Joint PhD Symposium on South East Europe LSE, 18 June 2010 Name: Georgios Monogioudis Affiliation: Centre for South East European Studies, SSEES, UCL Contact details: g.monogioudis@ucl.ac.uk +44 755 2700 412 Abstract Twenty years after regime change in Eastern Europe, accountability has become an end in itself for both political scientists and policy makers. The reason for this increasing interest is that the emergence of several defective democracies during the third democratization wave, confirmed the need to examine the constituent elements of the quality of democracy. Since accountability in modern democratic states is multifaceted, several actors in both the public administration and the society can cooperate towards the same aim. This research project focuses on the ombudsman institutions in Serbia and their impact on accountability through the delineation of their interactions with other state actors, civic organizations and the media. Although the ombudsman institution is not a panacea, this research argues that it can play a considerable role by participating in institutionalized and non-institutionalized networks of accountability. 1
The Ombudsman in Search of Accountability in Serbia Introduction In recent literature on democracy, it is surprising how often the term accountability appears. Indeed, Philippe Schmitter notes the growth in scholarly interest in this concept during the last twenty years (2004: 47), implying that accountability came to the forefront when the so-called third democratization wave spread around the world. An historical overview of democratization studies explains why accountability came into academic fashion. Beginning in the 1970s, when authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Greece and Spain collapsed, scholars were preoccupied with the mysterious background and the potential outcomes of democratic transitions. In the 1990s, namely two decades later, the emphasis shifted to the consolidation of young democracies. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence from several regions around the world indicated that many of the new regimes differed significantly from the ideal of liberal democracy, even though the transition from authoritarianism was irreversible or to quote Linz and Stepan democracy was the only game in town (1996: 5). In most of these cases, the distorted development and implementation of democratic institutions and procedures led scholars such as Croissant and Merkel to conceptualize these regimes using the terms defective, delegative or illiberal democracies (2004: 1). The identification of this grey zone between democracy and authoritarianism initiated a conceptualization debate on the intrinsic features of democracy. One of the most cited concepts within the relevant literature is Robert Dahl s polyarchy. However, his minimal definition has been criticized for emphasizing the procedural aspects of the democratic phenomenon (such as elections), leaving aside the crucial aspect of content (Merkel and Croissant 2004: 199). As a consequence, the academic debate moved to the notion of the quality of democracy in order to answer the essential question of what distinguishes good from bad democracy (Morlino 2004). 2
Considering that the notion of quality may refer either to procedures, the content or to outcomes of democracy, many renowned scholars such as O Donnell, Schmitter, Schedler, Diamond and Morlino argue that the quality of democracy has eight, mutually dependent dimensions: 1) the rule of law, 2) participation, 3) competition, 4) vertical accountability, 5) horizontal accountability, 6) freedom, 7) equality, and 8) responsiveness (Diamond and Morlino 2004: 22-28). These eight dimensions are densely interactive and overlapping, namely the distortion of one will impact upon the others. For example, the absence of the rule of law in a state will automatically have a considerable effect on accountability, freedom and equality. In conclusion, the main advantage of this theoretical approach is the crystallization of the interactions among the dimensions which constitute the quality of democracy. Types of accountability What is meant by accountability and why is it so crucial to the quality of democracy? The term is often used as a synonym for a variety of concepts such as responsiveness, responsibility, oversight, monitoring or control. Bovens uses a process-oriented definition in which accountability is a relation between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences (2006: 9). In democratic states, accountability refers to the constraint on the exercise of power by means of checks and balances. Accountability is thus crucial, since one of the most typical characteristics of a defective democracy is the unrestrained power of the executive which, in turn, encourages the establishment of unfair and often corrupt political rule. An unaccountable government or political leader has the potential to undermine the rule of law, restrict equality and threaten human rights. Given that accountability in democratic states is multi-faceted, political scientists have traditionally used a spatial metaphor which distinguishes between so-called vertical and horizontal accountability (Schmitter 2004: 52). From a hierarchical perspective, the former refers to a relationship between unequals while the latter 3
describes a relationship between equals (Schedler et al. 1999: 23). A typical example of vertical accountability are elections where the citizens periodically hold judgment over their representatives. Horizontal accountability refers to the arms or branches of the regime and state which control each other in a regular, institutionalized way. The actors of horizontal accountability include the judiciary, parliamentary committees, public auditors and ombudsman institutions (Schmitter 2004: 53). The relation among the actors of horizontal accountability should aim at both reciprocal control and cooperation. In fact, it is argued that their effectiveness and therefore their impact on accountability increases, as long as they do not act in isolation but in networks of cooperation (Schedler et al.1999: 39). Similarly, Larry Diamond believes that transparency in government can be achieved when the agencies of horizontal accountability interlock and overlap in a systemic fashion (2008: 303). For instance, an ombudsman handles a complaint concerning a case of electoral fraud, the electoral commission investigates the case and the judiciary presses for criminal penalties. Public accountability can also stem from society. Nowadays, even in countries that they do not fall into the category of fully consolidated democracies, civil society and the media play a significant role in holding accountable those in power through exposing governmental wrongdoing. In such cases, public pressure, namely the increase of reputation costs through social mobilization and media exposure, may activate the accountability chain. But these social actors can employ institutional tools as well by cooperating with the agencies of horizontal accountability. A typical example is when an ombudsman or a public auditor initiates the investigation of a case which is brought to its attention by civic organizations or the media. Peruzzoti and Smulovitz who conceptualized the above phenomenon by examining the defective state of public accountability in Latin America, call this non electoral yet vertical mechanism of control social accountability (2006: 10). In conclusion, it becomes apparent that the various types of accountability found in modern democratic states are interactive and overlapping, therefore it is crucial to examine their interrelations in depth. 4
