The Logistics of Emergency Response: Tsunami versus Haiti Ramina Samii, OPEC Fund for International Development and Luk N. Van Wassenhove, Academic Director, INSEAD Social Innovation Centre The 2004 Tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake have been the most devastating natural disasters in our recent history. Media coverage and the subsequent global response in form of donations for these two disasters have been comparable. However, the international community cannot claim the same success in terms of timely distribution of relief items to the Haitian people as it has for the Tsunamiaffected people. We argue that while there are important parallels between these two events, there are also major differences that affected the operations of those in the front-line: the concerned governments and relief organisations. Tsunamis and earthquakes continue to be the least predictable of all natural disasters and therefore the most challenging disasters to respond to. To put into context the response of the affected governments and the international community to the Tsunami and the Haiti earthquake, we start by presenting what activities and actors are involved in disaster response. Then we review the impact of the two disasters on the affected geographies. Thereafter, we discuss the similarities and differences between the two events with a view to explain the delays experienced in the Haiti operation. Disaster Response What is important to note is that disaster response is the prime responsibility of the affected country. The affected government has the option to request for international assistance. Typically, the eventual international assistance complements the national effort and is coordinated and directed by the concerned government authorities. For each emergency, a humanitarian organization establishes its own supply chain. This disaster-specific supply chain consists of a number of activities to be carried out by the humanitarian organization in cooperation with a range of actors. Those in the front-line have to plan their response, mobilize resources from the donor community, purchase goods from suppliers, and arrange for the transportation of goods and assets to the disaster site. Upon arrival of relief items, these need to be stored in warehouses before distribution to the population.
Operations of Humanitarian Organizations Supply Chain Activities Plan $ Goods Resource Mobilization People Asset Supply Chain Actors Media Donors Local To stage their response, humanitarian organisations need to leverage the assets and capabilities of a number of actors. Media coverage can directly impact the fund mobilization outcome of a relief operation. Governments and humanitarian organisations depend on the contribution of donors, which range from the public, to foundations, corporations, governments and their institutions to mobilize a wide range of resources. Donors, together with local, regional, and international suppliers, provide the relief items. Donors, the recipient country, neighbouring countries and the military provide access to physical infrastructure such as ports, airports and warehouses as well as movable assets such as helicopters and trucks. Implementing partners, i.e. the local and foreign NGO community with local knowledge, presence and network, typically act as distributors. What is important to note is that, with the exception of suppliers, with whom the affected government and humanitarian community have a commercial relationship, the motivation behind the contribution of the other actors can range from purely humanitarian to self-interest. The Tsunami-hit Countries Regional International Sourcing Suppliers Government Transport & Storage Physical Infrastructure Military Logistics Asset Providers Movable Assets Neighbouring Countries Distribution Implementing Partners The powerful earthquake measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale, which struck off the coast of the Aceh Province on the island of Sumatra in Indonesia on 26 December 2004, resulted in numerous tidal waves or the Tsunami. The Tsunami travelled as far as 1,600 kilometres from the earthquake epicentre touching the coasts of 15 countries. It had the most devastating impact in Indonesia and seriously affected four other countries: India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The death toll of this epical disaster has been estimated at 260,000 people while the number of people requiring immediate emergency relief was set at 2 million. The highest level of human loss, structural damage and disruption to lives and livelihoods was experienced in the west coast of Sumatra. It was estimated that around 200,000 were dead and over half a million people depended on external assistance. About 150 km of road along the western coast collapsed, impeding access. However, given the fewer number of survivors and the subsequent migration of around 250,000 people to the east coast in terms of actual numbers, the need for emergency assistance was lower in this area than in the less affected zones. As a result, the east coast, while damaged, had to contend with a major influx of Internally Displace People (IDP) whose high mobility created an additional challenge for the authorities. Donors
