FIFTH ANNIVERSARY THE WAR T. PRESIDENT CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE JESSICA OF THE IRAQ AR: LESSONS AND GUIDING U.S.

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1 THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ WAR AR: LESSONS LEARNED AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR FUTUR UTURE U.S. FOREIG OREIGN POLICY U.S. JESSICA T. MATHEWS T. PRESIDENT CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

2 We have put ourselves into a position now where the choice of staying or going is going to be one of the most politically divisive and painful choices and difficult choices we have ever had to make. ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ WAR AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS JESSICA MATHEWS: Here we find ourselves on the fifth anniversary of this war, which is almost incredible even for those of us who believed before the war how ill-advised it was. So, I mean, what do we know now? And what did we think then? We argued first of all that there was no evidence of an imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction, that we would probably find research on biological weapons, a destroyed nuclear program, and some old chemical weapons. And that is exactly what was found. Secondly, we argued that the idea that the invasion of Iraq would produce overnight a stable democratic Iraq, which in turn would create a tsunami of democracy across the region which was nonsense was a wild illusion either that you would achieve democracy overnight in Iraq or that others in the region would see that that was a desirable goal because how had it been achieved? Through a foreign invasion. This is not exactly what most people would have welcomed. Exactly what has happened on both counts. And indeed, we argued in advance that what it would probably produce was more authoritarianism in the region because of greater political unrest. And we have seen that as well. And third, we argued that the record through all of the interventions made military interventions made to achieve political change showed how extraordinarily difficult that is to do, and that the only we could only see, looking back through the whole history of American interventions, four that you could call a success in creating political change. Two were Germany and Japan, clearly special cases, destroyed nations that had been defeated in a major war, and where we made a major commitment to stay for decades, in one case, with huge numbers of troops, but which had both had democracy before the war and in the other case, two tiny little nations, Panama and Grenada, nothing that looked remotely like Iraq. And finally, we argued, as did a few others before the war, that we would be diverting ourselves from a difficult task in Afghanistan. And sure enough, we did. So to look back on these five years is painful because so much of what has happened has proved, in fact, to have been utterly predictable. And I guess I would have to say that I don t think we have seen the worst of it yet. We have lost 4,000 men and women, many more than that critically injured. We have spent over a trillion dollars. We have much more to spend, but more than that, we have worked ourselves, we have empowered Iran, we have made the region less stable. And we have put ourselves into a position now where the choice of staying or going is going to be one of the most politically divisive and painful choices and difficult choices we have ever had to make.

3 THE DEBATE OVER TROOP WITHDRAWAL ITHDRAWAL, THE SURGE URGE, AND LACK OF POLITICAL PROGRESS The middle of a presidential campaign is the worst possible time to have a debate like this because this is a debate that has two very unappetizing obvious answers: stay indefinitely or leave and quote, surrender. If we leave sometime in the next few years, I do think it is likely that in the short term, there will be a violent struggle for power in Iraq among the many armed militia and parties that we are currently now supporting many of. That is going to look like it was a terrible mistake to leave. On the other hand, if we stay, our presence in the region is more than an irritant. It is an igniter of opposition to us, not just in Iraq, but across the region. It looks like many believe we invaded in the first place to gain control of Iraq s oil resources. And what we do with the Iraqi oil law and in particular how much power foreign oil companies, multinationals have over the exploitation of Iraqi oil resources is going to mean a great deal of that what people see. The Sunnis are getting more disappointed and less hopeful that what they felt was promised will happen. So there is an unknowable deadline approachin ching when they will no longer wait But if we stay, it becomes a pretext in a region or a centerpiece of what defines the power struggles in this very unsettled part of the world. And this will be an experiment whether we stay or go, where we will never know what the other choice would have meant. And so because there are no appetizing answers, there has to be a wide degree of public consensus in this country about the right route to go or we will tear ourselves apart the way we did over Vietnam for generations, I think. The president was very, very clear on what the purpose of the surge was. It was to reduce the level of violence in order to achieve a political reconciliation or to create breathing space for political reconciliation. I think it is the case that the Sunnis are getting more and more disappointed and less and less hopeful that the things that they felt were promised to them will happen. So there is an unknowable deadline approaching when they will no longer wait for them. There was supposed to be a revision of the constitution, a meaningful one that would give them a greater role than the original constitution did. And you may remember that right after the constitution was approved, there was a promise that it would be amended. That hasn t happened. The fact that government can t deliver more services basic services: water, sewage, electricity, et cetera, also reflects the government s incompetence and corruption more than evil intent towards the Sunnis, but partly that as well. There is an unknowable period during which they will wait and hope for that change. And at some point, that will run out. And then we face a much bigger problem.

