A Comparative Survey of DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT Working Paper Series: No. 90 Jointly Published by Sources of Regime Support in East Asia Yun-Han Chu Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University yunhan@gate.sinica.edu.tw & Doh Chull Shin Jack W. Peltason Scholar in Residence, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California-Irvine, USA ShinD@missouri.edu & Bridget Welsh Associate Professor, Political Science, Singapore Management University, Singapore bwelsh@smu.edu.sg & Alex C. H. Chang Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica Exchange Scholar, Department of Government, University of Texas, Austin chang626@gate.sinica.edu.tw
Asian Barometer A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development Working Paper Series Jointly Published by Globalbarometer The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied research program on public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance around the region. The regional network encompasses research teams from thirteen East Asian political systems (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). Together, this regional survey network covers virtually all major political systems in the region, systems that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition. The ABS Working Paper Series is intended to make research result within the ABS network available to the academic community and other interested readers in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Scholars in the ABS network also devote their work to the Series with the hope that a timely dissemination of the findings of their surveys to the general public as well as the policy makers would help illuminate the public discourse on democratic reform and good governance. The topics covered in the Series range from country-specific assessment of values change and democratic development, region-wide comparative analysis of citizen participation, popular orientation toward democracy and evaluation of quality of governance, and discussion of survey methodology and data analysis strategies. The ABS Working Paper Series supercedes the existing East Asia Barometer Working Paper Series as the network is expanding to cover more countries in East and South Asia. Maintaining the same high standard of research methodology, the new series both incorporates the existing papers in the old series and offers newly written papers with a broader scope and more penetrating analyses. The ABS Working Paper Series is issued by the Asian Barometer Project Office, which is jointly sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences of National Taiwan University and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. Contact Information Asian Barometer Project Office Department of Political Science National Taiwan University No.1, Sec.4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei, 10617, Taiwan, R.O.C. Tel: 886 2-3366 8456 Fax: 886-2-2365 7179 E-mail: asianbarometer@ntu.edu.tw Website: www.asianbarometer.org
Sources of Regime Support in East Asia Yun-Han Chu Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University Doh Chull Shin University of California-Irvine, USA Bridget Welsh Singapore Management University, Singapore Alex C. H. Chang Academia Sinica and University of Texas, Austin Abstract Using the latest third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey we are able to identify the sources of regime support in East Asia within a comprehensive framework that takes into account both the on-going theoretical debates over what sustain regime legitimacy and the particular contexts of the region. We found that regime support in Asia has significant congruence and variation. On the one hand, political regimes in Asia draw their political legitimacy from a common well. This is largely from their governance and government performance, notably government responsiveness, economic performance and controlling corruption. On the other hand, ideology and culture are also important base for regime legitimacy under non-democratic regimes. These regimes gain support from cultivating nationalism and national identity. 1
Sources of Regime Support in East Asia Introduction Legitimacy by definition concerns how power may be used in ways that citizens consciously accept. All modern political regimes depend on the public s willing acquiescence and support for their survival and effective functioning. As Bruce Gilley has forcefully pointed out regimes that lack legitimacy devote more resources to maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which reduces support and makes them vulnerable to overthrow or collapse. 1 A measure of popular support can be found in states with many different kinds of regimes, some democratic and some not, a point often overlooked by theories that concentrate exclusively on democratization. 2 Normative political theory typically expects democratic regimes to be more legitimate than authoritarian regimes because democracy is built on the consent of the ruled and universal suffrage. Empirically, however, ample survey data have shown that the public s diffuse support for the regime varies considerably across democracies and the observed level of regime legitimacy under non-democratic regimes is sometimes substantially higher than that of emerging democracies. 3 Some recent efforts to resolve these puzzling results have put forward three alternative explanations, all of which are of theoretical importance to democratic studies. 1 Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 2 William Mishler and Richard Rose, Learning and Re-learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes, European Journal of Political Research, 41, no. 1 (2002): 5 36. 3 Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Peter Kotzian, Public Support for Liberal Democracy, International 2
