved receiving lists of planning applications and selecting sites for crime prevention advice. At the beginning of the research, the CPDA specialist generally received plans from only one of the two main councils in the Division. 3

11 As well as their general work on crime prevention within the Division, the CPOs also had to keep up their technical expertise. They received considerable numbers of brochures and letters from security and alarm companies and also occasionally attended displays and talks by private companies involved in crime prevention. Knowledge of other aspects of crime prevention came via twice yearly conferences of CPOs within the Metropolitan Police and occasional cross-border conferences with other areas and constabularies. Time spent on each activity Figure 1 provides a rough analysis of the workload of the Crime Prevention Officers over a one month period. It omits a very big omission times spent on collecting messages from the three stations, times spent daily on correspondence and phoning and much of the in-office work done by the CPDA specialist (some of this work was done out of office hours at home). In 1979 the Association of Chief Police Officers recommended a list of 68 tasks which they thought should be done by CPOs (see Weatheritt, 1986 for a summary). Of these there were some which the CPOs in the Division did not do to any great extent, or did not do at all, notably liaising on community relations and co-operating with social agencies concerned with the welfare of children and young persons (though it should be noted that there was a separate youth crime prevention panel). However, their work was not entirely concerned with physical security. A considerable amount of communication with the public involved talks, displays and meetings with a wide range of people representing both private and public concerns. In particular, it is perhaps worth mentioning that CPOs are often the main interface between police Figure 1. Crime prevention activities at the beginning of the project 4

12 and private security: a relationship which will become more valuable as the size of the private security industry grows. The description of CPO work given above indicates that both of the CPOs were kept busy responding to demands from the public and occasionally initiating preventive action or events. However, it also shows the relative isolation of crime prevention work from other forms of policing. There was little formal contact or liaison with the work being carried out by CID or uniformed officers, though there was considerable informal communication. The crime prevention activity was largely reactive, responding to the demands of the public to do surveys on residential or commercial/industrial property, or responding to the need of the service in general to try to reduce the time spent on false alarm calls. Obviously there was a demand from the public for such services. The system for policing alarms, however, had been centrally organised within the force and did not appear necessarily to be making the most effective use of the relatively scarce and expensive resource of CPOs. CPDA work, talks, displays and other initiatives were, of course, more proactive in nature. They were informed by CPOs knowledge of crime problems in the Division, but there was no systematic tie-up between crime problems and such activity. We concluded that almost all the CPO workload was justifiable and that much of it was responding to legitimate demands from the public. However, the delivery of this specialist crime prevention service was not co-ordinated with the rest of the policing service, nor was it necessarily planned to focus on the Division s main priorities for crime reduction. This is not a criticism of the CPOs there could be no such co-ordination under the then structures and systems of working. In fact, the work the CPOs were doing was relatively similar to that done in many other forces: Harvey et al. (1989) have described crime prevention as being ghettoised within policing. 5

13 3. Developing CPO work Pre-requisites for new CPO Structures The starting point for thinking about development of the CPO s role was that effective crime prevention effort in a division should be related to the overall policing priorities and crime priorities of that division. The overall model was that crime prevention activity should flow from crime analysis and informed discussion amongst those with local knowledge or knowledge about offenders/crime patterns. The key task for this project was to start to create a system in which this could he accomplished. From analysis of the existing CPO workload and crime prevention structure, all the partners in the research agreed that any new structure would need to fulfil certain pre-requisites: i. Existing CPO reactive workload could not simply be ignored. Where it stemmed from the public, major damage would be done to police-public relations if the service were withdrawn; moreover, the demand was legitimate, and if new ways were to be found to carry it out, then those would need to be in place before the public was switched to the new system. ii. Nonetheless, space had to be created for CPOs to be able to do more proactive tasks. Whilst the new initiatives were being set up, there would be a need for greater resources than when the new system was in a steady state (implementing change requires time and effort). People whose time is already full are also unlikely to be happy to contemplate change. iii. CPOs needed to be brought together with the crime analysis potential in the Division (largely situated in the DIIU). Crime problems affecting the Division had to be identified through computerised crime analysis, using variables and analyses developed during the project to highlight areas and kinds of crime which are a continuing major problem or show rising rates of incidence. iv. The resulting ideas and suggestions must be able to be fed into management decisions about operational policing and strategies for the future into senior management, into CID planning, and into planning how to tackle crime in particular beats. This must be not just a two-way process from CPO to other groups and back again, but an interactive process in which discussion about possibilities for crime prevention took place with those other officers. It implied CPO presence in relevant meetings, rather than paper communication. v. The resulting system should aim to raise the status of crime prevention and thus of CPOs from what Harvey et al. described as a sort of pre-retirement course for experienced but tired detectives (not a characterisation of our CPOs, but certainly 6

