Laying transoceanic cables on Africa s shores: a Neo-gramscian study Derbe, S.T.

UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Laying transoceanic cables on Africa s shores: a Neo-gramscian study Derbe, S.T. Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Derbe, S. T. (2010). Laying transoceanic cables on Africa s shores: a Neo-gramscian study General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl) Download date: 05 Jul 2018

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa s Shores A Neo-Gramscian Study Samuel Teshale Derbe

Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa s Shores A Neo-Gramscian Study ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus Prof. Dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op donderdag 4 november 2010, te 10:00 uur door Samuel Teshale Derbe geboren te Ambo, Ethiopië

Promotiecommissie Promotor: Co-promotor: Overige leden: Prof.Dr. C.J. Hamelink Prof. Dr. G. C. A. Junne Prof. Dr. L. F. M. Besselink Prof. Dr. A.J. Dietz Dr. J. Hoffmann Dr. H.S. Gebre Selassie Dr. A. A. M. Schrauwen Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid

Acknowledgment I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my promoters, Professor Cees Hamelink and Professor Gerd Junne. I am very lucky for having such knowledgeable and compassionate mentors. I am heavily indebted to Leonard and Alison for their generosity and constant friendship. reality. I thank Haile Selassie for making this PhD project a Meles Habte, Genet Baraki, Kim Bierhoff, and my colleagues at the Amsterdam School of Communication also deserve a special mention for their kind assistance. Finally, I am grateful to my wife, Abeba, and my children, Yonathan and Ruhama. Their love and sacrifice sustained me during my sojourn in the Netherlands.

Table of Contents Abbreviations and acronyms... v INTRODUCTION... 1 Literature Review... 3 Research on ICAIS... 3 Politics of global communication... 10 Africa and the politics of global communication... 12 Research Questions... 15 Research Methods... 15 Organisation of the Chapters... 16 CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK... 19 Neo-Gramscian Theory of Political Economy... 19 Methodology: Historic blocs, hegemony and civil society... 22 Strands of Gramscian thought... 24 Technology and Social Change... 26 Mapping a Neo-Gramscian Route for the Study of the Global Information Society... 29 A shift to postmodern cultural studies... 29 Hegemony, ideology and commercialisation of the Internet... 32 CHAPTER TWO: THE BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL BACKBONE PROVISION... 34 Technical Description... 34 Providers of Connectivity... 37 Historical Development of Internet Backbones... 43 Charging Arrangements... 46 Peering arrangements... 46 Transit arrangements... 48 Nature of the Contractual Agreements... 49 ii

Business Strategies of IBPs and Downstream ISPs... 52 ICAIS, Regulation, and the Economics of the Internet... 55 CHAPTER THREE: IDEATIONAL CONSTITUENTS OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ORDER... 58 Information Society... 58 A global information society?... 62 Information society and the digital divide... 65 Communication Society... 69 New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)/New International Information Order (NIIO)... 69 The Post-NWICO vision for world communication... 74 Developing countries in the Post-NWICO phase... 76 CHAPTER FOUR: INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ORDER... 79 The ITU and the Global Information Order... 79 Origins of the ITU development mandate... 80 ITU in a changing business environment... 86 The accounting rate system and ICAIS... 90 The World Summit on Information Society: Debating the Global Information Order... 93 The profile of UN summits... 93 The agenda of WSIS... 94 Civil society and the WSIS... 100 CHAPTER FIVE: LINKING AFRICA TO THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY... 107 Ownership of Telecommunications Assets in Africa... 107 The Politics of Telecommunications Reform in Africa... 115 Stakeholders of the global information superhighway... 120 SAT 3/WASC/SAFE... 121 EASSy, open access, and compromises... 127 iii

CHAPTER SIX: INFORMATION SOCIETY WITHIN A RESTRUCTURED AFRICA... 135 Africa s Information Society Initiative... 135 NEPAD, African Development and E-strategies... 139 Genesis of NEPAD... 139 Foreign and local engagement with NEPAD... 144 Framing NEPAD... 148 CONCLUSION... 159 References... 174 Summary... 207 Samenvatting... 215 iv

Abbreviations and acronyms Afrispa-African Internet Service Providers Association APC-Association for Progressive Communications APRM-African Peer Review Mechanism CODESRIA-Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa DFID-Department for International Development Dot Force- Digital Opportunity Task Force EASSy-Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System GEAR - Growth, Employment and Redistribution GISPA-Ghana Internet Service Providers Association ICANN-Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ICT-Information and Communications Technology IDRC-International Development Research Centre IICD-International Institution for Communication and Research IMF-International Monetary Fund IPDC-International Programme for the Development of Communication ITU-D- International Telecommunications Union- Telecommunications Development Sector ITU-International Telecommunications Union ITU-T-International Telecommunications Union- Telecommunications Standardization Bureau LAN-Local Area Network MAE-Metropolitan Area Exchange NAP-Network Access Point NEPAD-New Partnership for Africa s Development NIIO-New International Information Order NSFNET-National Science Foundation Network NWICO-New World Information and Communication Order Panaftel -Pan African Telecommunications Network v