The second most affected area was the southeast coast of Sri Lanka. The affected areas included some lightly populated zones. It was estimated that around 37,000 were dead and over 450,000 people depended on external assistance. Six Thai provinces were affected by the Tsunami killing around 10,000 people. The Tsunami reached the coasts of four Indian states but the worst hit areas were the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It is estimated that another 10,000 people lost their lives in India and close to a million people were displaced. The Tsunami was the biggest natural disaster to have ever struck the 300,000 inhabitants of the Maldives. The relative impact of the tsunami was much greater here than elsewhere. It affected 140 inhabited islands, 69 of which completely flooded, destroying over 4,000 homes. Inter-island communication facilities and systems collapsed in the affected islands. Similar to Indonesia, the Maldivian government had to deal with the IDP initially through evacuation and relocation including the provision of temporary shelters. Response to the Tsunami The Tsunami-affected countries had different policies with regard to foreign assistance: some welcomed it while others turned it down. Similar to Thailand, the Indian government s policy is not to ask for external assistance during emergencies. However, both countries do not oppose to voluntary assistance. Interestingly, the Indian and Thai government not only catered to the needs of their own population but also to that of the other Tsunami-hit countries such as the Maldives, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The Maldives was unprepared for a disaster of this scale. With no national or local level structure for disaster management, it reacted quickly by appointing the Minister of Defence as the chief coordinator of the response effort and activating a national disaster management centre. In contrast, the other affected countries could rely on disaster response institutional setups and mechanisms (e.g. disaster response plans, funds, ministerial responsibilities). In Thailand, for example, the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines between different government authorities including the Royal Thai armed forces and Thai Red Cross at the national, provincial and district levels are clear. In Sri Lanka, while all districts have disaster management plans in place, those districts with experience in managing emergency situations in conflict areas or localized natural disasters such as floods performed best. Line ministries in Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka quickly deployed staff and assets to the region in support of local authorities. As a result, government response of these four countries was immediate and on the whole considered effective. Again, with the exception of the Maldives, the military forces of the affected countries, part and parcel of their countries response mechanisms, were at the forefront of disaster response. Arriving quickly on the scene, they provided security, crucial logistics support, communications, and delivered large quantities of relief supplies. While in Thailand the capacity of the Royal Thai Armed Forces was sufficient, in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, needs outstripped the capacity of the national military both in terms of personnel and transport assets.
This gap was often filled by foreign military forces. For example, in Indonesia, the first distributions of food were made by military helicopter drop, with the US military taking the lead. In terms of infrastructure repairs, the Pakistani army together with the Indonesian army cleared up the Banda Aceh port while the Australian army assisted the Indonesian army to repair bridges. As many as 43 foreign military forces assisted Sri Lanka in its emergency assistance effort. The presence of the humanitarian community prior to the Tsunami among the affected countries was uneven. While most international humanitarian organisations had on-going operations in India and Sri Lanka, fewer organisations had sizable operations in Sumatra, Thailand or the Maldives. Those with local presence could act swiftly. Given their local capacity for emergency response and pre-existing relationships with relevant government entities, they mobilized and redeployed their resources, including in-country stockpiles, within hours from the disaster. To sustain their response effort, they released urgent stocks from their regional or global warehouses and engaged in procurement. In Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka relief organisations could readily rely on the local market to procure food (e.g. rice, fortified biscuits, noodles, etc.). In Sri Lanka, for example, given the limited damage to food crops and the bumper March harvest, the country could rely on local procurement of rice. Eventual shortcomings were swiftly supplemented by imports from the region. While in India none of the affected areas were food insecure areas, except for large quantities of fish, the Maldives depends on imports to meet its food requirements. With no pre-positioned emergency supplies and little storage capacity, the government of the Maldives released and distributed food and non-food items from its country stocks. Humanitarian organisations were obliged to fly in relief supplies. What made the difference in the Tsunami affected countries was the immediate and significant response of the local people. In India, Thailand and Sri Lanka local communities covered the initial basic needs of the affected populations at the time the authorities were putting into motion their emergency response plans. The response of local and international NGOs and private companies to the Tsunami was unprecedented. Hundreds of new NGOs arrived in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand while the size of the existing agencies grew in Sri Lanka. To manage and coordinate the huge and spontaneous international response, from the start, the Thai and Sri Lankan governments took a proactive coordination role and established coordination units. In Sumatra, no central authority was coordinating the response of the NGO community given the very high degree of destruction of government offices and loss of personnel. Although most contributions filled critical gaps, numerous inexperienced, scarcely resourced well-doers that arrived on the scene placed an unnecessary and additional strain on the response system creating coordination challenges. The large quantities of inappropriate donations that arrived further exasperated logistics and transportation challenges. The logistics challenges across the Tsunami-affected countries were uneven. The situation on the west coast of Sumatra was dire. Accessibility was reduced; in fact soon after the disaster only military helicopters and landing craft had access.
