The impact of migration, age and skills on innovation in Europe A study on France, Germany and UK

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The impact of migration, age and skills on innovation in Europe A study on France, Germany and UK Claudio Fassio (University of Turin and BRICK) Fabio Montobbio (University of Turin, BRICK & Kites, Bocconi University) Alessandra Venturini (MPC, University of Turin) ZEW SEEK conference Engines for More and Better Jobs in Europe 25-26 April, 2013 Mannheim, Germany

Background & Motivations European competitiveness, Europe 2020: smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Innovation and skills Innovation and R&D considered as key drivers of growth. Usual problems: difficulties with R&D targets, adverse technological specialization Figure 1: Trend in patent applications at the top five offices, 1883-2010. 500.000 United States of America China Japan Republic of Korea European Patent Office 375.000 250.000 125.000 - Source: WIPO Statistical Database, October 2011.

Background & Motivations Human capital related problems: ageing of population, lack of (mobility of) skills 1. Ageing of European labour force (CEDEFOP, 2010): is the increasing average age of the European labour force an obstacle to the growth of productivity and innovation? 2. Lack (of mobility) of skills: is the European labour market able to efficiently allocate its skilled labour force? In both cases migration can be beneficial for European competitiveness. However European policies often aim to restrict immigration on claims related to the use of the welfare state, the potential competitive role in the labour market, difficult integration.

Main Hypothesis We stress the fact that innovative capacity in European countries depends crucially on the quality of human capital and specifically on the following interconnected components : 1. Skills/ education 2. Age 3. Ethnicity

Background literature and research hypotheses The role of skills: Are skill necessary for innovation? Endogenous growth theory and the role of education/human capital (Benhabib and Spiegal, 1994, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992, Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby, Vandenbussche, 2009) Skill-biased nature of technological change (Acemoglu, 2002, 2003) The role of age: Is there an age dividend for innovation? Does it affect differently educated and non-educated workers? Human capital life cycle and continuing vocational training and investment in additional accumulation of human capital (Jones, 2010; Levin, Stephan 1991, Frosch, 2011)

Background literature and research hypotheses The role of ethnicity: Are skilled migrants contributing to innovation and growth in Europe? European Commission competitiveness agenda: Blue Card Directive inside the Global Migration Approach Some evidence in US (Peri, 2011; Ortega, Peri, 2011; Hunt and Gauthier- Loiselle, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln 2010) and conflicting evidence in Europe (Ozgen et al. 2011, Cattaneo et al, 2012, Breschi, Lissoni, Tarasconi, 2013) Are low skilled migrants contributing to growth in Europe? No evidence, only indirect evidence on complementarity with high skilled women s fertility choices (Cortes Tessada, 2011; Baroni Mocetti, 2011; Farré et al, 2011; Romiti Rossi 2011) The role of the country-level institutional framework : Are there different country migration patterns that affect innovation activities in Europe? Impact of EU enlargement

The empirical strategy: the model Endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990) and national innovative capacity (Furman et al. 2002). The rate of technological progress is: A ( A t t H Complementarity and imperfect substitutability of different labour factors t ) We expand the model: A ( A it it RD it L it X it ) And take logs: ln A it ln A ln RD ln L ln it 1 it 1 it 1 X it 1

Variables

Sources of data 3 countries, 16 manufacturing industries (NACE), 13 years (1994-2005) Patent applications and patent citations counts (4-y impact) at the EPO (Patstat). National labour force surveys for UK and FRA Microcensus Germany STAN ANBERD Database (sectoral R&D, Value Added, Trade)

Identification strategy We use log and estimate elasticities, one year lag for all independent variables Endogeneity issues Important pull factors Internal instruments: Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM-SYSTEM - All labour force variables are considered endogenous -This works well with large N and small T (as N decreases Hansen test unreliable and large standard errors: use of Roodman (2008) procedure to reduce the number of instruments) -Possible use of external instruments (Card, 2001) for country regressions

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Titolo asse Descriptive statistics Share of migrants on employment 0,14 0,12 0,1 UK 0,08 FRA 0,04 0,035 0,03 0,025 0,02 Share of tertiary educated migrants UK FRA GER 0,06 0,015 0,04 0,02 0 0,01 0,005 0 0,025 Share of tertiary educated young migrants under 35 (FRA&UK) under 40 (GER) 0,02 0,015 0,01 UK FRA GER 0,005 0

0.5 patint patint 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 1.5 Different sectoral distributions of the migrant labour force in the three countries UK share of migrants on total employment (by sector) in 1994 and 2005 and number of patents per worker (on the y axis) 32 32 24 33 30 33 30 24 29 29 28 35 20 26 21 25 23 34 31 36 27 15 17 27 25 31 26 34 3528 36 21 20 23 17 15.02.04.06.08.1 shareim 0.05.1.15.2 shareim