POP-Point of Presence PTO-Public Telecommunications Operator PTT-Postal Telegraph and Telephone SADC-Southern African Development Community SAT 3/WASC/SAFE - Third South Atlantic /West Africa Submarine Cable/South Africa-Far East SEA-ME-WE4 -South East Asia-Middle East- Western Europe 4 TWN-Third World Network TNC/ MNC-Transnational Corporation/ Multinational Corporation UNECA-United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNESCO-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization USAID-Unites States Agency for International Development USNSF-United States National Science Foundation WIPO-World Intellectual Property Organization WSIS-World Summit on Information Society vi

Introduction This dissertation explores the material interests, ideas, and institutions shaping Africa s integration into the global information economy. Among the plethora of issues arising in the context of this integration, International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS) are chosen as the entry point into this study. International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services are agreements between Internet service Providers to settle costs for carrying each other s traffic. The dominant players in these settlement arrangements are Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs). These are the largest Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in terms of number of customers, geographical coverage, web content, and ownership of high-speed fibre networks. IBPs, most of which are U.S. and European transnational corporations, thus, command vital resources for worldwide Internet connectivity. Since the 1990s, the charging arrangements for Internet connection have been identified as one of the key issues of the digital divide. The ICAIS dispute between Asia-Pacific ISPs and U.S. Internet Backbone Providers was submitted to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Study group 3 in 1998. The complainants alleged that they were obliged to pay the full cost of transmission links to U.S. Internet exchange points even though the transmission links were used to carry the traffic coming from the US. In other words, the charging arrangements grant U.S customers a free ride. In order to rectify this unfair trade practice, the complainant ISPs demanded that U.S. backbone providers be charged a fee for the Internet traffic they send to Asia-Pacific destinations. 1

The cost of interconnection has been compounded for Africa because the continent depended on satellite technology to connect to U.S. Internet exchange points. Apart from being more expensive than fibre optic technology for high volume traffic, these satellite links were leased from foreign companies. As a result, African ISPs paid the full amount not only for the incoming and outgoing traffic but also for the leased satellite link (Bell, 2002). Thus, African policy makers had to address the twin challenges of construction of transoceanic fibre optic cables and settlement of costs for traffic exchange. The Halfway Proposition, submitted to the New Partnership for Africa s Development (NEPAD) Ministerial Meeting in 2002, was the first proposal to address these challenges. According to this proposal, African states had better not litigate the ICAIS issue at the ITU. If the cost of Internet traffic exchange is to be reduced, these states must encourage their ISPs to devise techniques of aggregation of traffic. The monopoly telecoms operating in many African states have to be dismantled, and privatisation and liberalisation measures have to be introduced. The other half of the solution involved donor assistance to finance the construction of submarine fibre optic cables. These same measures were later endorsed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and NEPAD in their policies and projects to address the connectivity problem. While ICTs can be used to address mass poverty and underdevelopment, current ICAIS and information society policies of African regional organisations, instead, reflect the hegemonic ideas of a transnational capitalist bloc and its node in Africa. 2

The following review of the literature on the subject aims to situate the theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this study. Literature Review The Literature review is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section reviews prior research on ICAIS. The second sub-section summarises the broader literature on the politics of global communication within which the ICAIS research is situated. The third sub-section assesses the literature on international Internet connection, digital divide and information society with specific reference to Africa. Research on ICAIS For developing countries or non-us ISPs, international Internet connection has two cost components. The first one is the cost of physical capacity to link with exchange points or Network Access Points (NAPs) in the U.S. The other cost relates to purchase of transit access from IBPs to deliver or receive traffic within the US or via the US in a third country. In U.S-Africa routes, both these services are usually purchased in bundles from a few providers (Antelope Consulting, 2001, pp.21-22). The first complainant on ICAIS was Telstra, a telco in which the Australian government had a 50% share. The gist of the complaint was that Telstra was compelled to pay the cost for the physical links that are used by U.S.IBPs to forward their traffic to Asia-Pacific destinations. Hence, the remedy sought by the complainants was a financial settlement by 3

