International History Declassified

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1 Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org May 31, 1957 Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE : Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries Likelihood and Consequences' Citation: Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE : Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries Likelihood and Consequences', May 31, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Record Group 59. Department of State Records, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, Records Relating to Disarmament, , box 57, 2 15d: Armaments Nuclear Fourth Countries, Summary: This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the Fourth Country problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret Credits: This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation. Original Language: English Contents: Scan of Original Document

66 DECLASSIFIED -- I Authority ~..l.-. --' _ , ~ET -23- II. A. Nuclear 'Vieapons Production =.m PROBABLE CHINESE CQ IINUNIST POLICIES '... r 1... ~ _- The above factors indicate that Peiping almost certainly attempt to initiate a weapons phase in the development of its nuclear program during the period of this estimate. The degree of publicity accorded this decision will depend upon the state of international tension in the Far East and upon relative emphasis accorded the "peace" theme in Chinese Oommurd.st, propaganda at the tirl1e the program achieves some results. Although Peiping will be heavily dependent upon Soviet technical assistance, it 1'11.11 attempt to portray the nuclear pr-ogr-am, whether described as a weapons or a power program, as an "indj_genoustl achievement of the Chinese Conununist regime, possibly giving on1;y- perfunctory acknowledgment to Soviet aid.. The USSR almost certainly wishes to retain its monopoly on nuclear weapons within the bloc.. How much assistance it will give Peiping in the actual production of weapons w-ri11 depend in large part upon progress in achieving international control of nuclear weapons production in fourth countries and particularly upon the prospects that Japan may produce nuclear weapons of its om. The Sino-Soviet agreement under which Peiping was supplied 'tdth a research reactor appears to indicate that Communist China, in common with other countries supplying nuclear ores and materials to the USSR, has some bargaining power with Hoscow on nuclear matters. In any event, the USSR will,jprobably grant Peiping the necessary technical assistance for a nuclear power program, from which Peiping may well attempt to take off into a weapons program"

83 DECLASSIFIED Authority~ r--~--- :lj nuclear weapons. Present defense expenditures are resented as an infringement on finances needed for development plans warranted only by the need to retain a lead over Paldstan, and the diversion of resources into a nuclear weapons program would necessitate further curtailment of economic development, and a diversion of nuclear materials from energy to weapons production would be rej ecbed, Most importantly, the possession or production of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with many basic aspects of India IS foreign policy. Despite the depth of Indian feeling against nuclear weapons, there is one circumstance which might bring about a change in India's attitude toward the possession of such weapons, i.e., their possession qy neighboring states. The possession of nuclear wear::ons by Pakistan, or India's belief that Pakistan had received or was going to receive nuclear weapons, would very probably cause India to try to secure similar weapons for itself. The possession of nuclear weapons by Communist China would be a cause of uneasiness to India, and might make India desirous of having nuclear weapons, especially if there were increased Chinese activity on India's borders. A Congress Party government, although possibly vdthout Nehru during the latter part of the period, seel,1s the most likely eventuality for the next ten years. As long as Nehru remains the domi.nan t figure in India, present policies and attitudes are likely to continue~ Should he die or beomce ancepacatated, he would in all probability be succeeded by either a Co,lgress government or by a Congress-Socialist coalition. A Congress-Socialist coaj.ition would probably pursue policies

85 DEC.LASSlFlED.7. ';:'\ Authorjty~ l.- I r r ~T 10 be required to hold together such a bitterly-divided nation. The regime might well turn to sabre-rattling and foreign adventurism, which -ltjould obviously be more impreseive if backed up by nuclear capabilities. ISRAEL There is some evidence to suggest that Israel and France have an agreement to collaborate on nuclear :i...esearch and have for some years actually carried on jollt research in non-military phases. The scope of this agreement is not known, nor are there sufficient grounds for making any refined estimates on the cfrcumstancee, if any" under which France would supply Israel with the equipment, capital, and raw materials required for nuclear i'reapons production. It is not impossible that France might give such assistance to Israel. The chances are somewhat greater that France, once in possession of nuclear weapons, might turn over a small number of these to Israel, but permit their use on'ly with French approval. If the present French hostilit;)r to the Arab bloc and close relationship with Israel continues" the most likely possibility is that France would, with considerable and deliberate ambiguity, threaten to collaborate militarily with Isra.el by retaliating with nuclear weapons against any Arab capital that ordered an attack on Israeli soil. If Israel had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons, it would do so. Israel came into existence by fighting, and has perpetuated itself' by fighting. If it could come into possession of an ~T

International History Declassified

Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org April 23, 1980 Report by the Chairman of the Delegation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, General-