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Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 4, No. 3, December 2011, 459 467 COMMENT AND DEBATE Sic[k] of the new terrorism debate? A response to our critics Alexander Spencer* Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Science, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, Germany (Received 19 July 2011; final version received 11 August 2011) Apart from the great debates on the definition of terrorism or its causes, the discussion about whether new terrorism can really be considered new or not has become one of the central disagreements in terrorism research. This article will respond to the criticism voiced by some of the proponents of the new terrorism idea and reflect on the merits of their arguments. It will emphasis the importance of words and the implication of small predicates such as new for the construction of terrorism and our reaction to it. Keywords: new terrorism; criticism; words; debate; waves; metaphors Introduction In a recent article entitled The new terrorism and its critics, Ersun N. Kurtulus (2011) vehemently criticises what he refers to as the critics of new terrorism. He makes a number of important and interesting points. Seemingly sick of the debate on new terrorism, Kurtulus attempts to resolve once and for all the continuous discussion about the concept. By pointing to a number of errors made by the opponents of the idea, he aims to illustrate the truly new nature of new terrorism as religious, networked and indiscriminate. Thus far, the debate on the concept of new terrorism has been fairly one sided (see e.g. Gunarathna 2010, Spencer 2010a), as there was no response from the proponents of new terrorism to the criticism offered by a diverse number of scholars (Copeland 2001, Tucker 2001, Crenshaw 2003, Duyvesteyn 2004, Spencer 2006a, Field 2009). Many of the critics will therefore be glad that someone has finally engaged in a scientific debate on the issue. In the following discussion, I will examine the three main criticisms offered by Kurtulus. The first part will focus on his criticism of using straw man arguments and selective evidence, while the second part will reflect on his accusation of a reductionist interpretation and the use of inappropriate categories. The third and final part will consider the idea of newness and indicate the importance of small seemingly unimportant predicates such as new. A straw man argument and the selective use of evidence A central criticism raised by Kurtulus is, first, that the opponents of the new terrorism concept have built up a straw man: The concept of new terrorism is used by a few *Email: alexander.spencer@lrz.uni-muenchen.de ISSN 1753-9153 print/issn 1753-9161 online 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2011.623428 http://www.tandfonline.com
460 A. Spencer but criticized by many (Kurtulus 2011, p. 476). This appears to be a fairly strange claim which is difficult to uphold due to the fact that there are a number of highly influential and renowned scholars who make use of the concept (see e.g. Kushner 1998, Laqueur 1999, Lesser et al. 1999, Juergensmeyer 2000, Simon and Benjamin 2000, Hoffman 2002, Kegley 2002, Neumann 2009). The argument by Kurtulus is also interesting, because if the proponents of the new terrorism concept were indeed only straw men for our argument, then why would anybody make the effort of defending the straw man if there was no affinity with, or belief in, the straw stuffing. Second, critics are accused of shamelessly using statements of senior politicians to strengthen their argument: This raises the question of why the loose rhetoric of politicians, which aim to justify and mobilize, is jumbled together with peer-reviewed texts of academics, which attempt to understand (Kurtulus 2011, p. 492, emphasis added). As will be argued in part three below, the fact that the concept of new terrorism is or can be used to justify and mobilise is precisely one of the points many of the critics want to make. While Kurtulus argues that the term new terrorism is not explicitly used by politicians, he consciously or unconsciously forgets to illustrate that the statements of many of the politicians and officials quoted by the critics of new terrorism do explicitly link the predicate new with the concept of terrorism. For example, Tony Blair referred to new global terrorism, and George Bush spoke of new realities and dangers posed by modern terrorists (Field 2009, p. 195). Regardless of whether they have the same concept of new terrorism in their mind as academics, the important point here is that the understanding of newness is linked to the concept of terrorism, thereby making only new counterterrorism measures seem appropriate to dealing with the dangers of new terrorism. Referring to statements of politicians is a way of showing that the understanding of new terrorism has penetrated the political realm and therefore has real implications for policy. Beyond the academic bickering over whether terrorism is really new or not, the inclusion of political rhetoric is a way of