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Self-selection: The Roy model Heidi L. Williams MIT 14.662 Spring 2015 Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 1 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 2 / 56

Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II Much of 661/662 focuses on theories of earnings distributions Many so far: Human capital, Rosen-style superstar models... Neal and Rosen (2000) Handbook chapter a useful overview Facts: empirical regularities in earnings distributions * Right skewed * Mean earnings greatly differ across groups (e.g. education, gender) Theories: provide a synthesized review Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 3 / 56

Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II Roadmap for the rest of the semester Four models with implications for earnings distributions: 1 Roy model 2 Compensating differentials model 3 Discrimination models 4 Models of rent-sharing Three related topics which speak to other empirically important determinants of the distribution of labor earnings: 1 Management practices 2 Intergenerational mobility 3 Early life determinants of long-run outcomes Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 4 / 56

Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II Logistics Remaining lectures: Continue comments on assigned papers Two additional problem sets (due 4/22 and 5/6) Research paper proposal (due 4/28) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 5 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 6 / 56

The Roy model: Roy (1951) How does occupation self-selection impact the income distribution? Motivation: Contemporaries assumed distribution of incomes was arbitrary: developed by the process of historical accident Core of Roy s model is to ask how the distribution of earnings is affected if individuals purposively select their occupation Definitely worth reading, but not an easy read (verbal math) Instead will walk through (formally identical) Borjas (1987) model Standard formalization: important for you to be comfortable with Notes walk through more mechanics than I will cover in class Section this week will also walk through this model Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 7 / 56

The Roy model: Roy (1951) Two occupations: (rabbit) hunting and fishing Goal was to understand self-selection: Will the individuals best suited for fishing choose to fish? Will the individuals best suited for hunting choose to hunt? Core idea: individuals will not randomly sort across occupations Implies that the wage gap will reflect not only a real difference in potential earnings, but will also be a function of occupational sorting Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 8 / 56

Applications of the Roy model Roy-style selection applicable to essentially every sub-field of economics We will focus on three applications: 1 2 3 Immigration: Borjas (1987), Abramitsky et al. (2012, 2014) Health care: Chandra and Staiger (2007) Redistribution: Abramitzky (2009) Other applications on the syllabus: Borjas (2002): sorting of workers into the public sector Dahl (2002): geographic variation in returns to education Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2014): fields of study Rothschild and Scheuer (2013): optimal tax Willis and Rosen (1979): sorting into college attendance Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 9 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 10 / 56

Borjas (1987) application of the Roy model Motivation: Understanding native-immigrant earnings differences, with a focus on the self-selection induced by the migration decision Model written from perspective of an immigrant thinking of migrating from her home (non-us) country to the US Idea: Individuals compare potential income in the US with income in home country, make migration decision based on income differential (net of migration costs) Induces self-selection empirically testable predictions 1 If US has higher returns to skill (higher income inequality), migrants disproportionately drawn from top of home country s skill distribution 2 Vice versa if US has lower returns to skill (lower income inequality) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 11 / 56

Context for this paper Borjas (1999) Handbook chapter on economics of immigration: 1 Why do some people move? Our focus 2 What happens when they do? 14.661: Card (1990), Borjas (2003) We will focus in particular on skill composition of immigrants Important for interpreting native-immigrant earnings differences Of course, economic impact of immigration (question #2) depends on the skill distributions of natives and immigrants Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 12 / 56

Pre-Roy model of migration decisions Chiswick (1978): Economic theory suggests that migration in response to economic incentives is generally more profitable for the more able and more highly motivated Footnote outlining a simple model generating that prediction Key assumption: ability has same effect on earnings in home, US Roy model relaxes this assumption: selection critically depends on correlation between value of ability in home, US in Roy model, self-selection will not always imply immigrants are positively selected Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 13 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 14 / 56

Interpreting native-immigrant earnings differences: Chiswick-Borjas Chiswick (1978): How does time in the US affect immigrant earnings? Estimated standard cross-sectional Mincer-style human capital earnings functions that included variables for years since migration Possible because, for the first time since 1930, the (recently released) 1970 US Census asked a question about year of arrival Chiswick s conclusions thus based on cross-sectional comparison of different cohorts in 1970 Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 15 / 56

Chiswick (1978) analysis In the 1970 Census data, Chiswick estimated regressions like the following: where: ln(earnings i ) = X ( i θ + δi i + α 1 I i Years i + α 2 I i Years 2 i + ɛ i X ( : covariates such as education and potential experience i I i : indicator for foreign-born Years i : years since migration Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 16 / 56

