When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil
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1 Experimental Evidence from Brazil Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo UC Berkeley F. Daniel Hidalgo MIT Yuri Kasahara University of Oslo CEGA Research Retreat UC Berkeley November 4, 2012
2 Project Overview Research Question
3 Project Overview Research Question Treatment Corruption Information of Candidates
4 Project Overview Research Question Treatment Corruption Information of Candidates Outcomes Vote Choice, Spoiled Ballots, Turnout
5 Project Overview Research Question Treatment Corruption Information of Candidates Outcomes Vote Choice, Spoiled Ballots, Turnout Empirical Strategy Integrated Field Experiment, Survey Experiment & Survey
6 Presentation Structure Motivation The Brazilian Electoral Overview Field Experiment (Behavioral Responses) Survey & Survey Experiment (Mechanisms) Conclusions Current Work (CEGA Levin Family Seed Grant)
7 Motivating Questions 1 Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior?
8 Motivating Questions 1 Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? 2 What are effective ways to design transparency initiatives that result in electoral accountability?
9 Motivating Questions 1 Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? 2 What are effective ways to design transparency initiatives that result in electoral accountability? 3 What are the consequences of negative campaigning?
10 A Unique Set of Circumstances 1. The Candidates
11 A Unique Set of Circumstances 1. The Candidates 2. The Parties
12 A Unique Set of Circumstances 1. The Candidates 2. The Parties 3. The Lista Suja (Dirty List)
13 A Unique Set of Circumstances 1. The Candidates 2. The Parties 3. The Lista Suja (Dirty List) 4. Mandatory Voting
14 The Suplicy Flier
15 The Kassab Flier
16 Overview Treatment I (Kassab) [100 precincts] Treatment II (Suplicy) [100 precincts] Control [200 precincts] Field Exp Survey Survey Exp Field Experiment Oct 22-25, 2008
17 Overview Treatment I (Kassab) [100 precincts] Treatment II (Suplicy) [100 precincts] Control [200 precincts] Field Exp Survey Survey Exp Field Experiment Oct 22-25, 2008 Elec6on Oct 26, 2008
18 Overview Treatment I (Kassab) [100 precincts] Treatment II (Suplicy) [100 precincts] Treatment Group Sampling [20 Precincts, N=200] Control [200 precincts] Control Group Sampling [20 Precincts, N=200] Field Exp Survey Survey Exp Field Experiment Oct 22-25, 2008 Elec6on Oct 26, 2008 Survey/Survey Exp Oct 27, Nov 5, 2008
![Overview Treatment I (Kassab) [100 precincts] Treatment II (Suplicy) [100 precincts] Treatment Group Sampling [20 Precincts, N=200] Control [200 precincts] Control Group Sampling [20 Precincts,](/docs-images/85/91667911/images/19-0.jpg "N=200] Treatment I (Kassab) [N=67] Treatment II (Suplicy) [N=67] Control [N=66] Field Exp Survey Survey Exp Field Experiment Oct 22-25, 2008 Elec6on Oct 26, 2008 Survey/Survey Exp Oct 27, 2008- Nov")
19 Overview Treatment I (Kassab) [100 precincts] Treatment II (Suplicy) [100 precincts] Treatment Group Sampling [20 Precincts, N=200] Control [200 precincts] Control Group Sampling [20 Precincts, N=200] Treatment I (Kassab) [N=67] Treatment II (Suplicy) [N=67] Control [N=66] Field Exp Survey Survey Exp Field Experiment Oct 22-25, 2008 Elec6on Oct 26, 2008 Survey/Survey Exp Oct 27, Nov 5, 2008
20 Field Experiment Randomized voting precincts 400 precincts in randomization group 100 precincts in Treatment I (Kassab), 100 precincts in Treatment II (Suplicy) 200 precincts in Control Group
21 Field Experiment Randomized voting precincts 400 precincts in randomization group 100 precincts in Treatment I (Kassab), 100 precincts in Treatment II (Suplicy) 200 precincts in Control Group Treatment 187,177 fliers/households (roughly 50% Kassab, 50% Suplicy)
22 Field Experiment Randomized voting precincts 400 precincts in randomization group 100 precincts in Treatment I (Kassab), 100 precincts in Treatment II (Suplicy) 200 precincts in Control Group Treatment 187,177 fliers/households (roughly 50% Kassab, 50% Suplicy) Distribution Delivered to individual households Oct , 2008 (1-4 days before the election) Strong enforcement system in place
