Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes
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1 Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes Evidence from Namibia Marie Lechler 1 Lachlan McNamee 2 1 University of Munich 2 Stanford University June 20th, 2016 M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
2 Idea During colonial times, southern and central Namibia were directly ruled by the German and South African authorities while northern Namibia was indirectly ruled. As a consequence, the role of traditional authorities was much more important in northern Namibia than in southern and central Namibia. This influence of traditional authorities in northern Namibia persists to the present day. Idea: use division of Namibia as natural experiment to identify the long-term effects of indirect colonial rule. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
3 Main result We find that individuals living in the formerly indirectly ruled part of the country have lower support for democracy and the rule of law. Hypothesis: local governance structures, which are organized on a despotic basis (i.e. traditional leadership) undermine democratic attitudes M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
4 Table of contents 1 Motivation and historical background 2 Results 3 Conclusion M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
5 Motivation Our project contributes to understanding of determinants of political attitudes and of viability of democratic systems. We are able to document an important effect of the ongoing influence of traditional authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa, who play a uniquely important role in the governance of these countries. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
6 Motivation Adds to literature about the importance of civic culture and individual political attitudes for the viability of democratic institutions Almond & Verba (1963); Inglehart (1988,1990); Persson & Tabellini (2009) and Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln (2015) literature about long-term effects of direct vs indirect colonial rule Iyer (2010), Acemoglu et al (2000, 2001) literature about role of traditional authorities in Sub-Sahara Africa Mamdani (1996); Dusing (2002); Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson (2013); Baldwin (2013, 2015); De Kadt & Larreguy (2014) M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
7 History of the border Figure : Precolonial map of ethnicities (Murdock, 1967) M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
8 History of the border 1884: Namibia becomes German colony Germans settle in central and southern Namibia Rinderpest epidemic devastated cattle-dependent communities, which were concentrated in central and southern Namibia in the 1890s Strength tribes living in the North and inaccessibility of the North hamper settlements in the north Germans easily conquered southern and central Namibia 1905: Introduction of the Police Zone (police protection cannot cover entire protectorate) Due to financial constraints German activities (administrative, economic and military) focus on Police Zone M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
9 History of the border Source: Miescher, Namibia s Red Line, 2012 M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
10 History of the border 1915: Police Zone boundary and German policies of restricting movement were adopted by the South Africans. 1964: Police Zone boundary is formalized by Odendaal Commission 1990: Namibian independence. Transition to parliamentary democracy and homogenization of policies north and south of the border. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
11 Direct vs indirect rule Indirect colonial rule in northern Namibia Traditional authorities in the north were given a lot of political autonomy Despotic, hereditary and authoritarian system Influence persists even after independence and constitutes a parallel system of governance Direct colonial rule in central and southern Namibia German (and later South African) colonial administration directly ruled over this part of the country Traditional authorities were given little or no political role Since independence, people only experience governance via elected and accountable local representatives at all levels of government M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
12 Hypothesis 1. Indirect and direct colonial rule have persistent effects on democratic attitudes (test with OLS). 2. The key mechanism underlying this relationship is the ongoing influence of traditional authorities, which acts as a parallel despotic governance structure (test with 2SLS). M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
13 Data M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
14 Data Political attitude data: Afrobarometer ( , 4 survey rounds) Covers 166 EAs and 1426 individuals Questions Contact traditional authority: During the past year, how often have you contacted a traditional ruler? (Scale 0-3) Support for democracy (Scale: 1-3) Courts make binding decisions (Scale: 1-5) How likely is law enforcement by authorities (Scale: 1-4) Questioning leaders vs respect for authority (Scale: 1-4) M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
15 Data Table : Balancing table for observations from buffer zone (1) (2) (3) Direct rule Indirect rule Difference Contact traditional leader *** Age *** Gender Education Without food ** Observations 254 1,164 1,418 M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
16 The effect of indirect rule on political attitudes Baseline estimation equation: Y ider = α + β Indirectrule d + X ider γ + η e + µ r + ɛ ider Y expresses the outcome variables (the measures for democratic attitudes) for individual i, living in enumeration area d, belonging to the ethnic group e, being surveyed in round r. Indirectrule is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual lives in an enumeration area which belonged to the indirectly or the directly ruled part of Namibia X is a set of individual-level control variables η e are ethnicity fixed effects µ r are survey-round fixed effects. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
17 Identification Treatment: indirect vs direct colonial rule independent of other factors affecting political attitudes close to the colonial border (location of border exogenous to pre-colonial political attitudes) Pre-treatment attitudes were the same within each ethnic group M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