Chiswick (1978) estimates University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 17 / 56

Chiswick conclusion #1 The experience-earnings profile of immigrants is steeper than the experience-earnings profile of natives with the same measured skills. Estimated coefficients evaluated at 10 years of experience (T = 10) and 5 years of residency (YSM = 5) Concluded that the return to experience for immigrants (2.718%) is steeper than for natives (2.07%) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 18 / 56

Chiswick conclusion #2 The experience-earnings profile of immigrants crosses the experience-earnings profile of natives about 10-15 years after immigration. Estimated coefficients, holding constant schooling and total labor market experience For YSM = 10, predicted % difference in earnings between natives and foreign born is 3.349%; for YSM = 15, this is +1.956% Hence, he concluded that the immigrant experience-earnings profile crossed that of natives between 10 and 15 years after immigration Chiswick interpreted this fact as evidence of self-selection in migration in favor of high ability, highly motivated workers, and workers with low discount rates for human capital investments. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 19 / 56

Problem: Age-time-cohort effects However, because the 1970 Census is a single cross-section, the years since migration variable may confound two effects: 1 A true assimilation effect 2 Fixed quality differences across immigrant cohorts: quality of immigrant cohorts in terms of their earnings could change over time as a function of, e.g., changes in immigration policies. Figure 8-5 in Borjas s Labor Economics text illustrates why the Chiswick type cross-sectional analysis can erroneously estimate patterns in the age-earnings profile that may be driven by fixed differences across cohorts. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 20 / 56

Problem: Age-time-cohort effects (continued) Source: Figure 8-5 in Borjas s Labor Economics text (Fifth Edition, p. 333). McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 21 / 56

Problem: Age-time-cohort effects (continued) A true assimilation effect and fixed cohort differences are indistinguishable in the 1970 Census because: (year of migration) + (years in US) = 1970 Stated differently, the Chiswick-style cross-section approach encountered a version of the (now) well-known problem that it is impossible to separately identify age and cohort effects in a single cross-section. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 22 / 56

Borjas (1985) Borjas (1985) realized progress can be made by using repeated cross-section or longitudinal data (and a test version of Stata ) Took advantage of (recently released) 1980 US Census Contribution was to combine 1970 and 1980 US Census data to examine how well Chiswick s cross-sectional predictions about earnings growth predicted the actual earnings growth experienced by specific immigrant cohorts during the period 1970-1980 Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 23 / 56

Borjas (1985): Method In order to identify both the assimilation effect and cohort effects while controlling for year effects, a restriction must be imposed Borjas assumed time-specific shocks have the same effect on log earnings of natives and immigrants In a pooled sample of native-born and foreign-born individuals, effectively uses natives to estimate the Census year indicators Implicit assumption: factors fixed within Census year have same effect on log earnings of natives and immigrants For factors like inflation, that assumption seems reasonable However, other year-specific factors such as business cycles may have differential effects on natives and immigrants Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 24 / 56

Borjas (1985): Conclusions Chiswick: immigrants adapt quite rapidly into US labor market Borjas reached a different conclusion: Documents relatively slower rates of earnings growth for immigrants Implies a decline in the quality of immigrant cohorts Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 25 / 56

Take-away #1: Age-time-cohort effects Methodological point: The impossibility of identifying age, time, and cohort effects in a linear model comes up in a variety of contexts Useful framework to keep in mind while reading papers, attending seminars, working on your own research Example: Dave Molitor s MIT dissertation on physician practices Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 26 / 56

Take-away #2: Substantive conclusions How did the substantive conclusions of this Chiswick-Borjas exchange relate to Borjas s later Roy model application? Chiswick (1978): interpreted the fact that experience-earnings profile of immigrants crosses that of natives as evidence of self-selection in migration in favor of high ability, highly motivated workers Borjas (1985): clarified that this could instead reflect cohort effects Raises the question of how cohort effects relate to self-selection This question provides the starting point for Borjas s application of the Roy model Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 27 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 28 / 56

Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014) Re-examine this question using data on European immigrants to the US labor market during the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1913) Motivation for analyzing this period: Contemporaries were concerned about the ability of migrants to assimilate into the US economy Congressional commission in 1907 concluded immigrants - particularly from southern/eastern Europe - would be unable to assimilate Report fueled subsequent legislation to restrict immigrant entry via a literacy test (1917) and quotas (1924) Subsequent analyses suggested - contrary to the commission s report immigrants caught up with natives after 10 to 20 years in the US However, all of these studies are subject to: 1 2 Borjas (1985) critique on cohort effects Bias due to selective return migration Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 29 / 56