23 Flier Delivery Motivation 1
24 The Distribution of Precincts More thn $2654 1
25 The Distribution of Precincts More thn $2654 1
26 The Distribution of Precincts More thn $2654 1
27 Covariate Balance PT Pres. Vote % (2006) PT Mayor Vote % (2004) PT Congress Vote % (2006) PT City Council Vote % (2008) PSDB Congress Vote % (2006) PSDB City Council Vote % (2008) Statistic Variable DEM City Council Vote % (2008) t Test KS test 1st Round Turnout % (2008) 1st Round Suplicy Vote % (2008) 1st Round Kassab Vote % (2008) 1st Round Invalid Vote % (2008) 1st Round Blank Vote % (2008) # of Registered Voters p Value
28 Covariate Balance (Precinct Size) PT Pres. Vote % (2006) PT Mayor Vote % (2004) PT Congress Vote % (2006) Number of Voters PT City Council Vote % (2008) PSDB Congress Vote % (2006) Mean Difference Variable PSDB City Council Vote % (2008) DEM City Council Vote % (2008) Statistic t Test KS test Standard Error st Round Turnout % (2008) 1st Round Suplicy Vote % (2008) t- test p- value st Round Kassab Vote % (2008) 1st Round Invalid Vote % (2008) KS test p- value st Round Blank Vote % (2008) # of Registered Voters p Value
29 Suplicy Flier Precincts are the unit of analysis. Es3mates without covariates are from the simple ITT es3mator. Es3mates with covariates are from a linear model, including a treatment indicator, PT vote share in 2004, total number of registered voters in the precinct, and block fixed effects. All standard errors account for heteroskedas3city. Robust standard errors are used in covariate adjusted results. Intent- to- treat es3mates do not assume equal variance across treatment condi3ons.
30 Suplicy Flier Precincts are the unit of analysis. Es3mates without covariates are from the simple ITT es3mator. Es3mates with covariates are from a linear model, including a treatment indicator, PT vote share in 2004, total number of registered voters in the precinct, and block fixed effects. All standard errors account for heteroskedas3city. Robust standard errors are used in covariate adjusted results. Intent- to- treat es3mates do not assume equal variance across treatment condi3ons.
31 Suplicy Flier Precincts are the unit of analysis. Es3mates without covariates are from the simple ITT es3mator. Es3mates with covariates are from a linear model, including a treatment indicator, PT vote share in 2004, total number of registered voters in the precinct, and block fixed effects. All standard errors account for heteroskedas3city. Robust standard errors are used in covariate adjusted results. Intent- to- treat es3mates do not assume equal variance across treatment condi3ons.
32 Kassab Flier Precincts are the unit of analysis. Es3mates without covariates are from the simple ITT es3mator. Es3mates with covariates are from a linear model, including a treatment indicator, PT vote share in 2004, total number of registered voters in the precinct, and block fixed effects. All standard errors account for heteroskedas3city. Robust standard errors are used in covariate adjusted results. Intent- to- treat es3mates do not assume equal variance across treatment condi3ons.
33 Testing Mechanisms: Survey Evidence Ranking Candidates on Perceived Corrup4on by Vote in 2004 Don't Know Both equally corrupt Kassab is more corrupt Abstain / Spoiled Serra Voter Suplicy Voter Suplicy is more corrupt Proportion
34 Testing Mechanisms: Survey Experiment Evidence Suplicy vs Placebo Kassab vs Placebo Suplicy vs Kassab Estimate Standard Error % Conf. Int. [-1.41, -0.15] [-1.03, 0.31] [-1.36, 0.28] p-value The dependent variable is the post- treatment minus pre- treatment candidate evalua5on on a feeling thermometer scale of 0 to 10.
35 Testing Mechanisms: Survey Experiment Evidence Suplicy vs Placebo Kassab vs Placebo Suplicy vs Kassab Estimate Standard Error % Conf. Int. [-1.41, -0.15] [-1.03, 0.31] [-1.36, 0.28] p-value The dependent variable is the post- treatment minus pre- treatment candidate evalua5on on a feeling thermometer scale of 0 to 10.