4 FIVE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FUTURE U.S. I think as we think about what we need to do going forward, we first have to recognize some very simple principles. 1. The United States has very limited power to determine the course of political change in foreign countries. Policies built on affecting political outcomes are almost certain to fail. The first is our very limited power to determine the course of political change in large countries or in any country. I still Th The notion that somehow read now people writing complicated scenarios about how we fundamental political change can determine how the current political crisis in Pakistan will can happen overnight and come out, whether we support this party or this party, or push happen at outside instigation this, do this, do that. It should have become pretty clear, what was historically ly blind and happened over the course of the last several months already, obviously phony. that our ability to determine a political outcome is extremely small. And a policy that is built on attempting to do that is almost certainly going to be a disappointment, if not an outright failure. So that is number one. 2. Both timing and a country's readiness for democracy are critical to successful reform. The United States must be realistic about when timing is right for democratic reform and how long it takes for fundamental political change to happen. And of course that goes to the question, well, let s say as principle number two, it is to recognize that right now that while democracy may be always a good as the president says, freedom is better than anything else true. But timing is important and readiness for democracy is important. And democracy may be a very bad thing to be introduced at a particular push, at a particular moment. Certainly bad for U.S. interests, I mean, as it has been in the region recently. Everywhere there have been elections, forces inimical to our interests have been elected. And that has not gone unnoticed in other regions. Activists, Islamist groups now view elections as their most attractive tool to advance their own power because they did in Palestine with the victory of Hamas. They have done in Egypt with the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, et cetera. We have to be very smart and realistic about when conditions are right for it and how long it takes for fundamental political change to happen. That was the core mistake of the Bush administration. This notion that somehow fundamental political change can happen overnight and happen at outside instigation was historically blind and obviously phony. And look how long it took to get an imperfect still democracy in the United States and how long it took before more than half of the people in this country had the vote for heaven s sakes and in every other place where a democracy has evolved over the years. It does take a recognition that the simplistic formula that the Bush administration developed, that now our interests and our values are one was an illusion. There are many times and in many places where our values are steady, but our short-term interests require that we act with a certain

5 recognition of political realities on the ground and a much greater sense of the limits of what any outside power can do, any outside power. It doesn t matter how powerful they are. 3. Military power does not translate directly into political power and influence. The third principle that should shape our ongoing policy in the Middle East is a much clearer understanding that military power does not translate directly into political influence, political power. They are different things. And that question then, political power, political influence, our ability to influence the course of events probably leads us to principal number four, which is that we have to care about legitimacy. 4. Legitimacy matters. The way the world judges U.S. actions directly determines the ability of the United States to lead. We have to care and to recognize that it matters how the rest of the world sees us and judges us, which will determine whether the rest of the world sees our actions as having been legitimate or not. The fact is that most of the world and we knew this in advance saw our invasion of Iraq as illegitimate. It was not preemptive of an imminent threat, but it was preventive war unilaterally declared, and that is not a legitimate form of international action. So we have to care about legitimacy going forward because it determines our ability to lead because it will determine whether we have any followers. 5. The Israeli Palestinian conflict remains central in the political mind of o f the region. There will be no stable road to peace in the region so long as the conflict continues to fester, yet the conditions required to achieve a two-state solution are rapidly evaporating. And then I would also put down the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the political mind of the region. There is a view here that Arab governments simply use, don t really at all about the Palestinians, which is often true, and use that conflict as an excuse to divert attention from their own failings. Well, there is a good deal of truth in that, but it is only a partial truth because the fact is that they do use it and can use it and will be able to continue to use it. They can t use it if it is not there if there is some kind of a settlement. But much more importantly that throughout the Arab world there is a view that an enormous injustice was done to the Palestinian people. In part, I would argue because of their own failings, their own unwillingness to accept compromise. Fine, but nonetheless, there it is on the ground. And you are not going to find, I think, any stable road to peace as long as region-wide as long as that conflict festers. And I think one of the most important points that was made in Carnegie s New Middle East report that recently came out was that the conditions for allowing a two-state solution to be achieved are rapidly evaporating, that in order to have a two-state solution, you have to have two contiguous pieces of geography, you have to have two political entities that you no longer have on the Palestinian side able to exercise control and represent the sovereign interests of those two people, you have to have political will on both sides and all of that is disappearing. So time is not on our sides on that. And these seven, eight lost years are extraordinarily costly for us and for the region, for the world.