IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR, Case No. SC06-1687 Complainant, TFB Nos. 2004-11,725(13F) 2005-10,532(13F) v. 2005-10,754(13F) EDGAR CALVIN WATKINS, JR. Respondent / ANSWER BRIEF OF THE FLORIDA BAR Jodi Anderson Thompson Assistant Staff Counsel The Florida Bar 5521 West Spruce Street Suite C-49 Tampa, Florida 33607-5958 (813)875-9821 Florida Bar No. 930180
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................ i TABLE OF CITATIONS............................................ ii SYMBOLS AND REFERENCES.................................... iv STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE.................... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................... 7 ARGUMENT..................................................... 8 ISSUE: THE REFEREE CORRECTLY GRANTED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR AND CORRECTLY DENIED THE RESPONDENT S REQUEST TO RECONSIDER THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT CONCLUSION................................................... 17 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................... 17, 18 CERTIFICATION OF FONT SIZE AND STYLE....................... 19 APPENDIX.................................................... A-1 i
TABLE OF CITATIONS CASES PAGE Cinkat Transp., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 596 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). 10 Florida Bar v. Bailey, 803 So.2d 683 (Fla.2001)......................... 16 Florida Bar v. Brake, 767 So.2d 1163 (Fla.2000)......................... 16 Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 1994)...................8, 10, 13 Florida Bar v. Eubanks, 752 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1999)...................... 15 Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So.2d 725 So.2d 360 (Fla.1998).............. 16 Florida Bar v. Garland, 651 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1995)...................... 15 Florida Bar v. Kandekore, 766 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2000).................... 10 Florida Bar v. Kossow, 912 So.2d 544 (Fla. 2005)......................... 9 Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 1986).................. 8, 10, 14 Florida Bar v. Lord, 433 So.2d 983 (Fla.1983).......................... 16 Florida Bar v. Nunes, 734 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1999)......................... 9 Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1987)...................... 10 Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1996)..................... 8, 9, 15 Florida Bar v. Reed, 644 So.2d 1355 (Fla.1994)......................... 16 Goodwin v. Goodwin, 559 So.2d 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).................. 10 FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b)......................................... 8, 9, 11 ii
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540............................................. 2, 11 FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Fla. R. App. P. 9.210................................................ 5 RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR RULES OF DISCIPLINE Rule 3-4.3........................................................ 4 Rule 3-7.6(f)...................................................... 9 Rule 4-1.1........................................................ 4 Rule 4-1.3........................................................ 4 Rule 4-1.4(a)...................................................... 4 Rule 4-1.5(a)...................................................... 4 Rule 4-1.7(b)...................................................... 4 Rule 4-1.8(a)...................................................... 4 Rule 4-8.4(a)...................................................... 4 Rule 4-8.4(c)...................................................... 4 Rule 4-8.4(g)...................................................... 4 iii
SYMBOLS AND REFERENCES In this Brief, The Florida Bar will be referred to as The Florida Bar or the Bar. The Respondent, Edgar Calvin Watkins, Jr., will be referred to as Respondent. TR1 will refer to the transcript of the case management conference and hearing on The Florida Bar s Motion for Default in Supreme Court Case No. SC06-1687 held on October 18, 2006. TR2 will refer to the transcript of the sanctions hearing before the Referee in Supreme Court Case No. SC06-1687 held on January 2, 2007. RR will refer to the Report of Referee dated February 2, 2007. Rule or Rules will refer to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. iv
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE On August 22, 2006, the Florida Bar filed a three-count Complaint against Respondent. The Bar alleged in count I of its complaint that during the course of representing Roy Lee Heathcoe Respondent engaged in a conflict of interest with a client by entering into a business transaction with Mr. Heathcoe without obtaining the informed written consent of Mr. Heathcoe prior to doing so. Respondent also failed to pay the obligations due Mr. Heathcoe, and failed to assign him any enforceable interest in real property to secure the loans. In count II of its complaint, the Bar alleged that John R. Tackett paid Respondent $500 to represent him in a family law matter. Despite Mr. Tackett s numerous calls, letters, and an attempt to personally visit Respondent, Respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Tackett, failed to take action on the matter, and failed to return Mr. Tackett s fee. Respondent also failed to respond to the Bar s written inquiry and to the grievance committee. Count III of the Bar s Complaint alleged that Peter Schwarz retained Respondent to pursue a quiet title action. Mr. Schwarz paid Respondent $373 for a title insurance policy on the property. Respondent failed to procure the title insurance policy, failed to maintain communication with Mr. Schwarz, and failed to respond in writing to the Bar s written inquiry and to the grievance committee. 1