The first explanation suggests that regime legitimacy turns out to be created, maintained, and destroyed less at the input and more at the output side of the political system. 4 Nondemocratic regimes, while denying democratic rights to their citizens, might still enjoy a higher level of political support if they deliver economic wellbeing and good governance. 5 On the other hand, mechanisms of popular accountability and democratic representation do not immunize democracies from poor economic performance and bad governance. The second explanation suggests that some democracies have a lower level of regime support than non-democracies may be attributed to the presence of critical citizens nurtured under the polemic and contentious nature of democratic politics. 6 On the other hand, it is conceivable for some non-democratic regimes to enjoy a higher level of political support due to the nature of authoritarian politics. These regimes pre-empt viable political alternatives by suppressing political opposition and independent news media and occupying all organized space. The third explanation suggests that the observed level of regime legitimacy stems not just from the functioning of the political system but also from the prevailing political predispositions held by its citizenry. Some political regimes may benefit in part from the default condition of being endowed with a large portion of deferential and compliant citizens. In particular, people Political Science Review 32, no. 1 (2011): 23-41; Zhengxu Wang, Russell J. Dalton, and Doh Chull Shin, Political Trust, Political Performance, and Support for Democracy, in Citizens, Democracy, and Markets Around the Pacific Rim, eds. R. Dalton and D. Shin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 50-72. 4 Bo Rothstein, Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government, American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009): 311-330. 5 For example, Bruce Gilley, The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries, International Political Science Review 27, no. 1 (2006): 47-71. 6 Russell J. Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 3
who are still under the influence of traditional Asian values, which privilege group interests over individual interests, political authority over individual freedom, and social responsibility over individual rights, might be intimidated by the chaos and conflicts brought about by democratization while embracing paternalist politics under authoritarianism. If the current regime is a direct descendant of a revolutionary regime, state legitimacy and regime legitimacy are oftentimes fused into one. The so-called revolutionary legacy anchored on nation-building or anti-imperialist struggle will have its lingering impact through political socialization. In this sense, political culture matters and legitimacy is in the eyes of the beholders. In this paper, using the latest third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey we are able to identify the sources of regime support in East Asia within a comprehensive framework that takes into account both the on-going theoretical debates over what sustain regime legitimacy and the particular contexts of the region. Our empirical analysis also subjects these alternative explanations to rigorous empirical tests. East Asia provides an important testing site as it covers a wide range of political regimes from liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral authoritarian regimes to one-party authoritarian regimes. Using standardized linear regression, we illustrate that there are indeed common underlying factors accounting for regime support across the region, and, importantly, differences both in the levels and underlying factors in different regime types. Why East Asia? East Asia provides an important arena to assess whether different regime types are supported more than others, and why. Over the last decade East Asia has experienced considerable regime transformation. Beginning in the mid-1980s, East Asia became part of the third wave of democratic transitions, as authoritarian regimes in Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand embraced more democratic forms of government. In the wake of the 1997 4
Asian financial crisis, Indonesia transitioned toward democratic rule, after thirty-two years of military power. The Asian Financial Crisis did not provoke the same level of change elsewhere in the region, however, as the more resilient electoral authoritarian system in Malaysia and Singapore, for example, weathered calls for reform. East Asia entered the 21 st century with broadening democratic governance, yet the first decade would test many of the regimes. Political polarization, elite infighting, partisan gridlock and corruption scandals debilitated governments. This decade saw the rise of authoritarian rule in East Asia, with the 2006 military coup and 2008 judicial coup in Thailand, electoral fraud in the Philippines in 2004, and the 2004 marred elections in Mongolia. China s robust economic success, replicated in Vietnam, served to reinforce an authoritarian Asian role model in these one-party systems, as the United States after 2001 lost its luster as a democratic example. Even while regimes such as Indonesia became more democratically consolidated, concerns about political freedoms and entrenched elite rule rose to the fore. In this current decade, the authoritarian tide appears to be turning. The last few years have showcased greater contestation for power in Singapore and Malaysia. This was evident in Singapore s 2011 legislative and presidential elections, and with Malaysia s growing intense electoral competition. Democratic forces are gaining ground, both in the expansion of civil society and electorally. This is tied in part to rising inequality, generational changes, persistent concerns about governance, especially corruption, ineffective public engagement, and importantly, changing values. Even in the traditional democratic regimes, Taiwan and Korea weathered the partisan gridlock through a series of elections. Japan was severely tested by a tragic tsunami in 2011. Nevertheless democracy persevered and arguably strengthened. Thailand and the Philippines held free and fair elections in 2011 and 2010 respectfully. These strides 5