illustrating the policy relevance of the debate and importance of our criticism. Furthermore, Kurtulus criticizes the critics of new terrorism for overlooking the issue of representativeness of the historical examples that they mobilize against the concept of new terrorism (Kurtulus 2011, p. 482). Referring to examples of indiscriminate mass casualty terrorism incidences cited by the critics as arguments against new terrorism, Kurtulus argues that these may be statistical outliers. In response to a number of examples of mass casualty terrorism incidences prior to 9/11, Kurtulus argues that [g]iven the fact that this list more or less contains all mass casualty attacks prior to the emergence of new terrorism, there is a strong possibility that these attacks are, statistically speaking, outliers in over a hundred years of modern terrorist activity. (2011, p. 482) One is left wondering whether statistical evidence can really help us evaluate the nature of terrorism for two related reasons. First, the data or information necessary to establish any kind of statistical database is hard to collect and is subject to definitional biases as to what to count. For example, Kurtulus would probably include all incidences of insurgency in Iraq into such a database, while others may be more hesitant in equating terrorism with insurgency (Wilkinson 2000). Second, due to the fact that terrorism, in comparison to other social phenomena such as crime or traffic accidents, is very rare, any statistical evidence has to be treated with caution especially if one wants to discard uncomfortable outliers (Falkenrath 2001, Mueller 2005, Spencer 2006b). So, critics are accused of selectively choosing examples which fit their arguments. This is an interesting point to make as Kurtulus himself does not seem too bothered about using
Critical Studies on Terrorism 461 selective examples to illustrate his argument. For instance, Kurtulus brings up a number of examples which indicate that new terrorism has a clearly religious character. Pointing to the insurgency in Iraq, Kashmir and the conflict between Israel and Palestine, he claims: A couple of examples should be sufficient to illustrate this point (Kurtulus 2011, p. 481). Furthermore, Kurtulus does also not shy away from generalisations without presenting any of what Kurtulus would surely consider scientific proof in the form of statistical analysis. For example, Kurtulus argues that anarchist terrorist campaigns were know [sic] for being highly selective in their targeting (2011, p. 487). Statistical proof for this claim would have probably been too much, but a couple of references would have been nice. I think that Kurtulus misunderstands the whole point of questioning the concept of new terrorism. The main purpose, in my opinion, is not to prove that terrorism today is old and that terrorism has not changed, but that the category of new terrorism is contestable and not as unproblematic as some may suggest. The aim is to question the dominant interpretations and thereby show the inherently contested nature of the new terrorism category. Reductionist interpretations and inappropriate categories This leads to a second area of criticism. Kurtulus accuses the critics of new terrorism of employing reductionist interpretations and inappropriate categories and labels, which make it impossible to differentiate the characteristic features of new terrorism from those of the old (2011, p. 477). First, one may respond that Kurtulus again does not seem to be too worried about reductionist arguments or inappropriate categories himself. He, for example, argues that ethnic hatred can be considered more similar to the religious motivation of new terrorists than the political motivation of traditional terrorists (2011, p. 482). Any kind of further elaboration on the why and how in order to prove this adventurous claim is missing. Furthermore, he seems to equate insurgency in places such as Iraq and Kashmir with terrorism. In an attempt to illustrate the importance of religious motivation for new terrorism Kurtulus argues: In Iraq, the insurgency against the coalition forces had a clearly religious character although the country was a bastion of secular Arab nationalism and had one of the strongest Communist parties in the Arab world just a couple of decades ago. [...] In Kashmir, since 1989, 13 of the 17 insurgent organizations have religious outlooks in varying degrees. (2011, p. 481) A large number of academics have tried to illustrate the differences between terrorism and insurgency, including renowned terrorism scholars such as Paul Wilkinson who stated: it is grossly misleading to treat terrorism as a synonym for insurgency, guerrilla warfare or political violence in general (2000, p. 1). Apart from mixing and equating concepts such as insurgency and terrorism, Kurtulus is confronted with the same problems of subjective, or what he may refer to as inappropriate, categories. Kurtulus here discusses three different types of binary categories: indiscriminate versus selective attacks by terrorists; religious versus secular motivations; and network versus hierarchical organisational structures of terrorist organisations. Interestingly, when accusing the critics of new terrorism of inappropriate categories, Kurtulus chooses the categories of indiscriminate and selective use of violence (2011, pp. 485 486), which by their very nature are selective, not stable categories, and inherently involve some sort of subjectivity. What one considers to be a legitimate or select target is not something established by nature. What we consider to be indiscriminate attacks on