14 the national stereotype of such work) to a central task for the division as a whole. Senior management in the Division were keen to place the aim of reducing crime and reducing victims at the forefront of their strategy. This might well involve other officers becoming part of such work, and the challenge then was to see how the CPOs, as constables, could relate in such a scheme. The difficulties in creating any such change were well-known to all the partners: the problem of using specialists in policing, the difficulties of transferring expertise and communicating across rank structures in what is a very hierarchical management system, the current lowly status of CPO work and whether constables could be used in what was effectively a consultant role to senior management, and simply the problem of creating any change in policing practice. Most initiatives in policing have hardly affected the way in which policing is done. At most they create a blip of change which swiftly and thankfully returns to normality when the project finishes or the relevant senior officer moves. We wanted to attempt the seemingly impossible: to create change and then to routinise it so that it could continue to develop and mould itself to changing circumstances, hut retaining its essential characteristics. We had no high expectations that we would achieve all this within a two-year project. Different possible models We discussed a number of different models. Each had its advantages and disadvantages. We could: i. Create an entirely new specialism for the new CPO work, and leave existing CPO work to the existing CPOs. This would certainly symbolically show the new crime prevention, and might resolve the status problem, but it would create artificial distinctions between different kinds of crime prevention work and also make it very difficult for other divisions or forces to consider adopting our model if it were to prove interesting. It would just be assigning more manpower to crime prevention and starting again. ii. Give existing CPO work to other officers as far as conceivably possible, and develop the work of the existing CPOs. We thought that though there were possibilities in this approach, it would, if carried to extremes, lose the training and expertise in technical security of the CPOs and also effectively be undermining their pride in their job. However, the idea of using CPOs as a resource to train, act as advisor on difficulties, and generally supervise some crime prevention tasks to be done by other officers came out of this. If extending that expertise to the other officers would also give added value to their work, then this should be done. Whilst the scheme was starting, however, there would be an increased demand on CPOs (for training, etc.). 7

15 iii. Work with existing CPOs, but increase, at least temporarily, the manpower available, so that it was possible to create the change as well as keeping up existing work. This would have the maximum utility in terms of transferability to other divisions/forces, but would obviously put quite a strain on the existing CPOs, who would have had no idea that they would be creating a new role when they first took on the job. After considerable discussion, we decided to adopt the third model. We do not claim that this would be the best choice in any force, but, in the circumstances in our Division, it seemed the most appropriate. Initially, the Sheffield and Home Office partners in these discussions concentrated upon the role of the CPOs themselves, with some consideration of the DIIU S place. However, the senior management of the Division very quickly realised that this model of crime prevention implied not only change for CPOs, but change for the whole structure of crime prevention and crime management for the Division. To ensure that crime prevention was not only seen to be, but actually was, fully included in the structure for crime management the Division re-defined the line command structure for all crime management matters (see Figure 2). Figure 2. Divisional Crime Management Structure 8

