NO. 2007-CA-01581 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JAMES MARSHALL, CASEY WIGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Defendant-Appellee. FILED OFFICE OFTHE CLERK SUPREME COURT COURT OF APPEALS APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF LEFLORE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BRIEF OF APPELLANT OF COUNSEL: Attorney 4 Carlo E. Moore, Esq. MsB MOORE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 1155 Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd. Post Oftice Box 1402 Grenada, Mississippi 38902-1402 Telephone: (662) 227-9940 ATTORNEY FOR CASEY WIGGINS: Daniel J. Griffith MS- GRIFFITH & GRIFFITH 123 South Court Street P.O. Drawer 1680 Cleveland, MS 38732 Telephone: (662) 843-6100 ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons may have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the justices of the Supreme Court andlor the judges of the Court of Appeals may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal: Officer Casey Wiggins, Defendant-Appellee. Officer Henry Harris, Police Chief of Greenwood Police Department. Sheriel Perkins, Mayor for the City of Greenwood. Dr. Leslie L. Daniels. Superintendent of Greenwood Public School District. Percy Powell, Greenwood High School Principal. Daniel J. Griffith, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee. Richard, A. Oakes, Attorney for Greenwood Public School District. James K. Littleton, EI,Attorney for the City of Greenwood. James Marshall, Plaintiff-Appellant. Carlos E. Moore, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 5. m - CARLOS E. MOORE, ESQ. Counsel for James Marshall, Plaintiff-Appellant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.. CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS... 11... TABLE OF CONTENTS... 111 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... iv STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE... 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS... 3 SUMMARY OF THE ARUMENT... S ARGUMENT... 8 Standard of Review... 8 CONCLUSION... 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... 17 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE... 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So.2d 1045 (MISS. 2003)... 9 Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (hhss. 2000)...p assim Enterm Miss.. Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202 (Miss. 1998)... 8 McDonald's Cor~. v. Robinson Indus.. Inc., 592 So.2d 927 (MISS. 1991)... 9 Saliba v. Saliba, 753 So. 2d 1095 (MISS. 2000)... 8 Southern Leisure Homes. Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088 (MISS. 1999)...p assim Statutes Miss. Code Ann. 445-6-3 (2007)... Miss. Code Ann. 499-3-28 (2007)... assim assim
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES I. Whether the Chancellor erred when he dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint for declaratory relief on a question of law and failed to transfer the case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County pursuant to Article 6 $162 of the Mississippi Constitution and pursuant to precedent within this Court and jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE This appeal arises fiom the Chancery Court of Leflore County, Mississippi. On July 18,2007, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the Chancery Court of Leflore County, Mississippi. On August, 15,2007, the Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Leflore County dismissed Plaintiff's claim for lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 59-3-9 of the Mississippi Code Annotated since Plaintiff appeals a final judgment of the Chancery Court of Leflore County.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS James Marshall was a seventeen year old African American senior student at Greenwood High School on December 6,2006. At approximately 12:OO p.m. on December 6,2006, Marshall was standing in the main hallway of the Greenwood High School just outside of the cafeteria speaking with and showing some friends his tattoo when he was confronted, for no known reason, by Officer Casey Wiggins. Officer Wiggins was a law enforcement trainee assigned by the Greenwood Police Department as security detail at the Greenwood High School. Officer Wiggins was the only law enforcement present on the Greenwood High School premises. After confronting Marshall and the other students, Officer Wiggins began handling Marshall aggressively and roughly based on his personal suspicion. Officer Wiggins then threw Marshall, who was unarmed, against the wall, assaulted and battered Marshall, placed his gun to Marshall's head twice and verbally threatened to kill Marshall in the presence of several students, teachers, and staff of Greenwood High School. Despite Officer Wiggins' abuse, Marshall never struck Officer Wiggins. After using excessive force, Officer Wiggins falsely placed Marshall under arrest, falsely imprisoned him, and transported him to the Greenwood Police Department charging Marshall with simple assault. After arriving to the Greenwood Police Department, no weapons or any type of illegal contraband was found on Marshall's person or in his possession at the time of the false arrest. 3
Marshall was held at the station until Officer Archie andlor Captain Dino of the Greenwood Police Department had an opportunity to review the high school's surveillance video footage which captured Wiggins' assault and battery of Marshall. Upon review of said video, Marshall was released from police custody and the simple assault charge against him was dropped by Officer Wiggins' superior officers. On December 7,2006, Marshall and his mother signed a criminal affidavit against Officer Wiggins for assault and battery as a result of the December 6,2006 incident.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Leflore County erred when he failed to transfer the Plaintiffs case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County. The Chancellor ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to hear the issue pursuant to the authority of Miss. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(l), (6), and (7)(c). See Judgment Granting Motion to Dismiss. While the Chancellor was correct in his conclusion, he did not express his reasoning for concluding that he lacked jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Chancellor lacked jurisdiction because the complaint seeking declaratory relief concerned a question of law, or an issue legal in nature.' See Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999) (holding that chancery courts only have jurisdiction to hear cases in equity but not cases of a legal nature); See also Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (MISS. 2000) (requiring that the chapcery court transfer cases legal in nature to the proper circuit court). Instead of dismissing the case, the Chancellor should have transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County. a. Because of the Chancellor's error, the Plaintiff has been greatly prejudiced in that the question of law presented in Sections 99-3-28 and 45-6-3 has not been interpreted by courts of law within this jurisdiction. ' The Complaint requested that the Chancery Court adjudicate the rights of the parties with respect to the necessity and validity of a probable cause hearing pursuant to Sections 99-3-28 and 456-3 of the Mississippi Code Annotated. & Plaititrs Complaint for Declaratoly Judgment. 5
Particularly, the Chancellor's dismissal of the case, without transferring it to the circuit court, further endorses the error and injustice of allowing Officer Casey Wiggins, a law enforcement trainee, to be granted a probable cause hearing. Section 99-3-28 only grants probable cause hearings to sworn law enforcement oflcers, among other officials such as teachers and counselors. See Miss. Code Ann. 9 99-3-28 (2007). The circuit court's decision to allow Officer Wiggins a probable cause hearing was in clear violation of Section 99-3-28 because at the time of the incident Officer Wiggins was a law enforcement trainee. Section 99-3- 28 refers to Section 45-6-3 for the definition of a "law enforcement officer." In Section 45-6-3(c), a law enforcement officer is defined as "any person appointed or employed full time by the state or any political subdivision thereof, or by the state military department as provided in Section 33-1-33, who is duly sworn and vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests, and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of criminals and the enforcement of the criminal and traffic laws of this state andlor the ordinances of any political subdivision thereof." Miss. Code Ann. 9 45-6-3(c) (2007). Officer Wiggins was not a law enforcement officer because he had not been sworn in as such and was not vested with the right to bear arms and make arrests. As a matter of fact, Officer Wiggins was a law enforcement trainee which Section 45-6-3(e) describes as "any person appointed or employed in a full-time, part-time, 6
reserve or auxiliary capacity by the state or any political subdivision thereof for the purposes of completing all the selection and training requirements established by the board to become a law enforcement officer or a part-time law enforcement officer." Miss. Code Ann. $45-6-3(e). Because Section 45-6-3(c) and (e) carefully distinguished a law enforcement officer from a law enforcement trainee, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that Officer Wiggins, a law enforcement trainee, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing pursuant to Section 99-3-28 because Section 99-3-28 specifically proscribes the privilege of a probable cause to law enforcement oflcers. Despite the clarity of the statutes, the circuit court judge granted Officer Wiggins a probable cause hearing. When the Plaintiff challenged the circuit court's application of the statute, the Chancellor dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See Judgment Granting Motion to Dismiss. As a result of the Chancellor's failure to transfer the case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County, the Plaintiff has been prejudiced because the true issues concerning Officer Wiggins' actions were not addre~sed.~ This Court should remand the case back to the Chancellor with an order to transfer it to the Circuit Court of Leflore County pursuant to precedent in this Wiggins was an unsupervised law enforcement trainee who used deadly force against an unarmed minor in the crowded halls of Greenwood Leflore High School. Section 45-6-3(e) specifically forbids a trainee from using force, bearing arms, making arrests or exercising any of the powers of a peace officer unless the trainee is under the direct control and supervision of a law enforcement officer. See Miss. Code Ann. $456-3(e). Because the circuit court unlawfully granted Wiggins a probable cause hearing, these violations have gone unaddressed.
Court on the issue. See Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (h41ss. 2000) (holding that an issue legal in nature should be decided by the circuit court and remanded case back to chancery court with an order that the Chancellor promptly transfer the case to the circuit court); See also Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088, 1090 (MISS. 1999) (holding same proposition). 1. Standard of Review ARGUMENT a. De Novo Jurisdiction is a question of law. Enterm Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1204-05 (Miss. 1998). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. See Saliba v. Saliba, 753 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (MISS. 2000); Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (Miss. 2000). I. The Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Leflore County, Mississippi erred in failing to transfer Plaintiff's case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County Mississippi. In Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, this Court ruled that pursuant to Article 6 $162 of the Mississippi Constitution, chancery courts only have jurisdiction to hear cases in equity but not those that are legal. Southern Leisure Homes. Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088, 1090 (MISS. 1999)~ The Court furthered reasoned that when there is confusion as to whether a case is legal or equitable in %e Court held that although the Hardins' complaint contained an equitable element in that it alleged hudulent acts against the defendants, the relief of actual and punitive damages was of a legal nature. Southern Leisure Homes. Inc. v. Hardin. 742 So.2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999). It fiuther held that breach of contract claims would be best heard in circuit court. Id.
