The backstage of presidential elections in Brazil NorLARNet analysis, 19.4.2010 Yuri Kasahara, Research Fellow, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo General elections in Brazil are approaching and politicians get busy establishing deals. Although the candidates will not be officially announced until July, it is already clear who are the main contenders. This will be a rerun of the past three presidential elections, with President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva s Worker s Party (PT), a now center-left party, and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party ( PSDB), a center-right one, once more dividing the stage. However, even if the Brazilian party system seems to consolidate at the national level around two leading players, there is still room for important supporting actors. It seems likely that Dilma Rousseff (PT) President Lula s chief of staff and José Serra (PSDB) current governor of São Paulo, Brazil s richest and most populous state will be the main protagonists of the campaign. Both candidates are expected to obtain a considerable share of the votes and, eventually, be the candidates for a second ballot. As an underdog, it is already certain that Marina Silva, former minister of the environment during Lula s administration and a senator for the Green Party (PV), will run for the presidency. Although it is not sure so far, another possible candidate is Ciro Gomes a former minister of Lula s administration and a national deputy for the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). Neither is expected to get a significant share of the national votes. However, their votes can make a difference as the polls so far point out a tight race between Ms. Rousseff and Mr. Serra. Beyond the PT-PSDB divide Although the PT and the PSDB have achieved the presidency in the last four elections, neither of them was close to have a majority of legislators either in the Chamber of Deputies (Câmara dos Deputados) or the Senate. Due to its proportional electoral rules with open-lists and a federalist system, Brazil s party system has a record of party fragmentation (see Table 1). Currently, 21 parties are represented in the Chamber of Deputies, with the five largest parties controlling 325 of its 513
seats. In the Senate, 14 parties hold at least one senatorial seat and the five largest parties control 62 of its 81 seats. In such a scenario, the charismatic President Lula s party, PT, for instance, currently holds only 79 deputies and 9 senators. When Fernando Henrique Cardoso was reelected in 1998 without a second ballot, the PSDB performed better having 99 deputies and 16 senators. Nonetheless, that number was far away from the required single majority of votes in both chambers to approve a regular bill, as the annual budget, and even further from the three-fifths necessary to pass a constitutional change. Thus, in such a fragmented party system, Brazilian presidents are doomed to form broad legislative coalitions in order to pass substantial reforms or bills. In the past governments, the logic behind the process of coalition building has been guided by two principles: ideological affinity and patronage. Concerning the former, the PT and the PSDB have their preferential partners in the ideological spectrum of Brazilian politics. Smaller leftist parties such as the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) have been preferential coalition members in the legislative during the time the PT holds the presidency, and, before that, they were opposition parties during the PSDB s governments. On the right side of the spectrum, the Democrats (DEM) 1 was an important member of the legislative coalition during the two consecutive presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and has been a systematic member of opposition during President Lula s administrations. On the other hand, patronage has been a strong incentive to parties that lack clear political positions to join governmental coalitions. The so-called centrist parties, such as the Progressive Party (PP), the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), and the Republic s Party (PR) are the preferential targets of this strategy, as they mainly survive through the charisma and clientelistic practices of regional and local politicians. The tools used by presidents to bring centrist parties to their legislative coalition range from the traditional offer of ministerial and other official positions to plain pork barrel politics in budget negotiations. Being part of the government allows those parties to attract deputies and senators from smaller parties, what increases their bargain power and allows them to survive the next election. 2 Although these parties are heavily criticized for their narrow-minded pragmatism and chameleonic political goals, they are crucial legislative allies to presidents. Without luring them into a coalition, a president would not be able to govern based only on his partiy s own representatives and ideological allies. Table 1 Distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies after the elections Party 1998 2002 2006 DEM (former PFL) 105 84 65 PSDB 99 70 66 PMDB 83 75 89 PP (former PPB) 60 49 41 PT 59 91 83 PDT 25 21 24 PTB 31 26 22 1 Before 2007, the Democrats were named the Liberal Front Party (PFL). 2 A strong example of this dynamic is the Republic s Party. After the 2006 elections, it had 25 deputies and increased this number to 42 in 2009 as it has been a sound ally of Lula s administration.
