E-Filed Document Mar 28 2018 16:45:38 2016-CA-00807-SCT Pages: 6 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO.2016 CA 00807 SCT 2016-CA-00807-SCT PATRICK RIDGEWAY, APPELLANT vs. VS. LOUISE RIDGEWAY HOOKER, APPELLEE CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2016-IA-01428-SCT 2016 IA 01428 SCT PATRICK RIDGEWAY, APPELLANT vs. VS. LOUISE RIDGEWAY HOOKER, APPELLEE ON APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING JOHN ROBERT WHITE, P.A. JOHN ROBERT WHITE MS. BAR NO. 7142 PAMELA GUREN BACH MS. BAR NO. 8953 POST OFFICE BOX 824 RIDGELAND, MS 39158-0824 39158 0824 TELEPHONE: (601) 605-9811 605 9811 FACSIMILE: (601) 605-9836 605 9836 E-MAIL: E MAIL: jrw@jrwlaw.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
INTRODUCTION In its February 15, 2018 Opinion, this Court affirmed the Hinds County Chancery Court's finding that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in their 2014 Judgment of Divorce - Irreconcilable Differences, and therefore, that it properly denied Patrick's Rule 60(b )( 4) motion raised in response to the Petition for Citation for Contempt Louise filed upon Patrick's failure to comply with its provisions. Acknowledging that the Opinion states the facts correctly, Patrick asserts that his Motion for Rehearing "does not so much protest a result as it asks whether the en bane Court wishes to reach a result in the manner that the panel achieved." 1 (Motion for Rehearing at 5). He appears to contend that the Court's construction of Miss. Code Ann. 93-5- 2(1) as set forth in the Opinion was less than adequate, essentially expanding the lengthy arguments already made to the Court in his Principal and Reply Briefs. Rule 40(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, provides. that "the motion for rehearing is not intended to afford an opportunity for a mere repetition of the argument already considered by the court." The Motion for Rehearing therefore should be denied. DISCUSSION A motion for rehearing "shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which, in the opinion of the movant, the court has overlooked or misapprehended." Miss. R. App. P. 40 (a). It "should be used to call attention to specific errors of law or fact which the opinion is thought to contain." Id. Patrick instead engages in an expansive tutorial on the principles of statutory construction, attempting to create a distraction from the salient points made by the Court as they specifically pertain to him. It is Patrick, and not this Court, who has overlooked or misapprehended the law in the Opinion. 1 Notwithstanding that one Justice did not participate and the remaining Justices reviewed and voted to join the opinion, Patrick suggests that "the entire Court" should be taking a closer look at the panel opinion. 1
Article 6, Section 159 of the Mississippi Constitution vests chancery courts with subject matter jurisdiction over divorce cases, including those filed on grounds of irreconcilable differences. Lewis v. Pagel, 2017 WL 23776690, *6 (Miss. June 1, 2017). As the Court noted in response to Patrick's expansive discourse on jurisdiction and the Irreconcilable Differences Act, '[n]o case cited by Ridgeway stands for the proposition that the requirements of Section 93-5-2(1), if not strictly complied with, deprive the chancery court of subject-matter jurisdiction of an irreconcilable differences divorce." Ridgeway v. Hooker, No. 2016-00807 (Miss. Feb.15, 2018) Slip op. at 12 ('][24). Patrick brings nothing new to the table on this issue in his motion. Whether Patrick seeks to open a dialogue intended to spur the Legislature to revise the socalled Irreconcilable Differences Act or merely to satisfy his own intellectual curiosity, the approach to statutory analysis employed by the Court in this case is not outcome determinative. Regardless of how the Court chooses to construe Miss. Code Ann. 93-5-2 (1), the fact remains that the Chancery Court had in personam jurisdiction over Louise. Despite the failure of Patrick's attorney to follow the basic requirements of the statute, as this Court and the Chancellor both found, Louise voluntarily initiated the discovery process, engaged in more than a year of negotiations, and signed the parties' agreed judgment of divorce, thus making "a legal appearance in the matter." James v. McMullen, 733 So. 2d 358, 361 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Indeed, Patrick concedes that"[ t ]he Chancery Court of Hinds County possessed in personam jurisdiction of Louise and Patrick." (Motion for Rehearing at 18). It is well established that personal jurisdiction '"is an individual right that can be waived."' Ridgeway, Slip op. at 12 ('l[ 25) (quoting Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hinton, 192 So. 3d 966, 971 (Miss. 2016)). Waiver was Louise's claim to make and not Patrick's. The chancellor correctly found that Louise waived any jurisdictional defense she might have raised as to insufficiency of process or 2