nature, the better practice is to try the case in circuit court. Id. See also McDonald's Corp. v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 592 So.2d 927,934 (MISS. 1991) (stating that "[ilt is more appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court to hear actions at law since circuit courts have general jurisdiction but chancery courts enjoy limited jurisdiction"). The Court, consequently, held that chancery courts should transfer cases concerning questions of law to the circuit court. Southern Leisure Homes. Inc., 742 So.2d 1088 (MISS. 1999). See also Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So.2d 1045 (MISS. 2003) (holding that chancery court must transfer an issue concerning a question of law to the circuit court). While Plaintiffs complaint for declaratory judgment to the Chancery Court of Leflore County is equitable in form, it is legal in nature because it seeks to clarify the interpretation and application of Sections 99-3-28 and 45-6-3 of the Mississippi Code Annotated, which are questions of law. In Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., a recent decision on the issue, this Court held that the Chancery Court of Tunica County erred when it failed to transfer a case that was legal in nature to the appropriate circuit court. Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (Miss. 2000).~ See also Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, Instead of transferring the case, the Chancellor decided to retain the case on the grounds that the motion to tmnsfer was not timely filed. Burnette, 770 So.2d 948, 950 (Miss. 2000).
854 So. 2d 1045 (MISS. 2003) (ruling that it is the substance of the action that should be controlling on the issue, not its form or label). Similar to the case at bar, the Burnettes filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court of Tunica County. a. at 950. While a complaint for declaratory judgment is equitable in form, this Court ruled that the Burnettes' breach of contract claim for actual and punitive damages was legal in nature and could only be heard in circuit court. Burnette, 770 So.2d 948 (MISS. 2000). The Court held that the Chancellor erred in retaining the case and, consequently, remanded the case to the Chancery Court of Tunica County with an order that the Chancellor promptly transfer the case to the Circuit Court of Tunica County. a. Similarly, Plaintiffs complaint for a declaratory judgment was equitable in form but legal in nature because it sought adjudication of a question of law. Therefore, instead of dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Leflore County should have transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County, Mississippi. In accordance with its previous ruling in Burnette, this Court should remand the case back to the Chancery Court of Leflore County with an order to promptly transfer the case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County. If this Court does not order the case to be transferred to the Circuit Court of Leflore County, the Plaintiff will be greatly prejudiced in that the question of law within Sections 99-3-28 and 45-6-3 of the Mississippi Code Annotated will go un- 10
interpreted by Courts within this jurisdiction and Officer Wiggins, a law enforcement trainee, will be allowed to violate the letter of the law set forth in Section 45-6-3.5 Section 99-3-28 states in its pertinent parts that: "... [Blefore an arrest warrant shall be issued against any teacher who is a licensed public school employee as defined in Section 37-9-1, a certified jail officer as defined in Section 45-4-9, a counselor at an adolescent offender program created under Section 43-27-20 1 et seq., or a sworn law enforcement oflcer within this state as defined in Section 45-6-3 for a criminal act, whether misdemeanor or felony, which is alleged to have occurred while the teacher, jail officer, counselor at an adolescent offender program or law enforcement oflcer was in the pe flormance of oflcial duties, a probable cause hearing shall be held before a circuit court judge... ". Miss. Code Ann. 5 99-3-28. Section 99-3-28 was careful to state, as it pertains to law enforcement, that only a "sworn law enforcement officer as defined by Section 45-6-3" or a "law enforcement officer in the performance of official duties" is entitled to a probable cause hearing. Since Section 99-3-28 specifically referenced Section 45-6-3 in defining what a law enforcement officer is, it is necessary to address the statute. According to Section 45-6-3(c) a law enforcement officer is defined as: "any person appointed or employed full time by the state or any political subdivision thereof, or by the state military department as provided in Section 33-1-33, who is duly sworn and vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests, and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of criminals and the enforcement of the criminal and 5 Because the circuit court judge of Leflore County allowed Officer Wiggins, a law enforcement trainee, to have a probable cause hearing, despite Section 99-3-28 granting the hearings to sworn law enforcement officers only, Officer Wiggins will go unpunished for using deadly force against an unarmed minor, among other violations in the absence of a supervising officer, in direct violation of Section 45-6-3(e).