Tracing the ombudsman s impact on accountability in Serbia This research project focuses on the ombudsman institutions in Serbia and their impact on accountability. My initial interest in the topic was motivated by the striking finding that during the last two decades ombudsman offices have been established in each country of South-East Europe. In most of the cases, the international community actively promoted the ombudsman through its major international organizations such as the UN, the EU and the Council of Europe, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo the pressure was more direct. Serbia was the last country in South-East Europe that established a national ombudsman in 2007 but it was not the first office of its kind in the country. The ombudsman of the autonomous province of Vojvodina (Pokrajinski Ombudsman) was introduced into the administrative system of the region three years earlier (2004). Nowadays, the ombudsman institution in Serbia can be found at national (Zaštitnik Građana), regional (Pokrajinski Ombudsman) and municipal level, since 14 cities and municipalities established their own local offices (Belgrade, Subotica, Bečej, Zrenjanin, Kragujevac, Šabac, Niš, Bačka Topola, Kraljevo, Smederevska Palanka, Grocka, Voždovac, Vračar, Rakovica). Based on the typology outlined above, this research aims to examine the impact of the ombudsman institution in Serbia according to horizontal and social accountability. Since the effectiveness of the ombudsman decreases if the institution acts in isolation, it is crucial to examine and evaluate the density and quality of its interactions with other agencies and actors of accountability. With regard to horizontal accountability, this research focuses on the relations between the ombudsman and other state institutions with similar functions, such as the Public Prosecutor, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data, the Parliamentary Committee on Petitions, the Auditor General and the Courts, especially the Supreme and the Constitutional Court. With respect to social accountability, this research examines the interactions between the ombudsman and civic associations and NGOs on the one hand (e.g. Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Transparency Serbia, Open Society 5
Fund, Helpline for Women Victims of Discrimination) and the media on the other hand (e.g. printed media, such as Blic, Politika, Vreme, NIN or the electronic media, such as RTS and B92). Methodologically, the examination of the interactions between the ombudsman and the accountability actors and agencies mentioned above will be based primarily on structured interviews with selected members of personnel. In addition, a content analysis will be conducted on the annual reports of the ombudsman, as well as on newspaper articles and NGO statements, reports and publications. Can a Swede be a Swede in Serbia? In conclusion, it has to be acknowledged that the ombudsman is still met with scepticism in South-East Europe for several reasons. First, left-wing critics argue that the transplantation and rapid proliferation of an institution of Swedish origin in the Balkans is indicative of the neo-colonialist intentions of the West after the fall of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This is related to a criticism against the deterministic attitude of the international community that by establishing new institutions, there will be instant difference in countries which have been under authoritarian rule for many years or which have recently emerged from war. Furthermore, it is claimed that the Nordic mentality of mediation and arbitration that the ombudsman is trying to introduce in the region, is destined to fail when faced with the confrontational and distrustful character of the Balkan people. Last but not least, the effectiveness of the ombudsman is questioned. Is the institution independent from government? Does it have an extensive jurisdiction and adequate powers? Does it act in an accountable and transparent way? The criticism of the ombudsman institution in South-East Europe derives to a great extent from bias commonly found in post-communist literature. On the one hand, there is a firm belief that appropriate institutions will lead to the flourishing landscapes (blühende Landschaften) that Chancellor Helmut Kohl foresaw twenty years ago. On the other hand, the fatalistic mentality that five hundred years of Ottoman rule and fifty years of communism cannot be neglected, still determines the 6
way people perceive attempts at reform. Is there no alternative between institutional optimism and cultural pessimism? (Krygier et al. 1999: 78-79) In summary, the effectiveness of the ombudsman institution in South-East Europe is contingent on its ability to negotiate technical and not ideological hurdles. Bibliography Bovens, M. (2006). Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual Framework. European Governance Papers (EUROGOV), No. C-06-01 Retrieved May 24 2010 from http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-c-06-01.pdf Croissant, A., and Merkel, W. (2004). Introduction Democratization in the Early Twenty-first Century, Democratization, 11:5, 1--9. Diamond, L. (2008). The spirit of democracy. The struggle to build free societies throughout the world. New York: Times Books. Diamond, L., and Morlino, L. (2004). An overview, Journal of Democracy, 15:4, 20--31. Krygier, M. and Czarnota, A., eds. (1999). The rule of law after communism: problems and prospects in east-central Europe. Aldershot; Brookfield, USA: Ashgate. Linz, J., and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Merkel, W., and Croissant, A. (2004). Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracies, Democratization, 11:5, 199--213. Morlino, L. (2004). Good and Bad Democracies: How to Conduct Research into the Quality of Democracy, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20:1, 5--27. 7
Peruzzotti, E. & Smulovitz, C. (2006). Enforcing the rule of law: social accountability in the new Latin American democracies. Pittsburgh Pa. : University of Pittsburgh Press. Schedler, A., Diamond, L., and Plattner, M. eds. (1999). The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Schmitter, P. (2004). The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability, Journal of Democracy, 15:4, 47--60. 8