towards democracy have also occurred amongst more authoritarian outposts. Myanmar, which is not yet part of this survey, has been in the lime light recently with its recent moves towards democracy. Similarly pressures for democratic change are occurring elsewhere in one-party systems. Exposures of scandals in China and Vietnam have led these governments to engage their electorates, although the scope of this engagement remains narrow. The internet and social media have provided alternative forms of information and lowered transaction costs for political participation. While there have been openings and greater political liberalization, authoritarian forces remain entrenched. These take the form of hardliners in regimes, such as in Vietnam and Malaysia, and among conservative groups that are willing to fan nationalistic fervor and ethnic tensions to hold onto power. Human rights violations of free expression, political assembly and religious freedom, among others, remain serious. These issues are moving from state actors to non-state actors, broadening the challenges facing democratic regimes in the region. The 2011 attacks on religious freedom in Indonesia are illustrative. While there are signs of democratic expansion, serious obstacles remain. The ABS third wave survey was conducted in this context, as both democratic and authoritarian regimes are being challenged and transformed in the region. The thirteen East Asian countries and territories covered by the ABS survey spread over a full range of intermediate regimes. Based on the regime classification developed by Larry Diamond 7, the three Northeast Asian countries of Japan, Korea and Taiwan comprise liberal democracies, where there are long standing democracies with significant records of competitive elections, civil liberties and changes in government. By 2010, Thailand, the Philippines and 7 Larry Diamond, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2, (2002): 21-35. 6
Indonesia could be classified as electoral democracies where free and fair elections are institutionalized but political and legal hindrance to political freedoms remains significant. Malaysia and Hong Kong by 2010 could be classified as a competitive authoritarian regime where freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections are significantly compromised but significant parliamentary opposition exists. The more authoritarian systems of Singapore and Cambodia should be classified as non-competitive (or hegemonic) authoritarian regimes, where elections are dominated by the hegemonic party in power. Vietnam and China are typical one-party authoritarian systems, where the space for political contestation is completely closed and the communist party continues to monopolize politics. This diversity allows us to compare factors underlying regime support across four distinctive regime types that account for the bulk of political systems in the developing world today. Table 1: Regime Classification in East Asia Regime Classification Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy Competitive Authoritarian Regime Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime One-Party Regimes Countries Japan, Taiwan, Korea Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Mongolia Malaysia and Hong Kong Cambodia and Singapore China and Vietnam The Conundrum of Regime Support Defining, measuring and explaining regime legitimacy has proven to be very challenging. In this paper we measure regime legitimacy in terms of diffuse regime support, as defined by David Easton. 8 Diffuse support for political regime refers to the consistent and less conditional 8 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965). 7
feeling toward the general political system. 9 The third-wave ABS questionnaire designed a series of questions asking respondents about their allegiance to, preference for, and pride and confidence in their own respective systems of government. The ABS has made a point of guiding respondents to differentiate the system of government from the specific government in office or its performance. This specially designed battery of questions is not tied to the concept of democratic legitimacy and thus enables us to make a systematic comparison of levels of legitimacy across different regime types (see Appendix for details). Also, this concept also does not focus on the trust in specific institutions, but is an umbrella for the system as a whole. [Figures 2a to 2e] Based on the latest wave the ABS survey, we found that level of regime support varies considerably across East Asia. The Figures 2.a through 2.e show the percentage of positive responses to each of the five questions in our battery. The most striking finding is: the authoritarian countries enjoy higher levels of regime support than do the democratic ones. For instance, Vietnam (a one-party authoritarian regime) and Singapore (a hegemonic authoritarian regime) registered the highest level of support over the item regarding taking pride in the system (Figure 2.a). On the other hand, Japan, Korea and Taiwan (the three liberal democracies) registered the lowest. Among the electoral democracy, Thailand enjoys the highest level of support while Hong Kong the weakest among competitive authoritarian regimes. The four other indicators reveals a similar pattern across different regime types. In Figure 3, we compare the factor scores based on a four-item factor model, 10 the 9 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), 63; David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," British Journal of Political Science 5, no.4: 444. 10 Originally, the ABS employed a five-item battery for measuring the diffuse regime support. The confirmatory factor analysis suggests that the first four items (Q80-Q83) converge on a single factor with good fit while the fifth 8