Respondent failed to file an answer to the Bar s Complaint and on September 19, 2006, the Bar filed a Motion for Default. On October 17, 2006, after the Bar filed its motion for default, Respondent sent correspondence to Bar counsel requesting an extension of time to answer the Bar s Complaint. (TR1, 3). Respondent also sent a letter to the Referee asking the Referee to accept the letter as a motion for extension to file a response to the Bar s Complaint. (TR1, 3). At the hearing on the Bar s motion to dismiss on October 18, 2006, the Bar opposed Respondent s motion for an extension of time. (TR1, 8). Respondent argued that his uncontrolled diabetes allegedly made him fuzzy in handling things until about a month prior to the hearing. (TR1, 9). The Referee denied Respondent s oral Request for an Extension of Time, reasoning that Respondent was aware that his blood sugar levels were high six weeks prior to the hearing and presented no evidence to support his position or to show that he was incapable of timely responding to the complaint or the motion for default. (TR1, 16-17). The Referee entered a default judgment against Respondent on October 18, 2006. Respondent did not file a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Instead, Respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari styled in the Supreme Court of Florida, seeking review of the Referee s order granting the Florida Bar s Motion for Default. The Respondent filed the petition in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. Initially, the clerk 2
did not forward the petition to the circuit judge serving in the appellate division because the Respondent s check for the filing fee was dishonored for insufficient funds. (RR 1). Ultimately, the Appellate Division of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court issued an Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the ground that the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. On January 2, 2007, a sanctions hearing was held in this matter. That morning, the Referee received Respondent s Motion for Continuance of Sanctions Hearing to Allow Time to Document Record Regarding Respondent s Medical Condition and Request to Reconsider the Entry of the Default Entered Herein. The Referee denied both requests, reasoning that Respondent had not presented a good faith argument or an emergency reason that had come up since the entry of the default in October. (TR2, 23). Despite the default, during the sanctions hearing the Referee did hear testimony from witnesses regarding the underlying facts. During his examination of the witnesses, Respondent was able to elicit testimony from the witnesses that was favorable to his defense. Further, the Referee did take Respondent s medical condition into consideration as a mitigating factor. On February 2, 2007, the Referee issued a Report of Referee recommending that Respondent be found guilty by clear and convincing evidence of violating the following Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: Count I: Rule 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) 3
and Rule 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may constitute a cause for discipline). Despite the default, the Referee recommended that Respondent be found not guilty of violating Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.7(b), 4-1.8(a) and 4-8.4(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, because the Court found that Mr. Heathcoe was not a client when Respondent borrowed the money from him; Count II: by clear and convincing evidence and by virtue of the default entered, of violating Rule 4-1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), Rule 4-1.4(a) (a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information), Rule 4-1.5(a) (an attorney shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee or cost), and Rule 4-8.4(g) (a lawyer shall not fail to respond, in writing, to any official inquiry by Bar counsel or a disciplinary agency when Bar counsel or the agency is conducting an investigation into the lawyer s conduct.); Count III: violating Rule 4-1.4(a) and 4-8.4(g) as described above, by virtue of the default entered. It appears that Respondent was confused or unaware of the proper procedure by which to appeal the Report of Referee. On or about April 3, 2007, Respondent filed a copy of a Petition for Review and subsequently filed the original petition on April 11, 2007. On or about May 3, 2007, Respondent filed a copy of a Motion for 4
Extension of Time to file his Initial Brief on the Merits. The Court issued an order on May 22, 2007, directing Respondent to file the original motion on or before June 1, 2007. Respondent filed the original motion on June 5, 2007. On or about May 23, 2007, Respondent filed his Initial Brief on the Merits, which the Court determined contained incorrect page numbering, no conclusion, no certificate of compliance, only three copies were filed and the brief was not e-filed. As a result, on June 7, 2007, the Court issued an Order striking Respondent s brief for noncompliance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210. The Order additionally directed Respondent to file an original and seven copies of an amended initial brief in proper form and electronically on or before June 27, 2007. Respondent failed to comply with the Court s order. On July 3, 2007, the Court issued an Order of Dismissal for Failure to Comply. The Court directed that Respondent s failure to file a proper amended initial brief on the merits in accordance with the Court s prior order, by July 18, 2007, could result in dismissal of Respondent s Petition for Review and approval of the Referee s recommendation. On July 19, 2007, Respondent filed his Amended Initial Brief on the Merits. The docket notation indicated that the brief was filed one day late, the certificate of service was not dated, and the brief was not e-filed. On August 6, 2007, Respondent filed a Motion to Accept Brief as Timely Filed. On August 6, 2007 5