462 A. Spencer the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, others may interpret as a selective strike on the military and financial centre of the United States. One may therefore argue that Al-Qaeda and other new terrorists can still be considered selective. New terrorists generally do not go about randomly killing everybody, they do continue to carefully plan their attacks and consciously select their targets for maximum effect. Just because the selected target group is considered wider does not make it indiscriminate. Al-Qaeda is probably not interested in killing a native villager in the middle of the rainforest. So selectivity and its influence on public opinion are still very important to new terrorists ; it is only because wider selection includes categories such as western civilians that we consider it an indication of the indiscriminate nature of new terrorism. One may go as far as claiming that selectivity is central to the definition of terrorism which seeks to achieve some sort of objective. Terrorism, including new terrorism, is not random but uses violence selectively to create fear to reach its political/religious goals. Here, Jeff Goodwin s theory of categorical terrorism points out that this supposed randomness of terrorist victims has something to do with whether the terrorists perceive the civilians as potential allies or not. He argues that in a situation where there is little interaction between terrorists and civilians due to, for example, different languages, religions or territorial segregation, seemingly random attacks against civilians are more likely (Goodwin 2006). This brings us to a second type of category put forward by Kurtulus: secular versus religious motivation (2011, pp. 487 488). He argues that old terrorists had predominantly secular motivations, while new terrorists have mainly religious motivations. With regard to the underlying rhetoric and language used by terrorist organisations, I would fully agree. Very few would refute that the RAF used a more secular line of argumentation, while Al-Qaeda makes more references to religious themes in their public statements. Similarly, no one would disagree that most old terrorists such as the RAF came from the West, and most new terrorists come from the Middle East. It remains, however, open to debate as to whether this would justify the term new terrorism, especially considering that the religious or mystical motivation (Kurtulus 2011, p. 478) of new terrorists is fundamentally political as well. Here, I would agree with Kurtulus that it is difficult to separate religion from politics in Islam. However, I would go further to claim that it is almost impossible to separate politics from religion in general, and in particular when it comes down to the motivations of terrorist organisations. Although in many countries in the West there is an explicit separation between the institution of the state and the institution of religion, most political life is somehow influenced by religious belief systems. With regard to old terrorism the argument was not that old terrorist groups are/were religious, but that many of their motivations were partly influenced by religion and that Al-Qaeda, and on this Kurtulus and I would agree, is also motivated by politics. As Richard Jackson et al. (2011) point out: many secular groups displayed religious characteristics. For example, both the German RAF and the Italian Red Brigades pursued a radically different world order, painted their conflict in terms comparable to cosmic war, and described their enemies in similar eschatological terms to Al-Qaeda. Much of their violence was symbolic or redemptive rather than strategic, and the level of loyalty demanded from members was as total as that of the most exacting religious cults. Overall, drawing a clear separation between religious and secular motivation seems extremely difficult. 1 With regard to old terrorists, one may ask: Were the Jewish terrorists in British Palestine fighting for religion or against colonialism? Do the Tamil Tigers