difference in level of support becomes event more striking. On a scale of -1.0 to +1.0, most democratic regimes (except Thailand and Indonesia) fall in the negative territory. Most authoritarian regimes fall in the positive territory except Hong Kong. If one construct a scatter plot with the factor scores on the one hand and the Freedom House scores of Year 2010 on the other, one can detect a negative linear relationship between level of democratic development and level of diffuse regime support (see Figure 4). How to make sense of this big puzzle is indeed challenging. [Figure 4 here] There is no question that the exceptional high level of support for regime institutions observed in the more authoritarian systems has something to do with the fact that these regimes by and large are free of the scrutiny of independent mass media and/or bona fide political opposition. On the other hand, we should not be so complacent in believing that these systems enjoy higher level of political support simply because of being authoritarian. We need to dig further into the underlying factors accounting varying level of regime legitimacy both within a given political system and across different types of regime. Empirical Evidences We begin our analysis with three charts showing some preliminary evidences that in East Asia authoritarian regimes enjoy higher level of regime support because the majority of their citizens believe that the regime is doing a good job over delivering economic prosperity and being responsive to people's need. It is also probably due to the fact that authoritarian regimes are more capable of bolstering patriotism and nationalism, which tend to boost regime support. In Figure 5, we plot each country sample's average score of the answers to the question item (Q84) suffers from substantially weaker factor loading. In this paper, we construct the index of diffuse regime support by employing only the first four items. 9
assessing national economic condition along with its factor score of diffuse regime support. It is quite evident that most of the political regimes that have higher levels of popular support also tend to enjoy higher levels of popular approval over the country's economic condition with South Korea and Vietnam occupying the two polar ends of this implicit linear relationship. In Figure 6, we can detect a similar pattern between each country sample's average score of the answers to the question regarding government responsiveness and its level of diffuse regime support with Mongolia and Thailand somewhat deviating from this linear relationship. Figure 7 also shows that at the macro level, higher levels of regime support tend to go hand-in-hand with stronger sentiments of loyalty to one's country. 11 While these three charts do not exhaust the plausible explanations of why most authoritarian regimes enjoy higher level of diffuse regime support, they do provide some important clues to where we might locate the most powerful explanatory sources. [Figures 5, 6 and 7] In the following we corroborate the above findings with individual-level analysis. We adopt a standardized linear regression model that allows for comparison within and amongst countries. We shall uncover common underlying factors explaining regime support as well as differences in the underlying factors accounting for regime support among regime types and across countries. In identifying the causal variables for our standardized linear regression we employ variables from the ABS Wave III that correspond to the current debates about the underlying factors shaping regime legitimacy. These varied explanations are grouped under four different rubrics government performance, governance, political values, and partisanship. We also 11 See the Appendix for the exact wording of the question item (Q137). 10
employ relevant demographic variables as control variables in our regression model. The variables under each rubric are outlined below in Table 2. The questions corresponding to these variables are detailed in Appendix. Table 2: Explanations of Regime Support Table 1: Explanations of Regime Support Rubric Government Performance Good Governance Democratic Development Values and Ideology Partisanship Indicators 1. Condition of national economy 2. Access to public service 3. Condition of safety and crime 4. Government responsiveness 1. Controlling corruption 2. Rule of Law 3. Horizontal accountability 4. Fair and equal treatment 1. Freedom 2. Popular (electoral) accountability 3. Political competition 1. Authoritarian vs. Democratic Values 2. Social traditionalism 3. Nationalism 4. Xenophobia (Fear of Foreign Competition) 5. Social Capital 1. Attachment to winning camp (for democratic regimes only) Rubric 1: Government performance In Asia especially regime legitimacy has been interwoven with the output of governments. Whether this involves the perceptions of government s responsiveness or its economic 11
performance, focus centers on what governments deliver. 12 Here we include not only the evaluation of economic performance, but government responsiveness, access to public services and protection of human safety. Traditionally economic performance has been given considerable weight, as bread and butter issues such as growth, jobs and inflation have been seen to be extremely important for regime support. Economic crisis and mismanagement has been identified in destabilizing regimes, with the example of Indonesia in 1998 illustrative. The close tie of Asian regimes with economic performance, tied to the developmental states of the 1960s- 1980s, has made the economy prominent. 13 Closely associated with the economic are the provision of public services and management of human safety or crime. Finally, regimes are evaluated on the ability of their governments to be responsive to citizens needs. 14 Given the prominence of government capability to deliver in Asia, we expect these factors to be significant explanations of regime support. Rubric 2 Good Governance In East Asia it is increasingly unlikely that political regimes can win over the heart of their citizens with just a proven record in delivering material goods alone; they also have to deliver good governance. Recent studies have shown that one of the most important factors shaping East Asians perceptions of regimes involves corruption. 15 From the corruption charges levied initially against the KMT and 12 Bruce Gilley, Political Legitimacy in Malaysia: Regime Performance in the Asian Context, Lynn White ed. Legitimacy : ambiguities of political success or failure in East and Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005): pp. 29-66. 13 Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Challenges to Unity and Regime Legitimacy, Southeast Asian Affairs (1999), pp. 3-19. 14 Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, Chong-min Park, Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia, Journal of Democracy. Volume 18, Number 3, July 2007, pp. 66-80. 15 Eric Chang and Yun-han Chu, Political Corruption and Institutional Trust in East Asia,, Journal of Politics, 68, 2 (May 2006): 12