16 As will be explained later, this system provided both management and support for the CPOs and ensured they had an input at the crime tasking meetings etc. After a short settling-in period the object of these structural changes was accepted by all parties. It was also accepted that the project should not only evaluate the role of the CPO but the role of crime prevention and the whole crime management structure. The Organisational Initiatives Five organisational initiatives were established to develop the new structure of crime prevention within the Division. These were: i. Team budding and skills development: The number of CPOs was enlarged to four, with two additional (initially untrained ) officers joining the original two. For various personnel reasons, it was decided to increase by two, rather than by the one officer deemed necessary to cope with the effects of the change. This also brought in responsibility for Neighbourhood Watch to add to CPOs responsibilities. However, having four officers made it crucial to take more formal steps to create a team, including job descriptions, and sorting out management needs (see Section 4). Equally, CPOs needed to gain additional skills relating to analysing crime patterns, co-ordinating more proactive work, etc. Not only was there a need for team building between CPOs, but also across the wider group of officers to he involved in crime prevention (this included Home Beat Officers, CID and DIIU, as well as senior management). ii. Evaluation and extension of CPDA work: CPDA work was already a major proactive aspect of crime prevention in this particular Division, due to the skills of the senior CPO. However, it was decided to examine this aspect of crime prevention in more detail [see annex for more information]. iii. Routinise crime analysis: Crime prevention activity was intended to follow priorities revealed by crime analysis and discussion. A prerequisite for such activity was therefore to improve and then routinise crime analysis for crime prevention purposes in the Division, working with the DIIU (see Johnston et al, 1992a). iv. Train other officers to do some crime prevention work: The analysis of CPO workload had led to the conclusion that there were two areas in which CPO work might profitably be devolved to other officers. One was physical surveys of residential dwellings. It was obvious that some such move was essential, since it was suspected that if the increased emphasis on crime prevention succeeded, the demand for such surveys might well increase beyond the capacity of the CPOs. In addition, it was felt that this might in fact give HBOs another skill and service they could offer to people on their beat, particularly if they were visiting recent burglary victims. However, the CPOs quite rightly were insistent that standards for such surveys should remain high, which is always a possible difficulty when services are given by 9

17 a greater number of generalists, rather than specialists. On the other hand, HBOs could tailor their advice according to their greater local knowledge of burglary offenders tactics etc. on their beat. The answer was to devise a special training course for HBOs, together with a monitoring system. A further aim was to try to reduce the demands on CPO time taken up by alarm work. However, this was centrally organised within the force and although discussions took place with headquarters no change was possible during the lifetime of the project (although changes may ensue). v. Evaluation of the new divisional crime management structure: Essentially, this involved following the progress of the new management structure devised for crime management, in relation to its implications for crime prevention. In practical terms the central pivot of the structure was the crime tasking meetings, at which crime problms were reviewed and decisions taken as to which methods to adopt and what resources to allocate. Meetings were attended and those involved were interviewed. In a sense, this initiative set the context not only for the crime prevention initiatives associated with this project but also for the way in which crime was managed across all the Division s activities. 10 I

18 4. The Work of the CPOs at the End of the Project The work of the CPOs was re-examined at the end of the project, by which time they were still not in the same station as the Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit, but did have a new, rather more central office. They had also gained an extra telephone and their own answering machine, which were heavily used, and clearly essential for proper communications. The structure of the Crime Prevention Office Changes had taken place in the crime prevention staff. Two extra CPOs had been appointed, with a Sergeant to administer the Crime Prevention Office, and they reported to a new Detective Inspector in charge of intelligence (who was also in charge of the DIIU). Within the Division as a whole, the framework within which the Crime Prevention Office operated had changed considerably and a much more structured chain of command had been developed. Crime prevention work had been split into categories and Neighbourhood Watch coordination added to the workload of the Crime Prevention Office. The new specialisation s were: CPO 1 Crime Prevention Design Advice CPO 2 Commercial/industrial surveys CPO 3 Residential surveys CPO 4 Neighbourhood Watch. Categories were not cut and dried. Officers covered for each other in case of illness and holidays. However, generally the CPOs had become specialists in individual areas rather than jacks of all trades. The specialisations i. CPDA work: The first CPO was responsible for CPDA work and Secured by Design. By the end of the project regular liaison was taking place with two local authorities. CPDA work was the subject of an organisational initiative and is described in the Annex. ii. Commercial/industrial surveys: The second CPO was in charge of industrial/commercial surveys, effectively covering all non-domestic premises, ranging from homes for the aged, to factories and workshops. He was also mainly responsible for alarm work, unless this concerned a residential dwelling. On complex surveys CPO1 and CPO2 tended to work together, as there is a fine line between CPDA work and commercial/industrial surveys if extensive changes are planned. 11

