Democratisation in Ghana: assessing the impact of political aid ( ) Dr Gordon Crawford

Transcription

1 Democratisation in Ghana: assessing the impact of political aid ( ) Dr Gordon Crawford POLIS Working Paper No. 8 February 2004

2 Democratisation in Ghana: assessing the impact of political aid ( ) Gordon Crawford School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds Paper for ECPR Marburg conference, September Not for citation. Introduction This paper aims to establish some working hypotheses for a research project on evaluating international support for democratisation in Ghana. The propositions will be used as tools to guide fieldwork, inclusive of a participatory evaluation of international democracy assistance to be undertaken by a group of informed Ghanaian actors. The propositions are arrived at through a three-fold process. First, background analysis of the Ghanaian political context is undertaken, highlighting those areas critical to the democratisation process. Second, a preliminary map of the democracy and governance programmes of Ghana s main bilateral and multilateral donors is carried out. Third, the degree of correspondance between key areas of democratisation and donor support is examined. 1. Democratisation in Ghana: key issues and challenges The peaceful alternation of power that occurred at the presidential and parliamentary elections of December 2000 undoubtedly represented a very significant moment in Ghana s recent political history, ending the 19-year military and latterly civilian rule of Jerry Rawlings, and claimed as mark[ing] a real step toward democratic consolidation (Gyimah-Boadi 2001: 104). Yet it is also uncontroversial to suggest that much remains to be done in difficult circumstances, given the harsh economic and social conditions faced by newly democratic institutions in a low-income country. The remainder of this section examines a number of key issues perceived as crucial to the prospects for sustained 2

3 democratisation in Ghana, with indications given of areas where international assistance could have a positive role to play. Initial background is provided first. After becoming the first country to achieve independence in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1957, Ghana s political history entailed a series of alternations between authoritarian and notional democratic rule, with three periods of elected government and three of military rule between 1957 and Excepting the First Republic under Nkrumah, the interludes of civilian government under the Second ( ) and Third Republics ( ) have been short-lived, unable to endure for longer than 30 months. Ghana s most recent democratic transition has been more successful, however, with the fourth set of presidential and parliamentary elections now on the horizon, scheduled for December The democracy wave that swept sub-saharan Africa in the early 1990s brought irresistible pressure on the then quasi-military government of Fl. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), in power since 31 December The elite-managed democratic transition that followed has been well documented (Jeffries and Thomas 1993; Haynes 1993; Pinkney 1997: chapter 8). A draft multi-party constitution for the Fourth Republic was approved by a large majority (92 per cent) in the national referendum of April 1992, instituting a hybrid model of a US-style executive presidency alongside a unicameral parliament of 200 members, also able to serve as government ministers, elected on a first-past-the-post single member constituency basis. Three sets of presidential and parliamentary elections have been held subsequently (1992, 1996, 2000), with perceived advances each time in the quality of the electoral process. Although Rawlings and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), retained power in the 1992 and 1996 elections, a key criterion of democratic consolidation was met in the December 2000 elections when a peaceful transfer of power between political parties occurred for the first time in Ghanaian history, with the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), led by John A. Kufuor, winning both the presidency and exactly half of the 200 parliamentary seats. 1.1 Electoral Process 3

4 There is general agreement that successive elections, and the processes preceding them, have been characterised by a progressive improvement in terms of free and fair criteria [Ayee 1997, Lyons 1999, Gyimah-Boadi 2001, Ayee (ed.) 2001]. Such improvements did commence from a low starting-point, however, with the debacle of the 1992 elections in which the opposition parties disputed the result of the presidential election in November and boycotted the parliamentary elections held soon after. Subsequently, election results have been generally accepted and the Electoral Commission, established as an independent body under the 1992 Constitution, must take considerable credit for the improvements achieved in the whole electoral process. Nevertheless, problems remain for the Electoral Commission to address, notably the bloated Voters Register and the malapportionment of the parliamentary seats (Smith 2002), with failure to do so potentially threatening the legitimacy of future elections. The Electoral Commission s ability to implement such reforms depend largely on its capacity, principally determined in turn by Government funding, regarded as well below the requirements and subject to unpredictable timing (Map Consult 2002: 6). Bloated Voters Register Voter registration is described as the Achilles heel of election administration in Ghana (Map Consult 2002: 18), with the persistence of a bloated Voters Register acknowledged by many parties. Indeed the chair of the Electoral Commission openly admitted in the run up to the December 2000 elections that the register was not in the best of shape (Salia 2000, cited in Smith 2002: 624), with an estimated 1.5 million ghost voters (Smith 2002: 624). This problem arises due to a combination of factors, most significantly the failure to remove the names of deceased persons, the fraudulent registration of minors, and registration in more than one district (CDD-Ghana 2000a). The Government has expressed the intent that a new Voters Register be completed before the 2004 elections, but this is dependent on the commitment of sufficient funds to an under-resourced body. Malapportionment of parliamentary seats A more structural issue concerns the unequal size of parliamentary constituencies, analysed in detail by Smith (2002). If unresolved, this potentially poses a significant 4

