From Universalism to Managerial Coordination Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force

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1 From Universalism to Managerial Coordination Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force Konstantinos Travlos Assistant Professor of International Relations Ozyegin University, Istanbul Turkey

2 Goal: To furnish an updated version of Peter Wallensteen s Universalism-Particularism Concept and variable Wallensteen (1984) Focus on one dimension of Status-Quo Distribution of the Use of Force Who can fight? Over what issues can force be used? How much force? How cheap is it to use force? How to regulate the use of force in International Relations? Universalism Fosters Major Power Peace Particularism Fosters Major Power War

3 Problem Wallesteen s variable had four issues that limit its facility for the study of conflict dynamics 1) Restricted Temporal Domain ) Binary Measurement Instrument 3) Expert Knowledge makes replication hard 4) Why do major powers engage in policies of universalism? How do those policies foster peace?

4 Motivation: Paucity of alternative instruments for capturing regulation of distribution of the use of force Extant Instruments not an answer Monadic-Dyadic Measure Structural Attributes not Systemic Configurational Variables (Zinnes 1980) Not focused on distribution of use of force Extant System-Level Instruments of the Status Quo Instrument Braumoeller 2008, 2012 Boix 2011 Wallensteen 1984 Dimensions of Status Quo Distribution of Material Capabilities; Distribution of Political Regimes Distribution of Political Regimes Distribution of the Use of Force Temporal Range 1816-present 1800-present Variable Type Various Ordinal-Discrete Categorical-Discrete

5 Solution: Concept of Managerial Coordination (Details Travlos 2013) Caused by Major Power Elite Aversion to War Entails engagement in Consultation Multilateralism Avoidance of Adversarial Coordination Goal: Decrease of the chance of the use of force among Major Powers by restricting the general use of force in the system Mechanisms Discouragement-Denial

6 Solution: Scale of Major Power Managerial Coordination Intensity Intensity of Coordination Category Name Intensity Value (linear adjustment) Managerial alliance (Multilateralism) Shared Membership in International Pacific Institutions and Regimes (Consultation) Adversarial Alliances (Adversarial Coordination) Example Universalist Regime 2 (4)= Early Vienna Congress Managerial Regulation Bounded Regulation Regulatory Indifference 1(3)= (3)= (2.5)= Later Vienna Congress (2)= League of Nations N/A Particularist Regulation -0.5 (1.5)= (1.5)= Detente Cold War Period Adversarial Particularism -1.5 (0.5)= Main Cold War Period

7 Element of Managerial Coordination Multilateralism Consultation How is it compiled? Variable Temporal Range Sources Major Power Managerial Alliance Gibler 1999, ATOP Membership in Active IGOs None Hansen, Mitchell and Nementh (2008) ;Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) Adversarial Coordination Membership in Peace Congresses Major Power Adversarial Alliances None Various Gibler 1999, ATOP Major Power Linked Strategic Rivalries ATOP and Colaresi et al. (2008)

8 Advantages of MPMCI over Original Universalism- Particularism Variable 1) Longer Temporal Scale , and extendable 2) Greater granularity: Six levels vs. Two 3) Replicability No need for Expert Opinion 4) Theory of how coordination works represented in the instrument

9 Distribution of MPMCI Key events explaining increases in intensity 1763: AUH and FRN terminate alliance id : Creation of Quadruple Alliance 1840: Attempt at managerial alliance during 2nd Eastern Crisis id : London Conference 1878: Berlin Conference 1899: Hague Conferences 1919: League of Nations 1921: Creation of alliance concerning Pacific id : UN 1973: the PRC(China) becomes a UN member

10 Addressing A Puzzle: Universalism and peace beyond the major power circle Wallensteen 1984 Schahczenski 1991 Puzzling findings 1) Universalism worse than Particularism for the use of force in Major-Minor dyads 2) Universalism: worse than Particularism for the use of force in Major-Extrasystem Polity Dyads 3) Universalism no different than Particularism for the use of force in Minor-Minor Dyads Their Explanation: Peace of Lead My argument: Artifact of Binary Variable used

11 Why? Comparing Binary Variable vs. MPMCI MPMCI Category Universalism Years Particularism Years Universalist Regime 9 0 Managerial Regulation 28 8 Bounded Regulation Regulatory Indifference 11 3 NA NA Particularist Regulation Adversarial Particularism Many Years coded as Universalism by the Expert Opinion were institutionally periods of low managerial coordination. The puzzling findings may be the result of this lack of granularity

12 Comparing Results: Wallensteen 1984 Univer. Particul. Univer. Regime Man. Regulat. Regu. Indiffere. Parti. Regulat. Adver. Particular. Major-Major Wars Major-Minor Wars Minor-Minor Wars Length Years Average Major/Major Average Major/Minor Average Minor/Minor

13 Comparing Results: Schahczenski 1991 Universal. Particul. Univers. Regime Manag. Regulation Regul. Indiffer. Particul. Regulation Advers. Particula. Dispute Frequency 594(6.9) 378(5.1) 28(3.1) 225(6.25) 132(9.4) 889(11.2) 257(11.1) Interstate Wars 25(0.29) 38(0.51) 0(0) 18(0.50) 8(0.57) 56(0.70) 31(1.34) Major Power Wars 0(0) 11(0.14) 0(0) 7(0.19) 5(0.35) 33(0.41) 20(0.86) Extra-Systemic Wars 33(0.38) 17(0.22) 6(0.66) 22(0.61) 5(0.35) 48(0.60) 11(0.47) Years period means in parentheses

14 Reaction MPMCI indicates that intense managerial coordination (associated with universalism ) Is associated with decrease in the use of force in Major-Major Dyads Major-Minor Dyads Minor-Minor Dyads But not Major-Extrastate Polity Dyads Previous results were artifact of binary character of variable

15 Final Thoughts The Scale of Major Power Managerial Coordination Intensity is a Replicable Theoretically informed instrument for capturing the intensity of major power regulation of the distribution of the use of force Its use can revise extant findings And can help capture the effect of the system on monadic and dyadic conflict behavior