19 iii. Residential surveys: The third CPO was in charge of domestic surveys. During the course of the project Home Beat Officers had been trained to do this type of survey and the third CPO was in charge of administering this. iv. Neighbourhood Watch: The fourth CPO was in charge of handling Neighbourhood Watch and car crime initiatives. He maintained liaison with the 90 Neighbourhood Watches within the Division, generally via Home Beat Officers and NW co-ordinators. He was also responsible for providing each HBO with a list of crimes which had occurred in Watches in their beat. He obtained this list from the DIIU. v. The CPO Sergeant: The CPO Sergeant was in charge of the Crime Prevention Office. He acted as the main liaison with senior management in the Division and attended regular three-weekly tasking meetings. He also did some of the work on initiatives and supervised work in the office generally. Types of work done Much of the work was of the same type as before but the amount had increased, or the way in which it was done had changed. There were several types of work which had not been obvious during the first evaluation (see Figure 3). As before, this work measure does not take account of time spent in the office. However, for inter-agency and consultative work, such administrative activity is of considerable importance, As Harvey et al. ( 1989) comment, we can count surveys done, etc. but we must not then assume that these are the only important tasks in crime prevention. If we think, for example, of senior officers workloads, it is precisely these administrative and facilitative tasks which dominate their schedule. Much of the work involved in setting up the Crime Prevention Oriented Initiatives was also of this nature. Figure 3. Crime prevention activities at beginning and end of project 12

20 The demand for domestic surveys had increased dramatically. This was largely due to an Area operation to counteract residential burglaries, which also took place during the period of the project. The contact with residents and the survey were not, however, done by the CPO but by the HBOs. The CPO workload did not rise, therefore, as dramatically as the number of surveys. On average 170 domestic surveys were done per month during the project, of which 147 were completed by HBOs. The CPO in this instance carried out an administrative function: he collected details of all residential burglaries and sent these to the appropriate HBO administrator and received copies of the advice given by the HBO via a form, which was devised to ensure that HBOs covered all relevant matters. The CPOs were also involved in a considerable amount of new work: training sessions for probationers; co-ordinating the setting up of a new Divisional Crime Panel; arranging to set up a Crime Shop; arranging activities for Car Crime Prevention Year; the day to day running of the Vehicle Watch Scheme; setting up a Hospital Watch together with surveys of the hospital sites; and, with a school, establishing a School Crime Panel. Though it falls outside the month being studied, the CPOs had also been involved in three major new initiatives concerning domestic surveys, work on an industrial estate, and advice for people parking cars in car parks. These were sequels to the Crime Prevention Oriented Initiatives described in other reports in this series. More CPOs: greater quantity or greater quality of work? The number of CPOs had increased by two constables and a sergeant (as from 14 months into the project). To what extent had crime prevention work increased? If we compare those aspects of crime prevention work that can be easily counted (surveys etc.), then there was a doubling of days worked on crime prevention. This equated (see Figure 3 above) to a doubling of surveys of dwellings by CPOs (in addition to those done by HBOs), an increased number of surveys of commercial/industrial buildings, and a major increase in numbers of meetings, which comprised both meetings with other agencies and (to a much smaller extent) meetings with other officers. Work related to firearms remained constant, whilst alarm work went down 1. Is it the case, then, that if one increases the number of CPOs they merely perform more of the same kinds of work as before? Do the public just demand more of the same? The evidence from the project suggests that this is not primarily what happens. The increase in surveys of dwellings was partly due to the somewhat greater likelihood of the public being able to get hold of a CPO by the end of the project (due to the answering machine and efficient message taking), but mainly to the project s and the 1 The reasons for the reduction m alarm work were not related to the project s attempt to reduce such work since, as reported earlier, the project failed to modify the headquarters driven alarm reconnection policy during the period of the project and so this was the only aspect of crime prevention work in the Division which was outside the control ot the project. The number of alarm re-connection referrals from headquarters was simply less during the month monitored at the end of the project. 13