PSB 18 22 27 PPS 3 15 22 PR (fusion of PL and 13 32 25 PRONA in 2007) PC do B 7 12 13 Others 3 10 16 38 4 Total 513 513 513 Source: Câmara dos Deputados (www.camara.gov.br) However, the cost of bringing such parties into a coalition varies according to their size and political perspectives. Small and medium parties that heavily depend on the resources managed by the federal government tend to have a smaller bargain power and quite often are willing to participate in a coalition even if not necessarily as a part of the presidential cabinet. President Lula, for instance, adopted during his first mandate a strategy of building a broad and heterogeneous coalition mainly composed of small and medium sized parties. Conversely, big parties ask a much higher price, as they request considerable participation in the cabinet and several positions in the administration. Among all the parties that would fit in this fluid centrist category, the one that could be considered a big party and has been playing a more relevant role during the last 20 years is the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). As a direct successor of the official opposition party (MDB) during the authoritarian regime imposed by the military between 1964 and 1985, the PMDB works as a confederation of regional politicians and has a very heterogeneous political ideology, which ranges from conservatism to social liberalism. It has never won the presidency since the direct elections were reestablished in 1989, but its steady command of a significant number of seats in Congress has given its representatives a relevant place in presidential cabinets during the last four administrations. President Lula, for instance, invested a lot of political capital in bringing the PMDB into his coalition during his first mandate. However, he was only partially successful due to the resistance from his own party, PT, which considered such an alliance to result in loss of important ministries and to give space to controversial politicians in the government, and from factions of the PMDB that were either closely related to the previous administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso or wanted to maintain an independent position. After his reelection in 2006, Lula finally imposed his will over his party and lured PMDB s main factions to be a full coalition members. In exchange for its full support, the PMDB increased its share from three to six ministries. 5 Besides being in control of a considerable number of seats in the Legislative, the PMDB has another important attraction to presidents in office. Because of its size, the PMDB is an important electoral partner due to two important assets during elections: control of an important share of radio and television airtime, and access to local governments. In Brazil, during the campaign period, parties 3 The number of political parties with at least one representative varies a lot along the years, as old ones are extinct or merged, and new ones are created. In 1998, this category included 6 parties; in 2002, 7 parties; and in 2006, 9 parties. 4 In 2006, the Green Party (PV) and the Social Christian Party had elected 13 and 9 representatives, respectively. This unexpected result explains the surge in the number of representatives from small parties. 5 Currently the PMDB holds the following ministries: Health, Defense, Communications, Regional Integration, Energy, and Agriculture.