traffic laws of this state and/or the ordinances of any political subdivision thereof. The term "law enforcement officer" also includes employees of the Department of Corrections who are designated as law enforcement officers by the Commissioner of Corrections pursuant to Section 47-5-54, and includes those district attorney criminal investigators who are designated as law enforcement officers." Miss. Code Ann. $45-6-3(c). In the case at bar, Officer Wiggins was not a law enforcement officer within the meaning of this statute at the time of the incident because 1) he had not been appointed or employed full time by the state or any political subdivision thereof, or by the state military department as provided in Section 33-1-33; 2) he had not been duly sworn and vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests, and 3) he was not an employee of the Department of Corrections designated as a law enforcement officer by the Commissioner of Corrections pursuant to Section 47-5-54 nor was he a district attorney criminal investigator designated as a law enforcement officer. However, Section 45-6-3 describes two other positions, part-time law enforcement officers and law enforcement trainees. Officer Wiggins could not have classified as a part-time law enforcement officer because he was working 40 hours per week.6 Consequently, Officer Wiggins' duties at the time of the incident were exactly paralleled with that of a law enforcement trainee. According to Section 45-6-3, a law enforcement trainee is:.. A. - Part-time law enforcement officer shall mean anv oerson auwinted - or emoloved in a mrt-time. reserve or auxilii capacity by the state. or any political subdivision thereof who is duly sworn and vested with authoritv to bear arms and make arrests. and whose orimarv res~onsibilitv is the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of criminals'and the enfdrcement ofthe c&l and idic laws of this state. or the ordinances of any political subdivision thereof. Miss. Code Ann. 6 45-6-3(d). 12
"... [Alny person appointed or employed in a full-time, parttime, reserve or auxiliary capacity by the state or any political subdivision thereof for the purposes of completing all the selection and training requirements established by the board to become a law enforcement officer or a part-time law enforcement officer. Such individuals shall not have the authority to use force, bear arms, make arrests or exercise any of the powers of a peace officer unless: (i) The trainee is under the direct control and supervision of a law enforcement officer; (ii) The trainee was previously certified under this chapter; or (iii) The trainee is a certified law enforcement officer in a reciprocating state." Miss. Code Ann. 4 45-6-3(e). Officer Wiggins classified as a law enforcement trainee at the time of the incident because he had been employed by the Greenwood Leflore Police Department for forty hours per week for the purposes of completing all the selection and training requirements established by the board to become a certified law enforcement officer or a part-time law enforcement officer. The Circuit Court ruled that Officer Wiggins was entitled to a probable cause hearing. Officer Wiggins, however, was not a law enforcement officer within the meaning of Section 99-3-28 as defined by Section 45-6-3. He was, instead, a law enforcement trainee. Because Section 45-6-3 was careful to distinguish a law enforcement officer from a law enforcement trainee, Officer Wiggins was not entitled to a probable cause hearing as defined in Section 99-3-28. Despite the clarity of the statutes, the judge for the Circuit Court of Leflore County misinterpreted the statutes to entitle law enforcement trainees to a probable cause hearing. The circuit court's act of granting Officer Wiggins a probable cause 13
hearing constitutes a great injustice because it allowed a law enforcement trainee to evade the letter of the law that forbade law enforcement trainees fiom using force, bearing arms, making arrests or exercising any of the powers of a peace officer unless under the direct control and supervision of a law enforcement officer. Officer Wiggins, a law enforcement trainee at the time of the incident, committed all of the aforementioned acts in the absence of a supervising law enforcement officer. Therefore, Officer Wiggins was in violation of the law when he attempted to make an arrest and used deadly force against an unarmed minor in absence of a supervising officer. Courts within this jurisdiction have not ruled on the interpretation of Sections 99-3-28 and 45-6-3. Therefore, it is of great significance that this Court orders the Chancery Court of Leflore County to transfer this case to the Circuit Court of Leflore County. In Southern Leisure, this Court stated that Article 6 5 162 of the Mississippi Constitution requires that "all claims that may be brought in chancery court whereof the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the circuit court." Southern Leisure, 742 So.2d 1088 (Mtss. 1999). In both Southern Leisure and Burnette, where the issues were legal in nature, this Court ruled that the chancery court should promptly transfer the case to the proper circuit court. See Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (MISS. 2000); Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088,1090 (Miss. 1999). 14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Rules 28,30, and 32 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, the undersigned certifies this brief complies with requirements of Rules 28 and 30, for the following reasons: 1. This brief does not exceed 50 pages exclusive of pages containing the exempted portions. 2. This brief complies with all formatting standards set forth in Rule 32. The text of the body is at least 12 point face font and proportioned according to the margin requirements set forth in Rule 32(a). The &ont covers of the brief and excerpts are formatted pursuant to the requirements set forth in Rule 32(a). 5. A mandatory Record Excerpt will be submitted with the brief. The Record Excerpt is not bound in the brief pursuant to Rule 30(a). OF COUNSEL: MOORE LAW OPFICE, PLLC 1 155 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. BLVD P.O. Box 1402 Grenada, MS 38902-1402 662.227.9940