CORNELIUS SHIVER, JR S INITIAL BRIEF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CORNELIUS SHIVER, JR., Appellant, Supreme Court Case No.: SC11-129 IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF CORNELIUS SHIVER, JR., The Florida Bar File No.: 2011-70,736(11J-MRE) / CORNELIUS SHIVER, JR S INITIAL BRIEF CORNELIUS SHIVER, JR., FBN 0002852 Appellant/Petitioner 3095 Plaza Street Miami, FL 33133 (305) 562-8631

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CITATIONS... iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS. 2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9 ARGUMENT I THE REFEREE S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW CHARACTER AND FITNESS DURING THE DISCOVERY PHASE OF THE PROCEEDING IS NOT SUPPPORTED BY THE RECORD WHEN PETITIONER TIMELY RESPONDED TO ALL DISCOVERY REQUESTS AND PROVIDED ALL DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION.. 10 ARGUMENT II THE REFEREE S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE REQUISITE FITNESS TO RESUME THE PRACTICE OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS AND UNJUSTIFIED BECAUSE PETITIONER DID NOT ENGAGE IN DISQUALIFYING CONDUCT...13 ARGUMENT III THE REFEREE S DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE REFEREE S REPORT WARRANTS REVERSAL WHERE THERE ARE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE RECORD EVIDENCE AND THE FACTUAL FINDINGS PARTICULARLY WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 18 CONCLUSION..21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22 CERTIFICATE OF FONT COMPLIANCE..22

TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Cited Florida Bar Cases Page No. Fla. Bar re Grusmark, 662 So.2d 1235, 1236 (Fla.1995).10, 16 The Florida Bar re Whitlock, 511 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla.1987).13, 14 McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2007).21 Murphy v. Murphy, 948 So.2d 864 (Fla. 5 th DCA 2007). 18 Other Authorities Cited Florida Laws Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(1).. 11 Fla. Jud. Qual. Comm n R.9 18 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-6.1(e) 16 3-7.6(f) (2) 11 3-7.6(g). 12 3-7.10...10 3-7.10(f) (3)... 9 3-7.11(d) (3). 12

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Appellant, Cornelius Shiver, Jr., is seeking the review of a Report of Referee recommending the denial of Cornelius Shiver, Jr. s Petition for Reinstatement. Appellant will be referred to as Petitioner. Appellee will be referred to as The Bar throughout this brief. References to the Report of Referee shall be by the symbol RR followed by the appropriate page number. References to specific pleadings will made by Tab number followed by the title, then followed by the appropriate page number. (e.g., Tab 1, Petition for Reinstatement, 10). References to the transcript of the final hearing shall be by symbol TR, followed by the volume, followed by the appropriate page number. (e.g., TR I, 10). References to the Appendix shall be by the symbol AP followed by the volume number, followed by the appropriate page number. (e.g., AP 2, p. 10).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS On November 7, 2005, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for eighteen (18) months. While serving the eighteen month suspension, on April 10, 2007, petitioner was suspended for an additional three years commencing on June 8, 2007. On January 24, 2011, petitioner filed his petition for reinstatement. On February 2, 2011, the bar made a written request to petitioner to identify the names, addresses, and account numbers for each and every bank account in which petitioner maintained and, or was a signatory. (Tab 4, Fl. Bar Acknowledgement of Petition, 1). Specifically, bar counsel wrote: As to those items of deposit, with corresponding deposit slips are in the possession of the bank and not the depositor, it will be necessary for the bar to subpoena these items, as well as bank statements, from the bank directly. Bar counsel further requested that the information be provided by February 16, 2011. (Tab 4, Fl. Bar Acknowledgement of Petition, 2). On February 11, 2011, petitioner disclosed to the bar an account with Coconut Grove Bank and an IOTA with Wachovia Bank. (AP 3, p. 10). On February 24, 2011, bar counsel wrote a second letter to petitioner informing petitioner that he was not in compliance with his Continuing Legal Education Requirements (CLER), but that petitioner would have an opportunity to