0.5 patint 1 patint 0 1 2 3 4 5 1.5 2 FRANCE share of migrants on total employment (by sector) in 1994 and 2005 and number of patents per worker (on the y axis) 30 30 32 24 33 29 32 33 31 35 36 15 21 20 25 34 26 27 28 17 21 35 24 31 29 25 34 26 28 36 27 15 20 17.02.04.06.08.1.12 shareim 0.02.04.06.08 shareim

0 0.002.004.006.005 patint patint.01.015 GERMANY share of migrants on total employment (by sector) in 1996 and 2005 and number of patents per worker (on the y axis) 30 33 32 30 24 33 29 32 24 31 25 34 29 35 26 31 20 36 15 28 17 21 27 20 36 26 35 28 15 25 34 17 21 27.08.1.12.14.16.18 shareim.05.1.15 shareim

AGE and SKILLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM VARIABLES logpat logcit logpat logcit logpat logcit L.logRD 0.051 0.292** 0.121*** 0.357*** 0.075* 0.237*** (0.056) (0.122) (0.043) (0.086) (0.039) (0.081) L.loga 0.400*** 0.102 0.717*** 0.793*** 0.690*** 0.722*** (0.117) (0.127) (0.066) (0.087) (0.059) (0.074) L.lopen 0.067-0.379** 0.072*** 0.140*** 0.087*** 0.163*** (0.081) (0.187) (0.027) (0.048) (0.028) (0.051) L.logn 0.091-0.150 0.027-0.465 (0.086) (0.203) (0.148) (0.353) L.logedu 0.213** 0.421*** (0.091) (0.140) L.lognoedu -0.049-0.472* (0.110) (0.282) L.logage -0.945-2.657** -1.339* -4.877*** -1.114-3.327*** (0.672) (1.082) (0.774) (1.493) (0.829) (1.269) L.logage_edu 0.212-0.159 (0.220) (0.527) Constant 3.563 11.089** 1.902 13.435* 0.104 6.812 (3.128) (4.544) (3.832) (8.000) (3.725) (5.964) Observations 485 485 485 485 485 485 Number of id2 47 47 47 47 47 47 R-squared 0.467 0.748 AR(1) -3.236-2.406-3.482-2.472 AR(1) p-value 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.013 AR(2) 0.756 0.410 0.598 0.495 AR(2) p-value 0.449 0.682 0.550 0.620 Hansen test 0.254 3.058 2.469 6.543 Hansen test p-value 0.881 0.217 0.650 0.162

AGE, SKILLS and ETHNICITY (1) (2) GMM GMM VARIABLES logpat logcit L.logRD 0.079* 0.173*** (0.045) (0.058) L.loga 0.690*** 0.694*** (0.058) (0.083) L.lopen 0.090*** 0.168*** (0.028) (0.054) L.logedu_nat 0.208*** 0.457** (0.081) (0.199) L.lognoedu_nat -0.171-0.407 (0.130) (0.263) L.logedu_imm 0.033 0.084* (0.021) (0.043) L.lognoedu_imm -0.004-0.032 (0.019) (0.047) L.logage_nat -1.505* -3.698*** (0.787) (1.272) L.logage_edu_nat 0.144 0.162 (0.253) (0.612) L.logage_immi -0.167 0.303 (0.119) (0.379) L.logage_edu_immi -0.078-0.399*** (0.090) (0.152) Constant 3.786 7.606 (3.954) (6.185) Observations 459 459 Number of id 47 47 AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.005 AR(2) p-value 0.527 0.463 Hansen test p-value 0.610 0.163

Results (aggregate) 1. Positive role of education and skills for innovation in European countries 2. Positive (milder) role for education also among migrants 3. Ageing employment is a problem for innovation (negative effect of age on innovation performances among natives) 4. Age dividend for high skilled natives. Young dividend for high skilled migrants

Different country patterns UK GERMANY FRANCE GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS VARIABLES logpat logcit logpat logcit logpat logcit L.loga 0.902*** 0.800*** 1.129*** 0.951*** 0.934*** 0.970*** (0.055) (0.139) (0.080) (0.249) (0.035) (0.065) L.logedu_nat 0.130 0.564** -0.005 0.568 0.260** 0.616*** (0.131) (0.286) (0.173) (0.542) (0.111) (0.221) L.lognoedu_nat 0.084 0.295-0.493** -0.980* -0.343** -0.580** (0.176) (0.345) (0.250) (0.515) (0.156) (0.256) L.logedu_imm 0.075** 0.184*** -0.033-0.079 0.063** 0.128* (0.029) (0.056) (0.042) (0.089) (0.030) (0.075) L.lognoedu_imm -0.055-0.358*** 0.315** 0.381 0.045*** 0.045 (0.037) (0.115) (0.124) (0.262) (0.015) (0.032) L.logage_nat -1.195-2.656-2.350*** -3.370-0.503 1.957 (1.060) (1.953) (0.784) (3.022) (0.907) (1.886) L.logage_edu_nat 0.546 0.880-0.135 1.708-1.260-4.633*** (0.514) (1.215) (0.834) (1.910) (0.852) (1.654) L.logage_immi 0.079-0.017-0.044 1.220-0.298 0.090 (0.363) (0.598) (0.422) (1.361) (0.194) (0.457) L.logage_edu_immi -0.081-0.307* 0.102-0.651-0.056-0.373 (0.150) (0.170) (0.210) (0.453) (0.117) (0.301) Constant -1.641-2.014 6.575-4.018 6.745*** 6.276 (3.867) (9.972) (6.394) (12.616) (2.357) (4.841) Observations 175 175 144 144 151 151 Number of id2 16 16 16 16 16 16 AR(1) p-value 0.014 0.016 0.063 0.163 0.029 0.074 AR(2) p-value 0.288 0.078 0.515 0.313 0.626 0.511 Hansen test p-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

