Settlers and missionaries: a sub-national comparison of the consequences of colonial institutions and historical school investments

Similar documents
ECON 450 Development Economics

Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes

Remittances and Taxation in Developing Countries

Commuting and Minimum wages in Decentralized Era Case Study from Java Island. Raden M Purnagunawan

Intra-Rural Migration and Pathways to Greater Well-Being: Evidence from Tanzania

City Size, Migration, and Urban Inequality in the People's Republic of China

Intra-Rural Migration and Pathways to Greater Well-Being: Evidence from Tanzania

The Causes of Civil War

Immigrant Legalization

Is Corruption Anti Labor?

Leaving work behind? The impact of emigration on female labour force participation in Morocco

The Colonial Origins of Civil War

Frank-Borge Wietzke a a Department of International Development, London School of. Economics, London, UK Published online: 13 Aug 2014.

Violent Conflict and Inequality

Family Size, Sibling Rivalry and Migration

Immigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B. Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results

The Economic and Political Effects of Black Outmigration from the US South. October, 2017

Internal and international remittances in India: Implications for Household Expenditure and Poverty

The impact of Temporary Events on Spatial Concentration of Population:

What Democracy Does (and Doesn t do) for Basic Services

The Effect of Ethnic Residential Segregation on Wages of Migrant Workers in Australia

INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTH IN SAARC COUNTRIES

UCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES. Open For Business? Institutions, Business Environment and Economic Development

The Labour Market Performance of Immigrant and. Canadian-born Workers by Age Groups. By Yulong Hou ( )

What Can We Learn about Financial Access from U.S. Immigrants?

Split Decisions: Household Finance when a Policy Discontinuity allocates Overseas Work

Research Proposal: Is Cultural Diversity Good for the Economy?

Supplementary Materials for Strategic Abstention in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Countries)

Revisiting the Effect of Immigration on Native Employment in the EU

Network effects in Hungarian internal migration

Economic Costs of Conflict

China s (Uneven) Progress Against Poverty. Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen Development Research Group, World Bank

SEASONAL MIGRATION AND IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS IN VIETNAM

Migration and Consumption Insurance in Bangladesh

Research Report. How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa

The Effect of Immigration on Native Workers: Evidence from the US Construction Sector

Access to agricultural land, youth migration and livelihoods in Tanzania

Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the U.S.

The European Origins of Economic Development

Financial Development, Remittances and Growth in Jamaica

Drug Trafficking Organizations and Local Economic Activity in Mexico

Immigrant Children s School Performance and Immigration Costs: Evidence from Spain

Corruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions. Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University. August 2018

Perverse Consequences of Well- Intentioned Regulation

HIST252 Guide to Responding to Units 3 & 4 Reading Questions

Is emigration of workers contributing to better schooling outcomes for children in Nepal?

Spillovers in the Urban Wage Premium

Impacts of Legal Protections for Religious Activity: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges

Do immigrants take or create residents jobs? Quasi-experimental evidence from Switzerland

Online appendix for "Immigrants, Occupations and Firm Export Performance" by Léa Marchal and Clément Nedoncelle

The Primacy of Education in Long-Run Development

All democracies are not the same: Identifying the institutions that matter for growth and convergence

TITLE: AUTHORS: MARTIN GUZI (SUBMITTER), ZHONG ZHAO, KLAUS F. ZIMMERMANN KEYWORDS: SOCIAL NETWORKS, WAGE, MIGRANTS, CHINA

The Cultural Origin of Saving Behaviour. Joan Costa Font, LSE Paola Giuliano, UCLA Berkay Ozcan*, LSE

Do We See Convergence in Institutions? A Cross- Country Analysis

Wage Rigidity and Spatial Misallocation: Evidence from Italy and Germany

Development Economics

Impacts of Economic Integration on Living Standards and Poverty Reduction of Rural Households

MIGRANT NETWORKS AND POLITICAL

The Effect of Immigrant Student Concentration on Native Test Scores

Persistence of Relative Income for Countries and Populations

Understanding permanent migration response to natural disasters: evidence from Indonesia

The impact of low-skilled labor migration boom on education investment in Nepal

John Parman Introduction. Trevon Logan. William & Mary. Ohio State University. Measuring Historical Residential Segregation. Trevon Logan.

