G l o b a l P e r s p e c t i v e
The Iraqis have formed a new government. From a global perspective, this was the single most important event in May. The Bush administration remains politically weakened, in large part due to the war. As a result, its leverage with other major powers is limited. Russia, Iran and China all are challenging the United States, at least on the margins of their relationships. Given that George W. Bush has more than two years left in office, these challenges will intensify unless the United States can stabilize its position in Iraq, which has become a political and strategic vortex for American power. The United States needs, if not an exit strategy, then a stabilization strategy. The formation of an Iraqi government is the foundation for any such strategy. Therefore, if the United States ability to recover its global footing is the central theme of the international system, it follows that the formation of the Iraqi government was the most important event in May. Now, whether the new government in Baghdad can give the United States what it needs will be the critical question for June. The new government was born of a complex series of negotiations among the three leading Iraqi factions: the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds. The negotiation is not yet complete, insofar as the Interior and Defense Ministries do not, at this moment, have ministers. The negotiations revolved around how power would be distributed in Iraq and how it would be reflected in economic terms, particularly in terms of the distribution of oil revenue. The negotiations were not only between these blocs, but within them: Each of the three communities is split into multiple competing factions. And so the negotiations were mind-bendingly complex. The critical event in May was the formation of a government in Iraq. The core question for June is whether Iraq has reached a minimal level of stability. The fundamental issue, on the other hand, is breathtakingly simple: Will the Iraqi Sunnis now act to suppress the insurgents? Many of the insurgents are directly linked to the Sunni leadership whether Baathist, religious or simply traditional. Others are jihadists from the outside. All operate to the extent to which local communities provide them cover and support. A major insurgent offensive clearly has taken shape in late May and we would expect that to continue in early June. Then, the Sunnis should be able to reduce the level of violence. 1
If that doesn t happen by late June, we will know that the Sunni political leadership either cannot or does not want to reduce the violence. It is a useful bargaining chip for them, but they are gaining a significant place at the table in Iraq s government. If they continue to allow the insurgency to go forward, it would signal they are trying to renegotiate the deal something that is not likely to work, given the attitude of the Shia. If, on the other hand, the Sunnis cannot control their communities, it will be clear that the United States has brought the wrong Sunnis to the table. If the violence declines, the United States will begin pulling out forces more rapidly than expected. If the violence does not decline, the United States will begin pulling out forces more rapidly than expected. Either way, U.S. forces will not be bringing security to Iraq. In remaining, they would be taking casualties, for no clear purpose. We note that British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Washington in May, clearly carrying a message for Bush: the British are leaving Iraq, sooner rather than later. In the United States, the mid-term elections are coming, and Bush is under continual attack on multiple issues in Congress. If the violence in Iraq spirals out of control, a U.S. withdrawal is as likely as if the violence continues unabated. The answer June will bring is whether Iraq has reached a minimal level of stability or not. The rest now plays itself out. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s, I r a n a n d R u s s i a The Iranians obviously have a great stake in Iraq. As we have consistently said, Iran s view of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program are intimately linked. The Iranians are using the latter as a lever in the former. Amid all the howling and scary faces being pulled by both the Americans and the Iranians, the process of negotiation has been continuing. The Iranians, taking a page from the North Korean playbook, have used their nuclear program to place themselves at the center of the international system. The United States has threatened to take them before the U.N. Security Council. It is not clear, however, why the Americans think Iran should feel threatened by this. First, U.N. Security Council resolutions aren t worth the paper they are written on, unless some nation-state takes it upon itself to enforce them. Second, neither the Russians nor the Chinese, both permanent members of the Security Council, are going to allow any resolution to pass that has any serious teeth to it. Both are enjoying the sight of the United States getting tied up in knots over Iran s nuclear program. They are hardly going to take the United States off the hook by authorizing any effective action against Iran. 2
From the Iranian point of view, the threat of a U.N. resolution is exactly what they want. The Iranians have enriched some uranium but are still years away from a weapon. Nevertheless, they are running in the tall grass with the big dogs. The United States, Russia, China, Britain, Germany and France are all spending inordinate amounts of time thinking about the Iranians. Within Iran, that reinforces the fact that President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has raised Iran s visibility. Within the Muslim world, it is no longer al Qaeda that is causing the United States pain, but Iran. The risk is an airstrike, but that is a remote risk. Washington has no stomach for dealing with Iran, and Israel is not going to go to the extreme effort of striking Iran. The Iranian nuclear crisis seems to be heading in the direction of the North Korean nuclear crisis years of discussions about whether or not to discuss it. The Iranian nuclear crisis seems to be heading in the direction of the North Korean nuclear crisis years of discussions about whether or not to discuss it. In the more important area of Iraq, it seems likely that even this level of progress would not have been achieved if the Iranian government disapproved. Tehran has too many levers in Iraq not to disrupt the process if it wanted to. Iraqi Shia might not want to be dominated by Iran, but at the same time, they understand that Iran is a mainstay of their power. They would not simply disregard Iranian sensibilities. That means that the Iranians are on board at least to the extent of allowing the government to form. They obviously can disrupt the process at any time, even if they cannot stop it. They haven t disrupted it yet. Thus, we would expect talks with Iran to move forward in a desultory fashion over the coming months, attracting headlines but not much else. For the moment, the Iranians are accepting the new government in Baghdad. The Russians, as we said, are certainly content to see friction between the United States and Iran. The Russians have worked to be honest brokers between Washington and Tehran. There is historical animosity between Russia and Iran: Russia occupied the northern part of Iran during World War II and historically has been seen as an antagonist by Tehran. However, at this moment, these two have a common interest in limiting American power. The Russians want to maintain the tension without triggering an American attack. 3