21 Area s initiatives on burglary which were planned to increase survey work. The increase in survey work, therefore, was a planned part of the five crime preventionorientated initiatives, and an Area initiative, and not just the CPOs doing more of the same in an unplanned way. More importantly, the increase in numbers of meetings and the increase in administrative work (shown in Figure 3) reflect the substantially increased role of the CPOs in energising crime preventive work by other agencies and officers. The move towards a greater number of proactive initiatives, as opposed to reacting to individual and uncoordinated requests for surveys, is not a move towards CPOs carrying out all these initiatives themselves. It is rather a move towards CPOs providing the energising spirit and the technical expertise for Divisional enterprises involving other officers, or inter-agency work. This was shown in the five crime prevention-orientated initiatives which were part of the project, but it reached much wider into what had become routine parts of CPO work. So, for example, the development of the Crime Panel widened contact with local businesses. The CPOs, via architectural liaison requests, had become involved much more with local hospitals. The Crime Prevention Shop will mean much more inter-agency work, as it is planned not only for crime prevention displays but also to host surgeries both for other branches of the police and various parts of local government. Equally, the CPOs continue to be involved in training, both of probationers, and in relation to devolution of crime prevention work to other officers. Courses have been instituted for Special Constables along the same lines as those for HBOs. Further courses will be put on in the future as HBOs and Specials are replaced. Devolution of crime prevention work The concept of using HBOs instead of CPOs to do residential surveys is not new, but it was new to the Division. How was this devolution carried out? The groundwork was laid in a presentation by the research team and the CPOs early in the project. Here HBOs were shown a crime analysis of the Division and the five crime prevention initiatives which formed a large part of the project were described. Two of the initiatives were planned to involve HBOs in residential surveys and it was hoped that they would also provide supplementary training for HBOs. The second step was to teach the HBOs to do residential surveys. A Chief Inspector and two CPOs began a series of short courses in the late spring of The course described how a survey should be done and what the HBO should look for. There was discussion and descriptions of various types of security hardware. Each group was also taken out and shown a house and a flat (loaned by a local authority) so that they could see how surveys were done in practice. They were also each given a copy of the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre booklet on domestic surveys. 14

22 Efforts were made to ensure that the quality of domestic surveys was maintained. Thus special forms were created on which the HBO could note advice given to the client. The top sheet went to the client while the second sheet was returned to the CPO in charge of residential surveys. The CPOs arranged to provide the HBOs with a list of alarm companies and other providers of security hardware from which the HBOs could supply a minimum of three names to householders. A few of the HBOs were given an early chance to practice what they had learned by doing residential surveys as part of the project s five crime prevention initiatives, but the decision to start the major Area initiative on burglary meant that many had only the training courses prior to starting surveys on a fairly large scale. Nonetheless, few problems were encountered, and satisfactory liaison was maintained between CPOs and HBOs. The increase in workload for HBOs was probably about 1096, most of which was a consequence of the Area initiative. HBOs interviewed at the end of the project felt the surveys were not too much of a problem, since they were fairly well spread out in time and were a good way to meet the public. A proactive Christmas initiative in which teams of CPOs, HBOs and Special Constables were involved was very rewarding and popular with the public. CPOs move into the mainstream Finally, the changes in the structure of crime prevention within the Division were most important. From the point of view of the Crime Prevention Office, the increase of the CPO staff to five and the appointment of a Sergeant meant that it became less of an appendage to CID and more a department in its own right. This, they feel, has meant an increase in the status of the Crime Prevention Officer. The new structure also means that the Crime Prevention Office is much better placed to be considered as a component of decision making. Divisional Tasking Group meetings are now regularly attended, usually by the CPO Sergeant. This means that he can now not only receive taskings put forward by senior management but can recommend strategies which the CPOs would like to see done. As the head of a group of experts he is in a much better position to do this than a CPO representing only himself and a colleague. We consider the organisational and structural implications of the changes in CPO work in Section 5. It is worth at this point, however, bringing in the comments of divisional senior management made in the interviews at the end of the project. They said that, before the project began, CPOs had essentially been left on their own by the police organisation, whilst the organisation got on with what was considered the main job of policing. Now, within the Division, CPOs and crime prevention had come into the mainstream. 15