U.S.IBPs in proportion to the volume of traffic they send over the transmission links. The Australian government initially submitted the complaint to the Telecommunications Meeting of Ministers of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998. An ICAIS task force was set up to investigate the matter (APEC, 2000, Annex A). On the basis of the findings of the task force, APEC members, in their meeting in Cancun, Mexico in 2000, recommended that governments play a role to restore fair competition where there are dominant players in the market of Internet interconnection. The following were also suggested as the relevant considerations for ICAIS in bilateral commercial contracts: (a) the use by each party of the interconnected network resources, (b) the end-to-end costs of international transport link capacity, and (c) the contribution of each network to the communication (APEC, 2000, Annex B). The Australian government also submitted its complaint to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The ITU World Telecommunications Standardization Assembly (WTSA) passed recommendation ITU-T D.50, 2000, as amended in 2004. The recommendation stated that bilateral negotiations between Internet service providers should consider the following elements: traffic flow, number of routes, geographical coverage and cost of international transmission. USA and Greece did not adopt this recommendation. China also objected because it preferred charging arrangements based on traffic flow only. The ITU-T D.50, 2008, which is now in force, introduced an additional consideration, namely: the possible application of network externalities. This addition was based on another ITU recommendation, ITU-T.D.156. The latter recommendation 4

was based on a study conducted to identify the impact of network expansion in developing countries on revenues received by developed country telcos. The finding was that the addition of new users of telephone in the developing countries results in the increase in the value of networks of developed countries. Hence, ITU recommended that telecommunication companies in the developed countries pay a premium to developing country telcos in proportion to the positive externality. This premium was a payment on top of the regular charges for telephone calls. It must be noted that ITU recommendations are not legally binding. They neither impose mandatory rules on the ISPs and IBPs entering into charging arrangements nor subject these arrangements to a regulatory scrutiny. The overriding issue in the ICAIS literature has been whether the charging arrangements were a result of monopoly pricing by American IBPs. Savage, Frieden and Denton (1999, 2000a, 2000b), who were assigned by APEC to study the ICAIS dispute, answered the question in the negative. The Internet backbone market is generally competitive, and there are no barriers to entry. The IBPs do not have any monopoly over provision of capacity. The high cost of Internet interconnectivity in the region is attributable to other factors, mainly the lack of competition in the domestic telecommunication sector. Besides, the ISPs in the region had not designed business models to avoid routing intra-regional traffic via US. They did not also utilise available technologies to reduce the amount of traffic routed via the long haul transmission links (Savage, Frieden & Denton, 1999, 2000a, 2000b). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) explained the cause of the dispute in very technical 5

terms. It asserted that ICAIS are a result of the shift in the financial midpoint for traffic exchange from the oceans (as in the case of cables) and geostationary orbit (as in the case of satellites) to Internet exchange points (1998, p.36). In other words, telecommunication links between US and other countries used to be jointly owned by the respective national providers. ITU regulations were put in place to make sure that each party paid for its half of the circuit. Now, according to the OECD, charging arrangements deal with costs for carrying traffic from NAPs to U.S.IP addresses, and the NAPs are located in the US. Besides, the OECD pointed out that the cost sharing mechanism based on traffic proposed by the complainant countries also affects European interests. European telcos have invested in the U.S. backbone market. As a result, they would prefer to maintain the current arrangements. Antelope Consulting (2001) specifically dealt with the issue of whether the major variable determining access to Internet in developing countries was the high cost of interconnection. Based on case studies conducted in Zambia, Nepal, India and Brazil, this study concluded that international connection is a significant cost component for end users. According to Antelope, these costs do not reflect exploitative behaviour by companies from the developed countries, either in international leased circuit market or in the global interconnectivity market (p, 25). However, it noted that the existing ICAIS lack transparency and a procedure to address grievances. To sum, all the above studies on the ICAIS dispute recommended speeding up liberalisation of the infrastructure market to address the problem. The industry, they conjectured, 6

will devise its own solution if it is allowed to operate in a competitive, rather than a regulated, market. Adoption of cost saving technology and rationalisation of usage of bandwidth were also the other measures recommended to ISPs from developing countries (Kende, 2000; WiK, 2002). Roseman (2003a, 2003b) applied a realist-mercantilist theoretical framework to interpret the ICAIS dispute as a conflict between the national interests of EU/US and developing countries. The fact that the company that initiated the ICAIS complaint, Telstra (Australia), later withdrew its claim, according to Roseman, validates this argument. In other words, the developing countries involved in this dispute seek a return to the old accounting rate system of the ITU. In the previous accounting rate system, the country that originated a telephone call paid the country that terminated the call. As more calls originated from developed countries than from developing countries, the latter received substantial transfer of revenue for terminating these calls. In contrast, ICAIS required developing countries to pay for Internet traffic that originated from USA and Europe. The new arrangement, therefore, ensures cash transfer from the developing to the developed countries. Roseman concluded that market liberalisation and adoption of cost-saving technology are not sufficient to solve the issue of ICAIS. A more useful measure would be application of antitrust laws against the IBPs of the developed countries. Nevertheless, this measure can be implemented only if the US, as a benevolent hegemon, is willing to extend its assistance to those countries affected by the new settlement arrangements. 7