satisfy the CLER prior to the final hearing. (Tab 5, CLER Noncompliance Correspondences, 1). Petitioner completed the remaining necessary credits to satisfy his CLER prior to the final hearing; however, petitioner did not submit a petition for removal of the CLER delinquency along with the required $150 fee. (Tab 23, Ex.5 Affidavit of Michelle Francis) ;( TR II, 199). On April 5, 2011, petitioner responded to the bar s first set of interrogatories, disclosing the name of all of his employers, the date of his employments, the names, addresses and account numbers for every bank account where he was a signatory, his current and yearly obligations, including his creditors, all of his sources of funds or financial support and circumstances under which such funds were received. (Tab 8, Fl. Bar s 1 st Set of Interrogatories, 2, 4, 7, 8-10). On April 8, 2011, the bar filed a motion for continuance of the final hearing. (Tab 11, Fla. Bar s Motion for Continuance). At page 3, paragraph 13 of the motion for continuance, bar counsel stated that he did not have access to certain financial records and documents. On April 11, 2011, and in response to the bars April 7, 2011 letter, petitioner hand delivered documents to the bar along with a cover letter. (Tab 13, April 11, 2011 letter to Bar Counsel). At page two of the cover letter, petitioner informed

bar counsel that all requested bank records in petitioner s possession had been delivered to the bar, that the Bank of America account was closed, and that petitioner would have to rely on a third party to request any remaining Bank of America statements. On April 14, 2011, petitioner filed his objections to the bar s motion for continuance. (Tab 18, Petitioner s Objections to Fla. Bar Continuance). At page three, paragraph 13, petitioner stated that he had been forthcoming on all of the bar s discovery requests and petitioner reaffirmed that he had provided to the bar all requested documents in his possession. In paragraph 17, petitioner further stated that he felt the bar had not been diligent in its obligations to conduct its investigation. On April 15, 2011, a telephonic hearing was held on the bar s motion for continuance of the final hearing. (Tab 17, Notice of Telephonic Hearing). During the telephonic hearing, bar counsel asserted that the bar did not have the documentation necessary to perform its investigation. (AP 3, p. 4). Petitioner asserted that the case had been open for three months, and that the bar had failed to use its authority to subpoena documents that were not in the possession of petitioner. (AP 3, p. 10, 14, 20, 23). The referee granted the bar s motion for continuance after making the following findings:

THE COURT: Okay. So the IOTA as we stand right now is a non-issue. So we have three outstanding issues, the income tax returns, the student loans and the sale of the property and the Bank of America, sale of property and the student loan. Mr. Shiver believes that he ll be able to get the information within seven days. (AP 3, p. 34). THE COURT: Now, the outstanding issue of the income tax. Understanding that Mr. Shiver does not have the finances to be able to cut the check he s going to try to get that from the IRS, but we don t know how long that will take. (AP 3, p. 34, 35). THE COURT: Okay. So let s do this, based upon the information that you provide to them, I ll tentatively set this back a week to the 13 th. If, based upon the review that you had, Mr. Kroeger, that something materializes, we ll have another telephonic conference. (AP 3, p. 30). If, in fact, you are able to provide them that information and they can review to, then they can sit - - they being the Florida Bar, can sit down and have an independent review of it to determine whether or not we need to have this full-blown hearing. (AP 3, p. 40). The bar filed no further motions in this proceeding nor caused any subpoenas to be issued. On May 13, 2011, the final hearing was conducted. Record evidence shows that during the suspension period, petitioner financially supported his children, cared for one of his daughters who desired to live with him, and cared for his mother, who could not care for herself. (TR I 35, 47, 48). Petitioner was the sole care-taker to his 83 year of mother. (TR I, 25, 45). Petitioner s mother had been ill with a heart condition, high blood pressure, diabetes and at one point was bedridden and was unable to do anything for herself.