23 5. The Development Of Crime Prevention The overall aim of the project was to develop a new more creative and proactive role for the Crime Prevention Officer and, through this, enhance crime prevention in the Division. The focus was, therefore, on the CPO, though it was always intended that crime prevention should attain a greater presence and moment in the work of the Division as a whole. It was realised, very early on, that effective crime prevention meant that the project would need to encompass far more than the CPOs. It is not possible to regard the CPO and his or her role in a capsule. The implications of whatever model of the CPO is adopted must be followed through in the whole geographic unit within which he or she is based. The model recommended in the report has implications for crime analysis and for the work of Home Beat Officers. It also has the potential substantially to affect the work of CID. Thus it has implications in tasking and in senior management policy planning. It also has implications for the interaction between police and other agencies and for that between police and the community. This section sets out how the role of the CPO has developed, and how the structure of crime prevention in the Division has changed. The new crime prevention has implications beyond the Division itself. It exposes the need for the dissemination of criminological expertise and evaluated crime prevention initiatives. It changes the way in which the response to crime is thought about in a division. It raises questions about the use of specialists within policing. CPOs and the CPO team At the start of the project, there were two CPOs at the end, four CPOs and a CPO sergeant (although the scope of the work had also broadened with the addition of Neighbourhood Watch). As described in Section 4, the CPOs had specialised in different kinds of work, although there was some back-up facility for each job. All CPOs are expected to answer messages, liaise with the different stations, and understand the basics of crime prevention through crime analysis, and to be able to promote initiatives in their areas and to give presentations to different external and internal audiences. It is agreed both by the CPO team and by senior management that some functional specialisation by CPOs is important. In particular, CPDA work is seen as requiring special training and expertise, since without that training/knowledge/experience, it is very difficult to offer proper advice to councils and others. However, the other functional specialisms are roles, rather than requiring specialist training additional to that given to CPOs generally. Hence it would be possible for CPOs to swap jobs periodically, to gain more experience, or in response to personnel changes. 16

24 It is not claimed that this particular functional division is the only possible one but it is a practical arrangement, which works well in both day-to-day terms of coping with both reactive and proactive workload, and in allowing expertise to develop over a manageable range of tasks. It allows a team structure to develop within a participative management strategy, and for the space to be there to develop proactive initiatives. There are some implications. One is that when personnel change there needs to be a short hand-over period between old and new staff member, so that expertise is not lost. This is, in fact, a general recommendation for the police service: it is extraordinary that there is normally no hand-over period or planned induction programme in any job, so that new post-holders are assumed to be immediately competent! There is also a possible conflict between role specialisation for CPOs and the need to liaise with more than one police station or with sectors (as in sector policing). We are sure that this conflict is far more apparent than real and that mechanisms can be developed to ensure proper liaison with all police geographical units. These include: ensuring that messages are both taken and acted upon: an answering machine system is essential; planning roles and workloads so that there is someone in the office who can give advice for some of the time the image of the Crime Prevention Office must not be that it is only populated by a ringing phone (or an answering machine)! ensuring that each station/sector team is visited periodically by a CPO who can discuss ongoing initiatives and problems and can pick up the local intelligence on what is happening in crime terms in that area. Creating a larger team has also had implications in terms of supervision. Initially, the CPOs reported to and were supervised by a Detective Inspector, who had responsibility not only for the project but also for other investigative work. He played a considerable part in setting some initiatives going and in promoting the team within the tasking meeting structure of CID and senior management (see below). However, the expansion of the team caused some difficulties with supervision. Constables were unused to reporting directly to an Inspector. Detective Inspectors were seen in that force as mainly investigators to take on big jobs, which then naturally reduced the time they had to act as, say, day-to-day project management on crime prevention. As a result, a Sergeant was appointed to head up the team of four CPOs. The CPO Sergeant was not trained as a CPO and the consensus of opinion at the end of the project was that this was not necessary. He acted as a general administrator and facilitator, manning the office, filtering and arbitrating on priorities within the team, representing the team at tasking meetings, helping out with presentations and initiatives in the community, acting as project manager, and generally attempting to co-ordinate what had become a large operation involving many different kinds of 17

