NO. 10-12369-B CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES F.R.A.P. 26.1 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (CIP) List of PERSONS having an interest in the outcome of this case: COLBATH, JUDGE JEFFREY J. FREIMAN, PEYTON YATES (Trustee for Lawson Family Trust) GARY, JUDGE WILLIAM L. LAWSON, ALEXANDRA (a minor) LAWSON, JEFFREY P. MARRA, JUDGE KENNETH OFTEDAL, JUDGE RICHARD L. STATE OF FLORIDA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MALLORY LAW GROUP, Traded as EARL K. MALLORY PALM BEACH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURTS 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT JUDICIARY and COURTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA LEON COUNTY/CIRCUIT COURT PEYTON YATES FREIMAN, LAWSON FAMILY TRUSTEE i
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED Appellant Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson requests oral argument. Her appeal in this case is narrowly focused on questions of racial equality, sexual freedom, and fundamental federally protected constitutional rights. May it please the Court to hear her pleas of plain error and unconstitutional application of federal law: Appellant asks this court to analyze the 44 year old judicial construction and application of Civil Rights Removal (28 U.S.C. 1443(1), 1447(d)) by application of the strict scrutiny test applicable all race-based schemes, even those called benign and give that statute the full breadth and strength implicit in the plain language enacted by Congress. 28 U.S.C. 1443(1), a statute tracing its history back more than a hundred and thirty five years, as written, adopted, and codified by Congress into the positive law of the United States, ought to be one of the most powerful engines of civil rights enforcement under the constitution. The language of 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) is inclusive, rather than exclusive, but it was given an unbelievably narrow construction by the United States Supreme Court in 1966, from which the court has never retreated. Appellant submits that the racially unequal application of 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) is an affront to all recent U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence since Regents of the UC v. Bakke in 1978 and City of Richmond v. Croson in 1989. Appellant next asks this court specifically to reverse the District Court s remand of her Florida dissolution proceedings to the 15 th Judicial Circuit Court, and to allow Appellant to put on evidence showing that all the non-racial or racially neutral criteria imposed on the invocation of 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) and 1447(d) by the U.S. Supreme Court in Greenwood v. Peacock and Georgia v. Rachel do in fact apply to all proceedings under the Florida marital and dissolution statutes, in that these statutes are designed to obliterate the following fundamental ii
Constitutional freedoms: (1) freedom from statutes impairing the obligations of contract, (2) freedom from laws respecting an establishment of religion, (3) freedom of association, (4) freedom to petition for redress of grievances, (5) freedom from deprivation of private property for public use without just compensation, (6) freedom from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, (7) the right to jury trial in all cases where the matter in controversy exceeds $25.00. In sum and substance, Appellant Kathy Ann Garcia-Lawson s appeals the District Court s denial of her right to present evidence showing (1) that the outcome of all Florida Petitions for Dissolution of Marriage is fixed and predetermined, simultaneously by Florida marital statutes, court rules and practices having the force or effect of law relating to the dissolution of marriage and other official customs, practices, and policies of the state of Florida relating to marriage and having the force and effect of written law, (2) that the statutes fixing and predetermining this outcome constitute an infringement of the rights of religious freedom and freedom of contract, (3) that the statutes, court rules, and state customs, practices, and policies relating to divorce uniformly deny due process of law and give unbridled and hence unconstitutional discretion to arbitrary and capricious judicial decisions which all tend uniformly to the suppression of constitutional rights to private contractual formation of family, ownership of private property, and individual freedom. Likewise, the statutory racial language of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982 must be subjected to strict scrutiny and this court should order it stricken, because there can be no compelling governmental interest in maintaining that: All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, When the consequence of this law is to allow states to create non-racial categories of disfavored persons, such as Respondents in divorce cases, who must always lose. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES page i ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED....page ii TABLE OF CONTENTS..page iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..page vi JURISDICTION.....page 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.... page 3 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW... page 6 STATEMENT OF THE CASE (APPEAL OF REMAND OF CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL)....page 8 RELIEF REQUESTED: MAKE CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL RACIALLY NEUTRAL AND COMPLETELY COLORBLIND...page 10 ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL..page 11 ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES SHARED & RESTATED FROM KATHY ANN GARCIA-LAWSON S FIRST APPEAL 09-16406-D..page 15 Issue I: 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) the Judicial Rule Imposing Racial Discrimination in the availability of this law Cannot possibly pass strict scrutiny tests now required..page 15 Issue II: Appellant has shown that she has alleged and can prove by clear and convincing evidence all non-racial pre-requisites for removal established in Greenwood v. Peacock, Georgia v. Rachael, and Johnson v. Mississippi as required to sustain removal under 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) and 1447(d)...page 17 Issue III: Nature and Identity of the rights denied by Florida Marital and Dissolution Laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 & 1982. page 19 iv
Issue IV: Nature and Identity of the First Amendment rights denied by Florida Marital & Dissolution Laws.page 20 Issue V: Nature and Identity of the Impairment of Contract Effectively forced by Florida Marital and Dissolution Laws...page 28 Issue VI: The role of the Federal Courts in Supervising Enforcement of Federal Rights in State Court.page 31 RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT..page 33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......page 35 11th CIRCUIT RULE 32(a) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. page 36 v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)..3, 10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296; 60 S.Ct. 900; 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). 23 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469. ii, 3, 10 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479; 85 S.Ct. 1116; 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965).7, 17, 18, 19, 31, 32 Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573; 64 S.Ct. 717, 718; 88 L.Ed. 938 (1944)...22, 26 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966)..ii, 3, 10, 11 Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966). ii, 3, 5, 10, 11, 17, 30 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S.Ct. 1678; 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)..29 Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233; 56 S.Ct. 444; 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936).....21 Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936) 16 Hill v. BellSouth Telecom, Inc., 364 F.3d 1308 (11 th Cir. 2004).16 Johnson v Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 95 S.Ct 1591, 44 L.Ed.2d 121 (1975)...3, 5, 10, 11, 13 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558; 123 S.Ct. 2472; 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003)..29 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602; 91 S. Ct. 2105; 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971) 25, 27 McCullough v. Ligon, 430 F. Supp. 2d 846, 850 (E.D. Ark. 2006) 16 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).28 vi
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225; 92 S.Ct. 2151; 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972)..12, 13, 14, 17, 28 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111-115; 63 S.Ct. 870, 874-876; 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1298-1300 (1943) 21, 22, 24, 26 Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d 351, 355 (8 th Cir. 1997)..16 Near v. Minnesota 23 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 535 (1925)..28 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833; 112 S.Ct. 2791; 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)..29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; 93 S.Ct. 705; 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)..29 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978)...ii, 3, 10 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164; 60 S.Ct. 146, 152; 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939)..23, 24 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645; 92 S.Ct. 1208..28 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054; 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)..28, 29 Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978) ii, 3, 10 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37; 91 S. Ct. 746; 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).17 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 233 (1972)...28 Rule 59(e) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 28 U.S.C. 1291 1 28 U.S.C. 1331..1, 11 28 U.S.C. 1343 1 28 U.S.C. 1441(a).1,11 28 U.S.C. 1443(1).1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 26, 28 28 U.S.C. 1446 8 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 16, 35 vii
28 U.S.C. 2283.13 42 U.S.C. 1981..8, 10 42 U.S.C. 1982 8, 10 42 U.S.C. 1983 4, 13, 14, 15, 28-29 42 U.S.C. 1988(a) 4 viii