Therefore, while the literature summarised above framed ICAIS in terms of behaviour of firms, Roseman analysed the issue from the point of view of the national interests of the countries involved. In conclusion, national interest being ultimately dependent on the balance of coercive or material power in the world, the solution to the problem of ICAIS lies in the benevolence of the powerful countries. African ISPs also complained about the ICAIS. According to Bell (2002), if a Kenyan ISP sends traffic to the US, then it has to pay 100% of the transmission link to the US NAPs. The Kenyan ISP also pays for the transmission link when an e- mail or another electronic content is carried by a US IBP to a Kenyan destination. Besides, as many business and intergovernmental organizations in Africa had their websites in US or Europe in search of a reliable connectivity, the problem was exacerbated (Bell, 2002). Bell commented that Internet backbone providers have no reason to agree to a cost sharing arrangement. He put the response of the latter as follows: if you (AISP) [African Internet Service Providers] want service, you have to come to me, if you don t want to come to me-that is fine, I am not paying to come to you (2002, p.3).he, therefore, advised against joining the ICAIS controversy at the ITU. The alternative strategy proposed by Bell stressed the need for a strategic leadership by the private sector and donors to solve the continent s connectivity problems. Accordingly, the African Internet Service Providers Association (Afrispa), in collaboration with transnational companies was to set up national exchange points in all countries across the continent. Then, national ISPs would establish a consortium, Pan-African Virtual Exchange Inc. 8

(PAVIX Inc) that will aggregate the traffic originating from the various national ISPs. By aggregating intra-africa traffic at regional exchange points, African ISPs would avoid the cost of transmission of intra-africa traffic via U.S. exchange points. African ISPs would also be able to take advantage of the higher volume of the aggregated traffic and negotiate a better price with IBPs. The Halfway Proposition sought to insert African ISPs into a position where they can appropriate a slice of the annual payment the continent pays to U.S. IBPs. However, in order for the private sector to play its role of a business intermediary, the physical infrastructure had to be put in place. This requires large investment that African governments cannot finance. Hence, the role of donors in providing the necessary financial resources is the other key part of the strategy. African governments, on the other hand, were urged to withdraw from the market and introduce liberalisation and deregulation policies so that the private sector can develop innovative business solutions to the issue of ICAIS. The Halfway Proposition is not, therefore, just a strategy to address the issues of ICAIS. It is also a political agenda to change the respective power and role of the state, local and foreign capital as well as donors in connection with bridging the digital divide in Africa. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this political agenda was at the root of the conflicts surrounding ownership of essential telecommunication facilities such as fibre optic cables in Africa. 9

Politics of global communication The specific issue of ICAIS can also be situated within the broad literature on the study of international communications. There are two schools of thought on how Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) should be approached within the framework of international communications. Rosenau (2002) argued that though there is a digital divide, it is fast closing down mainly because of the decline in the cost of production of ICTs. The emergence of new technologies allows developing countries to leapfrog from traditional to current state of the art communication modes and processes. An example of such leapfrogging is the growing number of users of mobile phones in developing countries. The other benefit of extensive use of ICTs, according to Rosenau, is that developing countries can collaborate with a wide spectrum of global actors and networks to challenge the existing world order. Singh (2002) further pointed out that after the failure of import substitution and other socialist experimentation of the 1960s and 1970s, what has emerged now is a neoliberal developing world. It is not, thus, a tenable claim that third world countries compromised away their future to global multinational corporations. The agreement they concluded to liberalise the telecommunication sector under the framework of the WTO agreements is in line with their domestic policies. The current official discourse on information and communication technology in Africa tallies with the view of these authors (See Hegazy, 2004; UNECA, 1996). 10

The other school of thought on international communications attempts to address a different set of questions. Do information technologies empower all? Are the poor and the marginalised in the developing world making use of the new information technologies? Are information technologies neutral? Hamelink (1994) expounded that the politics of world communication has but enhanced the growing power of global corporate media to the detriment of individual and collective rights to communicate. Technology and media have largely served the interests of powerful corporations to advertise their products, to coordinate their global businesses, and to shape the attitude of international actors toward the global market. On the other hand, the views and concerns of a large section of the population of the world have not found outlet. This, in turn, has resulted in inadequate information and understanding about pressing issues such as war, famine, environmental crisis, etc. Hamelink, thus, proposed a human rights approach to reframe the issues of international communication. In particular, positive and enforceable rights to education, culture, communication and knowledge have to be promoted in order to empower the disadvantaged. He further recommended that the direction of governance of world communication should be redefined. Governance structures must enable civil society actors and the ordinary people to influence decisions that affect the majority of people in the world. This calls for such institutions such as world parliaments and community media organizations (Hamelink, 1997; Golding & Harris, 1997; O Siochru, 2004b; Padovani, 2005; Sussman, 1997). 11