Novel data Ambitious new data effort: Construct a novel panel data set that follows native-born workers and immigrants from 16 sending countries through the US censuses of 1900, 1910, and 1920 Match individuals by first/last name, age, country/state of birth Because these censuses do not contain data on wages or income, they assign individuals the median income in their reported occupation Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 30 / 56

Empirical specifications 1 Cross-section model Compare occupation (proxy for labor market earnings) of native-born and immigrant workers as a function of time spent in the US, indicators for year and country of origin, and age controls Note: arrival cohort indicators not included 2 Repeated cross-section model Add arrival cohort indicators Comparison with cross-section model allows them to infer how much of the earnings difference between natives and immigrants is attributable to differences in the quality of arrival cohorts 3 Panel model Follows individuals across census years Comparison with repeated cross-section allows them to infer whether and to what extent return migrants were positively or negatively selected from the immigrant population Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 31 / 56

Figure 2 Panel estimates suggest that the average immigrant did not face a substantial occupation-based earnings penalty upon first arrival, and experienced occupational advancement at the same rate as natives University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 32 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 33 / 56

Basic set-up of the model Two countries: country 0 (home) and country 1 (US) Decompose earnings into observables (µ), unobservables ( ɛ i ): ln w ij = µ j + ɛ ij σ 2 ( E i 0 ) N ( 0 i1 0 ), 0 σ 0,1 σ0,1 σ2 1 From here, drop i subscripts cov (E 0,E 1 ) σ 0,1 σ 0 σ 1 σ 0 σ 1 Correlation coefficient of ɛ 0, ɛ 1 : ρ 0,1 = = Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 34 / 56

Basic set-up of the model (continued) Migration cost C Time-equivalent migration costs π = C w o Individual decision to migrate determined by sign of I : w 1 I = ln wo + C = ln(w 1 ) ln(w 0 (1 + π)) = µ 1 + ɛ 1 µ 0 ɛ 0 ln(1 + π) (µ 1 µ 0 π) + ( ɛ 1 ɛ 0 ) Defining v ɛ 1 ɛ 0, migration rate P is: P = Pr[ ɛ 1 ɛ 0 > (µ 1 µ 0 π)] = Pr[v > (µ 0 µ 1 + π)] Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 35 / 56

Basic set-up of the model (continued) µ 0 µ 1 +π Define z = σ v φ, Φ: PDF and CDF of standard normal distribution v v = ɛ 1 ɛ 0 s = σ v follows a standard normal v µ 0 µ 1 + π P = Pr > σ v σ v v µ 0 µ 1 + π = 1 Pr σ v σ v ( ) µ 0 µ 1 + π = 1 Φ = 1 Φ(z) Migration rate increasing in mean US wages ( P > 0), decreasing in mean µ 1 home wages ( P < 0), and decreasing in costs of migrating ( P < 0) µ 0 π σ v Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 36 / 56

Useful facts (in case anyone is rusty) [Property 1.] If a vector of random variables X N(µ, Σ), then AX + b N(Aµ + b, AΣA ( ). ( ( )) X µ σ 2 x x σ [Property 2.] If N X,Y Y µ y,, then σ X,Y σ2 ( y ) σ (Y X = x) N y µy + ρ X,Y ( σx )(x µ x ), σ 2 y (1 ρ 2 X,Y ). [Property 3.] For any non-stochastic function f ( ) and X = f (W ), E (Y X ) = E (E (Y W ) X ). [Property 4.] Let φ(z) and and Φ(z) denote the PDF and CDF of the v standard normal distribution, respectively. If σv N(0, 1), then ( ) v φ(z) E v > z = ; we refer to this expression as the Inverse Mills σ v σ v 1 Φ(z) Ratio. Because φ(z) = φ( z) and 1 Φ(z) = Φ( z), we can also write φ( z) the Inverse Mills Ratio as λ(z) = Φ( z). Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 37 / 56

Analyzing self-selection To analyze self-selection, Borjas derives expressions comparing E (ln w 0 I > 0) and E (ln w 1 I > 0): that is, for individuals who immigrate compare average earnings in country 0 and average earnings in country 1 Let s start with E (ln w o I > 0), which can be re-written as follows: ( ) v E (ln w 0 I > 0) = E µ 0 + ɛ 0 > z σ v ( ) v = µ 0 + E ɛ0 > z σ v ( ) ɛ0 v = µ 0 + σ 0 E > z σ 0 σ v Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 38 / 56