service of process by her voluntary appearance and her failure to raise the matter pursuant to Rule 12(h)(l) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, "[t]here is a substantial body of case law that recognizes the effectiveness of a party's voluntary appearance, without any discussion being made of whether that appearance complied with the statutory or Rule requirements." James, 733 So. 2d at 362 ('ll 15) (emphasis added). As the Court pointed out "Ridgeway makes the statement in his brief that "[a]ll know that where the [Irreconcilable Differences Act] and, here, Rule 12 conflict, that the IDA governs. But the converse is true." Ridgeway, Slip op. at 12 ('l[ 26). Regardless of how Patrick might wish this Court to construe Miss. Code Ann. 93-5-2 (1), it was he who failed to comply with the most basic requirements of the Irreconcilable Differences Act. As the Chancellor and this Court both determined, it is Patrick who created the alleged defect and he cannot complain of an error of his own creation. This Court expressly found that an "[a]ppellant has no standing to seek redress from [an] alleged error of his own making." Ridgeway, Slip op. at 14 ('l[28) (quoting Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 573, 494-95) (Miss. 2002)). CONCLUSION In his conclusion, Patrick notes that it is this Court's role to discern the meaning of the statute, "but not to amend it or independently seek to determine what the law should be." (Motion for Rehearing at 24 ). Patrick's critique of the Court's analytical approach to Miss. Code Ann. 93-5-2 (1) does nothing to advance his assertion that reconsideration of the Court's decision is warranted nor does he articulate a particular point of law or fact that the Court overlooked or misapprehended in its Opinion. This Court properly found that the Chancery Court had subject matter and in personam jurisdiction of the parties, and further, that Louise effectively waived any jurisdictional issues both by making a legal appearance and by not challenging the matter of 3
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(l) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Most significantly, Patrick did not have standing to seek relief from a problem his own making. This matter arose from a contempt proceeding - nearly two years later, matters of alimony and child support remain unresolved and Patrick's obligations to his former wife and family remain unpaid. His protestations to the contrary, "Ridgeway is content with the result and the remand that allows the Parties to contest the issues that were the subject matter of the interlocutory appeal." (Motion for Rehearing at 5). Patrick's Petition for Rehearing should be denied and the mandate entered as soon as permitted by Rule 41 ( a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. Respectfully submitted, LOUISE HOOKER ls/john Robert White John Robert White Mississippi Bar Number 7142 ls/pamela Guren Bach Pamela Guren Bach Mississippi Bar Number 8953 JOHN ROBERT WHITE, P.A. P.O. Box 824 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39158 Telephone: 601-605-9811 Facsimile: 601-605-9836 jrw@jrwlaw.com Attorneys for Louise Hooker CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed the foregoing pleading or other paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system which sent notification of such filing to the following: T. Jackson Lyons 4
appealsinms@bellsouth.net Marc Brand marc@brandlawfirm.com Michael J. Malouf Mike@malouflaw.com J. Matthew Lenderman matt@malouflaw.com I further certify that on this day, I mailed a true and correct copy of this document via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to: Hon. Patricia D. Wise, Chancellor Hinds County Chancery Court Post Office Box 686 Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0686 Trial Court Judge This the 28th day of March, 2018. Isl Pamela Guren Bach Pamela Guren Bach Mississippi Bar Number 8953 JOHN ROBERT WHITE, P.A. P.O. Box 824 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39158 Telephone: 601-605-9811 Facsimile: 601-605-9836 Email: jrw@jrwlaw.com Attorneys for Louise Hooker00039 5