Petitioner s mother can t be left in the home alone. (TR I, 34, 45, 46). Petitioner utilized his time, efforts and financial resources to take care of his mother. (TR I, 34). Jason Tracey attested at paragraph 9 of his affidavit that petitioner would not entertain the thought of putting his mother in a home or an assisted living facility. (Tab 25, Ex. A). During 2006 through 2010, petitioner was appointed by the City of Miami Commission and served in a public official capacity as a board-member to the City of Miami Zoning Board. (TR I, 64, 65). Also within the suspension period, petitioner was appointed by the City of Miami Commission and served in a public official capacity as a board-member to the Civilian Investigative Panel. (TR I, 16, 17, 18, 21). Petitioner was active in his community. (TR I, 31). Within the suspension period, petitioner initiated a fund raising event for a nursery serving low income mothers, at a time when the nursery was being closed for lack of funding. (TR I, 61); (Tab 25, Ex. D Affidavit of Pierre Sands). Jason Tracey attested at paragraph 6 of his affidavit, that the manner by which petitioner struggled to support his family, and his community after being suspended from the practice of law for such a long period of is noteworthy. (Tab 25 Ex. A).

Miriam Arthur 1 attested that petitioner financially supported her and their children, that petitioner is active in the children s lives, that she has full faith in petitioner as a father, a friend, a community leader and an attorney. (Tab 1 Ex.A- 11 attached to Petition for Reinstatement). Dewayne Terry testified that he knew the family extremely well, that Miriam Arthur and petitioner were in agreement, that he sees them together quite often, and that the children sometimes stay with Petitioner. (TR I, 35). 1 Miriam Arthur was the complainant in SC04-444, The Florida Bar v. Cornelius Shiver, Jr. Jason Tracey further attested at paragraph 11 of his affidavit, that petitioner had reconciled all differences with complainant, Miriam Arthur, and that petitioner understands that he mishandled his personal/family matter and since the suspension, has made amends. (Tab 25 Ex. A.). Petitioner was able to maintain his financial obligations the first four years of the suspension. (TR I, 7, 8); (Tab 8 Fl. Bar s 1 st Set of Interrogatories, 8). However, within the past year leading up to the filing of the petition for reinstatement, petitioner began to experience financial hardships. (TR I, 51, 55, 56); (Tab 8 Fl. Bar s 1 st Set of Interrogatories 8). At TR I, 66-67, Petitioner testified about his financial hardships as follow: MR. SHIVER: I did the best I could to handle my obligations as best as my means and ability would allow me within the five-year suspension.

Four of the five years were uneventful. The last year has been very difficult financially, has been very difficult for me because also with the obligations I have with my mother. It has been very difficult for me with the obligations I have now with my daughter It has been difficult because the economy has been difficult and the sources of income and the people that helped me in the work that I was doing with lawyers, they could no longer do it. For the year 2010, petitioner did not have the means to meet certain financial obligations, including child support payments, his annual Florida Bar membership dues; costs related to petitioning to remove have his CLER delinquency status. (TR II, 199). There have been no motions for contempt, contempt hearings, or contempt findings against petitioner for failure to pay child support. (TR I 66). There are no pending matters and, or liens before the IRS, nor does the Petitioner owe any IRS taxes. (TR I 83, 84, 108, 109).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS Petitioner produced clear and convincing evidence of his rehabilitation as required by Rule 3-7.10(f) (3), R Regulating Fla. Bar. Petitioner strictly complied with his disciplinary order by paying all assessed costs and by serving his suspension without any further contempt proceedings. Petitioner s unimpeachable character is shown by raising money for a nursery serving low income mothers and by caring for his elderly mother. Petitioner has shown clear evidence of good reputation for professional ability by serving in public official capacities on the City of Miami Zoning Board as well as the City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel. Petitioner has reconciled all differences between him and complainant Miriam Arthur. The petitioner was forthcoming in all of his discovery responses and provided the bar with all financial documents in his possession. The past year of the five year suspension period proved to be financially challenging for the petitioner; however, during the suspension, petitioner did not create any new debt, did not default on any financial obligations, had no tax liens and owed no IRS taxes.