Respondent s Amended Initial Brief was filed as Respondents Corrected and Amended Initial Brief, with a notation in the case docket that the e-mail was not in the proper format and that another e-mail was requested from Respondent on August 9, 2007. On August 22, 2007, the Court issued an Order granting Respondent s Motion to Accept Brief as Timely Filed. The Court also issued an order allowing Respondent until September 4, 2007 to submit an electronic version of his brief. 6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Contrary to Respondent s assertions, Respondent had ample time to respond to the Bar s Complaint. Respondent demonstrated throughout the proceedings that he lacked knowledge of rules and procedures of the Bar; continued to suffer diminished capacity, and simply chose to ignore the proceedings. The Referee correctly entered a default against Respondent after he failed to answer the Bar s complaint. Respondent failed to show excusable neglect for failing to timely answer the complaint and failing to timely file a motion to vacate the default. Respondent also failed to show that he had meritorious defenses to the complaint or good cause for a continuance of the sanctions hearing. As a result, it was within the Referee s discretion to deny Respondent s attempt to file a motion to vacate the default and to deny Respondent s last minute request for a continuance of the sanctions hearing. Accordingly, The Florida Bar respectfully requests that this Court approve the Referee s findings of fact and impose the recommended sanction of a 91 day suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of proper control of diabetic condition; professionalism workshop; and taxation of costs in the amount of $4,909.00. 7
ARGUMENT ISSUE: THE REFEREE CORRECTLY GRANTED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR AND CORRECTLY DENIED THE RESPONDENT S REQUEST TO RECONSIDER THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT The Bar would first note that Respondent s Corrected and Amended Initial Brief lacks any legal citation supporting his position. As discussed below, the law supports the Referee s issuance of a default judgment in this case and denial of Respondent s request to vacate the default. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a disciplinary proceeding, it is within the sound discretion of the referee to grant or deny a motion for default or a motion for continuance. Such a ruling will not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion. Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So.2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 1994); Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So.2d 1165, 1167-68 (Fla. 1986). A default properly entered pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) provides a referee with competent, substantial evidence upon which to base the referee's findings. Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So.2d 810, 813 (Fla. 1996). A referee s findings of fact are presumed correct unless clearly lacking in evidentiary support. Porter, at 813. If the referee s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, then this Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the referee. Id. 8
As to discipline, although a referee's recommendation is persuasive, this Court does not pay the same deference to this recommendation as it does to the guilt recommendation because this Court has the ultimate responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction. Florida Bar v. Kossow, 912 So.2d 544, 546 (Fla. 2005). Generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess a referee's recommended discipline as long as that discipline has a reasonable basis in existing case law or in the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Id. B. LAW AND ARGUMENT In a disciplinary proceeding, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the extent not inconsistent with the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.6(f). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) empowered the Referee to enter a default against Respondent, who failed to plead or defend this attorney disciplinary action. Florida Bar v. Nunes, 734 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1996). The Referee was also correct in refusing to vacate the default judgment. For a trial court to grant a motion to set aside a default final judgment, the moving party must show three things: (1) the failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of excusable neglect; (2) the moving party has a meritorious defense; and (3) the moving party acted with due diligence in seeking relief from the default. Cinkat 9
Transp., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 596 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 559 So.2d 109, 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). As set out in detail below, Respondent failed to meet his burden to vacate the default, and the Referee acted within her discretion in denying Respondent s request to vacate the default. The Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1994). It was also within the discretion of the Referee to deny the Respondent s eleventh hour request for a continuance of the sanctions hearing. Florida Bar v. Kandekore, 766 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2000); Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Fla. 1987); Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167-68 (finding that [i]t is within the sound discretion of the referee... to grant or deny a motion for continuance: and that [s]uch a ruling will not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion ). In arguing for a continuance in Kandekore, the respondent neither claimed that he failed to receive notice of the hearing nor alleged that he was unable to receive the evidence he wished to present prior to the hearing. The Court concluded that given Kandekore s lack of explanation for his eleventh hour request, the referee did not abuse his discretion in denying Kandekore s request for a continuance. Similarly, Respondent could give the Referee in this case no explanation for his apparent inability to obtain the evidence he wished to present at the hearing on The Bar s Motion for Default and the sanctions hearing. Thus, the 10