Critical Studies on Terrorism 463 want their own homeland because they are Hindus in a Muslim nation or because they are Tamils in a Sinhalese country? (Quillen 2002, p. 288). Surely the answer is a bit of both. The third type of category which according to Kurtulus is used in an inappropriate fashion is the distinction between a network or hierarchical structure of terrorist organisations. Fittingly, Kurtulus here discusses B. Jackson s typology of terrorist organisations (Jackson 2009). While Jackson refers to these types of organisation as networks, Kurtulus claims: it can be argued that the use of the term network should be confined to this latter category and Jackson s typology should be regarded as taxonomy of hierarchical terrorist organizations (2011, p. 490). So while Jackson calls them networks, Kurtulus believes that most of them involve hierarchical dimensions. This illustrates our point very well. It is unclear where a hierarchy stops and a network begins, as organisations show signs of both kinds of organisational arrangement. This is visible even in the apparently most network-like organisation such as Al-Qaeda, when, following Osama bin Laden s death, second-in-command Ayman al-zawahiri has taken over as the head of the organisation. 2 And to a certain point, Kurtulus and I would agree that one can see an increased level of networking due to a technological and information revolution throughout society. As Kurtulus argues: Seen from the perspective of this article, there is no reason to assume that contemporary terrorist organizations are immune to such influences that emanate from the Internet and information technology. 3 One possible outcome of this transformation is the emergence and strengthening of horizontal networks among terrorists just like other political organizations and social movements where power is more evenly distributed at the expense of vertical hierarchical structures where the power is concentrated at the top. (2011, p. 491) It is, however, then questionable whether this would legitimise the use of the concept new terrorism. As pointed out by some: Can we really expect terrorists to remain as they were in an isolated state of inertia, separated from the evolving world around them? Evolution does not justify the term new terrorism. If this was the case we would have to call most things new every single day. (Spencer 2006a, p. 25) Overall, Kurtulus criticism of using inappropriate categories is an important one, as it reflects precisely one of the central points many of the critics of the concept new terrorism would want to make. By questioning the validity of the categories of, for example, selective and indiscriminate targeting, critics can illustrate the disputed nature of the concept. The point is not so much to prove that new terrorism is in fact old terrorism, but that the categories which are used to establish this difference are artificial or at least contested. Kurtulus is right to point out that the categories used by the critics are unstable, but illustrating the instability of categories is precisely the point of the exercise. The concept of newness and the power of words Finally, Kurtulus accuses the critics of the new terrorism concept of adopting a simplistic notion of new or newness that cannot detect significant social change or novel social trends (2011, p. 480). Here he suggests that dictionary style definitions of concepts cannot grasp the complexity of the real word. Definitions of newness which consider new to mean not existing before or discovered recently of now for the first time are, in his opinion, inappropriate to capture the cyclical return of different terrorisms.
464 A. Spencer Interestingly, Kurtulus fails to provide a convincing original conceptualisation of newness and instead copies Rapoport s idea of waves of terrorism (Rapoport 1984, 2004). Kurtulus here argues that [t]he important thing is whether there are sufficient number of qualitative changes in sufficient number of key features to warrant the claim that a new wave has emerged regardless of whether there is one or another residual element (2011, p. 484). He goes on to argue that: The underlying presumption here is that if the society or the political climate has experienced a significant change such as increased religiosity, technological revolution, desensitizing to violence it is only natural that terrorism and terrorist organizations will also do so. (Kurtulus 2011, p. 484) Interestingly, this is exactly the argument made by some to critics of the concept of new terrorism : Without doubt terrorism has evolved and changed over time. But so have many things. Without wanting to re-ignite the old debate about agency and structure, one should consider whether terrorism has changed or whether the world has changed in which it operates. (Spencer 2006a, p. 25) Surely, very few of the critics of new terrorism would suggest that terrorism has not changed at all and our quarrel is not with the notion of waves of terrorism suggested by Rapoport, but with the concept of new terrorism and the small, seemingly unimportant predicate new. 4 In my opinion, the most important element in this discussion is not whether new terrorism is really new or not, but that the concept of new terrorism is not simply a neutral description of reality. So, Kurtulus and I probably have a fundamentally different perspective on what we consider words capable of in (international) politics. While Kurtulus, and more positivist authors, would argue that words simply reflect reality, other more post-positivist authors believe in the constitutive power of words. From this perspective, the words