Africa and the politics of global communication The Halfway Proposition and related research on the digital divide identify the market as a mechanism to attain welfare and development. Competition among ICT enterprises is expected to bring price of products and services to an affordable level. Thus, foreign investment is singled out as the key factor in facilitating a competitive market (UNECA, 1996; Nulens, 2002). There are important exceptions to this dominant view, however. Ya u (2004) characterised the information society initiative as a platform for penetration of the market of Africa under the banner of globalisation. With the help of ICTs, multinational corporations have acquired a new capability to expand their activities. Consequently, they have been keen to link their manufacturing activities in Africa with their financial sources. WTO rules have also made health, education, and knowledge tradable commodities that the poor countries now buy from these global corporations. According to Ya u, the direct consequence of this trend is that ICTs will not be part of a social provision in Africa. As a result, the majority of the people will not have the opportunity to use technology and improve their life. In order to reverse this trend, Ya u recommends that developing countries should create a bloc in international organisations and push for a development and democratisation agenda. Similarly, Alden (2003) has argued that information society discourse shelves off Africa s call for aid and debt reduction. In contrast, it advances the corporate interests of the G8 countries. He attributes this asymmetry to lack of democratic representation of developing countries in such 12

clubs like the G8. Therefore, a more representative decision making process at an international level is recommended to address the issue of digital divide. These works provide a useful insight into the stakes involved in adopting information society policies in Africa. However, the inquiry should be broad enough to include the complex structural, instrumental, and discursive power of transnational capital. In addition, the role of African governments in the international organisations mentioned above has to be problematised. Nulens and van Audenhove (1999) have also critically analysed the whole range of issues pertaining to the claim that new ICTs will enable Africa to leapfrog into an advanced stage of growth. They pointed out that such a technologically deterministic view assumes that information will be almost free in the information society. However, the profit motive supported by liberalisation and privatisation is not likely to result in access to information for those with low income. Nulens and Van Audenhove, thus, suggested that African governments should challenge Western ideology in a unified voice and push forward alternative strategies in the interests of Africa. However, they also underlined that this is unrealistic in the present context because Africa is marginalised and has little leverage at the international level. While Nulens and Van Audenhove have developed useful criticism on the discourse of digital divide, the statecentric framework of their analysis limits the dimension of the issues under consideration. African actors are depicted as victims of the asymmetry of power in the global political economy. This conceals the class interests of African elites 13

in maintaining the existing world order. Their characterisation of the continent as a monolithic bloc also conceals from view the internal contradictions within African states. Moreover, it limits the possibility of conceptualising resistance to the status quo from within Africa. This dissertation applies a Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy to explain Africa s attempt to integrate into the global information economy. In this framework, a global economic order is conceived as a constellation of material capabilities (natural resources, technology, equipment, and wealth), ideas that make a social discourse possible and institutions. This structure conditions but does not mechanically cause the actors behaviours, experiences, and expectations (Cox, 1983, 1987).When there is a fit between these components, then we have a hegemonic structure where the power relation among actors is primarily based on consent. As will be elaborated in the subsequent chapters, the prevailing global structure has pitted social actors against each other along class, gender, racial and ethnic configurations depending on local circumstances. Research based on a Neo-Gramscian theory attempts to explain how order and legitimacy is maintained in such a divided world. In a hegemonic structure, the role of ideas in constituting power relationships is critical. Thus, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and government functionaries exercise hegemony through an ideational structure that enables their agency and constrains that of their opponents. The counterhegemonic forces constitute radical civil society actors, victims of exploitation along gender, class, ethnic, etc lines and, in general, the poor and marginalised populace. A counterhegemonic movement starts by developing a 14

new vision for an alternative world order around which the subaltern can rally and challenge the hegemonic structure. For both hegemony and counter hegemony to materialise, the role of organic intellectuals i.e. those who generate ideas that organise the system or movement, is vital. Research Questions The literature on ICAIS has mainly focussed on the business dispute among the Internet backbone and service providers. This dissertation situates this dispute and the position taken by African regional institutions on the issue within the broader theoretical framework sketched above. Hence, the research questions are: Is the common position of African regional organisations with regard to ICAIS in particular, and the information society initiative, in general, shaped by a hegemonic relationship between local and transnational social forces? If so, what are the specific components of the global structure that upholds this relationship? Are there local and transnational counterhegemonic social forces that can transform the global structure? If so, what are their visions and strategies? Research Methods The various works cited in the literature review have applied qualitative research methods to the analysis and 15