Lack of logistics assets such as helicopters and destroyed infrastructure further constrained movements and delivery of goods. Humanitarian organisations used a wide range of transport means to stage their response. To relieve the extraordinary congestion on the Banda Aceh airport, they used different routes from the other airports in Indonesia to the Subang air base in Malaysia. To overcome shortage of storage areas, humanitarian organisations established temporary warehouses including a floating warehouse set up by the World Food Programme off the west coast. Unlike in Aceh, Sri Lanka s central infrastructure in Colombo was hardly touched by the Tsunami. In terms of transport, compared to Aceh, the distances in Sri Lanka were shorter and the damage to infrastructure less extensive. Thanks to its well-established logistics mechanisms, the Sri Lankan government took the lead role both in the transportation and distribution of relief items. Humanitarian organisations and private donors would deliver their donations to government warehouses in the capital city. The government would then arrange for their transportation to district stores and distribution points. Given the island geography of the Maldives - a composition of 1,200 islands across 900 km and its highly dispersed population, even under normal circumstances, transportation is a time consuming exercise given the distances to be covered. Moreover, the islands are serviced by slow and light-load local vessels. However, as the government s food distribution system is well established, it performed efficiently in the aftermath of the disaster. Similar to the other affected countries, the arrival of a wide variety of food and non-food donations, including both requested and unsolicited items, placed a tremendous strain on the country s limited storage facilities and logistics capacity. Haiti s earthquake The epicentre of the January 2010 7.0 Richter scale Haiti earthquake was 25 km from the capital city of Port-au-Prince and 15 km from the other major urban centres; in other terms the most densely populated area of the country. The earthquake is estimated to have killed over 200,000 people, left behind more than 1 million homeless, a further 500,000 IDP and a staggering 300,000 injured survivors, most of whom requiring medical assistance. Approximately three million Haitians are estimated to have been severely affected by the earthquake, 2 million of whom require regular food and water. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. Prior to the disaster, out of approximately 8.5 million Haitians, one million was already dependent on foreign aid. Years of conflict, poor management and successive deadly natural disasters had eroded government resources and capability. It goes without saying that the only option facing the Haitian government was to call for a massive international assistance.
Operations of Humanitarian Organizations Supply Chain Activities Plan Media Solicited $ Goods Resource Mobilization People Unsolicited Asset Supply Chain Actors Donors Local Regional Sourcing Suppliers International Government Transport & Storage Physical Infrastructure Military Logistics Asset Providers Movable Assets Distribution Implementing Partners The quake left the whole country under shock; a state of shock which lasted for days. The quake had hit the capital city, the seat of the government. While the images of the damaged presidential palace travelled around the world, there were no images of the parliament or other symbolic government buildings as they had all collapsed. Around 1.2 million people regrouped in more than 500 densely populated makeshift camps. With no resources or a functioning governmental structure, the country was not in the position to take the lead in disaster response or coordinate the international effort. Moreover, as Haiti does not have any military force, the country could not rely on an army and military assets such as heavy duty equipment and helicopters to jump-start an initial response. Donors Neighbouring Countries Dominican Rep Given Haiti s political and economic situation, the humanitarian community was present throughout the country, some organisations with sizable operations. However, their response capability was also seriously affected. Indeed, the UN experienced its biggest human loss in its history. This, together with damage to its infrastructure, made it almost un-operational in the first few days. To stage a response, the humanitarian community first used its in-country stockpiles and released stocks from their regional and global warehouses. As the opportunity for local procurement of food and non-food items was negligible, the community had to rely on imports from regional and global suppliers. Usually in any natural disaster, the immediate and significant response comes from the local communities. However, given the extent of damage and the fragile state of the economy prior to the disaster, the Haitians were not able to extend a helping hand to those affected. In addition, the private sector lost a significant portion of its human capital and infrastructure, the latter loss estimated at around 20,000 commercial buildings destroyed. The response of the international community to the earthquake was heartening both in terms of speed and size. Hundreds of NGOs, private companies, and individuals converged on the disaster site while the size of existing humanitarian organisations grew exponentially. Therefore, there was no lack of goodwill or financial resources to stage a relief effort.