36 Possible Mechanisms No Differences 1 Intensity of Candidate Support
37 Possible Mechanisms No Differences 1 Intensity of Candidate Support 2 Evaluations of Candidate Corruption (Whether Their Own Candidate or the Opposing Candidate)
38 Possible Mechanisms No Differences 1 Intensity of Candidate Support 2 Evaluations of Candidate Corruption (Whether Their Own Candidate or the Opposing Candidate) 3 Corruption Information/Dirty List Knowledge
39 Possible Mechanisms No Differences 1 Intensity of Candidate Support 2 Evaluations of Candidate Corruption (Whether Their Own Candidate or the Opposing Candidate) 3 Corruption Information/Dirty List Knowledge However there is a difference on the emphasis PT v. non-pt voters place on corruption in their voting decision
40 Testing Mechanisms: Survey Experimental Evidence Heterogeneity in Survey Experiment for Suplicy and Kassab Fliers Suplicy vs Placebo Kassab vs Placebo Non-Suplicy Voters Suplicy Voters Non-Kassab Voters Kassab Voters Estimate Standard Error % Conf. Int. [-1.01, 0.25] [-2.33, -0.25] [-2.22, -0.26] [-0.56, 1.4] p-value n The dependent variable is the post- treatment minus pre- treatment candidate evalua5on on a feeling thermometer scale of 0 to 10.
41 Testing Mechanisms: Survey Experimental Evidence Heterogeneity in Survey Experiment for Suplicy and Kassab Fliers Suplicy vs Placebo Kassab vs Placebo Non-Suplicy Voters Suplicy Voters Non-Kassab Voters Kassab Voters Estimate Standard Error % Conf. Int. [-1.01, 0.25] [-2.33, -0.25] [-2.22, -0.26] [-0.56, 1.4] p-value n The dependent variable is the post- treatment minus pre- treatment candidate evalua5on on a feeling thermometer scale of 0 to 10.
![42 Standard Error 0.32 0.53 0.5 0.5 95 % Conf. Int. [-1.01, 0.25] [-2.33, -0.25] [-2.22, -0.26] [-0.56, 1.4] p-value 0.24 0.02 0.](/docs-images/85/91667911/images/42-2.jpg "02 0.4 n 85 48 62 72 The dependent variable is the post- treatment minus pre- treatment candidate evalua5on on a feeling")
42 Testing Mechanisms: Survey Experimental Evidence Heterogeneity in Survey Experiment for Suplicy and Kassab Fliers Suplicy vs Placebo Kassab vs Placebo Non-Suplicy Voters Suplicy Voters Non-Kassab Voters Kassab Voters Estimate Standard Error % Conf. Int. [-1.01, 0.25] [-2.33, -0.25] [-2.22, -0.26] [-0.56, 1.4] p-value n The dependent variable is the post- treatment minus pre- treatment candidate evalua5on on a feeling thermometer scale of 0 to 10.
43 Conclusions Motivation 1 The work demonstrates differential responses to corruption information by voters based on candidate
44 Conclusions Motivation 1 The work demonstrates differential responses to corruption information by voters based on candidate 2 Publicizing a candidate s corruption record can alter voters behavior, but effects are contingent upon importance placed on clean governance
45 Conclusions Motivation 1 The work demonstrates differential responses to corruption information by voters based on candidate 2 Publicizing a candidate s corruption record can alter voters behavior, but effects are contingent upon importance placed on clean governance 3 Information transparency with candidate corruption can lead voters to switch votes and abstain
46 Conclusions Motivation 1 Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue
47 Conclusions Motivation 1 Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue 2 Ignores political context including the party system, voter perceptions, and heterogeneity across candidates
48 Conclusions Motivation 1 Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue 2 Ignores political context including the party system, voter perceptions, and heterogeneity across candidates 3 We suggest the nature of the party system and voter attitudes mediate information in important ways, and ultimately shape the conditions under which voters punish corrupt politicians
49 Conclusions Motivation 1 We offer suggestive evidence that PT voters expectations about the PT s anti-corruption reputation was a central dimension of their voting behavior
50 Conclusions Motivation 1 We offer suggestive evidence that PT voters expectations about the PT s anti-corruption reputation was a central dimension of their voting behavior 2 Increased transparency may disadvantage candidates from parties with a reputation for clean governance when they compete against candidates from parties with no such reputation
51 Current Work (CEGA Levin Family Seed Grant) Why Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Qualitative (Focus Groups + Field Interviews) and Experimental Work
52 Current Work (CEGA Levin Family Seed Grant) Why Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Qualitative (Focus Groups + Field Interviews) and Experimental Work Treatments 1 Corruption Type 2 Court Rulings 3 Party Labels 4 Core v. Swing Voters
53 Current Work (CEGA Levin Family Seed Grant) Why Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Qualitative (Focus Groups + Field Interviews) and Experimental Work Treatments 1 Corruption Type 2 Court Rulings 3 Party Labels 4 Core v. Swing Voters Part of a broader research agenda on compliance in challenging settings