explanation of the historical, social and political issues. Similar methods are used in this dissertation. The concepts derived from the Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy merely provide guidance and reference in approaching the specific characters of the global and African context relevant to the research questions. The research is designed along the operational decisions made at the initial stage. The ITU, the WSIS and NEPAD are the organisations that this study closely observed. The selection is made based on availability of data as well as degree of relevance to the research questions. All empirical data are collected using the same tools: archival and documentary sources (typical documents being position papers) including diplomatic submissions, video and audio recordings of speech delivered in international conferences. The research uniformly relies on a systematic analysis of contents of treaties, conventions, and regulations in addition to related secondary data. The result of this systematic analysis is finally presented as a synthesis, not merely interpretive but also explanatory of the social reality under study. Organisation of the Chapters The first chapter introduces the assumptions, origins, and variants of Gramscian theory. The concepts of hegemony, historic blocs, and civil society have been used with varying connotations in previous Neo-Gramscian studies, leading to different routes of empirical inquiry. This chapter, therefore, clarifies these variations of application and situates the study within a particular strand of Neo-Gramscian 16

theory. It also spells out the assumptions this study makes about the relationship between technology and social change. Chapters two, three, and four depict the frame of action for the various social forces involved in shaping the political and economic components of the prevailing global information order. The patterns of production and distribution of Internet connectivity are highlighted in chapter two. In chapter three, the major ideas developed to constitute the global information order, information society and communication society, are discussed. Chapter four examines the function of international organisations as sites of (counter) hegemonic political engagement. Chapters five and six analyse the reciprocal relationship between the global structure and African regional political and economic initiatives. Finally, an alternative account of the current information for development policy and discourse in Africa is presented. The major finding is that African business and political players were co-actors in shaping this global hegemonic structure. Nonetheless, Africa remains a weak node as the ruling classes lack the material capability to exercise cooption and trasformismo vis-a-vis the popular masses. The conclusion also highlights the limits of possibility for a counterhegemonic resistance under the current global structure. The findings of this dissertation have implications for the theoretical framework of Neo-Gramscian international political economy and critical international communications studies. It is argued that a blanket disavowal of hegemonic politics in the periphery omits some subtle differences in 17

national politics. Hegemony has gradients and some forms of political engagement in African countries approximate to a hegemonic politics by degrees. Finally, by applying the Gramscian concept of civil society to analyse recent developments in the politics of international communication, this study contributes to the further articulation of counterhegmonic praxis. 18

Chapter One: Theoretical Framework The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical framework adopted for the study of the subject matter of this dissertation. The first section highlights the ontological and epistemological assumptions of Neo-Gramscian theory of international political economy. In the next section, the theories on the relationship between technology and social change are explicated. Finally, the specific strand of Neo-Gramscian theory used in this study shall be explained. Neo-Gramscian Theory of Political Economy Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy was first formulated by Cox as a critique of the existing theoretical traditions in the field of international relations (1981, 1983, 1996). Subsequent works based on this theory have further elaborated Cox s interlocution rather than the original works of Gramsci himself (Bieler & Morton, 2004). According to Worth (2008), therefore, Neo-Gramscian theory is more Coxian than Gramscian in that sense. Theories of (neo) realism and liberal pluralism, it is contended, have an essentialist and ahistorical view of the world. Neo-liberalism postulates that human beings are essentially power maximizers, while realism assumes that states are driven by national interest. An analysis premised on these abstract assumptions is likely to have a problemsolving concern. In other words, its findings can only be useful to maintain the system (Cox, 1981). Neo-Gramscian theorists distinguish their approach from some strands of (neo) Marxist approaches as well. The latter 19

are rejected for setting down an objective law of history in which progressive social change mechanically follows from economic development (Cox, 1981, p.89). Neo-Gramscian theory aspires to introduce a comprehensive ontological, epistemological and methodological critique of these theories. Ontologically, Neo- Gramscian theorists placed social forces or classes as the major protagonists in the international arena. According to Overbeek (2004), the national-international dichotomy that is essential to international relations should be rethought in terms of the dynamics of social relations. Social forces or classes, therefore, primarily shape the form of the state and interstate relations. The specific question, then, becomes how the relation of production that is the basis of social power in one state is extended into the world arena. The state, in this theoretical formulation, comprises the official apparatus such as the government, military and political parties as well as civil society such as church, education and media. Where civil society is penetrated and dominated by the ideology of a certain group or class, the state s goal and function (raison d état) will be conditioned by that ideology and interest. Equally, new social forces can articulate an alternative ideology in the realm of civil society in order to precipitate another raison d état. This insight is used to conceptualise a global civil society where counterhegemonic forces may be mobilised to challenge intergovernmental organisations (Cox, 1999). Neo-Gramscian theory attempts to avoid both structural determinism and voluntarism by placing equal emphasis on the changing nature of structure and the limits of possibility of change at a given historical point. In other words, in order 20

