Cover Page The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/19885 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation. Author: Pohl, Benjamin Title: "But We Have To Do Something" : the drivers behind EU crisis management operations Date: 2012-09-27
But We Have To Do Something The Drivers behind EU Crisis Management Operations Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van rector magnificus prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden, volgens het besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op donderdag 27 september 2012 klokke 16:15 door Benjamin Pohl Geboren te Dresden in 1979
Promotiecommissie: Promotor: Prof. dr. R. de Wijk Co-promotor: Dr. T. Aalberts Overige Leden: Prof. dr. J.S. van der Meulen, Universiteit Leiden Prof. dr. J.H. de Wilde, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Prof. dr. S. Biscop, Universiteit Ghent ISBN: 978-94-6203-074-9 Print: WÖHRMANN PRINT SERVICE 2012 Benjamin Pohl. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the proprietor. 2012 Benjamin Pohl. Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen, of op enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de rechthebbende. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables... v List of Abbreviations... vi Acknowledgements... ix Chapter I: Introduction... 1 A. The Research Puzzle... 1 B. The Analytical Framework... 4 C. Limits of this Study... 6 D. The Rest of this Book... 8 Chapter II: ESDP Operations and International Relations Theory: An Analytical Framework... 10 A. Introduction... 10 B. ESDP and the Quest for External Power (I)... 19 C. ESDP and Normative Power Europe (II)... 23 D. ESDP and the Search for Ever Closer Union (III)... 27 E. ESDP and Domestic Politics (IV)... 31 F. Conclusion... 38 Chapter III: Studying ESDP Operations... 44 A. Historical Prologue and Institutional Framework... 44 B. Case Selections... 53 C. Methods and Sources... 62 Chapter IV: EUFOR ALTHEA... 70 A. Background... 71 B. Putting Operation Althea on the ESDP Agenda... 75 C. Preparing EUFOR Althea... 82 D. Implementing ALTHEA... 86 E. Proximate Drivers behind Althea... 97 F. Conclusion... 102 Chapter V: EULEX Kosovo... 107 A. Background... 107 B. Putting EULEX on the ESDP Agenda... 109 C. Preparing EULEX Kosovo... 116 iii
D. Implementing EULEX... 125 E. Proximate Drivers behind EULEX Kosovo... 132 F. Conclusion... 137 Chapter VI: EUPOL Afghanistan... 141 A. Background... 141 B. Putting EUPOL Afghanistan on the ESDP Agenda... 144 C. Preparing EUPOL Afghanistan... 153 D. Implementing EUPOL Afghanistan... 157 E. Proximate Drivers behind EUPOL Afghanistan... 163 F. Conclusion... 169 Chapter VII: EUFOR Tchad/RCA... 173 A. Background... 173 B. Putting EUFOR Tchad/RCA on the ESDP Agenda... 177 C. Preparing EUFOR Tchad/RCA... 185 D. Implementing EUFOR Tchad/RCA... 193 E. Proximate Drivers behind EUFOR Tchad/RCA... 197 F. Conclusion... 203 Chapter VIII: The Case Studies and National Preferences... 206 A. French Preferences... 206 B. British Preferences... 210 C. German Preferences... 215 Chapter IX: Revisiting the Propositions... 221 A. ESDP and the Quest for External Power (I)... 221 B. ESDP and Normative Power Europe (II)... 226 C. ESDP and the Search for Ever Closer Union (III)... 229 D. ESDP and Domestic Politics (IV)... 234 E. Conclusion... 241 References... 246 Summary... 275 Nederlandstalige Samenvatting... 282 Curriculum Vitae... 291 iv
LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Potential Purposes of Foreign Policy... 15 Table 2. Potential Purposes of ESDP... 18 Table 3. Overview of Propositions Regarding Drivers behind ESDP... 39 Table 4. Overview of ESDP Operations... 50 Table 5. ESDP Operations by Type and Location... 59 Table 6. National Contributions to Althea... 89 Table 7. National Contributions to EUPOL Afghanistan... 158 v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFP ALTHEA AMIS Artemis Berlin Plus (agreements) BiH BMI CFSP COM CPCC CSCE CSDP CSU CGS CIVCOM Concordia DSACEUR EC ECJ ECOWAS EU EUFOR EUFOR RD Congo EUFOR Tchad/RCA EULEX (Kosovo) EUMC EUMS EUPM EUPOL (Afghanistan) Agence France-Presse EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina African Union Mission in Sudan EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003) Set of agreements between NATO and the EU concerning the Union s use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU crisis management operations Bosnia and Herzegovina Bundesministerium des Innern (German Federal Ministry of the Interior) Common Foreign and Security Policy European Commission Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Common Security and Defence Policy Christlich-Soziale Union Council General Secretariat Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management EU Military Operation in Macedonia Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe European Community European Court of Justice Economic Community of West African States European Union European Union Force EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006) EU Military Operation in Chad / Central African Republic EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EU Military Committee EU Military Staff EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina EU Police Mission in Afghanistan vi