They have been skillfully using their diplomacy and the Iranians have encouraged them to do so in serving as a go-between. That puts Russia in the ideal position of maintaining tensions between Washington and Tehran, while creating an American dependency on the Russians. The United States has developed a dependency on China in the North Korean affair. It is a dependency that the Chinese have used to their advantage. The Russians want to do the same. P u t i n s D u a l C o n f r o n t a t i o n s Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his State of the State address in May. It carried two messages. The first was that Putin intends to move against corruption. The second was to watch out for the United States. The two messages are linked: The privatization of Russia s economy was something that the United States supported and which amounted to one of the most extraordinary, decade-long spasms of corruption in centuries. The entire economy was expropriated by a combination of former Soviet officials, including Putin s own KGB, and newly risen oligarchs closely linked to Western financial interests. The result for Russia was devastating. Consider that life expectancy itself has fallen dramatically in Russia and that the population is in decline. That is a measure of how badly the privatization surge hit the bulk of the population. In moving against corruption, Putin is moving against his own colleagues in the security services as well as against Western interests. Putin sees Russia as being on a limited collision course with the United States. It is not a cold war, but it is also not the warm friendship that the United States had with Russia under Boris Yeltsin. Putin is strengthening his control over the state, and the state s control over the country. In the course of this effort, he is challenging many of the relationships and arrangements that were established in the 1990s. From the viewpoint of many Russians, the kleptocracy was a creation of the West in general and of the United States in particular. It was Western banks that underwrote the current system. Putin, of course, comes from that system. At the same time, he is no fool and he knows the direction of the wind. The system as it stood in 1999 was unsustainable. Putin has been slowly limiting both the free market and the democratic process in Russia. This is not 4
because he does not support them ultimately, he does. However, he understands that the predominant forces in Russian society no longer stand behind either. He is trying to limit the free market and democratic process in order to save them. His problem, of course, is that he is the prisoner of these forces and not their master. They cannot be stopped. Putin sees himself in a dual confrontation with the United States. First, he knows that he has to limit liberalization. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney s attacks against him in May for these limitations struck Putin as unwarranted interference in Russian affairs and a direct threat to his political survival. He likewise sees the U.S. support for liberalization as an attempt to undermine the Russian state. At the same time, he sees the United States as encroaching on the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union also an attack against the Russian state. He therefore sees Russia as being on a limited collision course with the United States. It is not a cold war, but it is also not the warm friendship that the United States had with Russia under Boris Yeltsin. That was the point of the State of the State address. In fact, the message was that U.S.-Russian relations could get much worse. A F o c u s o n C h i n a Meanwhile, the United States warned in May that relations with China also could get much worse. The Pentagon published a report on China s military that claims China is in the process of developing weapons that could threaten U.S. control of the Western Pacific and able to strike as far as U.S. bases in Guam. These submarine- and air-launched missiles could secure China s sea lanes, but only by forcing U.S. naval forces to withdraw not only from the region around Taiwan, but back into the central Pacific. What was important in this report was less what it said about Chinese plans than what it said about Washington s thinking on China. We are returning to a period like that between January and September 2001, when the Bush administration was heavily focused on China and saw it as the prime threat to American interests. Of greater significance have been recent discussions of the Chinese banking system. On May 15, accounting firm Ernst and Young issued a statement that pegged China s bad loan liabilities at potentially $911 billion. The Chinese government went ballistic over the report, saying that it was distorted and ridiculous. As our readers know, we don t regard that number as either. 5
We have been saying for a while that the number is in that region. Nevertheless, Ernst & Young withdrew the report a few days later, denying that the move had anything to do with Chinese pressure. However, a spate of other reports has now come out, indicating problems. The most important of these was issued by Fitch Ratings at the end of May. Fitch said the Chinese financial system faced $220 billion in losses due to bad loans and that this figure is close to one-third larger than the stock of capital in the entire banking system. It also said that troubled debt was at about $700 billion, which all told brought Fitch close to the Ernst & Young figure. Mainstream analysts now are focusing in on the Chinese banking problem. A new reality is emerging that will shape Western thinking and investment in China. What is important here is that mainstream analysts now are focusing in on the Chinese banking problem. It was at about this point in the cycle in 1991 when the Bank of International Settlements started warning Japanese city banks that they could be suspended from the system for undercapitalization a warning that prompted some Japanese banks to simply close down international branches rather than deal with the issue. China has been encouraging Western banks to come and invest in Chinese banks, obviously to ameliorate the problem. But the problem is systemic. Chinese loans are not being allocated in accordance with market realities. Many are going to existing debtors in order to keep them afloat. The system itself is failing; the issue is when this will be recognized. The Fitch report will not be withdrawn, and many other analysts will follow Fitch s read. That will create a new reality that will shape Western thinking and investment in China. It also will create a new dynamic between China and the rest of the world. The Chinese government s need to generate patriotic fervor a tactic for offsetting domestic tensions will grow. Relations with Japan will deteriorate further, and we strongly suspect that Sino-U.S. relations will decline as well, although neither side can give up the symbiotic trade relationship in which they are locked. But we do expect China to be thinking more geopolitically in the coming months. Given Russia s thinking, we see common interests emerging. 6
Clearly, the U.S.-jihadist war is winding down. The United States will be withdrawing from Iraq. A major issue exists in Afghanistan, where the United States has not begun to think seriously about an exit strategy. As the focus on Iraq winds down, attention will shift to Afghanistan, where the Taliban is fighting hard. But the real focus will be on a three-power game: Russia, China and the United States, with much of the rest of the world drawn into that dynamic. We are not speaking of war by any means. We are, however, speaking about serious international tensions that will affect a range of relations, including economic ones. Dr. George Friedman Chief Executive Officer Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 7