to explain both stability and change, the historicity of a given frame of action has to be demarcated. Thus, structure is understood as persistent social practice that constrains and puts pressure on agency, rather than mechanically determining its action. The relationship between structure and agency is dialectical (Gill, 1993, pp.23-25). Epistemologically, Neo-Gramscian theory rejects classical positivism, which is predicated on a subject-object duality. Theory is for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination... (Cox, 1981, p.87). Gill further asserted that theory has some strategic goal in favour of a certain interest or worldview. Therefore, when a theory claims neutrality or self-imposed restraint to describe the world accurately, its underlying ideology has to be unmasked. Mainstream economics theory is cited as an example. It claims to limit itself to the description and enumeration, with the help of mathematical tools, of the natural behaviour of consumers, demand, supply, price, etc. Such an approach, therefore, implicitly accepts and endorses the normative premise of the underlying relations of power. Yet, theory should go beyond mere expression of perspective. It is desirable for a theory to be reflexive. It has to clarify its own assumptions and origins. Still, the initial perspective is always contained in the theory. This formulation of subject-object identity leads Neo-Gramscian IR to include theory itself as part of the problematic to be studied. 21

Methodology: Historic blocs, hegemony and civil society The major feature of Neo-Gramscian theory is that it offers a historicist reading of materialism. It takes class struggle as a heuristic model for the understanding of structural change, mediated by ideology (Cox, 1996, pp.57-58). Class, in the historical materialist strand of neo- Gramscian theory, is a historical, rather than a static analytical category. It is used to explain exploitation that arises from the production process. Likewise, class consciousness arises from the particular historical context (Cox, 1981, pp.138, 143). The Gramscian methodological constructs that have been deployed for such a historicist interpretation of specific international relations issues are mainly hegemony, historic bloc, and civil society. Cox (1983) applied the concept of historic blocs to capture the dialectical relationship between economic structure and the political superstructure in different eras of world history. Where these cohere in a reciprocal relationship, then we have a hegemonic historic bloc. Hegemony is about the constitutive role of ideology and culture in maintaining social orders at state and world level (Cox, 1981; Murphy, 1998; Ritzer, 1983; Rupert, 1998). The foremost revision to the study of international relations suggested by Gramscian approaches is that coercive power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to establish dominance. In a hegemonic relationship, the dominant and subordinate social actors are engaged in an educational or opinion moulding process. The primary focus of the struggle for power is intellectual and moral leadership (Bieler & Morton, 2004). 22

The origin, content and future trend of such a historical bloc is what Neo-Gramscian studies attempt to explain. The major contributions within this theoretical framework have expounded the processes by which social forces created within particular states forge alliances with kindred classes in other states. Van der Pijl (1998) traced the emergence of liberal internationalism, state monopoly capitalism, corporate capitalism and neo-liberalism over three centuries to such a process. His thesis was that these forms of capitalism became the foundation of state in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Later, the fractions of capital that played the role of a steward in these states were also able to establish the hegemony of the national political economic configuration at a world level. Likewise, Gill (1990) depicted the hegemonic leadership of the Trilateral Commission in constructing a neo-liberal world order. The Trilateral Commission was an elite organisation comprising owners and managers of TNCs, national and international financial authorities, politicians and civil servants in most developed and developing countries. With regard to the North-South issues of international relations, the concept of passive revolution, rather than hegemony, has been more useful. This refers to a situation where the ruling class are unable to integrate the masses under a comprehensive order based on consent and coercion. As a result, the state in the periphery merely absorbs only some aspects of the model that is hegemonic at a global level. Passive revolution takes the form of either Caesarism, or trasformismo. The former refers to a balance between forces promoting and opposing the social change maintained by sheer personal power of the leader. Trasformismo refers to domestication or cooption of potentially radical ideas and subaltern groups or leaders (Cox, 1981; Morton, 2007). 23