Huge logistics challenges confronted those on the front-line. Accessibility was significantly curtailed. Port-au-Prince s airport and more specifically its air control tower was damaged. To resume air traffic for humanitarian purposes, soon after the disaster, the US military took over the air traffic control responsibilities and ran the one-runway airfield using a portable control tower brought from the US. As a result the airport, which prior to the disaster managed the arrival of 10-12 aircrafts a day, accommodated up to 170 flights/day. As a passenger airport, the airport did not have sufficient cargo storage space. To overcome shortage of storage facilities, humanitarian organisations established their own temporary warehouses near and around the airport. Lack of logistics assets such as helicopters and trucks, which constrained movements and delivery of goods to distribution points, was the next logistical bottleneck humanitarian organisations had to contend with. Finally, given the overall destruction and the emergence of spontaneous make-shift settlements, humanitarian organisations had to set up exnovo distribution sites. The capital s port was also seriously damaged. It became only partially operational 11 days after the disaster. It took a month before the port could handle an average of 350 containers per day, and that was only after installation of equipment and arrival of specialized crane ships. To increase the capacity of the port up to four times, two floating docks were installed. The Dominican Republic, Haiti s immediate neighbour was extremely collaborative. To relieve the extraordinary congestion on the Port-au-Prince airport, it consented to the use of the Santo Domingo airport and port for humanitarian cargo. Given the lack of other viable alternatives, the airport, port as well as the road connecting Santo Domingo to Haiti soon became congested with humanitarian cargo. One month after the disaster, it took an average of one and a half day to travel between the two capitals that are only 375 km apart. Similarities and differences There are a number of similarities between these two disasters. The nominal number of deaths and people requiring assistance are very similar. The scale and complexity of both emergencies exceeded the response capacity of any single humanitarian organization and the experience of affected countries. Both disasters galvanized public and media attention for weeks. The international response to these disasters was overwhelming. As a result, both relief operations were relatively well and rapidly resourced without the need for a major fund raising effort on the part of the humanitarian community. In the aftermath of the Tsunami and the Haiti earthquake, armed forces by providing logistical support and establishing a safe and secure environment played a vital role. However, while in the Tsunami-affected countries, national military forces took the lead, in the case of Haiti, in the absence of a national army, the US army took the lead. The international response resulted in an unprecedented flow of solicited and unsolicited relief goods. This was followed by an influx of experienced and less experienced individuals and NGOs. Well-resourced, specialized, and experienced organisations had to work alongside individuals and organisations lacking experience in disaster response. This gave rise to similar coordination problems.