Analyzing self-selection (continued) ( ) Let s derive a simplified version of the E v > z term: E 0 σ 0 σ v 1 Because ɛ 0 and ɛ 1 are jointly normally distributed, applying Property 1 you can show that ɛ 0 and v ɛ 1 ɛ 0 are jointly normally ( E σ 2 0 ) ( ( )) ( 0 0 σ 0,1 σ2 distributed: N ), 0. E 1 E 0 0 σ 0,1 σ0 2 σ0 2 +σ1 2 2σ 0,1 2 Given that ɛ 0 and v ɛ 1 ɛ 0 are jointly normally distributed, applying Property 2 you can show that E ( 0 v) = ρ 0,v ( σ 0 ɛ σ v )v, where σ 0,v σ 0,v ρ0,v =. Simplifying implies E ( ɛ 0 v) = v. σ 0 σ v σv 2 3 Applying Property 3, you can show that E ( E 0 v > z) = E (E ( E 0 v ) v > z). σ 0 σ v σ 0 σ v σ v Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 39 / 56

Analyzing self-selection (continued) Putting this together, let s simplify E( E 0 v σ 0 σ v ). Let s = σ v N(0, 1). Applying Property 2, E ( 0 s) = σ 0,s s. Substituting ρ σ 2 0,v = σ 0,v ɛ σ 0 σ v gives: ɛ E( 0 v ) = σ 0 σ v = = s 1 E ( ɛ 0 s) σ 0 1 σ 0,s s σ 0 σs 2 1 1 σ v cov(v, ɛ 0 ) v σ 0 1 σ v v σ 0,v = σ 0 σ v σ v v = ρ 0,v σv v Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 40 / 56

Analyzing self-selection (continued) φ(z) 1 Φ(z) The Inverse Mills Ratio is the conditional expectation for a standard normal truncated on the left by z. Using this notation: ( ) v v E (ln w 0 I > 0) = µ 0 + σ 0 ρ 0,v E > z σ v σ v ( ) φ(z) = µ 0 + σ 0 ρ 0,v 1 Φ(z) Similar expression for E (ln w 1 I > 0) : µ 1 + σ 1 ρ 1,v ( ) φ(z) 1 Φ(z) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 41 / 56

Analyzing self-selection (continued) Useful to re-write equations for E(ln w 0 I > 0), E (ln w 1 I > 0) Substituting σ 0,v = cov( ɛ 0, v) = E [ ɛ 0 ( ɛ 1 ɛ 0 )] = σ 0,1 σ 2 0 : ( ) φ(z) E (ln w 0 I > 0) = µ 0 + σ 0 ρ 0,v 1 Φ(z) ( ) ( ) σ 0 σ 1 σ 0 φ(z) = µ 0 + ρ 0,1 σ v σ 1 1 Φ(z) Substituting σ 1,v = σ 2 σ 0,1 : 1 ( ) φ(z) E (ln w 1 I > 0) = µ 1 + σ 1 ρ 1,v 1 Φ(z) ( ) ( ) σ 0 σ 1 σ 1 φ(z) = µ 1 + ρ 0,1 σ v σ 0 1 Φ(z) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 42 / 56

Analyzing self-selection (continued) In order to understand the position of migrants in the distribution of workers in each country, we want to know the signs of Q 0 and Q 1 : ( ) ( ) σ 0 σ 1 σ 0 φ(z) Q 0 E ( ɛ 0 I > 0) = ρ 0,1 σ v σ 1 1 Φ(z) ( ) ( ) σ 0 σ 1 σ 1 φ(z) Q 1 E ( ɛ 1 I > 0) = ρ 0,1 σ v σ 0 1 Φ(z) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 43 / 56

Four cases of immigrant selection 1 Positive selection: Q 0 > 0 and Q 1 > 0. Arises ρ 0,1 > σ 0 σ 1. Migrants drawn from upper tail, fall in upper tail. Borjas s example: high-skilled workers migrating from Western Europe. 2 σ Negative selection: Q 0 < 0 and Q 1 < 0. Arises ρ 0,1 > σ Migrants drawn from lower tail, fall in lower tail. Borjas s example: US safety net may draw low-skilled immigrants. 3 Refugee selection: Q 0 < 0 and Q 1 > 0. Arises σ ρ 1 0,1 < min( σ 0 σ 1, σ 0 ). Migrants drawn from lower tail, fall in upper tail. Borjas s example: Communist takeover. 4 No fourth case: Q 0 > 0 and Q 1 < 0. Mathematically, this case is ruled out because it would require ρ 0,1 > 1. 1. 0 Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 44 / 56