5 threat to future electoral legitimacy, given a built-in partisan dimension that favours the old ruling party, the NDC, and disfavours the current governing NPP. The present boundaries of the 200 constituencies were established in the late 1980s by the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) under the old PNDC regime (Smith 2002: 638). Smith has identified a significant uneven distribution of seats by population and voter registration. While the average constituency has 53, 495 registered voters, there are 20 constituencies with over 90,000 voters, while the smallest 20 constituencies have less than 27,500 registered voters (ibid.: 641). All but one of the twenty largest constituencies are in the Greater Accra and Ashanti Regions, containing the metropolitan areas of Accra and Kumasi (ibid.: 641). The average number of registered voters in Greater Accra s 22 constituencies is 83,904, considerably higher than the national average of 53, 495 voters (ibid.: 640). This raises the issue of significant underrepresentation especially in the regions dominated by large, urban populations. Aside from the issue of equal representation, a partisan dimension to the current constituency demarcation becomes evident. The 100 NPP MPs currently in Parliament represent on average almost 61,000 registered voters, in contrast with the 92 NDC members who serve less than 46,000 voters per constituency (ibid.: 644). Given the relative equivalence in strength between the two main parties, such a large discrepancy in votes received in comparison with seats gained increases the threat of disputed outcomes in future closely-run elections, potentially undermining the legitimacy of the whole electoral process. The malapportionment of parliamentary seats is also unconstitutional, given that the 1992 Constitution states that the number of inhabitants in each constituency be as nearly as possible equal to the population quota (Article 47(3), cited in ibid.: 639). 1 Additionally, following the publication of the 2000 census results, the Electoral Commission is constitutionally mandated to review and alter the constituency boundaries, and has stated 1 The population quota is defined as the number obtained by dividing the inhabitants of Ghana by the number of constituencies (Article 47 (7) of the 1992 Constitution, cited in Smith 2002: 639). 5

6 its intent to do so (ibid.: 639). This remains a large and difficult task and, again, the issue of resources available to the Electoral Commission becomes a crucial one. 1.2 Political Parties An institutionalised political party system is regarded as a key element of democratic consolidation, with, according to Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1999: 28), some support for the conventional wisdom of a two-party system as most conducive to stable democratic governance. What evidence is there of the development of an institutionalised party system in Ghana, two-party or otherwise? Although a multiplicity of parties have contested the three sets of elections of the Fourth Republic (1992, 1996, 2000), two parties have been dominant, the NDC and NPP, suggesting that there is an incipient two-party system. What level of institutionalisation have these parties achieved? Initial evidence is fairly positive. First, in terms of organisational structures, the NDC had ready-made structures inherited from the PNDC, inclusive of its allied mass organisations, such as the Association of Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (ACDR) and the 31 st December Women s Movement, which effectively became wings of the new party. Moreover, despite the ban on political parties under PNDC rule, Pinkney (1997: 182) states that opposition party networks were maintained during this time and thus revived with considerable ease, as is confirmed by the example of the NPP. 2 Second, in terms of the mutual acceptance of the legitimate roles of competing political parties and of the rules of electoral competition, the historic turnover between parties in the December 2000 elections provides evidence of significant progress. 2 The NPP rapidly established a committee structure in 1993 to monitor the activities of all government ministries and to formulate party policy, presenting material to Parliamentary Committees, despite its boycott of the parliamentary elections and its lack of parliamentary representatives (Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1999: 31). 6