Similar to the Aceh Province, the main port of Port-au-Prince was damaged. Key airports in Indonesia and Sri Lanka like in Haiti and Dominican Republic were congested. Similar to the Maldives and Indonesia, humanitarian organisations in Haiti had to deal with a major influx of internally displaced people (estimated at around 460,000) and the need to predict their movements over time. In terms of differences, a Tsunami like an earthquake kills fast but a Tsunami injures few. Indeed, despite similar number of deaths and people requiring aid, the number of injured in the Haiti earthquake amounted to a staggering 300,000 while that of the Tsunami was contained. The Haiti earthquake was concentrated on a very small and densely populated area compared to the Tsunami which reached thousands of kilometres of coastline, some areas of which lightly populated. Relocation was to a large extent managed by the Tsunami-affected governments while in Haiti, the population regrouped in hygienically unequipped spontaneous settlements. Due to shortage of space, space for latrines and adherence to minimum shelter size in organized settlements could not be assured. Moreover, the Haiti earthquake hit the capital city of the country and as such the seat of the government and the life-line of the economy. The Tsunami did not affect any capital city. Comparison Haiti Quake vs. Tsunami 2004 Haiti Before Disaster Poorest Country No Military Forces Weak Government Haiti Disaster Capital City Densely Populated Areas 300,000 injured Deaths/No. of Survivors Well-resourced Relief Operation Government Affected NGO/UN/Private Sector Affected Port/ Road/ Airport Affected Country Food dependent Tsunami 2004 Unlike many emergency operations managed by international humanitarian organisations, the Tsunami countries had relatively strong government response mechanisms in place. While India and Thailand declared that they could deal with the situation on their own, the Sri Lankan government required some assistance. Despite the fact that the level of destruction and relief needs were highest in the Aceh province, the government and its military had an overall control over the relief effort. This was not the case of Haiti. The earthquake had decapitated the government preventing it to take the lead in the coordination and distribution of the relief operation. In the absence of a national military force, the US military took over many governmental functions. Finally, lack of transport assets, storage space and distribution outlets paralyzed the relief effort. The worst affected areas in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were or had been conflict areas but this did not have an adverse affect on the countries response capabilities. On the contrary, past natural disasters and the ongoing conflicts had reinforced government structures and capabilities. In contrast, in Haiti, the long list of natural disasters and political instability had emptied government coffers and weakened government structures. 10
Contrary to the Tsunami-hit countries where the humanitarian organisations present could immediately mount their response, in Haiti, the response capabilities of these very organisations were seriously affected along with that of the private sector. The worst affected areas by the Tsunami were generally food self-sufficient or food surplus regions. In addition, the response effort could depend on local and regional food procurement. Unfortunately, Haiti, which is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, even before the earthquake depended on foreign aid and was food deficient ruling out the option of significant local procurement. Moreover, because of lack of rain, the upcoming harvest season is not expected to alleviate the current food situation. The response of local communities in the aftermath of the Tsunami made a difference. Again, this was not the case in Haiti as local communities were themselves seriously affected and the economy could simply not absorb the shock. Conclusion The delays experienced in the Haiti operation can be attributed to four elements. The first element is related to the weak state of the Haitian economy prior to the disaster. Second, the earthquake seriously affected the response capabilities of key actors such as the government, the local communities, the existing humanitarian community, and the private sector. This was further compounded by absence of national military forces. Third, the earthquake created significant logistical challenges. The level of destruction, congestion and inadequacy of the receiving infrastructure such as the primary port and airport, the road network, and storage and distribution capacity delayed the staging of a response for days. Finally, such logistical challenges were further compounded by the massive arrival of experienced and inexperienced new and well-established well-wishers and large quantities of appropriate and inappropriate in-kind donations all concentrated in a small area. The ability of a country to respond to its disaster is correlated to its level of economic development. Investment in disaster preparedness is often marginal in poor and underdeveloped countries. Prevention measures, such as construction standards against natural disasters such as earthquakes or floods, are typically lax in less developed countries increasing the level of destruction during disasters. Lack of prevention measures and national disaster preparedness together with a low level of economic development further aggravate the impact of a disaster on the population. In Haiti, these three elements, which are interconnected, created a vicious circle. The implication for the international community is the need to distinguish between fragile/failed states, least developed countries and other countries. This is with a view to establish specific funds, policies and operational procedures to guide the planning and response phases. As described earlier in this article, to meet the needs of the affected population, humanitarian organisations need to conduct a series of activities which leverage the assets and capabilities of a range of actors. However, disasters themselves may temporarily disable one or even multiple actors. The disaster or the lack of infrastructure and assets may also affect the capacity of the humanitarian community to execute a particular activity. As a result, the humanitarian community needs to have a plan to replace each missing node in its supply chain.
