UKRAINE AT THE CROSSROADS: TOWARDS MORE UNITY OR FURTHER DISINTEGRATION?

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1 Analysis No. 242, March 2014 UKRAINE AT THE CROSSROADS: TOWARDS MORE UNITY OR FURTHER DISINTEGRATION? Kateryna Pishchikova After the turmoil of the Maidan protests, the removal of President Yanukovich and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Ukraine is undergoing profound political changes and is facing difficult challenges. Identity issues and regional dynamics in Ukraine are at the heart of its domestic politics as well as its geopolitical orientation. Although many ethno linguistic stereotypes often cited in the media do not withstand scrutiny, Ukraine is indeed diverse and pluralistic. This is both good and bad news for its future. The Maidan protests contributed greatly to forging a unifying state building agenda for Ukraine. If this agenda prevails in the post revolutionary phase, the inherent pluralism and diversity of the Ukrainian society will be the best safeguard against the centralisation of power by another autocrat. At the same time, a worrying rise of nationalistic discourses and actors as well as tensions in some regions of Ukraine may undermine the newly found sense of unity. A fractured Ukraine is also less likely to remain on the path of further democratic reform. Kateryna Pishchikova is visiting scholar at the Cornell University, Institute for European Studies, USA, and associate fellow at FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid and Brussels. ISPI The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo

2 Ukraine has been at the forefront of the international politics over the last few months. In late 2013, it made the headlines, first, with an unprecedented and largely unexpected snub of one of the most comprehensive and far-reaching agreements the EU has ever offered to a third country, and then, with the biggest pro-europe mass rally in recent history, known as the Maidan. By early March 2014, it has become an apple of discord between Russia and the West leading to the tensest confrontation since the end of the Cold War. With the Russian lightning-fast occupation and annexation of Crimea, fears of a military confrontation with a nuclear power and concerns over deterring Russia from redrawing the borders in its neighbourhood grew in many European capitals. Despite the intense diplomacy and a series of crisis responses, including sanctions against Russia, by the EU, US and UN, the future of Ukraine and its foreign policy remains unclear. Domestically, the new interim Ukrainian government has been struggling with a series of deep crises economic, political, and security. At the same time, parts of the population do not see this as a legitimate or representative government, while many protesters continue to be suspicious of its commitment to far-reaching reforms. Although the factors behind the current crisis are a multitude, a more detailed exploration of the domestic tendencies seems overdue. The inherent pluralism of the Ukrainian society can become a positive driving force for change and a safeguard against the centralisation of power. At the same time, however, growing centrifugal forces in a number of regions in Ukraine and the post-revolutionary prominence of nationalistic discourses and actors may undermine the newly found sense of unity in the country and contribute to its fracturing, political and possibly, administrative. Despite the intense diplomacy and a series of crisis responses, including sanctions against Russia, by the EU, US and UN, the future of Ukraine and its foreign policy remains unclear Growing centrifugal forces in a number of regions in Ukraine and the post revolutionary prominence of nationalistic discourses and actors may undermine the newly found sense of unity in the country and contribute to its fracturing, political, if not administrative Revisiting the regional identities in Ukraine As tensions are growing in some regions of Ukraine, a lot of data has been cited as the evidence of the country s overall propensity to fracture. Although the divisions are striking, these are not simply ethno-linguistic. Neither do they correspond to the electoral maps depicting Victor Yanukovich s victory over Yulia Tymoshenko in the presidential race of The often-cited 2001 census data on how many people identify themselves as Russian-speaking does not help us understand the complex regional identity dynamics at play inpost-revolutionary Ukraine. An obvious point that cannot be overstated, given the prevailing debate at the moment, is that in many parts of Ukraine identifying oneself as Russian-speaking does not necessarily mean identifying oneself as an ethnic Russian minority. Many families have mixed ethnic origins and speaking Russian In many parts of Ukraine identifying oneself as Russian speaking does not necessarily mean identifying oneself as an ethnic Russian minority 2