ARGUMENT I THE REFEREE S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW CHARACTER AND FITNESS DURING THE DISCOVERY PHASE OF THE PROCEEDING IS NOT SUPPPORTED BY THE RECORD WHEN PETITIONER TIMELY RESPONDED TO ALL DISCOVERY REQUESTS AND PROVIDED ALL DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION. A petitioner seeking reinstatement to the Florida Bar must established by clear and convincing evidence that he has met the criteria set forth in Rule 3-7.10, R. Regulating Fla. Bar. In pertinent parts, Rule 3-7.10 states: In determining the fitness of the petitioner to resume the practice of law, the referee shall consider whether the petitioner has (1) engaged in any disqualifying conduct; (2) the character and fitness of the petitioner and (3) whether the petitioner has been rehabilitated. The party seeking review of the referee s recommendation on a reinstatement petition has the burden to demonstrate the referee s recommendation is erroneous, unlawful or unjustified. Fla. Bar re Grusmark, 662 So.2d 1235, 1236 (Fla.1995). In the instant case, the referee s finding that petitioner failed to produce complete sets of bank documents, and gave no reasonable explanation for the

failure to provide the complete documents for three bank accounts 2 is legally unjustified under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(1). Under Rule 3-7.6(f) (2) discovery shall be available to the parties in accordance with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. Rule 1.350(1): any party may request any other party to produce any designated documents that are in the possession, custody, or control of the party whom the request is directed. Petitioner provided the bar with all financial documents in his possession, custody, or control, and so informed the Bar on same. (AP 3, p 8, 18, 19); (Tab 10, 13). Petitioner informed bar counsel that petitioner had provided all requested bank records in his possession. The bar knew that the Bank of America account had been closed and that petitioner had to ask a third party to order the remaining Bank of America statements. (AP 3 p. 17, 23, 24).. The referee s findings are inconsistent with his earlier rulings. The referee rendered a ruling during the April 15 th telephonic hearing that the IOTA account was a non-issue. (AP 3 p. 34). During the telephonic hearing, the referee further 2 The three accounts are Plaintiff s IOTA, and Coconut Grove Bank and Bank of America accounts. (Tab 8, Petitioner s Responses to the Bar s First Interrogatories, question 7).

ruled that the only bank account that was an outstanding issue was the Bank of America account. 3 (AP 3 p. 16, 34). The bar had the authority and the duty to subpoena documents or records not in petitioner s possession or control that the bar believed to be necessary to prepare and to prosecute its case. Rule 3-7.6(g); Rule 3-7.11(d) (3); (TR III, 165). Actually, on February 2, 2011, bar counsel represented to petitioner that it will be necessary for the bar to subpoena these items as to financial records in the possession of the bank and not with the depositor. (Tab 4, Fl. Bar Acknowledgement of Petition, 1). For whatever reason, bar counsel chose not to subpoena any documents or records from the three (3) banks referenced in the referee s report. (TR II, 166); 180); (AP 3, p. 10). As such, the bar did not act with the utmost diligence as prescribed under Rule 3-7.6(g). The referee s conclusion that petitioner precluded an assessment regarding the propriety of his finances is inconsistent with the referee s directives and rulings during the telephonic hearing on the bar s motion for continuance and is not supported by competent record evidence. (RR 9). 3 The third account was a Coconut Grove bank account Petitioner s mother used for direct deposits of her retirement and Medicaid.

ARGUMENT II THE REFEREE S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE REQUISITE FITNESS TO RESUME THE PRACTICE OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS AND UNJUSTIFIED BECAUSE PETITIONER DID NOT ENGAGE IN DISQUALIFYING CONDUCT. To deny reinstatement to the practice of law because an attorney failed to make more money while suspended is basically denying that an attorney reinstatement forever. The Florida Bar re Whitlock, 511 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla.1987). Petitioner s responsibilities as a care taker made it challenging for petitioner to work outside the house. (TR I 51, 67, 111); (TR II, 199). Essentials like feeding his mother and daughter and keeping the electricity on became petitioners dominate focus. (TR I 110). The referee s report misplaced the significance of petitioner s care-taking responsibilities. The referee concluded that petitioner s loving care and attention being given to his ailing mother is laudable: however, while commendable, it is no more and no less than what is required any child who has reaped the benefits of love and attention from their parent. (RR 8). The referee ignored competent evidence on the time commitment and the resources needed to care for an ill parent. (TR I, 34, 45, 46, 55). The referee ignored competent evidence that petitioner s personal finances were adversely affected by petitioner s responsibility and obligation to care for his elderly mother.