Strong partnerships with parties committed to the humanitarian cause with core competencies that match the requirements of humanitarian organisations is a valid mitigation measure against missing nodes. The number of disabled actors was unprecedented during the Haiti earthquake. The response and coordination capability of the government together with that of the local community and the private sector was severely reduced. There was no military. The response capability of humanitarian organisations already in the country, hence their planning, transport and distribution capacity, was also affected. Although one cannot expect international humanitarian organisations or foreign countries to take over government roles and functions, this scenario needs to be contemplated. In Haiti, the US government through its military forces took over some government functions. 10 days elapsed before for the UN and the US government could agree on their roles and responsibilities and their interface with the government. To avert power vacuum or usurp in future disasters, the UN could establish guidelines on the distribution of roles and responsibilities of the local government, the UN, and foreign governments to be endorsed by UN member states. In the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, humanitarian organisations quickly scaled up their capacity with the arrival of additional staff from other duty stations. However, the response capability of the local community and the domestic private sector is hard to replace through external resources. It is worth noting that the response of the well-established humanitarian community to the Haiti earthquake could have been fragmented and dispersive if it were not for the cluster approach. Through the cluster approach, a number of organisations are designated as lead agencies for about a dozen areas such as food, shelter, and logistics. These organisations then coordinate the response of those humanitarian organisations that have endorsed the cluster approach. This method ensures predictable leadership, coordination and accountability. Given the vast needs of the affected populations, in Haiti, the cluster approach was implemented in full-scale ensuring coordination among organisations active in providing similar goods or services and/or requiring common services (e.g. logistics support). The lead agency of a cluster would hold regular (even daily) meetings with organisations part of its cluster with a view to share information on the latest developments, identify gaps, avoid access capacity or surpluses, plan and prioritize response operations, agree on responsibilities, and coordinate the actions of the cluster with other stakeholders and actors. To stage their response, humanitarian organisations require logistical infrastructure and assets. In case of shortage, they need to find a solution or an alternative. However, the establishment or identification of ex-novo infrastructure such as warehouses and distribution sites or mobilization of additional assets such as trucks requires time, effort and funding.
As noted earlier on, the physical infrastructure of Port-au-Prince (port, airport, warehouses, and distribution points) was either damaged or insufficient to accommodate the massive influx of goods and people. Insufficient transport capacity to move goods and people into and within Haiti was another drawback. In this respect, the logistics cluster contributed to alleviating the significant logistical challenges met on the ground. Led by the World Food Programme, this cluster which provides a common service to the humanitarian community, over time shared logistics information; secured warehousing space for inter-agency use; transported goods into and within Haiti for different organisations; ensured the air transport of humanitarian and media operators in, around and out of Haiti; coordinated the activities of the humanitarian community with US and other forces deployed in the country; established transit hubs; and managed a logistics information platform. As a result, it ensured a more effective and efficient use of scarce logistical resources as it would have been otherwise. Disasters often destroy the very infrastructure required to receive relief items. The humanitarian community is not endowed with an emergency reconstruction fund. Often, funding for reconstruction is raised months after the emergency period is over. To repair critical infrastructure, the community depends on the voluntary financial and technical contribution of donor countries. To move away from this situation and ensure a degree of predictability in critical infrastructure repair, it would be desirable for the humanitarian community to establish an emergency reconstruction fund and for the affected country to seek grants for reconstruction purposes immediately after the disaster. Humanitarian organisations have a code of conduct to regulate donations. By setting standards that include ethical and operational issues, they have the right to refuse certain donations. Apart from their own policies, they also adhere to guidelines provided by a recipient country. To mobilize relief items, humanitarian organisations have an open channel of dialogue with their long-standing donors. These long-standing donors are informed of the precise needs and goods specifications of the humanitarian organisations they support. However, the list of recommended and restricted items, dispatch modalities, packaging specifications and other relevant information is not readily available to the public. Instead, it is buried in practitioners documents and organizational websites. Although humanitarian organisations do not miss an occasion to voice their preference for cash donations as opposed to goods, the level of communication remains weak. In large-scale disasters which attract a lot of media attention, this results in the arrival of significant amounts of unsolicited goods without an identifiable addressee to the disaster site. A partnership with the media in form of an information campaign can help humanitarian organisations and the recipient government communicate their needs and procedures in order to deter the arrival of inappropriate goods and inexperienced organisations. References WFP, Full Report of the Real Time Evaluation of WFP s Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, September 2005 Samii, R., Leveraging Logistics Partnerships: Lessons from Humanitarian Organisations, Erasmus Research Institute of Management, ERIM PhD Series, 153, 2008