Note: Joint normality assumption As an econometrician, what you observe is individuals migration decisions (whether they moved to US or stayed), data on US wages of migrants E (ln w 1 I > 0), and data on home wages of non-migrants E (ln w 0 I 0). Given this data, we would like to know the joint distribution of ln w 0 and ln w 1 so that we can make statements about where migrants fall in the home and US country income distributions. Heckman and Honore (1990) show that the joint normality assumption in the original Roy model allows you to identify the joint distribution of ln w 0 and ln w 1 in a single cross section of data, but that without this assumption the model is no longer identified. French and Taber Handbook chapter gives some intuition Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 45 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 46 / 56

Testing the Roy model Mixed evidence on the Roy model Chiquiar and Hanson (2005): evidence against negative selection of Mexican migrants (as would be predicted by the Roy model) Focus here: Abramitsky, Boustan, Eriksson (2012) Age of mass migration (1850-1913): open borders Focus on Norwegian migrants: Roy model predicts negative selection Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 47 / 56

1900 income distributions: US and Norway Courtesy of Ran Abramitzky, Leah Platt Boustan, Katherine Eriksson, and the American Economic Association. Used with permission. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 48 / 56

Data and analysis Another heroic data effort: Two fully digitized Norwegian censuses (1865 and 1900) Newly-digitized dataset of all Norwegian-born men in the US in 1900 using now-publicly-available census records Match migrants and stayers based on names and ages Earnings-related outcome: Occupation Evidence of negative selection in urban sample (mixed for rural sample) Two pieces of direct evidence: 1 Compare occupational distributions of leavers/stayers 2 Compare fathers of migrants/non-migrants Indirect evidence: compare OLS/family FE returns to migration Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 49 / 56

Comparing occupational distributions of leavers/stayers Courtesy of Ran Abramitzky, Leah Platt Boustan, Katherine Eriksson, and the American Economic Association. Used with permission. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 50 / 56

Comparing fathers of migrants/non-migrants Courtesy of Ran Abramitzky, Leah Platt Boustan, Katherine Eriksson, and the American Economic Association. Used with permission. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 51 / 56

Comparing OLS/family FE returns to migration 1 2 OLS: compare earnings of migrants with earnings of stayers FE: compare earnings of migrants with earnings of stayer brothers If the OLS estimate measures the return to migration plus a selection term, and if migrants are negatively selected, then the OLS estimate will be smaller than the family fixed effect estimate. Of course, family FE estimate is not free of selection concerns Appendix presents IV analysis using gender composition of a man s siblings and birth order as instruments for migration Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 52 / 56

Comparing OLS/family FE returns to migration Courtesy of Ran Abramitzky, Leah Platt Boustan, Katherine Eriksson, and the American Economic Association. Used with permission. Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 53 / 56

Take-aways 1 2 3 First, this is a very recent paper providing new, interesting evidence testing the predictions of the Roy model. This is a classic question, but that doesn t mean that there isn t room for good papers on it! Second, this paper highlights the value of looking for the right empirical setting and of constructing the right data Testing for selection: Open borders Data: empirical estimates are basically just summary statistics, but that s because the authors did an enormous amount of work to construct data that enables transparent empirical tests Finally, this is a great example of how economic history can overlap nicely with core questions in labor economics Useful to keep in mind for your own research, in addition to more traditional focus of economic history, which is shedding light on the long-run impacts of economic phenomena Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 54 / 56

1 Preliminaries: Overview of 14.662, Part II 2 A model of self-selection: The Roy model 3 Application: Immigration Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985): Assimilation Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014): Assimilation Borjas (1987): A model of self-selection Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012): Testing the Roy model 4 Looking ahead Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 55 / 56

Looking ahead Two additional applications of the Roy model: Health care: Chandra and Staiger (2007) Redistribution: Abramitsky (2009) Please comment on Chandra and Staiger (2007) Williams (MIT 14.662) Self-selection: The Roy model Spring 2015 56 / 56

MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 14.662 Labor Economics II Spring 2015 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.