EUPT European Union Planning Team in Kosovo EUSR EU Special Representative F.A.Z. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (German daily) FFM Fact-Finding Mission FRA France / French FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia G8 Group of 8 (major economies) GAO Government Accountability Office (US) GER Germany / German GFA General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) GPPO German Police Project Office (in Afghanistan) ICG International Crisis Group ICJ International Court of Justice IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies ICR / ICO International Civilian Representative in Kosovo / International Civilian Office (headed by ICR) IFOR Implementation Force (NATO Operation in Bosnia) IPOS Institut fuer praxisorientierte Sozialforschung IPTF International Police Task Force (UN Police Mission in Bosnia) IPU Integrated Police Unit ISAF International Security Assistance Force (NATO Operation in Afghanistan) IR International relations ISG International Steering Group for Kosovo ISIS (Europe) International Security Information Service JAM Joint Assessment Mission (Afghanistan) KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO Operation) KLA Kosovo Liberation Army MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MoD Ministry of Defence MoI Ministry of Interior MS Member state NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OEF Operation Enduring Freedom vii
OHR OSCE PIC PRT PSC SAA SFOR SG/HR SHAPE SWP UK UN UNAMA UNAMID UNMIK UNSC UNPROFOR UNSG US USSR WEU Office of the High Representative in Bosnia Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Peace Implementation Council (International body charged with implementing the GFA) Provincial Reconstruction Team Political and Security Committee Stabilization and Association Agreement Stabilization Force (NATO Operation in Bosnia) Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council of the EU (sometimes also HR/SG) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik United Kingdom / British United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Security Council United Nations Protection Force (Croatia and Bosnia) United Nations Secretary-General United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Western European Union viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It was in one of my very first interviews that, when asked how ESDP operations come about, an EU official explained to me that they were typically preceded by an outcry in the media, and then Solana says his famous words, but we have to do something. In heeding his advice to put that phrase on this study s cover, I am also paying homage to the many officials who made their precious time available in order to help me put together a history of what happened behind the scenes. Because they were promised anonymity, their names do not feature, but I would like to express my gratitude to all those who agreed to talk to me. Whereas their testimonies were indispensable to this study, they bear no fault for the false conclusions that I may have drawn from their collective (and at times mutually contradictory) recollections. I am especially indebted to many of my former colleagues at the German Foreign Office who not only helped me survive in the bureaucratic machinery that is ESDP, but also assisted me during my research. While this book owes a lot to my interview partners, it would never have seen the light of day without the encouragement and support of numerous colleagues at university. Although it is difficult if not dangerous to single out individuals, special thanks go to my roommates over the years Tom Louwerse, Marc Uriot, Sergiu Gherghina, Kavita Ziemann, Floris Mansvelt Beck, Veerle van Doeveren, Mohammed Pervez and Cris Boonen. Many others also went beyond the call of duty in taking the time to read and comment on various drafts of this study, and in never tiring of encouraging me. I am particularly indebted to Niels van Willigen, Jan Erk, Hans Vollaard, Huib Pellikaan and Lee Seymour. Hans Vollaard deserves special mention for making this study s Dutch summary comprehensible. Moreover, a number of friends and colleagues beyond Leiden were very helpful by contributing ideas, giving feedback on my work, and supporting me in identifying crucial interview partner: special thanks to Christian Burckhardt, Hadewych Hazelzet, Hylke Dijkstra, Alexander Mattelaer, Sven Biscop, and Guillaume de Rougé. This study furthermore owes a lot to Henk Wagenaar and Bertjan Verbeek, who both counseled and encouraged me at crucial stages of my research. Particular gratitude also goes to Michael E. Smith. The generous conditions of my postdoctoral research fellowship with Michael at the University of Aberdeen allowed me to finish this project during daylight hours. Most significantly, this project would not have succeeded were it not for my promotores : Rob de Wijk, who gave me all the freedom I needed to pursue my ideas while intermittently pushing me back on a path towards finishing my project; and Tanja Aalberts, who reliably provided detailed and thoughtful comments on one overly verbose draft after another. ix
I am grateful for the funding which I received from the Netherlands Institute of Government (NIG) for my field research in various EU capitals. What made this field research experience particularly enjoyable however were the many friends who were willing to share their apartments so that I could stay for weeks in expensive cities and interview officials. Special thanks in that regard go to Perrine and Guillaume, Caecilia, Kareen and Christoph, Katrine and Anna, Kasia, Amanda, Miguel and Frederik, as well as Julia and Sebastiaan. I am moreover very grateful to Markus for designing a beautiful cover for this book. More generally, I could not have succeeded without the support of my friends and family who patiently encouraged, consoled and distracted me, and who helped me keep in perspective any intermittent discontent with research and writing. Their support shielded me from being consumed by this task; the greatest debt however I owe to Constanze, without whom this project would never have started, much less finished. x