Petitioner was not neglectful and riskless with his financial obligations as the bar and the referee s report suggests. During the suspension, petitioner s child support arrears were reduced. (TR I, 67). There had been no child support proceedings filed against the petitioner, including no motions for contempt or no contempt findings. (TR I, 66). Petitioner s children and their mother agreed, understood and supported petitioner in the challenging times of the suspension. (TR I 35, 35, 56); (TR II 197); (Tab 1, Ex. A-11). In The Florida Bar re Whitlock, supra at 525, the petitioning attorney had not contacted some of his judgment creditors and the Court refused to penalize the petitioner for inaction when the action required, contacting creditors, would had been useless. In the instant case, the referee found that petitioner had not made a voluntary periodic payment on his student loan, had not paid membership dues for 2010 and had not petitioned for removal of his CLER delinquency status. (RR 9, 10). Being responsible, petitioner established a payment plan with the Department of Education on his student loan obligation. While petitioner was past due on his student loan in the amount of $1,893.92, petitioner was not in default. Petitioner completed all required CLER credits, but had not filed for removal of delinquency status because of the $150 fee requirement. (TR I, 74, 75); (TR II, 199). Petitioner paid his Florida Bar membership dues in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. (TR I, 7, 8).

Petitioner testified that he was behind on his property taxes. (RR 9). In 2008, petitioner s mother conveyed title of her residential home to petitioner. Petitioner s mother conveyed the house to petitioner because petitioner was caring for her. (TR I, 108). Petitioner did not think the conveyance was in his best interest. Petitioner had not earned enough money to pay the past due property taxes. (TR I, 78). Petitioner had not filed income taxes since 2008. (RR 9); (TR I, 83, 83). During the suspension, petitioner s income had been less than the minimum threshold amount set by the IRS for personal income tax filing. Petitioner had no outstanding issues with the IRS nor did petitioner have any tax liens, or any other pending IRS problems. (TR I, 83, 84, 95, 108, 109). The referee found that petitioner had reported the required amount of CLER credits; however, the referee report was critical that petitioner had to complete a number of the credits after bar counsel call attention to his credit delinquency (RR 10). The record shows that petitioner relied on bar counsel s representation that petitioner would have an opportunity to complete his CLER prior to the final hearing. (Tab 5, CLER Noncompliance Correspondences, 1). The record does not support the referee s finding that petitioner neglected his professional obligations by failing to submit the required sworn quarterly reports required by Rule 3-6.1(e). (RR 10). The affidavit of Adam Stetson raised

no issues about the adequacy or inadequacy of petitioner s notice under Rule 3.6.1. (Tab 24 Ex. 6); (TR I 81, 82, 93, 94). Under paragraphs seven (7) and (8) of Adam Stetson s affidavit, the bar acknowledged receipt of notices. Petitioner had not worked with any other attorney since working with the law firm of Robert A. Young, and as such, had no other employments to report under Rule 3-6.1. In The Florida Bar re Grusmark, 662 So.2d 1235, 37 (Fla.1995), the Court held the denial of attorney s petition for reinstatement to practice law was not warranted by an attorney s disorderedly financial situation, where the attorney had a modest lifestyle, had significantly lessened his financial burden and had taken steps to organize his affairs. The petitioner in Grusmark owed numerous creditors in excess of $ 268,000, owed the Florida Bar $1,410 in dues and late fees, and reinstatement fees and the Client Security Fund $3,900. The Court found persuasive that Grusmark had taken steps to improve his financial problems by living within his means and that he had indicated his intent to file bankruptcy. Id, at 1236. In the instant case, Petitioner paid all of the disciplinary costs assessed against him. (Tab 1, Satisfaction of Judgments, Ex. A-2, Ex. A-3). During the suspension, petitioner created no new debt. (TR I, 51).

