Professor Jon M. Van Dyke William S. Richardson School of Law University of Hawaii at Manoa November 7, 1991

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Transcription:

THE GULF KAR'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW RAMIFICATIONS; Ii RETROSPECTIVE Professor Jon M. Van Dyke William S. Richardson School of Law University of Hawaii at Manoa November 7, 1991 The Positiye Aspects 1. Aggression was confronted and rolled back. 2. A multilateral approach was used--close coordination among a11ies--no unilateral intervention. 3. The United Nations was used throughout; Security Council Resolutions sanctioned the used of force. 4. The U. S. Congress was asked to give specific authorization for the use of force and did so--no unilateral presidential use of force--war Powers Resolution given greater legitimacy. 5. During the conduct of the war, the U.S. forces appear to have given attention to the duty Qf combatants to protect civilian liyes and only target true military facilities. When au. S. "smart" bomb did attack a bomb shelter containing civilians, this caused substantial criticism and reinforced the view that civilians should be protected. "Smart bombs" appear to enable combatants to give,greater prote'ctiqn to civilians. The requirements of the 1977 ProtQcol I to the Geneva Conventions, which require those who plan attacks to take "all feasible precautions" to avoid damage to civilians (art. 57) and tq weigh the military damage to be gained against the civilian loss, appear to have been taken seriously by the allied forces. 6. A prqgram Qf reparations has been establ ished, thus reinforcing the view that Iraq is responsible for the harm it has imposed upon Kuwait. 7. The conflict bas led to greater attention to the risks of nuclear proliferation. And may lead to new efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 8. The cqalition of allies organized for this war appears to have played a positive role in leading to the beginnings of negotiatiqns to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Negatiye Aspects 1. A war occurred, in which enormous numbers of soldiers and substantial numbers of civilians were killed. The large number of dead Iraqi soldiers does not seem to be a matter of concern outside Iraq. Although the "smart bombs" may have spared some damage to civilians, 90 percent of the bombs were ordinary nonsmart bombs which are relatively indiscriminate in their destruction. Many civilians were killed. 2. Economic sanctions were not given enough time to work. Although this confrontation provided an almost classic case where sanctions could work--because all exports of petroleum from Iraq could be stopped--the allies were not willing to wait and see if these sanctions could work, and thus were not willing to avoid war and save lives. 3. Long-term environmental damage was imposed on the Gulf region. The release of oil into the Gulf appears likely to leave an impact on the ecology of the region for years to come. The burning of the Kuwaiti oil fields has caused substantial air pollution in the region. 4. saddam Hussein remains in power and unpunished. Despite the obvious crimes war crimes committed by Saddam Hussein, he remains in power, and no real effort appears likely to bring him to punishment. The people of Iraq are now suffering from lack of basic goods and services. Speaking in Honolulu in October 1990, President Bush referred to the Nuremhurg Trials, and pronounced that "Saddam Hussein... will - be held accountable for his, outrageous' behavior." Addressing the U. N. General Assembly a month earlier, President Bush had said, "Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these crimes of abuse and destruction. It Security Council Resolution 674 (Oct. 29, 1990) warned Iraq that "under international law, it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq." Thus far, no efforts have Qeen undertaken to enforce personal liability. The failure to act weakens the Nuremburg precedents. 5. The oppression of the Kurds and other minorities in Iraq remains. The world community seems relatively oblivious to the aspirations of the Kurds for self-determination, and to their very real fears of continued oppression. 6. Kuwait remains undemocratic. The preexisting regime in Kuwait' has returned to power, and prospects for free elections remain uncertain. 7. Iraq' s capacity to make nuclear weapons and chemical weapons apparently remains. Although U.N. investigators have made headway in discovering the nature of Iraq's arsenal, it is unclear whether Iraq's capacity to make weapons of mass destruction will be diminished.

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THE GULF WAR'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW RAMIFICATIONS; " RETROSPECTIVE Professor Jon H. Van Dyke William S. Richardson School of Law University of Hawaii at Manoa November 7, 1991 The Positive ASDects 1. Aggression was confronted and rolled back. 2. A multilateral approach was used--close coordination among 8ll1es--no unilateral intervention. 3. The United Nations was used throughout; security Council Resolutions sanctioned the used of force. 4. The V, S. congress was asked to give specific authorization for the use of force and did so--no unilateral presidential use of force--war Powers Resolution given greater legitimacy. 5. During the conduct of the war. the V.S. forces appear to have given attention to the duty of combatants to protect civilian lives and only target true military facilities. When au. S. "smart" bomb did attack a bomb shelter containing civilians, this caused substantial criticism and reinforced the view that civilians should be protected. "Smart bombs" appear to enable combatants to give.greater prote ction to civilians. The requirements of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which require those who plan attacks to take "all feasible precautions" to avoid damage to civilians (art. 57) and to weigh the military damage to be gained against the civilian loss, appear to have been taken seriously by the allied forces. 6. A program of reparations has been established, thus reinforcing the view that Iraq is responsible for the harm it bas imposed upon Kuwait. 7. The conflict has led to greater attention to the risks of nuclear proliferation. And may lead to new efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 8. The coalition of allies organized for this war appears to have played a positive role in leading to the beginnings of negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Negatiye Aspects 1. A war occurred. in which enormous numbers of soldiers and supstantial numbers of civilians were killed. The large number of dead Iraqi soldiers does not seem to be a matter of concern outside Iraq. Although the "smart bombs" may have spared some damage to civilians, 90 percent of the bombs were ordinary nonsmart bombs which are relatively indiscriminate in their destruction. Many civilians were killed. 2. Economic sanctions were not given enough time to work. Although this confrontation provided an almost classic case where sanctions could work--because all exports of petroleum from Iraq could be stopped--the allies were not willing to wait and see if these sanctions could work, and thus were not willing to avoid war and save lives. 3. Long-term environmental damage was imposed on the Gulf region. The release of oil into the Gulf appears likely to leave an impact on the ecology of the region for years to come. The burning of the Kuwaiti oil fields has caused substantial air pollution in the region. 4. Saddam Hussein remains in power and unpunished. Despite the obvious crimes war crimes committed by Saddam Hussein, he remains in power, and no real eff.ort appears likely to bring him to punishment. The people of Iraq are now suffering from lack of basic goods and services. Speaking in Honolulu in October 1990, President Bush referred to the Nuremburg Trials, and pronounced that "Saddam Hussein... will - be held accountable for his outrageous' behavior." Addressing the U. N. General Assembly a month earlier, President Bush had said, "Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these crimes of abuse and destruction." Security Council Resolution 674 (Oct. 29, 1990) warned Iraq that "under international law, it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. II Thus far, no efforts have ~een undertaken to enforce personal liability. The failure to act weakens the Nuremhurg precedents. 5. The oppression of the Kurds and other minorities in Iraq remains. The world community seems relatively oblivious to the aspirations of the Kurds for self-determination, and to their very real fears of continued oppression. 6. Kuwait remains undemocratic. The preexisting regime in Kuwai t has returned to power, and prospects for free elections remain uncertain. 7. Iraq's capacity to make nuclear weapons and chemical weapons apparently remains. Although U.N. investigators have made headway in discovering the nature of Iraq's arsenal, it is unclear whether Iraq's capacity to make weapons of mass destruction will be diminished.