18 OLS estimates Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Support Courts make Courts make VARIABLES for democracy for democracy binding decisions binding decisions Indirect colonial rule ** ** * * (0.0746) (0.0757) (0.102) (0.105) Constant 2.493*** 2.660*** 3.557*** 3.844*** (0.0908) (0.237) (0.130) (0.265) Observations 1,347 1,329 1,392 1,375 R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
19 OLS estimates Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Law Law Respect Respect VARIABLES enforcement enforcement authorities authorities Indirect colonial rule ** ** (0.115) (0.116) (0.0890) (0.0899) Constant 3.507*** 3.134*** 1.950*** 1.978*** (0.127) (0.304) (0.121) (0.279) Observations 1,026 1,009 1,396 1,379 R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
20 Robustness Applying an ordered probit model Using observations for the entire country (not only buffer zone) Clustering observations on the constituency level (60 clusters instead of 165) Link Link Link M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
21 Channel of causality Identification of contact to traditional leaders as channel of causality by applying 2SLS estimations. instrument contact with traditional authorities with indirect colonial rule dummy M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
22 Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders Table : Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders (1) (2) (3) (4) Contact Contact Contact Contact VARIABLES traditional ruler traditional ruler traditional ruler traditional ruler Indirect colonial rule 0.555*** 0.391*** 0.373*** 0.350** (0.0700) (0.104) (0.103) (0.166) Constant 0.240*** 0.887*** (0.0533) (0.122) (0.305) (0.462) Observations 1,418 1,418 1,400 1,400 R Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes Round FE no yes yes yes Region FE no no no yes Controls no no yes yes F-Test # clusters Results from OLS regressions. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
23 2SLS results Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Support Law Law VARIABLES for democracy for democracy enforcement enforcement Contact traditional leader ** ** ** ** (0.216) (0.237) (0.329) (0.356) Observations 1,347 1,329 1,026 1,009 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters First-stage F statistic Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
24 2SLS results Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Courts make Courts make Respect Respect VARIABLES binding decisions binding decisions for authority for authority Contact traditional leader * * (0.263) (0.281) (0.243) (0.252) Observations 1,392 1,375 1,365 1,348 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters First-stage F statistic Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
25 Robustness checks Exclusion restriction: Living north of the border is uncorrelated with any other determinant of political attitudes. Potential concerns: geography and culture political socialization selective spatial sorting Link contemporary institutions income and education Link Link Link Link M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
26 Effect on voting behavior Table : Effect on voting turnout (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES OLS Probit 2SLS Indirect colonial rule *** ** (0.0463) (0.182) Contact traditional leader ** (0.225) Constant 0.328** (0.147) (0.295) Observations R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes # clusters Results from OLS, Probit and 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
27 Conclusion Indirect colonial rule has persistent effects on contemporary political attitudes and political behavior. Key mechanism: influence of traditional authorities Parallel despotic governance structure undermines support for democracy and the rule of law and and encourages to respect leaders rather than to question them. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 27
28 Appendix Table : Summary statistics for observations from buffer zone Mean SD Min Max Obs Contact traditional leader Courts make binding decisions Support for democracy Enforce law: crime Respect authority Age Education Without food M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
29 Robustness OLS: Ordered probit Link Table : Ordered probit model (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Indirect colonial rule ** ** (0.124) (0.128) (0.165) (0.0943) Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,379 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters Results from ordered probit regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
30 Robustness OLS: Observations for entire country Link Table : Observations for entire country (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Communal *** ** 0.124*** (0.0331) (0.0416) (0.0545) (0.0416) Constant 2.263*** 3.388*** 3.128*** 1.775*** (0.117) (0.166) (0.178) (0.167) Observations 4,598 4,826 3,263 4,134 R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of observations for the entire country. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
31 Robustness OLS: Cluster on constituency level Link Table : Cluster on Constituency level (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Indirect colonial rule ** * ** 0.136* (0.0792) (0.0925) (0.123) (0.0700) Constant 2.660*** 3.844*** 3.134*** 1.960*** (0.273) (0.276) (0.390) (0.277) Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,348 R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of observations for the buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Constituency) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
32 Potential concern: Geography and culture We only focus on individuals living within a 100km buffer zone of the boundary to ensure comparability between individuals surveyed on several dimensions (e.g. proximity to ports, the capital and the national border, geographic characteristics) We include ethnicity fixed effects to account for differences in ethnic cultures We include regional fixed effects as a robustness check, which does not change our results M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