Publicizing malfeasance:

Commuting and Productivity: Quantifying Urban Economic Activity using Cellphone Data

Low skilled Immigration and labor market outcomes: Evidence from the Mexican Tequila Crisis

Family Ties, Labor Mobility and Interregional Wage Differentials*

Risk Sharing and Transaction Costs: Evidence from Kenya s Mobile Money Revolution. William Jack and Tavneet Suri

Endogenous antitrust: cross-country evidence on the impact of competition-enhancing policies on productivity

Trust, Governance, and Growth: Exploring the Interplay

The University of Warwick. Local Governance and Contemporary Development in Indonesia: The Long Shadow of the Adat Law

Brain drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries. Are there Really Winners?

The Impact of Immigration on the Wage Structure: Spain

Corruption and Agricultural Trade. Trina Biswas

An Empirical Analysis of Pakistan s Bilateral Trade: A Gravity Model Approach

The Effect of Ethnic Residential Segregation on Wages of Migrant Workers in Australia

Migration and Tourism Flows to New Zealand

Education Benefits of Universal Primary Education Program: Evidence from Tanzania

The China Syndrome. Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States. David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H.

Migration, Wages and Unemployment in Thailand *

Remittances and the Brain Drain: Evidence from Microdata for Sub-Saharan Africa

Democracy and Primary School Attendance. Aggregate and Individual Level Evidence from Africa

Being a Good Samaritan or just a politician? Empirical evidence of disaster assistance. Jeroen Klomp

Human capital transmission and the earnings of second-generation immigrants in Sweden

Impacts of International Migration on the Labor Market in Japan

Family Values and the Regulation of Labor

Size of Regional Trade Agreements and Regional Trade Bias

Schooling and Citizenship: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms

Weather Variability, Agriculture and Rural Migration: Evidence from India

Divergent effect of social cohesion on economic growth in East Asia and Latin America

10/25/ million in

Understanding institutions

The gender gap in African political participation: Individual and contextual determinants

Do (naturalized) immigrants affect employment and wages of natives? Evidence from Germany

Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University and NBER and. David C. Maré * New Zealand Department of Labour

44 th Congress of European Regional Science Association August 2004, Porto, Portugal

Figure 2: Proportion of countries with an active civil war or civil conflict,

GOVERNANCE RETURNS TO EDUCATION: DO EXPECTED YEARS OF SCHOOLING PREDICT QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE?

The effect of residential land use regulations on urban welfare. J. Vernon Henderson. Brown University May 2007

Transcription:

Settlers and missionaries: a sub-national comparison of the consequences of colonial institutions and historical school investments Frank-Borge Wietzke Department of International Development and Masters of Public Administration

Motivation Are development outcomes explained by differences in human capital or quality of institutions? Around the world sub-national incomes highly correlated with human capital (Acemoglu and Dell 2010, Gennaioli et.al. 2013). But a lot of variation not accounted for. This could be due to differences in local institutions (Acemoglu and Dell 2010). Existing studies also do not account for endogeneity of human capital and institutions at the sub-national level.

Study approach and contribution This study uses historical data on institutions and human capital to deal with these endogeneity issues. Compares long-term consequences of missionary schooling and colonial settler institutions within Madagascar. Sub-national focus also helps resolve deadlock in the debate about colonial institutions and colonial human capital (AJR 2001, 2002, Glaeser et al. 2004, Huillery 2010, Bolt & Bezemer 2009).

Main Results Robust long-term impacts of colonial settlement institutions No sign of regional development impacts of school investments Results suggest a reversal of fortunes story (AJR 2002): Initially disadvantaged settlement areas developed due to better property rights institutions Weak regional impacts of missionary schools probably due to domestic migration

Identification strategy Study exploits historical variation between missionaries and settlers Variation in time: Missionaries active in Madagascar since 1820 French colonial rule established in 1896

Identification strategy Study exploits historical variation between missionaries and settlers Variation in time: Missionaries active in Madagascar since 1820 French colonial rule established in 1896 Example: David Livingstone travelled Africa from 1850-1873, well before the scramble for Africa.