25 officers. He needed to understand the whole model of crime prevention, but his skills had to be in organisation and management. Have we merely recreated the police rank structure, with an Inspector, Sergeant and four Constables? In fact, very sadly, the Inspector had to go on sick leave for an extended period six months or so before the end of the project, so leaving the Sergeant reporting directly to the Detective Chief Inspector in charge of CID. Reflecting back over the project, all ranks came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to have both Sergeant and Inspector in day-to-day operation, once the project was up and running (though both may be necessary initially). One or the other is essential, and in future, given possible changes in rank structure in the police, the Sergeant rank may be the more sensible. However, it would be possible for four Constables to report directly to an Inspector, if one were to be seen as the leader of the team. As a member of senior management said: PCs can be experts and advise others providing the right structure is in place. Or, as someone else commented: What you need is a facilitator. You don t need a DI if you ve got a Sergeant with the ear of senior management. By the end of the project, there were clear signs that the necessary team building and skills development had taken place. CPOs spoke of the team, and others referred to them as such. There were mechanists to solve the challenges others threw to them, to initiate work themselves, to assign work to the person most suitable, to resolve the niggles, and to work forward towards the goal that everyone subscribed to: making crime prevention a much more central part of the Division s reaction to crime. Through much hard work, significant progress had been made. Crime prevention in the Division By the end of the project, crime prevention had also become much more visible in the Division and much more influential. Quoting again from interviews at the end of the project: CPOs used to be men in grey suits now it s Glasnost. More people come in to ask advice. I have more contact with senior officers now than in my whole service. (CPO) The CPOs status in the eyes of the rest of the Division has gone up. Others are beginning to go to them for advice and input into the unit. (senior management) CPOs have a much higher profile than before. A lot of trainees come and ask about crime prevention and we get lots of queries prior to (promotion) boards. I m much more enthusiastic now. (CPO) 18

26 Our status has gone up. We get lots of phone calls from PCs to get advice. Now it s not seen as a soft number, because people are being trained by us it s seen as expertise. (CPO sergeant) CID now acknowledge that crime prevention is their baby. Crime detection used to be the in thing now it s changing. (senior management). What factors created this greater status for CPOs and the enhanced role for crime prevention in the Division? It is difficult to separate out the organisational factors from those due to the fact that this was a special project, with Sheffield researchers and the Home Office involved. We shall try to consider each separately, and then pose the question whether this was in fact merely due to its special project status (often referred to as a Hawthorn effect), and whether it will now wither away. Organisational factors i. The major organisational mechanism for ensuring crime prevention strategies would be considered at Divisional level was the tasking meetings. These had been running for some time before the project began, but were expanded and promoted by senior management as part of the Division s overall crime management strategy (see Figure 2). They were attended by senior management from both uniformed and CID sides (including Inspectors from each station, and the Inspector in charge of HBOs), the DIIU Sergeant, the CPO Sergeant, the Local Intelligence Officer (collator), Scenes of Crime, the Divisional Support Group and other specialist squads/branches. In these meetings, the crime problems affecting the Division were considered and strategies proposed and adopted to deal with them, including allocation of the resources necessary. Over the period of the project, these tasking meetings started to consider not just short-term strategies for dealing with crime (investigation, extra patrols, targeting etc.), but also medium and long-term strategies, including crime prevention initiatives. Slowly, crime prevention came to be seen as an integral part of crime management, and the Crime Prevention Office came to be seen as the source of ideas and expertise for this. ii. The status of CPOs has, however, also considerably been enhanced by their role in training other officers to do domestic surveys. It is this that has made them visible to HBOs and to uniformed supervisors. We must not overstate this visibility there is no doubt that uniformed shift officers out on patrol would be highly unlikely to know about CPO work or the project. However, as crime prevention initiatives are being carried out throughout the very considerable geographical area covered by the Division, more officers are becoming aware. 19