33 Potential concern: Geography and culture Link Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Contact traditional leader * * (0.361) (0.509) (0.425) (0.411) Constant 2.908*** 4.308*** 3.034*** 1.695*** (0.401) (0.498) (0.404) (0.422) Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,348 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Region FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity, survey round and regional fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
34 Potential concern: Different political socialization Link Indigenous population did not experience democracy in either the direct or indirectly ruled areas of Namibia during colonial times. Since the governance system of the south enabled the exploitation of the local indigenous population, if anything, the bias from different experiences with western institutions during the colonial era should bias against our hypothesis. If this concern was true the effect should be larger for older people. Interaction effect is however insignificant. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
35 Potential concern: Different political socialization Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Respect VARIABLES for democracy Law enforcement binding decisions authority Indirect colonial rule ** ** * (0.0828) (0.123) (0.118) (0.116) Indirect rule x Old dummy (0.107) (0.123) (0.114) (0.143) Old dummy (0.0957) (0.114) (0.102) (0.131) Constant 2.628*** 3.443*** 3.920*** 2.020*** (0.225) (0.311) (0.252) (0.279) Observations 1,334 1,013 1,379 1,352 R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and a binary age dummy as well as ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The old dummy equals one if an individual is older than 31 years. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
36 Potential concern: Different political socialization Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Law Courts make Respect VARIABLES for democracy enforcement binding decisions authority Indirect colonial rule (0.159) (0.200) (0.169) (0.211) Indirect rule x age ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Constant 2.557*** 3.143*** 3.794*** 2.091*** (0.254) (0.334) (0.277) (0.333) Observations 1,329 1,009 1,375 1,348 R Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and age as well as ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
37 Potential concern: Selective spatial sorting Link During the German and South African colonial rule, permanent migration between the two parts of the country was prohibited. We cannot rule out selective sorting after independence in 1990, however we believe this is unlikely to act as an important confounder. In northern areas of Namibia, land is communally held and ties to one s family, one s community and to ancestral land rights are extremely close Moreover, migration statistics from the Namibian Statistics Agency suggest that permanent migration from the north, where it has occurred, has been economic in nature and primarily inter-regional as poor laborers move to the larger cities of the south M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
38 Potential concern: Different contemporary institutions Link People living north and south of the border do not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of government institutions differently. Inclusion of regional fixed effects ensures that we only compare individuals living close to each other on the same part of the boundary, who are governed by the same national and regional institutions nowadays. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
39 Same contemporary institutions Table : Balancing table (1) (2) (3) Direct rule Indirect rule Difference Government officials listen [1.06] [1.08] (0.11) Trust in police * [0.85] [0.88] (0.070) Trust in courts [0.92] [0.95] (0.067) Fear of unjust arrest [0.73] [0.93] (0.091) Observations 253 1,163 1,416 M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
40 Potential concern: Income Link Table : Effect of indirect rule on income (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit Indirect colonial rule (0.134) (0.163) (0.146) (0.148) Contact traditional leader *** *** (0.0333) (0.0360) Constant 1.307*** 1.216*** 0.804*** (0.126) (0.184) (0.229) Observations 1,417 1,417 1,400 1,400 R Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes Survey round FE no yes yes yes Controls no no yes yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
41 Potential concern: Effect of education Table : Effect of indirect rule on education (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit Indirect colonial rule (0.189) (0.193) (0.150) (0.0987) Contact traditional leader (0.0481) (0.0308) Constant 3.802*** 4.038*** 5.068*** (0.176) (0.225) (0.360) Observations 1,406 1,406 1,400 1,400 R Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes Survey round FE no yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
42 Afrobarometer questions Contact traditional leader During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A traditional ruler? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
43 Afrobarometer questions Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 0=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 1=Statement 1: Democracy preferable Which of the following statements is closest to your view? 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority. 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, Please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by. 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like you committed a serious crime? 1=Not at all likely, 2=Not very likely, 3=Likely, 4=Very Likely M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
44 Afrobarometer questions Education Income What is the highest level of education you have completed? 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school, 5=Secondary school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, 7=Some university, 8=University completed,9=post-graduate Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat? 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
45 Afrobarometer questions How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Elected Local Government Councillors? 0=Never 1=Only Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always How much do you trust each of the following: The Police? 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot How much do you trust each of the following: Courts of Law? 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, / 18
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