Referee was within her discretion in denying Respondent s oral motion to continue the default hearing and the sanctions hearing. As shown in the statement of facts, Respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence explaining his refusal to respond to inquiries from The Bar or the investigating member. Respondent also failed to provide sufficient evidence explaining his failure to answer the Complaint filed by the Bar. Thus, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b), the Referee correctly entered a default judgment against Respondent on October 18, 2006. Ordinarily, a motion to vacate a default would be filed where a Respondent intends to challenge the entry of a default. Respondent never filed a motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 in this case. Instead of filing a motion to vacate the default, Respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Appellate Division of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was dismissed because the Appellate Division of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Then, on January 1, 2007, the day before the sanctions hearing in this matter, Respondent faxed a Motion for Continuance of Sanctions Hearing to Allow Time to Document Record Regarding Respondent s Medical Condition and Request to Reconsider The Entry of the Default Entered Herein to Bar counsel. The Referee 11
received this motion on the morning of the sanctions hearing. The Referee considered the motion as a motion to vacate default judgment and denied it. The Referee was correct in denying Respondent s request to reconsider the entry of the default for the following reasons. The only explanation given by Respondent for the two-month delay in responding to default was that he had been attempting to obtain medical documentation and testimony regarding his past and present medical condition. Respondent attached to his request the affidavit of John M. Kilgore, M.D., who was not the physician who had been treating Respondent for his diabetic condition, but was simply a friend of Respondent. (TR2, 20, 21). In fact, Dr. Kilgore s affidavit states that Respondent was referred to Antonell Bianchi, M.D. with the Diabetes Care Institute, and in the three months or so that Respondent had been under the care of this group and had been taking prescribed insulin injections, Respondent had been regaining a great deal of his former focus and ability to handle his affairs. Rather than constituting evidence of some exceptional circumstance explaining the two-month delay in seeking to vacate the default judgment or his failure to answer and defend the disciplinary action, Dr. Kilgore s affidavit supports the referee s denial of Respondent s request to reconsider the default on the basis of inexcusable neglect. The affidavit suggests that Respondent should 12
have been capable of filing an answer to the Bar s Complaint before the entry of the default on October 18, 2006. Thus, Respondent did not show that the failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of excusable neglect. Respondent also failed to establish that he had any meritorious defenses. As noted by the Referee, and conceded by Respondent, Respondent never attached to his writ or filed with the Court what his good faith responses to the Bar s Complaint would have been. (TR2, 18). In his Corrected and Amended Initial Brief, Respondent still fails to set out any meritorious defenses to the Bar s Complaint. Respondent simply states that had an extension been granted and the default not entered, he would have been able to offer meritorious defenses to the grievance allegations, not just medical excuses, but factual defenses to the grievances. Thus, Respondent has failed to show that he has a meritorious defense. In The Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1994) Dubow failed to file a response to the Bar s request for admissions within the time allotted. The Bar filed a motion to have the matters deemed admitted. After the Bar filed its motion, Dubow responded to the request for admissions and replied to the Bar s motion. The referee granted the Bar s motion and Dubow subsequently filed a motion to vacate that order. The referee refused to set aside the order deeming matters admitted. In his petition for review, Dubow argued that his failure to file a 13
timely response was due to excusable neglect and ignorance of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. The Court held that Dubow simply ignored the Bar s complaint and the request for admissions and under those circumstances the referee acted within her discretion in deeming the matters admitted. Like Dubow, Respondent simply ignored the Bar, and it was within the Referee s discretion to deny Respondent s the motion to vacate the default. The Referee also correctly denied Respondent s motion for continuance of the sanctions hearing. Respondent alleged that he needed additional time to obtain his medical records. The Referee noted that Respondent was an experienced personal injury attorney and knew how to obtain medical records, yet failed to do so. As noted above, in Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167-68 (Fla. 1986) the Court held that [i]t is within the sound discretion of the referee... to grant or deny a motion for continuance and that [s]uch a ruling will not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion. Respondent concedes in his brief that he cannot strongly argue in opposition to the findings and decision of the Referee, which the Respondent would submit were fair given the framework she was having (sic) to deal with. By entry of the default, the allegations in the Bar s Complaint were deemed admitted, and the default thereby provided the Referee with competent, substantial evidence upon which to base the findings. Respondent is precluded from now complaining about 14