7 One major constraint, however, on the institutional capacity of political parties is a weak financial base (Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1999: 30). 3 Financial constraints are intensified by the ban on external donations and on company donations to political parties, and a limit on donations from private Ghanaian citizens of one million cedis per year. 4 Consequently, some commentators (for instance, Oquaye 2001: 10) advocate the public funding of political parties, though this remains controversial, with a national debate on party political funding needed. 1.3 Parliament In its relatively short history since independence, the Ghanaian Parliament has suffered greatly at the hands of military intervention. Oquaye (2000: 12) observes that Parliament s dissolution on the occasion of every military coup (1966, 1972, 1979, 1981) has checked the systematic and sustained development on the institution. Following the return to constitutional rule in 1992, the boycotting of the parliamentary elections by opposition parties led to an ineffective first Parliament, dominated by the ruling NDC with 189 of the 200 seats. The second Parliament had a more vocal opposition, with one-third of the seats, and better quality debate was generated, though generally Parliament remained subjugated to the executive. Perhaps unsurprisingly, judgements on Parliament s performance have noted improvements in carrying out its various functions, while emphasising the following continued weaknesses (CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000a: 4; Oquaye 2001). Executive dominance of the first and second Parliaments has been most evident as regards its legislative function, with the opposition unable to influence the Bills brought before it by the executive (CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000a: 7). A further glaring failure (ibid.) has been Parliament s inability to initiate legislation: by 3 One exception is the NDC during its time in power ( ),when it is widely recognised that the ruling party accessed state resources for its campaign use. 4 This protection of Ghanaian sovereignty from external interference and from the excessive influence of the wealthy has much to commend it, however. 7

8 2000, there had been only one attempt by an MP to bring legislation before the House (Oquaye 2001: 15). The quality of legislation has also been criticised due to insufficient scrutiny of government-initiated bills, with defects going either unnoticed or uncriticised. For instance, the Office Holders Assets Declaration Law excluded spouses of public officers and military personnel from asset declaration (Oquaye 2001: 14), thereby failing to enact effective anti-corruption legislation. Regarding Parliament s oversight function, its role in ensuring greater accountability of government has been limited, with three reasons given. First, there is criticism of that element of the Westminster model whereby some ministers come from Parliament. This is perceived as limiting the critical perspectives of the government party MPs, many of whom have one eye on future ministerial appointments (Oquaye 2001: 15; CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000a: 52). 5 Second, there is a lack of interaction between Parliament and civil society, failing to mutually reinforce their respective watchdog roles. Third, Parliament s Committee system is crucial to the oversight function, yet perceived to require strengthening, with a recommendation that members of opposition parties chair certain important committees (ibid.: 50). As regards Parliament s representative function, Oquaye (2000: 12) perceives a tremendous improvement in MPs representation of their constituents, largely due to the increased competition for parliamentary seats. Such improvement is qualified, however, by reference to some MPs being scared to visit their constituencies because of the incessant demands being made upon them for cash or kind by constituents (ibid.). This raises the issue of neo-patrimonialism, examined in detail by Lindberg (2003). In a casestudy of Ghana s parliamentarians, he demonstrates how parliamentary elections, especially those based on the first-past-the-post principle in single member constituencies, can feed neo-patrimonialism rather than counteract it. The transformation of the political representative constituent relationship to one of patron client stems from the practice of disbursing money, gifts and promises by candidates at 5 This point would appear to stem more from a preference for a US-style Presidential model than from specific shortcomings in the Ghanaian context. 8

9 election time. Personal loyalty (i.e. votes) is sought through such neo-patrimonial mechanisms in exchange for looking after the needs of such clients. Consequently the role of parliamentarians is undermined as elected MPs become embroiled in the timeconsuming tasks of attending to their personal, clientelist networks, rather than attending to matters of public policies, the use of public resources and so forth (Lindberg 2003: 124). Solutions to such deeply engrained traditions are not obvious, especially in situations of rural poverty, and Lindberg offers few. One suggestion is for state funding of campaign expenses for parliamentary candidates, in place of reliance on party funds or raising personal finance. Another is for greater civic education on the role of MPs. More fundamentally, the relative suitability of different electoral systems in situations of patronage politics could be reviewed, notably those based on majoritarian or proportional representation principles. A further issue of representation in Ghana s Parliament concerns the gender balance, with currently only eight per cent of female MPs. Clearly this is woefully inadequate and Oquaye (2000: 13) reminds us that Nkrumah adopted an affirmative action policy in the early years of independence, arguing for a similar legal intervention now to provide an improved gender balance. A final issue is that of parliamentary capacity, generally regarded as weak in both material and human terms. Consequently there is a lack of support staff, research assistants, library facilities, access to independent data, and so on. This is perceived as largely a resource issue, stemming from Parliament s low priority in the governmental budget (Oquaye 2001: 16) and its lack of financial autonomy. Yet to address the above set of institutional weaknesses, a substantial expansion of available financial and human resources is required. 1.4 The Judiciary The judiciary in Ghana has been described as more a thorn in the flesh of actual or aspiring authoritarian rulers than has the legislature (Pinkney 1997: 75), partly because it could not be closed down in the same way as Parliament. Nonetheless, if dissolution 9