3 reflects their education and professional background. During the Soviet times, the Russification was more intense among the urban professional elites, rather than in the rural areas. For example, in Kharkiv, the second-biggest city in the north-east, while those living in the city speak Russian, the majority of those living in the province s (oblast) rural areas identify their native language as Ukrainian. Although linguists may dispute it as a dialect based on a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian (surzhyk) and not the literary Ukrainian, blurred linguistic boundaries and mixed usages seem to prevail. The fact that the 2001 census data is more than a decade old is a problem in itself. It hardly covers those Russian speakers that were born around the time of Ukraine s independence. These younger generations grew up in a Ukrainian state that was lenient to their linguistic habits at home, yet provided ample opportunities for proficiency in Ukrainian through the education and media. The result is a new generation that although still statistically insignificant is practically bilingual and whose identity is primarily based on their citizenship rather than ethnicity. For them, Moscow is a distant place on the map, not their one-time capital. Different responses to the Maidan protests in Kiev as well as to the post-revolutionary situation all point to significant differences between different provinces (oblast) within the macro-regions (east, south, center, and west). During the Maidan, attempts at occupying the regional administration buildings took place in a number of provinces that had given considerable support to Yanukovich in 2010 and his Party of Regions in 2012, including Kyrovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiyv. At the same time, when the protests spread from the capital to the regions, not all western and central cities showed the same degree of mobilisation. Different post-revolutionary mobilisation dynamics in Ukraine s three biggest cities in the east, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk, is another proof of the need to look more in detail at the diversity within the macro-regions. Clearly, a separate note on Crimea is necessary here 1. Crimean Russians (more than a half of the total population), many of whom were resettled into the peninsula after the Second World War, never identified strongly with the Ukrainian state. Not all of them are necessarily vehemently The result is a new generation that although still statistically insignificant is practically bilingual and whose identity is primarily based on their citizenship rather than ethnicity. For them, Moscow is a distant place on the map, not their one time capital Crimean Russians (more than a half of the total population), most of whom were resettled into the peninsula after the Second World War, never identified strongly with the Ukrainian state. Not all of them are necessarily vehemently pro Russian 1 All-Ukrainian 2001 census data from Crimea is as follows: Russians are 58.5%, Ukrainians 24.4%, Crimean Tatars -12.1%. At the same time, 77% claim Russian to be their mother tongue, and only 10.1% say so about Ukrainian. The Crimean Tatars consistently recognize their mother tongue as Crimean Tatar (11.4%). 3

4 pro-russian. Yet, as the events on the ground after the signature of the Russia-Crimea treaty on annexation on March 18 show, they do not oppose the re-unification with Russia, either. Indeed, the ethno-linguistic divisions in Crimea are much more clear-cut and consequential. Its ethnic Ukrainian population, mostly Russian speaking, is a minority, and its Crimean Tatar population that is also politically most mobilised, has a strong ethnic identity and an openly anti-russian attitude. Although the annexation by Russia may not be perceived as traumatic by large majorities in Crimea, it has had a profound effect on the Ukrainians in the mainland, increasing their sense of insecurity. Ukrainian population, mostly Russian speaking, is a minority, and its Crimean Tatar population that is also politically most mobilised, has a strong ethnic identity and an openly anti Russian attitude How strong is the Russian separatism in Ukraine? A number of experts have highlighted that the three-month protests and violence against peaceful activists may have forged a new discourse that united Ukrainians east and west. Indeed, deep-seated concerns about the lack of rule of law, impunity, and pervasive corruption emerged as the backbone of a unifying state-building agenda that is shared by most Ukrainians. This newly found common ground combines with rather low levels of separatism throughout the mainland Ukraine. In late 2013, only 23% of Ukrainians thought that the west and east Ukraine are so different politically, culturally, linguistically, and economically that they should split or become part of other countries. While the percentage changes for different regions, the ratio between those who see such a scenario as a possibility and those who don t is relatively similar 2. One can safely conclude that the pro-unitary Ukraine sentiment prevails throughout the country. A more recent poll conducted just before the ousting of President Yanukovich and two weeks before the Russian military incursion into and annexation of Crimea, shows that only 12.5% of Ukrainians believe that Russia and Ukraine should be united into one country, while almost 90% are against. The poll cites higher percentages of supporters for re-unification with Russia in the east and south: Donetsk (33%), Luhansk (24%), Odessa (24%), Zaporizhia (17%) and Kharkiv (15%) 3. In Crimea, not surprisingly, this result was the highest: 41%, although clearly very far from the announced results of the referendum that took place in Crimea on 16 March 4. A more recent poll conducted just before the oust of President Yanukovich and two weeks before the Russian military incursion into and annexation of Crimea, shows that only 12.5% of Ukrainians believe that Russia and Ukraine should be united into one country, while almost 90% are against 2 A Razumkov Center poll conducted on December 2013, i.e. one month after the start of the Maidan protests. 3 A poll conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on 8-18 February. 4 The official result of the referendum was the Soviet-style 97%, with 83% turn-out, in favour of Crimea becoming part of the Russian federation. Although the referendum 4