Variation in space Missionaries preferred the temperate central highland regions European settlers concentrated in coastal lowlands (for cash crop production). These areas had low initial population densities Correlation between missionaries and settlers close to zero Missionaries 1904 Settlers 1950s

Estimation Dep var: log of mean district hh consumption logexp d = α 1 + β 2 log Missionaries +γ log Controls d +ε d logexp d = α 1 + β 2 log Settlers +γ log Controls d +ε d IV for Missionaries: dummies for stages of expansion of pre-colonial Merina empire IV for Settlers: District population densities 1936 (AJR 2002)

What do my historical variables measure? Missionaries: Number of churches per 1000 inhab per district in 1904. Churches historically linked to mission schools. Mission schools often double as churches I combine Protestants and Catholics because they were in the same regions

What do my historical variables measure? Settlers: population proportion of French non-military personnel 1951 French encouraged settlement in Madagascar. Settlement accompanied by introduction of formal land titles. Traditional communal land-titling system remained intact in non-settlement areas

What do my historical variables measure? Settlers: population proportion of French non-military personnel 1951 French encouraged settlement in Madagascar. Settlement accompanied by introduction of formal land titles. Traditional communal land-titling system remained intact in non-settlement areas NB: Contextual evidence suggests Settlers does not proxy for human capital: It is often difficult to distinguish a European or Creole plantation from that of his Malagasy neighbour. In general the settlers appear to have had little or no capital and often little competence or aptitude. (Heseltine 1971: 150)

Main results No economic effects of missionary schools Robust effects of colonial institutions 12 12.5 13 13.5 Mean incomes and Churches in 1904, district level 12 12.5 13 13.5 Mean incomes and proportion settlers, district level 0 1 2 3 lnallch1904pck -4-2 0 2 lnpfrench51 lnincom_fiv Fitted values lnincom_fiv Fitted values

Main results No economic effects of missionary schools Robust effects of colonial institutions 12 12.5 13 13.5 Mean incomes and Churches in 1904, district level 12 12.5 13 13.5 Mean incomes and proportion settlers, district level 0 1 2 3 lnallch1904pck -4-2 0 2 lnpfrench51 lnincom_fiv Fitted values lnincom_fiv Fitted values NB: Same result for missionaries and wages levels in 1938 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 Wage levels 1938 and Churches in 1904 0.5 1 1.5 2 lnallch1904pck lnwage38 Fitted values

Estimation results missionaries and incomes Hh income Hh income Hh income OLS OLS 2SLS Missionaries -0.002 0.005-0.081 SE (0.077) (0.069) (0.086) Geographic and historical controls No Yes Yes N 107 106 106

Estimation results district incomes Hh income Hh income Hh income Hh income OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Settlers 0.139*** 0.112*** 0.097*** 0.275** SE (0.025) (0.032) (0.032) (0.107) Geographic and historical controls No Yes Yes Yes Historical wages and infrastructure No No Yes Yes N 107 106 106 106

What explains greater effect of Settlers? Reversal of fortunes thesis (AJR 2002): former settlement regions historically disadvantaged (low population densities). But faster growth in subsequent periods due to superior property rights institutions

What explains greater effect of Settlers? Reversal of fortunes thesis (AJR 2002): former settlement regions historically disadvantaged (low population densities). But faster growth in subsequent periods due to superior property rights institutions Settlers IV first stage Pop density1936-0.337*** (0.105) % Land titled Cash crops Manufactu ring Settlers 0.149** 0.057 0.257*** (0.075) (0.095) (0.080) Full set of controls included

What explains weak effect of missionary schools? Evidence for human capital spill overs from missionary districts to former settlement regions Public school teachers Private school teachers Secondary school Adult education rates Settlers 0.046-0.016 0.030 0.146** SE (0.054) (0.056) (0.062) (0.059) Missionaries 0.210* 0.885*** 0.341** 0.150 SE (0.109) (0.145) (0.169) (0.167) Full set of controls included

Conclusions Paper uses historical experiment to study income effects of institutions and human capital investments. Strong support for institutional approach (AJR s reversal of fortunes hypothesis). Weak / no support for human capital argument. Missionary education alone was not sufficient for regional economic development.

Conclusions Paper uses historical experiment to study income effects of institutions and human capital investments. Strong support for institutional approach (AJR s reversal of fortunes hypothesis). Weak / no support for human capital argument. Missionary education alone was not sufficient for regional economic development. But some questions about measurement of human capital impacts: Is the regional level the right level of analysis to study school impacts? Human capital is mobile, institutions less so. Domestic migration may dilute regional impacts of school investments

IV for missionaries Stages of expansion of the Merina empire