10 was not possible, Rawlings PNDC government did attempt to weaken and marginalise its powers through the establishment in 1982 of the parallel judicial system of Public Tribunals. These were an alternative to the regular courts, with jurisdiction over a wide range of criminal matters, outside of the supervision and appellate jurisdiction of the judiciary (CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 4). Indeed, the experience of the judiciary under PNDC rule is described by Oquaye (2000: 22) as tragic, with high levels of intimidation, indicated most graphically by the abduction and murder of three High Court judges by PNDC operatives in the early 1980s (CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 4). The return to constitutional rule in 1992 included the re-establishment of the judiciary as one of the three branches of government under the principle of the separation of powers. Under the 1992 Constitution, the judiciary is given final judicial power over all matters civil and criminal, including matters relating to the Constitution (Article 125 (5), cited in Oquaye 2001: 23). The judiciary is subject only to the Constitution and it is explicitly stated that neither the President nor the Parliament should interfere with judges or judicial officials in the exercise of their functions (Article 127 (2), cited in CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 8). Various other provisions have been included in the Constitution to ensure the independence of the judiciary, for example: financial autonomy through preparation of its own proposed annual budget; job security and protection of judges salaries and pensions (Oquaye 2001: 22-3; CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 8). Therefore, in principle, it would appear that the judiciary has been relatively well insulated from executive interference through constitutional provisions. In practice, the executive has remained a dominant force and the judiciary under the Fourth Republic cannot be said to be independent of executive influence. Tellingly, the findings of a survey showed an overwhelming public perception of government interference (73 per cent) and a majority (57 per cent) who perceived the judiciary as not independent (CDD- Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 7). The main factors limiting judicial 10

11 independence are the appointments system, including that of the Supreme Court, and the lack of financial autonomy. 6 Further findings of the CDD survey indicated the generally low opinion of judicial performance, with only 12 per cent regarding the judiciary as fair and 23 per cent as competent (CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 5). There are doubtless a number of factors that account for the low assessment of judicial competence and capacity, including the corruptibility of judges, but the lack of funding would seem to be a key issue. Similar to Parliament, the lack of material and human resources is evident, described as a lack of the basic tools of the trade, including a lack of a complete set of Ghana Law Reports and law journals (CDD-Ghana / Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 2000b: 36). Poor library facilities and poor access to information, as well as inadequate staffing, inevitably have an adverse impact on judicial performance. Large-scale judicial reform is clearly required in order to renew and strengthen the judicial system, inclusive of a more independent judiciary. This is a multifaceted and difficult task, however, especially given the relative paucity of available resources. 1.5 Human Rights There is a broad consensus that Ghana s previously poor human rights record has improved significantly since the return to constitutional government in 1992 (Map Consult 2002: 23), with this Ghanaian organisation reporting that Ghana currently has a good profile [with] general respect for political rights; for freedom of the press; for religious freedom; for freedom of movement; and for freedom of association (ibid.). In its annual human rights report for 2002, the US Department of State (2003: 1) found a few infringements of rights such as freedom of assembly, but recognised that The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens. The abolition of the Criminal Libel law in July 2001 removed an instrument that had been used in the past to cow the media (Map Consult 2002: 23). Such an improved situation, in contrast with that under military rule, can be accounted for by four factors: 6 The notional financial autonomy of the judiciary, through the submission of its own annual budget, is undermined by huge cuts being effected by the executive. For example, the budget of 56 billion cedis for 1998 was reduced to an allocation of 19 billion cedis, reduced further to 17 billion cedis in