later against the former leader of the DPP in Taiwan to the cries of cronyism in the Philippines and Indonesia, corruption has been a focal point of government criticism. Closely related to corruption is rule of law, whether those in government exercise the power strictly adhering to the constitutional and legal procedures and requirements. 16 In addition to corruption and rule of law, another key component in governance includes horizontal accountability in terms of effective check on the executive power by the judiciary and the legislature. Rule of law and mechanisms of horizontal accountability establish a self-restraining state and minimize the abuse of power by the office-holders. Last but not least, we also examine whether Asian publics support their regimes for attaining the goals of equality. How much does the provision of basic necessities for all and equal and fair treatment by government, for example, matter? Asian governments, especially before the Asian financial crisis were lauded for achieving growth with equality, and similarly argued amidst the Asian values debate of the 1990s that Asian publics valued the provision of housing and other basic needs over civil liberties. There is no guarantee that democratically elected governments are necessarily superior to non-democratic regimes over these key indicators of good governance. For instance, according to the World Bank s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Singapore and Malaysia, the region s two electoral authoritarian regimes, are ranked substantially higher than Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines on the measures of control of corruption and rule of law. 17 In addition to the perceived capability of the political system in delivering material goods, more favorable popular assessment of the quality of governance could be another important explanation for why sometimes nondemocratic regimes might enjoy higher level of political support than democratic ones. Rubric 3: Democratic Development 16 Zhengxu Wang, Russell J. Dalton, and Doh Chull Shin, Political Trust, Political Performance, and Support for Democracy, in Citizens, Democracy, and Markets Around the Pacific Rim, eds. R. Dalton and D. Shin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 50-72. 17 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 13
While democracy may yet be the only game in town in the context of East Asia, it becomes increasingly difficult for any political regime to obtain and exercise political authority without the standard institutional fixtures of a representative democracy -- such as regular election, multi-party competition, independent media and freedom of expression and association. First, resistance to democratic changes became increasingly untenable because few East Asian regimes could defy the transformative forces of modernization over the long run as prescribed by the Modernization theorists. 18 Rising levels of economic development necessarily lead to growing mass demands for liberalization in authoritarian societies and to rising levels of direct mass participation in societies that are already democratic. Second, it becomes increasingly difficult also because most East Asian regimes are susceptible to external pressures and criticism as their societies have become intimately enmeshed with the global economy and international community. Political regimes that openly reject these formal institutions of voice, representation and popular accountability suffer from a substantial loss of external legitimacy in the contemporary global ideological arena. With the exception of China and Vietnam, all East Asian regimes covered by ABS formally commit themselves to the principle of popular accountability and open political contestation. In competitive authoritarian systems such as Malaysia and hegemonic authoritarian regimes such as Singapore, the incumbent may routinely manipulate formal democratic rules and effectively deny the opposition a level playing field, but they are unable to eliminate them or reduce them to a mere façade. So it is reasonable to infer that political regimes that fulfill citizens aspiration for freedom protection, popular accountability, and fair and open political contestation might enjoy higher level of popular support. These 18 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 14
evaluations should be more important for young democracies that are widely expected to fulfill these essential characteristics of a democracy. Rubric 4: Political Values and Ideology An important source of regime legitimacy, according to social capital theory, is social trust in terms of vibrant social networking and generalized trust. 19 According to Putnam, as social capital develops it also helps build efficient and effective political institutions, which in turn boost people s trust in those institutions. The culturalists, on the other hand, argue that many hybrid and authoritarian regimes are buttressed by the default condition of being endowed with a large portion of deferential and compliant citizens. 20 An important variant of the culturalist approach is oftentimes dubbed under the "Asian values" discourse. More explicitly, Huntington argues that Confucianism values group interests greater than individual interests, political authority more than individual freedoms, and social responsibility over individual rights. Confucian thought encourages social harmony and cooperation, avoids conflict, values the attainment of social order and maintains hierarchical social structures. These characteristics of traditional East Asian culture will not assist the development of democracy in the region. 21 As such we examine two different dimensions of Asian values: Social traditionalism which captures traditional values toward the social relations and authoritarian values that capture orientation for more authoritarian political order and structures. In the Asian context, many non-democratic regimes also draw their support from a political legacy of nation-building project or anti- 19 Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 20 Yun-han Chu and Yutzung Chang, Culture Shift and Political Stability: Comparing Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in Shiping Hua ed. Chinese Political Culture, 1989-1999. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. 21 Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of Third Wave," Journal of Democracy, vol. 8, no. 4(1997), p. 10. 15