Summing up Important role of skilled labour force. Ageing employment is a problem for innovation Different country patterns. In UK higher flow of educated immigrant with a positive effects on innovation Positive impact for Germany of low educated immigrants Mixed results in France Age premium for educated natives in UK (but the contrary in France) Younger educated immigrants contribute positively to innovation (less so in Germany)

Prospect Why exactly these different country patterns occur? Use better (external) instruments and countries of origin Expanding the database on other EU countries (Italy)

-200000-100000 nosk_nat_d9 0 100000 200000-150000 -100000-150000 -100000 nosk_nat_d11-50000 -50000 0 0 50000 UK NATIVE AND MIGRANT LOW EDUCATED WORKERS FRANCE 37 23 34 32 33 3530 21 2528 26 36 28 15 25 34 27 31 24 31 2730 3224 33 29 20 35 36 26 21 29 15-20000 -10000 0 10000 nosk_imm_d11 GERMANY 17-5000 0 5000 10000 nosk_imm_d11 Y axes=difference between noneducated natives in 1994 and 2005 X axes=difference between noneducated migrants in 1994 and 2005 27 29 17 24 26 31 36 2533 32 21-60000 -40000-20000 0 20000 nosk_imm_d9 20 34 30 28 35 15 In UK and France low-educated migrants are often substituting low educated natives. In Germany this is never the case

-20000 0 sk_nat_d9 20000 40000 60000 80000-5000 -10000 0 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 sk_nat_d11 10000 20000 30000 40000 UK NATIVE AND MIGRANT HIGHLY EDUCATED WORKERS FRANCE 24 15 34 24 25 31 25 27 36 26 28 33 35 32 21 23 30 34 29 15 21 28 26 29 35 36 33 31 20 17 27 32 17-5000 0 5000 10000 sk_imm_d11-1000 0 1000 2000 3000 sk_imm_d11 30 GERMANY Y axes=difference between highlyeducated natives in 1994 and 2005 X axes=difference between highlyeducated migrants in 1994 and 2005 31 30 35 15 20 21 2636 32 17 25 28 24 27 33 29-5000 0 5000 10000 15000 sk_imm_d9 34 In Germany highly-educated migrants are often substituting highly educated natives. In Uk and France this is never the case

logsk_~m logsk_~t lognos~m lognos~t logsk_imm 1 logsk_nat 0.2671 1 lognosk_imm 0.3289 0.3363 1 lognosk_nat 0.2172 0.6359 0.8128 1

Looking at the previous graphs we notice that: In Germany the share of migrants is high only in low tech sectors, with a little number of patents per worker. IN France this is the case only for the 1994 distribution In UK there is not a clear relationship between technology intensity and migrants share. UK and Germany are two opposite sytems, France is in the middle

Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences and Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden the capacity to absorb technological progress may be higher with a younger age structure and more recent education in the workforce. Empirical evidence based on pooled cross-country data over the period 1960-1990 indicates that workers aged 40-49 have a large positive effect on productivity (as measured by the Solow residual). A study based on Japanese industries, however, indicates that the positive effect of educated workers older than 40 on technological progress turned from positive in the 1980s to negative in the 1990s. Why? Higher rate of technological change and capital-biased (or skill biased ) technological change during the 1990s may have shifted the productivity peak towards younger ages, opening for the speculation that it may shift again as this slows down with the maturation of ICT technologies

age-related productivity declines for individuals is likely to be age-specific reductions in cognitive abilities IN austria and sweden: The age-productivity curve shows a hump-shaped pattern with a peak for mid-life workers in ages 30-49. technology differences between industries also modify what we can expect from changing age and education structure in the workforce.

According to cattaneo et al Germany was the firs tot implement plocicies aimed at increasing skilled immigrants France was the last (after 2005), UK didi it before 2005 Inf rance and uk nosk im substituted nosk natives. In germany instead they had the same dynamics