Strands of Gramscian thought Neo-Gramscian theory has also its own schisms with far reaching implications for the foundational claims stated above. Germain and Kenny (1998) drew attention to the ambiguities of the Coxian formulation of hegemony in which structure and superstructure are combined. This observation led to a revision of Cox s proposition that idealism and economism can both be maintained in the same framework without privileging one over the other. There are three different views about this particular proposition (Macartney, 2008). The first one rejected the possibility of congruence between hegemonic ideas and material forces as a disguised endorsement of liberal pluralism or idealist accounts of historical change. According to this position, ideas must be treated as mere epiphenomena that actors can instrumentally manipulate, while the determining factor is the economic structure. The second position interprets Cox s historic structure composed of ideas, material capabilities and institutions as eclectic but grounded on historical idealism or subjectivity. It is maintained here that subjectivity is necessary to give complete form and substance to material structures (Germain, 2007, p.129). This post-marxist historical materialism treats class as just one myth that may or may not be the foundation of the material structure. The point of departure in this approach is the particular form of consciousness at a given time. 24

In direct opposition to the above, the third position interprets Cox s formulation as a Marxist historical materialism in which hegemony is presented as class dominance. Nevertheless, unlike the first position, which regards ideas as epiphenomena, this one treats them as constitutive of the material structure (Morton, 2006; Bieler & Morton, 2008). Hall elaborated this position as follows: It is possible to hold both the proposition that material interest helps to structure ideas and the proposition that position in the social structure has the tendency to influence the direction of social thought, without also arguing that material factors unequivocally determine ideology or that class position represents a guarantee that a class will have the appropriate forms of consciousness (Cited in Rupert, 1998, p.430). In other words, in a historical materialist approach, class positions are necessary but not sufficient for the analysis of any ideological formation. Ideologies can be transformed through discursive practices or political construction. As aptly summarised by Rupert, social relations of production may be understood as having some determining effects in the first instance, rather than the last (1998, p.431). This dissertation similarly takes into account that economic structure sets important limits, but the political and economic superstructure has a degree of autonomy. The implications of this proposition for the study of global information society shall be highlighted in the third section of this chapter. As the specific issue under discussion in this dissertation relates to ICTs, it is in order first to clarify the relationship between technology and society. The following section deals with the definition of technology and the contending views as to its explanatory value for social change. 25

Technology and Social Change Technology can have different meanings depending on the level of analysis. At the lowest level, it can refer to physical artifacts, such as the personal computer, the telephone, etc. But, at a higher level, technology refers to the context and knowledge that accompany use and development of such artifacts (Flew, 2002, pp.36-37; Sussman, 1997, p.19).in this study, we understand technology to refer broadly to the knowledge that underlies the artifacts and the way they can be used in society (Harvey cited in Castells, 2000b, pp.28-29; Herrera, 2003, p.575). The role of technology in social change has been analysed in the literature in terms of technological versus social determinism. For the former, technology is driven by the logic of scientific progress, or by its own autonomous logic. It is, a prime mover or independent variable that is uncaused by social factors but with a determinate impact upon society (Mackenzie, 1984). Technological determinism has been quite dominant in one or another form especially in connection with the new information and communication technologies. It is marked by the predominant role it assigns to ICTs in increasing personal freedom, empowering consumers, strengthening democracy, bridging global inequalities, etc. A subtler version is that technologies are neutral and it is up to human beings to shape their design and use (Chandler, 1995). The critics of technological determinism argue that it is a perspective based on a conception of technology as an exogenous factor to the social system. Besides, technological determinism allegedly downplays negative stories such as job 26

loss and income disparity, invasion of privacy, etc that also accompany its use (Sussman, 1997; Flew, 2003; Herrera, 2003). For instance, the various initiatives to bridge the digital gap such as African Information Society Initiative (AISI) of 1996 posit that information and knowledge ensure better provision of such human needs as health and education. Yet, the intellectual and managerial skills needed for their use and development are, unfortunately, in the hands of a few transnational corporations (Hamelink, 1997, 1999). The opposite pole in this debate is social determinism. It insists that technology is entirely determined by social and political factors and its effects are created by human interest and creativity. Social determinists emphasise that the development of particular technologies is determined by the social necessities of particular commercial or powerful groups. Some even argue that where the technology contains a potential to be used to challenge the dominant pattern of social relations, a law of suppression of radical potential operates to stop or reverse its development (Winston cited in Flew, 2003, p.57). The Political Economy tradition has generally underscored the social construction of technology. It spells out the political role played by owners and managers of large-scale corporations, the state and other players in the use and deployment of technology. Technology is regarded as a form of capital used in production processes to coordinate and control labour, or to cheapen labour power by employing unskilled and docile workers. In short, it is an instrument of profit maximisation and of class power in capitalism. Likewise, the recent emergence of digital technology is causally linked to changes in methods, instruments, and scales 27