5 Interestingly, a Razumkov Center poll also shows almost 95% Ukrainians identify Ukraine as their motherland, including 88% in the south. Almost 85% define themselves as Ukrainian patriots, with numbers as high as 81% in the south and 72% in the east of the country. A number of symbolic actions, such as an initiative to speak Ukrainian in Donetsk and Russian in Lviv on a mutually agreed date, cultural projects and civic initiatives have grown around the Maidan-inspired sense of cross-regional unity. Clearly, President Putin s infamous comment that Ukraine is not a country is a view not shared by most Ukrainians. Separatist sentiments may have risen since, especially in those regions that have seen most unrest in March this year. Donetsk, the site of most numerous and violent pro-russia manifestations and the leader in pro-russian sentiment on the mainland, is possibly the next hot spot to watch closely in this respect. Two centrifugal forces are working in Ukraine at the moment that may dangerously shift the public debate from the unifying state-building agenda. One is the growing presence and visibility of the nationalist discourse in Ukrainian politics. Combined with an unprecedented prominence of the right-wing politicians in key political institutions, this discourse is increasingly divisive, especially with respect to some eastern and southern provinces. The annexation of Crimea and the risk of further Russian military aggression may also prove divisive, at least in some Ukrainian regions. At the time of writing, the regions bordering on Russia, such as Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv as well as Odessa that is sandwiched between Crimea and Russian-controlled Transnistria, struggle with the escalation of tensions, and even violence. In some cities, residents are concerned with a temporary power vacuum that raises questions of public order and security. Some of these tensions are home bred; others have been fomented from the outside. There have been reports of the increased support to the existing pro-russian groups and organisations as well as of the Russian protest tourists being bussed in for pro-moscow rallies from across the border. The effects of these and other destabilising actions, either sponsored by Russia or promoted by local pro-russian or anti-kiev stakeholders, are difficult to assess at the moment. The annexation of Crimea and the risk of further Russian military aggression may also prove divisive at least in some Ukrainian regions It remains to be seen whether and to what extent larger parts of the population can be mobilised on a separatist agenda. Many residents in the east and south regions that are closely integrated with Russia through was condemned as illegitimate by most Western states, the Venice Commission, the G7, and the UN (Russia predictably vetoed the resolution in the UN Security Council), President Putin said the results were in line with the international law and signed the treaty on annexation of Crimea with its self-proclaimed authorities on 18 March. 5