imperialist struggle. 22 To tap into this pillar of regime legitimacy, we bring in two additional sets of values, nationalism and xenophobia. The former measures respondents identification with their country and the later captures the popular aversion to foreign competition and cultural influence. We expect given the prominence of political culture in understanding support for democracy that political values variables will be as important as government performance. Rubric 5: Partisanship The winner-loser-gap theory calls our attention to the possibility that the polemic and contentious nature of democratic politics might suppress citizens' support for the political regime. Previous studies have addressed the gap between electoral winners and losers on various dimensions of political support, from specific institutional evaluations to more diffuse aspects concerning democratic principles and procedures. 23 For our analysis, we take this factor into consideration by adding an extra variable measuring if the respondents' are attached to the winning camp, the losing camp, or not identified with any political party. It is hypothesized that those who are identified with the winning camp will be supportive of the regime than who belongs to the losing camp regardless of other conditions. This variable is constructed for democratic countries only. Rubric 6: Demographic Variables 22 Muthiah Alagappa, The Anatomy of Legitimacy, in Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994): 11 30; Jungmin Seo, Nationalism and the Problem of Political Legitimacy in China, in Lynn White ed. Legitimacy : ambiguities of political success or failure in East and Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005): pp. 141-182. 23 See Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, Winners, losers and attitudes about government in contemporary democracies, International Political Science Review, 22 (2001), pp. 321-338; Christopher J. Anderson, André Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Ola Listhaug, eds, Losers Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Devra C. Moehler, Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects: Election Losers and Winners in Africa, British Journal of Political Science, 39 (2009), pp. 345-366. 16
Finally, the control variables in the multivariate analysis are the socio-economic criteria, namely age, education and gender. Differences among generations, classes and gender have long been highlighted in assessing support for regimes. Conventional wisdom runs that people with less education are less resistant to the propaganda of authoritarian regimes and thus more perceptive to their rule. 24 The younger generations are usually more detached from the political system and less supportive. We explore the range of these indicators to learn whether they continue to matter and how. These indicators we expect to be less important for regime support than government performance, governance and political attitudes. With this analytical framework, we are able to tackle two analytical questions: 1) What are the common factors that explain regime support across Asia and what do these common factors tell us about how Asians view their governments? 2) Do different regime types in Asia have different underlying factors accounting for their support from citizens? Do more democratic regimes draw their legitimacy from a different set of factors than more authoritarian regimes? We report the findings from standardized linear regression models in Table 3. Among the four aspects of government performance, the economic performance and perceived government s responsiveness to people s needs, are the most important explanatory sources of regime legitimacy. Across regime types, perceived government responsiveness proved to be important for regime support, especially in liberal democratic countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan where regime support is relatively low. In these countries citizens are allowed or even encouraged to voice their discontent with government. Therefore, their perception of the extent to which government will solve their most concerned issues and government respondents their requests certainly determines their regime support. 24 Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 319-347 17
Access to public service is quite important in many countries, especially Southeast Asian countries. Economic performance is also a common factor underlying regime support in Asia across regime types. Given its emphasis on the priority of economic development, Asian values prevail and become one of the most important indicators for measuring government performance. However, while this factor emerges as significant in most East Asian countries, this is striking to find that in the hegemonic authoritarian regime such as Vietnam and China, where considerable weight has been placed on the importance of economic growth for political legitimacy, the explanatory power is not as high as one would expect. This might due to the fact that there is strong consensus (i.e., not a great deal of variation in statistically sense) among the populace over the evaluation of economic performance. Most indicators under the rubric of quality of governance are also important pillars for sustaining regime legitimacy across all political systems. The collective explanatory power of quality of governance indicators is just as important as that of government performance. In liberal democracies such as Japan and Taiwan, their explanatory is even greater. Across regime types, citizens gave greater support when they believed that their respective regime was promoting equality. There are three different aspects associated with equality- provision of basic need to all, fair treatment across income and different ethnic groups. This points to the central role that promoting basic needs and treating all the citizens in a country equally play in underlying support for a political system. At the same time, the perceived extent of corruption tends to suppress people s support for the political system. It reminds us that corruption remains an important governance indicator for regime support in Asia. It is interesting to note, however, that this persists across regime types, irrespective of the standing of different countries in their corruption performance by organizations such as Transparency International. 18