any factual findings deemed admitted. The Bar would note, however, that the Referee did consider testimony presented by the Respondent in the sanctions hearing, and did not find that Respondent was guilty of all of the violations alleged in the Bar s Complaint. Turning to the substance of the Report of Referee, a Referee s findings of fact are presumed correct unless clearly lacking in evidentiary support. See Florida Bar v. Garland, 651 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1995). Because Respondent did not contest the factual allegations in the Bar s Complaint and a default was entered, that default now stands as a formal stipulation by Respondent as to the correctness of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint. See Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So. 2d 810, 813 (Fla. 1996). To the extent the Referee s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt are reasonably supported by the factual allegations in the Complaint, the default constitutes competent, substantial evidence supporting the Referee s factual findings and recommendations as to guilt. See Florida Bar v. Eubanks, 752 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So. 2d 810, 813 (Fla. 1996). The Bar contends that the record shows that the Referee s factual findings and recommendations as to guilt are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, The Bar prays that this Court approve the findings of fact and recommendations that Respondent violated the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as set out above and in the Referee s Report. 15
Finally, in determining the proper sanction, the Court will take into consideration the three purposes of lawyer discipline: First, the judgment must be fair to society, both in terms of protecting the public from unethical conduct and at the same time not denying the public the services of a qualified lawyer as a result of undue harshness in imposing penalty. Second, the judgment must be fair to the respondent, being sufficient to punish a breach of ethics and at the same time encourage reformation and rehabilitation. Third, the judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be prone or tempted to become involved in like violations. Florida Bar v. Bailey, 803 So.2d 683, 694-95 (Fla.2001) (quoting Florida Bar v. Brake, 767 So.2d 1163, 1169 (Fla.2000)). See also Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So.2d 725 So.2d 360, 363 (Fla.1998); Florida Bar v. Reed, 644 So.2d 1355, 1357 (Fla.1994); Florida Bar v. Lord, 433 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1983). The Referee s recommended sanction is consistent with the purpose of discipline and should be approved. 16
CONCLUSION The Referee correctly entered the default and it was within the Referee s discretion to deny the Respondent s motion to continue the sanctions hearing and deny the motion to vacate the default. The Referee s findings of fact and recommendation of a 91 day suspension with reinstatement upon proof of proper control of diabetic condition; attendance of professionalism workshop; and the taxation of costs in the amount of $4,909.00 should be approved. Dated this day of September, 2007. Respectfully submitted, Jodi Anderson Thompson Assistant Staff Counsel The Florida Bar 5521 West Spruce Street Suite C-49 Tampa, Florida 33607-5958 (813)875-9821 Florida Bar No. 930180 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original and seven (7) copies of this Answer Brief have been provided by DHL Express, Waybill Number to The Honorable Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, The Supreme Court of Florida, 500 Duval Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1927; a true and correct copy by regular U.S. Mail and U.S. Certified Mail, Return Receipt 17
Requested No. to Edgar Calvin Watkins, Respondent, at his record Bar address of 110 West Reynolds Street, Suite 208, Plant City, FL 33563; and a copy by regular U.S. Mail to Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300, all this day of September, 2007. Jodi Anderson Thompson Assistant Staff Counsel 18
CERTIFICATION OF FONT SIZE AND STYLE CERTIFICATION OF VIRUS SCAN Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this brief is submitted in MicroSoft Word 14 point proportionally spaced Times New Roman font, and the computer disk filed with this brief has been scanned and found to be free of viruses, by Norton Antivirus for Windows. Jodi Anderson Thompson 19
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR, Case No. SC06-1687 Complainant, TFB Nos. 2004-11,725(13F) 2005-10,532(13F) v. 2005-10,754(13F) EDGAR CALVIN WATKINS, JR. Respondent / APPENDIX TO THE ANSWER BRIEF OF THE FLORIDA BAR 1
INDEX TO APPENDIX TO THE ANSWER BRIEF OF THE FLORIDA BAR APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C Respondent s Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari dated November 20, 2006 in The Florida Bar v. Edgar Calvin Watkins, Jr. in Supreme Court Case No. SC06-1687. Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Certiorari dated January 4, 2007 in Edgar Calvin Watkins, Jr. v. The Florida Bar, Case No. 512006CA3669ES, SC06-1687 in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pasco County, Florida Appellate Division Report of Referee dated February 2, 2007 in The Florida Bar v. Edgar Calvin Watkins, Jr., in Supreme Court Case No. SC06-1687 2