6 trade and labour migration are strongly in favour of maintaining open borders with Russia. Indeed, the majority (69%) of Ukrainians would like to maintain that status quo, and only 14,7% said in a February 2014 poll that they would not mind closed borders, visas, and customs between Ukraine and Russia. 5 It is unclear how these preferences will be distributed once the Ukrainians are forced into choosing. The fact that Russia has amassed military forces on the border with these regions adds to the potentially explosive mix. It may compel most Ukrainians, including in the east and south, to rally around the flag but it may also push more pro-russian regions, like Donetsk, in the opposite direction. The polling conducted on 7-9 March, right after the Russian de facto military occupation of Crimea, showed 83% against and only 9% in favour of the Russian military entering Ukraine. While in the west and centre Ukraine, those in favour are even fewer (4% and 3%), up to 15% in the east and south approve of the possibility that Russian military may intervene in Ukraine 6. This situation renders the task of re-establishing the trust and dialogue between these regions and Kyiv ever more urgent. The polling conducted on 7 9 March, right after the Russian de facto military occupation of Crimea, showed 83% against and only 9% in favour of the Russian military entering Ukraine The post-revolutionary crisis of representation As the concerns over Ukraine s territorial integrity loom large, one should not overlook the complexities and deficiencies of the domestic political process. The Maidan revolution and the ousting of President Yanukovich opened the door to the genuine political reform. Yet, serious concerns over representation and inclusiveness of the political process led by Kyiv, if not addressed quickly and effectively, may ruin the incipient process of democratic change. Even at the height of Maidan, only half of Ukrainians were supporting the protesters, with 50% supporting the protesters and 46% not 7. Moreover, the difference between different regions was striking, with the support peaking in the west (80%) and the centre (63%), and being low in the east (30%) and south (20%). A similar divide was observed with respect to the demands set forward by Maidan: supported by 45% and not supported by 36% 8. Even at the height of Maidan, only half of Ukrainians were supporting the protesters, with 50% supporting the protesters and 46% not 5 The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation poll conducted on 8-18 February Poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. 7 The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation poll conducted on December Interestingly, this did not translate into the support of the so-called Antimaidan movement, with only 27% Ukraine-wide supporting it, and most of its demands were not gaining much support either. 6

7 After the new interim government 9 was voted in on 27 February concerns were raised as to its inclusivity, both politically and in terms of regional representation. A recent poll shows as many as 30% of the population did not support the transfer of power from the Party of Regions to the opposition, while 22% believed such a transfer would make the situation in Ukraine worse. Too swift a take-over of major political posts by the opposition aggravates the sense of being excluded from the political process in Kyiv by sizable portions of the electorate that voted against these parties in Until this issue of representation is addressed, the regions at the heart of the former President Yanukovich s power base will continue to feel excluded and be susceptible to the anti-government propaganda. The forthcoming presidential election on May 25 provides opportunities to address this issue. There remains a risk that some regions may choose to boycott this election altogether. It is therefore imperative that the election campaign period is used to foster the cross-regional dialogue. There is also little trust in the government s commitment to far-reaching reforms. This may be unfair to the new government, given the gravity of the situation they have to deal with. Yet the risk that crisis management mode of governance prevails and deep reform is pushed aside is very tangible. The opposition s own electorate and especially the Maidan protesters have repeatedly called for a complete system reload, not just a reshuffle among familiar faces. The current Parliament was voted in October 2012 during the election that was widely condemned as unfair. Almost half of deputies still come from the pro-yanukovich camp, even if most have distanced themselves from the fugitive ex-president. Indeed, over two-thirds of Ukrainians are now in favour of an early parliamentary election 10. It has to be ensured that the new parliamentary election is truly inclusive and that it opens the political process to new actors. Implications for Ukraine s geopolitical cause Although the Maidan protests started because President Yanukovich did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, the EU integration does not seem to be the central unifying issue for the Ukrainians. Indeed, the Maidan itself quickly shifted to domestic grievances as its key demands. Despite the beautiful imagery of the Ukrainian and European flags soaring together all over Ukraine, little more than half of Ukrainians are 9 Most posts were divided between the party of Yulia Tymoshenko Batkyvshchyna and the right-wing Svoboda, both with their constituencies in the west and centre Ukraine. The third opposition party UDAR led by Klychko did not participate in the government formation. Only four Maidan activists were given modest ministerial portfolios. Only two ministers come from the east and south. 10 SOCIS poll conducted on February 24 - March Although the Maidan protests started because President Yanukovich did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, the EU integration does not seem to be the central unifying issue for the Ukrainians 7