ARGUMENT III THE REFEREE S DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE REFEREE S REPORT WARRANTS REVERSAL WHERE THERE ARE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE RECORD EVIDENCE AND THE FACTUAL FINDINGS PARTICULARLY WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. The referee caused an unreasonable four month delay in rendering the referee s report. An excessive delay in the rendition of judgment, or an excessive delay between trial and entry of final judgment, or unreasonable delay in the rendering of a final judgment, may require reversal. Murphy v. Murphy, 948 So.2d 864 (Fla. 5 th DCA 2007). See also Fla. Jud. Qual. Comm n R.9. Whether the delay warrants a reversal is whether or not there is any conflict or inconsistency between the trial court s statements or findings at the time of trial and the ultimate judgment entered later or if there is a factual finding in the final judgment unsupported by the trial evidence. Supra. On January 31, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered that a referee be appointed in this proceeding. (Tab 2, Order to Appoint Referee). The Order to Appoint instructed that the referee s report be filed within 180 days of the date of the appointment, unless there was a substantial reasons requiring delay.

On February 9, 2011, the referee in this proceeding was assigned. (Tab 3, Order Appointing Referee). The referee s report was due no later than August 8, 2011. On November 8, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida wrote to the referee reminding the referee of his obligation to file a timely report in this proceeding. (AP 1 Supreme Court of Florida letter). On November 18, 2011, the referee signed the referee s report and purported to have mailed copies to petitioner and bar counsels, however, petitioner, bar counsel and the Supreme Court of Florida did not received the referee s report until the first week of December 2011, almost three weeks after the report was signed and nearly four months after the report was actually due to be filed. (AP 2, Fl. Bar letter dated January 30, 2012). In the instant case, reversal of the referee s recommendation is warranted when the referee found that petitioner failed to produce complete sets of bank statements for three (3) accounts. (RR 9). Significant to this argument, the referee found that petitioner lacked candor because he gave no reasonable explanation for not providing bank statements from three banks is clearly in error and inconsistent with the record evidence. (RR 8). During the motion hearing, the referee appeared to understand petitioner s financial challenges where petitioner did not have money

to cut a check a second time to IRS. (AP 3, p.34, 35). In the referee s report, the referee s position changed and the petitioner was penalized for being out of money. However, the record evidence shows that petitioner provided the bar with all financial documents in his possession and so informed the bar. (AP 3, p. 8, 18, 19); (Tab 10, 13). The record evidence shows that during the April 15 th telephonic hearing, the referee rendered a finding that the IOTA account was a non-issue. (AP 3, p. 34). During the same motion hearing, the referee further ruled that the only bank account that was an outstanding issue was the Bank of America account. 4 (AP 3, p. 16, 34). The referee s finding that petitioner lacked candor for not giving a reasonable reason for not providing statements from the three (3) banks is factually baseless. Petitioner explained that his name was taken off the Bank of America account before the account was closed. Petitioner explained that he had to ask a third party to order the remaining Bank of America statements. (AP 3, p. 17, 23, 24). Reversal of the referee s recommendation is warranted where the referee understood his role and responsibilities to be the referee for the bar. (TR I 6). The referee s misunderstanding about his role along with the several contradictory findings made by the referee mandates that this Court reverse the referee s recommendation. A review of the cumulative effects of the referee s errors 4 The discovery responses for the Coconut Grove and the IOTA accounts were found to be satisfactory.

essentially denied petitioner of a fair and impartial hearing. McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2007). CONCLUSION Petitioner requests that this court find in light of the evidence presented, that petitioner was forthcoming in providing the bar with all requested documents in his possession and that petitioner s finances were adversely impacted partly by his demanding responsibilities associated with taking care of his elderly mother and partly by petitioner not being able to make a living in the field which he is trained. Petitioner further requests that this court find that petitioner is a very responsible person and that petitioner has proven rehabilitation through competent record evidence of his family, civic and community commitments, all of which warrants that petitioner be reinstated as member of the Florida Bar, once petitioner satisfy all of his administrative matters before the bar.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of Petitioner s Initial Brief was delivered by U.S. mail to: Thomas A. Kroeger, Bar Counsel, 444 Brickell Avenue, Suite M-100, Miami, Florida 33131 on this 8 th day of March, 2012. CORNELIUS SHIVER, ESQ. 3095 Plaza Street Miami, Fl 33133 (305) 562-8631 CERTIFICATE OF FONT COMPLIANCE I certify that the lettering in this brief is Times New Roman 14-point Font, and complies with the font requirement of the Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a) (2). CORNELIUS SHIVER, ESQ.