we use not only describe the world but actively take part in its constitution (Kratochwil 1989, Onuf 1989, Guzzini 2000). Let us take the example of the wave suggested in the article by Kurtulus. While he would probably consider this metaphor to be an appropriate rhetorical tool to accurately describe the reality of current terrorism, I would hold that words and metaphors such as new or wave do more than simply describe reality. As firmly established in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and imported into political science (Landau 1961, Zashin and Chapman 1974, Miller 1979, Rayner 1984), International Relations (Campbell 1998, Milliken 1999, Little 2007, Carver and Pikalo 2008) and most recently terrorism research (Hülsse and Spencer 2008, Spencer 2010b), metaphors such as wave of terrorism transfer knowledge from a source domain (wave) onto a target domain (terrorism). They create a strong perceptional link between the two concepts and thereby almost automatically make us apply knowledge about one domain onto the other. This understanding effects our reactions to the phenomena. As Chilton and Lakoff point out, metaphors are concepts that can be and often are acted upon. As such, they define in significant part, what one takes as reality, and thus form the basis and the justification for the formulation of policy and its potential execution (Chilton and Lakoff 1999, p. 57). For example, the metaphor of waves constructs terrorism as something natural, in effect, as something normal, unstoppable, almost inevitable (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, pp. 145 146). As pointed out elsewhere:
Critical Studies on Terrorism 465 If terrorism is a wave then ceasefires and negotiations are nonsensical as one cannot persuade a wave from hitting the shoreline. As waves and catastrophes are a natural phenomena they are unstoppable, they will happen regardless of what is done to prevent them. If terrorism is a wave the reasons for such waves become unimportant as one cannot change the physics of their creation. The naturalisation of new terrorism through these metaphors marginalizes the question of what causes waves of terrorism. What is clear is that we are not responsible for these waves. If we cannot prevent the waves from striking the coastline then it does makes sense to implement measures to alleviate the effects such waves will have. (Spencer 2010b, p. 120) Similarly, from a perspective open to cognitive linguistic approaches, the concept of newness and the predicate new actively takes part in the constitution of the world in general, and terrorism in particular. By describing terrorism as new terrorism, our understanding of what is considered appropriate in response is already framed in a particular way. As Kurtulus himself points out: It is true that these politicians sometimes refer to a new terrorist threat in their speeches, most probably to justify new measures, increase their rating among the electors or simply to mobilize support for their policies (2011, p. 491). So despite our disagreements, we seem to agree that the concept of new terrorism can be used, for example, to make new counterterrorism seem appropriate. They make certain reactions seem more appropriate than others. 5 Conclusion Kurtulus reply to the criticism voiced by a number of scholars against the concept of new terrorism is a welcome one as it shows that terrorism research is not (yet) sick of the new terrorism debate. Even though the debate may not reveal who is right and who is wrong, it nevertheless nicely illustrates the contested nature of the new terrorism category. Although further discussion on the issue may never fully convince the other of abandoning his or her perspectives, continued engagement can stimulate if not understanding, then mutual acceptance. At the very least, it can alleviate the feeling of talking to a brick wall. Notes 1. For more detailed critical evaluation of religion and terrorism, see, for example, Gunning (2007) and Zulaika (2009). 2. Ayman al-zawahiri appointed as al-qaeda leader. BBC News [online]. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13788594 [Accessed 5 July 2011]. 3. Original footnote 106 here reads: Cf. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism, 49 50. Neumann also identifies the freer movement of people across national borders as one of the independent variables that explain the emergence of transnational terrorist networks. 4. For a more detailed and critical engagement with Rapoport and his idea of waves of terrorism, see Sedgwick (2007) and Rosenfeld (2010). 5. Whether new counterterrorism is really needed or is not is the question here. References Campbell, D., 1998. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Carver, T. and Pikalo J., eds., 2008. Political language and metaphor: interpreting and changing the world. London: Routledge. Chilton, P. and Lakoff, G., 1999. Foreign policy by metaphor. In: C. Schäffner and A.L. Wenden, eds. Language and peace. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 37 59.
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