have free airtime in television and radios, and this time is divided between the candidates based on the number of seats each party occupies in the Chamber of Deputies. 6 Considering the PMDB s congressional power, and the fact that any other kind of paid advertisement on TV and radio is forbidden, presidential candidates are eager to forge an electoral coalition with it. The PMDB also has a respectable political machine in different states and municipalities around the country. They have governors in nine of the twenty seven states and 1.201 mayors in the 5.564 municipalities in Brazil. The widespread distribution of these positions in different regions of Brazil confers the PMDB a reach to electors in different parts of the country what is crucial to a candidate disputing a national-wide election. Therefore, President Lula s effort to make the PMDB an electoral partner for this year s presidential race is not unreasonable. The limited political experience of PT s candidate, Dilma Rousseff she has never ran for an election before and her lack of charisma and oratory skills are clear liabilities, which make the resources provided by the PMDB even more important. With more airtime and hustlings around the country to show herself to the public, Ms. Rousseff hopes to succeed. The other name on the ticket The price that Ms. Rouseff will pay for this partnership is the vice-presidency and a more prominent role in a future presidential cabinet rumors say that the PMDB could even control the powerful Ministry of Treasury (Ministério da Fazenda). The negotiations between the PT and the PMDB to pick Ms. Rousseff running mate have not concluded yet, but it looks likely that Michel Temer, current speaker of the House and PMDB s national president, will fill in the ticket. If it does not happen, the odds are that a heavy-weight member from the PMDB, with a strong influence in the party, will occupy the post. By itself, such an agreement does not represent a novelty in Brazilian politics; during two consecutive administrations, former President Cardoso had established a smooth relationship with Marco Maciel, his vice-president during the period from the DEM. In that period, both politicians were experienced and had a quite clear idea of the role each one should play. In case of a victory of Ms. Rousseff, however, two different scenarios can be envisioned. In the first, a more benign one, Mr. Temer will play a discreet role and use his position to help an inexperienced Ms. Rousseff to manage her legislative coalition. In a second one, Mr. Temer could play a more disruptive role, as he could use his position and influence to increase his party s ability to concede political favors and resources of patronage. Whichever scenario prevails, one can expect a more active and visible vice-presidency in case of a new PT administration. For Mr. Temer and his party, an eventual defeat in the presidential election would not prove to be disastrous neither. As it is likely that his party will keep an important number of seats in both legislative houses, it is almost certain that whoever becomes president will bring the PMDB into the government. For the PSDB, the negotiations to choose Mr. Serra s partner has up to now been a source of anxiety. The political influence of its main electoral partner and a natural provider of a vice-president candidate, the DEM, has gradually diminished in the last years. Although the DEM still has a relevant role in Congress and in some states, the party s last electoral performances have been disappointing. 6 Normally, all parties have in total two hours of advertisement everyday, except Sundays, during the period of the campaign one hour for the radio and one hour for television, and the advertisements are aired in slots of 30 minutes along the day. One third of the time is divided equally among all the candidates, and the other two thirds are divided by the number of seats each party or electoral coalition has in the Chamber of Deputies after the last election.
In the last three national elections it saw its number of seats in Congress decrease considerably. In 2006, the party only won a single gubernatorial election. For 2010, its electoral prospects are not favourable neither. The ageing of its main political leaders heavily related to practices of patronage and clientelism and its ferocious right-wing criticism of Lula s administration contributed to reducing the electoral appeal of the party. To make things worse the party currently is in disarray after a recent corruption scandal involving its only governor, José Arruda from Distrito Federal. Mr. Arruda was videotaped receiving off the books campaign contributions in December 2009 and was arrested for almost three months after interfering in the investigations. With the public image of the DEM badly damaged, the PSDB has been looking for a vice-president in its own ranks. PSDB has been dreaming about the young and popular governor of Minas Gerais state, Aécio Neves, as Serra s running mate. For the PSDB, his name on the ticket would carry an important number of votes due to his high levels of popularity in Minas Gerais, the second most populous state in Brazil, as his approval rates are as high as President Lula s. However, Mr. Neves considered up to a month ago a potential presidential candidate himself announced that he would run for a seat in the Senate instead. Although many PSDB leaders still try to convince Mr. Neves to change his mind, apparently he has decided that pursuing a senatorial position better suits his own presidential ambitions. Staying for four years and possibly eight in Mr. Serra s shadow would not help him much. And in case of a Serra s defeat, being out of the national political scene would be even worse. In this context, the PSDB has to choose between an innocuous vice-president candidate and an appealing one that will have strong desires to share the spotlights with Mr. Serra. Surely, when the campaign officially starts in July, all the attention will be on the presidential candidates and their proposals for the next four years. Nevertheless, the candidates will not be making efforts only to charm the voters. Their success in the race and its aftermath will depend also on their ability to deal with the complex network of interests between parties and within their own ranks. As many analysts talk about a duopoly in national politics between the PT and the PSDB, it is important to remember that in the complex Brazilian political system, a president, or a party, does not govern alone.