Among the three aspects of democratic developments, the common factor is political competition. Political competition is important in the more democratic regimes as well as electoral authoritarian systems such as Cambodia and Hong Kong, where people still demand greater competitiveness for choosing leaders. Yet, the consistent role that political competition plays across regimes points to the need for competition in elite selection in places such as China. Among the five indicators under the rubric of values and ideology, democratic values, social traditionalism and nationalism exert very strong influence on individual support for the political regime. In most countries, the three collectively exert more explanatory power than any other categories of explanatory variables, especially most hybrid regimes and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Their collective explanatory power remains very substantial in liberal democracies, such as Japan and Taiwan. The most noteworthy finding is the critical citizen syndrome. The more people subscribe to liberal democratic values, they become more critical and as a result less supportive of the political regime. This syndrome happens not just in liberal democracies or electoral democracies. It is very salient in other hybrid regimes or even hegemonic authoritarian regime as well. Social traditionalism performs rather differently from democratic values. It remains an important pillar of regime support for non-democratic regimes and electoral democratic regime at lower level of socio-economic development, such as Indonesia. But it ceases to be an important explanatory sources for liberal democracies such as Taiwan and South Korea. Social capital and fears of foreign competition and economic openness do not seem to be useful predicators in most countries. Lastly, our additional regression analysis (which is not shown here) suggests that among democratic regime the winner-loser-gap thesis applies to Taiwan only suggesting that the polarization over national identity does takes its toll on the legitimacy of the young democracy. 19
By Way of Conclusion Our multivariate analysis showcase that regime support in Asia has significant congruence and variation. Political regimes in Asia draw their political legitimacy from a common well. This is largely from their governance and government performance, notably government responsiveness and economic performance. The tie between regime support and governance indicators such as equality and corruption places pressures on Asian governments to respond more effectively to these areas. Corruption remains a serious problem in the region and is not being adequately addressed and has the potential to undermine regime support in Asia. A similar dynamic is occurring with equality as regimes in Asia are grappling with how to manage the growing inequality in their societies. These challenges are common across regime types, but the failure to manage these point to possible regime change, as this places pressures on systems, especially more closed systems. Economic performance is also a possible point of regime vulnerability, as the task of delivering continued economic success becomes ever more challenging in a more turbulent global economy. Moreover, our empirical findings register an important qualification to the prevailing view that attributes the resiliency of Asian non-democratic regimes primarily to their superior capability in delivering economic prosperity. In these countries, whether the government is perceived by the citizens as being responsive to their needs, effective in controlling corruption, and adherent to the expectation that ordinary people are treated fairly and equally are shown to be as important as economic performance to regime support. Furthermore, ideology and culture are also important bases for regime legitimacy under non-democratic regimes. These regimes gain support from cultivating nationalism and national 20
identity. They also benefit from being embedded in a more hospitable cultural soil where traditional social and political values are still prevalent. While popular political convictions matter to all political systems in the region, they matter more to non-democratic than democratic regimes. While the numbers point to higher regime support for authoritarian regimes than democratic ones, these numbers also need to be interpreted with an appreciation that we understand that citizens in democracies give their systems lower markings; they are more critical. In fact, the criticism of democracy in Asia, especially in the more liberal democracies, is a sign of democratic resilience. The levels of regime support suggest, at least on the surface, that there is only one regime that faces serious immediate challenges ahead, that is China. The level of support for this one-party authoritarian system is on par with that of the liberal democracies but without the same level of political space for criticism. There appears to be potential tensions ahead for China, as the regime responds to comparatively low regime support. In reviewing the differences in the base of regime support across regime types it is not surprising to see a parallel between regime types and different sources of legitimacy. Social traditionalism continues to be more important for one-party systems and controlling corruption for more democratic ones. It is likely that different regimes in the region will continue to base their political legitimacy on these regime featured elements. Our analysis resolves the puzzle why democratic regimes suffer from lower level of regime support. Mechanisms of popular accountability and democratic representation do not immunize these democracies from poor economic performance, inability to respond to people s need and crackdown corruption. At the same time, non-democratic regimes in East Asia have been able to establish their legitimacy without a full implementation of the standard fixtures of a liberal 21