54 Thank You!
55 Additional Slides
56 Knowledge of the Dirty List Knowledge about Dirty List by Vote in 2004 Know Both on List Know Kassab on List Serra Voter Suplicy Voter Know Suplicy on List Proportion
57 Descriptive Statistics Turnout % (2008) DEM/PFL Vote % (2008) Variable PT Vote % (2008) PT Vote % (2004) (Number of Voters)/ %
58 Suplicy - Interactions Interaction: Education Interaction: Income Interaction: PT Strength Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median DV: PT Vote Share DV: Turnout Estimate
59 Kassab - Interactions Interaction: Education Interaction: Income Interaction: PT Strength Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median DV: PT Vote Share DV: Turnout Estimate
60 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? On one hand, corruption may not be of importance to voters, especially in the developing world
61 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? On one hand, corruption may not be of importance to voters, especially in the developing world For the less educated, who support breaking rules the Brazilian way, there is also a tendency to show high tolerance of corruption. For many of these people, there is no forgetting when it comes to these allegations; they simply are not important. (Almeida & Young 2007)
62 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? On one hand, corruption may not be of importance to voters, especially in the developing world For the less educated, who support breaking rules the Brazilian way, there is also a tendency to show high tolerance of corruption. For many of these people, there is no forgetting when it comes to these allegations; they simply are not important. (Almeida & Young 2007) On the other hand, theoretical literature posits information improves accountability to mass publics
63 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Recent empirical literature is mixed Ferraz & Finan (2008) (Brazil): Information about municipal corruption audits decrease the probability of politicians being reelected
64 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Recent empirical literature is mixed Ferraz & Finan (2008) (Brazil): Information about municipal corruption audits decrease the probability of politicians being reelected Banerjee, Kumar, Pande & Su (2010) (India): Distributing corruption record in New Delhi increases turnout by 3.6 percentage points
65 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Recent empirical literature is mixed Ferraz & Finan (2008) (Brazil): Information about municipal corruption audits decrease the probability of politicians being reelected Banerjee, Kumar, Pande & Su (2010) (India): Distributing corruption record in New Delhi increases turnout by 3.6 percentage points Chong, De La O, Karlan, & Wantchekon (2011) (Mexico): Distributing corruption audit information reduces turnout by 4 percentage points
66 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue
67 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue Ignores political context including the party system, and voter perceptions
68 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue Ignores political context including the party system, and voter perceptions Heterogeneity across candidates is also largely ignored in the extant literature
69 1. Is candidate corruption a salient factor in voting behavior? Corruption information is typically presented solely as a valence issue Ignores political context including the party system, and voter perceptions Heterogeneity across candidates is also largely ignored in the extant literature We suggest the nature of the party system and voter attitudes mediate information in important ways, and ultimately shape the conditions under which voters punish corrupt politicians
70 2. What are effective ways to design transparency initiatives that result in electoral accountability? What leads governments to become clean is still unknown
71 2. What are effective ways to design transparency initiatives that result in electoral accountability? What leads governments to become clean is still unknown In contrast to the mounting scholarly research on the consequences of good governance, our knowledge about what causes governments to be clean and efficient is still at its infancy. -Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003)
72 2. What are effective ways to design transparency initiatives that result in electoral accountability? What leads governments to become clean is still unknown In contrast to the mounting scholarly research on the consequences of good governance, our knowledge about what causes governments to be clean and efficient is still at its infancy. -Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003) Transparency is seen as one important way to improve accountability
73 2. What are effective ways to design transparency initiatives that result in electoral accountability? What leads governments to become clean is still unknown In contrast to the mounting scholarly research on the consequences of good governance, our knowledge about what causes governments to be clean and efficient is still at its infancy. -Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003) Transparency is seen as one important way to improve accountability Our findings show that, under certain conditions, corruption information can suppress voter turnout
74 3. What are the consequences of negative campaigning? Extremely divided in the extant literature
75 3. What are the consequences of negative campaigning? Extremely divided in the extant literature Empirical work either lacks credible identification strategies or external validity
76 3. What are the consequences of negative campaigning? Extremely divided in the extant literature Empirical work either lacks credible identification strategies or external validity To our knowledge, ours may be considered one of the first field experiments in negative campaigning
77 3. What are the consequences of negative campaigning? Extremely divided in the extant literature Empirical work either lacks credible identification strategies or external validity To our knowledge, ours may be considered one of the first field experiments in negative campaigning Poorly conceptualized term: informing vs. negative campaigning?
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