8 in favour of closer integration with the EU, although this number represents a substantial increase in the pro-eu sentiment over the past few months. Before the events, in early 2013, the number of Ukrainians that had a clear preference for a particular form of regional integration, either with the EU or with the Russia-led Customs Union, was equal and around 30%. The numbers remained the same about two weeks before the Vilnius Summit in November 11. Ironically, pro-eu attitudes started growing when President Yanukovich himself launched a concerted pro-eu campaign in Although the number of supporters of two regional integration schemes was roughly equal, they were not distributed evenly throughout the country. In the west of the country, those pro-eu outnumbered those pro-customs Union 66% to 13%. In central Ukraine the pro-eu constituency was twice that of the pro-customs Union. In the south this ratio was reversed in favour of the Customs Union, whereas in the east the distribution mirrored that in the west with 61% supporting the Customs Union and only 15% the EU. Before the events, in early 2013, the number of Ukrainians that had clear preference for a particular form of regional integration, either with the EU or with the Russia led Customs Union, was equal and around 30% At the peak of the Maidan in January-February 2014, many previously undecided citizens seem to have swung in favour of the European integration: 55.2% support the European integration, and 44,8% - joining the Customs Union. The fact that despite the three-months EuroMaidan, there is no clear pro-eu majority needs to be taken on board, both by the central government in Kyiv and their European counterparts. Following a number of assessments, the EU has already recognised the need for a much better outreach in Eastern Partnership countries. The new Ukrainian government has to ensure that there is an inclusive cross-regional dialogue on these issues. It also seems to be the case that many Ukrainians would prefer not to be forced into choosing between the EU and Russia. Although many of those supporting greater integration with the European Union, including those in the east and south, say they are mostly attracted by the governance model and political values at the heart of it, it has to be recognized that the regions whose trade and economy are highly integrated with Russia 11 Polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in May Yanukovich government suspended the preparations for further integration with the EU and the signature of the Association Agreement on November , only one week before the EU-EaP Summit in Vilnius. Although opinions differ on whether the president was bluffing all along or was genuinely hoping to sign the agreement, he and his government were very active in promoting this agreement throughout

9 have immediate practical concerns that have to be addressed through concrete measures and targeted support. Conclusion At the moment of writing it is difficult to assess how far the Russian meddling will go in Ukraine or how viable the central government will prove to be. In trying to understand this fluid situation, we should move away from replicating old electoral maps or equating the Russian speaking population with the pro-russia population, as some sources have been doing. A more nuanced understanding of divisions within the macro-regions of west, centre, east, and south is also necessary. The picture that is emerging is the one of great pluralism, cultural and political, as well as of complex and unexpected alliances that will be driving Ukraine s future and its geopolitical orientation in the coming years. This pluralism may be Ukraine s greatest asset and a safeguard against the re-centralisation of power by another autocratic leader. It may also, however, turn into a threat to the incipient democratisation and territorial cohesion. Coupled with the growing nationalist discourse and enhanced by the sense of exclusion in some parts of the country, this complex landscape may give birth to a fractured nation. The picture that is emerging is the one of great pluralism, cultural and political, as well as of complex and unexpected alliances that will be driving Ukraine s future and its geopolitical orientation in the coming years. This pluralism may be Ukraine s greatest asset and a safeguard against the re centralisation of power by another autocratic leader Despite the pressure from Russia, these tensions have to be addressed through an inclusive political process, of which the new unifying state-building agenda has to become the centrepiece. While issues of language or geopolitical choices remain divisive, commitment to the rule of law, fighting the impunity and corruption, open and inclusive politics, transparency, and accountability is shared throughout the country. Indeed, a distinct Ukrainian identity that goes beyond ethno-linguistic divisions may be in the making. What is needed at the moment is a political process that will help strengthen it. 9