democracy. Instead, they can rely on other desirable characteristics and policy performance while being buttressed by the traditional social values and nationalism. 22
Appendix Questionnaire Items Used Variables Measurement Questions Diffuse Regime Support Q80. Over the long run, our system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces. Government Performance Economic Evaluation Government responsiveness Public Services Q81. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government. Q82. A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves the people's support. Q83. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of. Q1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? Q2. How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Q3. What do you think will be the state of our country s economic condition a few years from now? Q4. As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today? Q97. How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years? Q113. How well do you think the government responds to what people want? Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Q38. An identity document Q39. A place in a public primary school for a child Q40. Medical treatment at a nearby clinic Q41. Help from the police when you need it 23
Human Safety Q42. Generally speaking, how safe is living in this city/ town/ village very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe? Quality of Governance Anti-Corruption Political Competition Vertical Accountability Horizontal Accountability Equality Q116. How widespread do you think corruption and bribetaking are in your local/municipal government? Would you say? Q117. How widespread do you think corruption and bribetaking are in the national government [in capital city]? Would you say? Q118. In your opinion, is the government working to crack down on corruption and root out bribery? Q37. On the whole, how free and fair would you say the last national election was? Q99. Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period. Q111. How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates? Q115 How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think? Q100. Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions. Q109. How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view? Q112. To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping government leaders in check? Q101.When government leaders break the laws, there is nothing the court can do. Q103. All citizens from different ethnic communities in Country X are treated equally by the government. Q104. Rich and poor people are treated equally by the government. Q105. People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter. 24
Freedom Q106. People are free to speak what they think without fear. Q107. People can join any organization they like without fear. Rule of Law Q108. Do officials who commit crimes go unpunished? Q110. How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power? Social Capital General Social Trust Q23. General speaking, would you say that Most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people? Q24. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Political Values Social Traditionalism Authoritarian vs. Liberal Democratic Values Q50. For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second. Q51. In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group s collective interest. Q52. For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed. Q53. When dealing with others, developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one s immediate interest. Q54. When dealing with others, one should not only focus on immediate interest but also plan for future. Q58. In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group. Q59. Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict. Q60. A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him. Q63. When dealing with others, one should not be preoccupied with temporary gains and losses. Q138. The government should consult religious authorities when interpreting the laws. Q139. Women should not be involved in politics as much as men. Q140. People with little or no education should have as 25
much say in politics as highly-educated people. Q141. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions. Q142. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society. Q143. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups. Q144. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch. Q145. If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. Q146. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything. Q147. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic. Q148. When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation. Nationalism Q137. A citizen should always remain loyal only to his country, no matter how imperfect it is or what wrong it has done. Q154. How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)? Are you? Fear of Foreign Competition and Influence Q151.Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries. Q152. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: We should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods. Q 153. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Foreign goods are hurting the local community. Partisanship Party Identity Q47. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to? Partisanship is recoded as dummy variables. Demographic Gender SE2. Male or Female 26