12 The provisions of the 1992 Constitution, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, inclusive of civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. The establishment by the 1992 Constitution of an independent Commission, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), in addition to some checks and balances offered by a somewhat more challenging judiciary and legislature. Increased political will of civilian governments to respect human rights, with the current NPP government responsible for the establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission. The persistent campaigning of civil society organisations on human rights issues, both before and after the return to constitutional rule. Established in 1993, CHRAJ has undoubtedly had a key role in this improvement in the human rights situation in Ghana, but is itself beset by two main problems - its multiple mandate and its chronic lack of resources. CHRAJ s mandate entails three main functions: To promote and protect human rights; To investigate complaints of administrative injustice (Ombudsman role); To investigate incidences of alleged corruption, both public and private, individual and organisational. This multiple mandate is excessive and problematic for one relatively small organisation. Moreover, it is burdened by a very large caseload (9600 cases in 2000) of two-party dispute resolution cases, the majority of which are labour-related, for example dismissals from work, social security, pension issues (CDD-Ghana 2002: 2). 7 This prevents the organisation from focusing on more policy-oriented human rights work. Additionally, CHRAJ is woefully under-resourced (CDD-Ghana 2002: 7) to implement such a demanding mandate, exacerbated by high staff turnover due to poor employment conditions (ibid.: 4). Despite its status as an independent Commission established in the 7 It is contended that these would be more appropriately dealt with by the creation of an Industrial Tribunal (CDD-Ghana 2002: 5). 12

13 Constitution, its annual budget is determined not by Parliament, to whom it is accountable, but by the Ministry of Finance, with adverse financial consequences. Despite Ghana s improved human rights profile, especially with regard to civil and political rights, other serious human rights abuses do persist, particularly in relation to women and children. As in many other countries and cultures, violence against women remains an acute problem, including the sexual abuse of underage girls. Despite the outlawing by the state of certain cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and trokosi, they remain prevalent in certain areas (Map Consult 2002: 24). 8 Similarly child labour remains a problem, notably in the informal sector (ibid.). 9 Finally, the issue of past human rights violations has recently been addressed by the establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission, an election pledge by President Kufuor s NPP government. The Commission has invited the submission of complaints of human rights violations from Independence in March 1957 to the re-introduction of constitutional rule in January 1993, and public hearings of such complaints commenced in January It is notable that the Chair of the NRC stated that they had had not much success in sourcing external funding, and although still in contact with agencies no foreign funding has arrived (19 December 2002). 1.6 Civil-Military Relations Given the successive military coups against elected governments in post-independence Ghana (1966, 1972, 1979, 1981), and that 20 of the 35 years from independence in 1957 to the establishment of the fourth Republic in 1993 were under military rule, the improvement of civil-military relations entails a key test for the sustainability and consolidation of democracy. Despite over a decade of constitutional rule, there remains a perception of the military as politically partisan, given its close association with both the 8 Trokosi entails ritual servitude where young girls are held in virtual slavery in atonement for alleged past digressions of family members (Map Consult 2002: 34). 9 The Ghanaian government has signalled its intent to combat the issue of child labour through its ratification of relevant international treaties, the ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and by introducing its own Children s Act 13

14 military PNDC and elected NDC governments. Additionally, civil-military relations in Ghana have also suffered due to military excesses in relation to the civilian population, with the harsh and at times violent treatment of civilians resulting in the negative characterisation of soldiers as abongo boys. This section examines the measures taken to strengthen civilian control over the military and to improve civil-military relations, while also identifying remaining issues and concerns. What are the mechanisms for achieving civilian, democratic control of the military and how effectively have these been implemented in Ghana? A three-fold distinction can be made between constitutional provisions, controls through governmental institutions, and civil society oversight. Additionally, the military is itself responsible for ensuring civilian control through its own commitment to constitutional rule and military professionalism. The 1992 Constitution formally places the military under political authority, with the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, appointing the Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs. A degree of control through the legislature and judiciary also exist. Parliament s oversight role is implemented mainly through the Select Committee on Defence, given responsibility for generally overseeing the military, including review of its annual budget. It is stated, however, that this function has been performed in a perfunctory manner and that parliamentary scrutiny is yet to be fully realised (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 20), due largely to a paucity of capacity, including a lack of material and human resources (ibid.). The broader watchdog role of civil society is also important. Just as the long period of military rule stunted the growth in civil society in Ghana, equally the opening up of democratic space in the past decade has enabled civil society organisations to flourish, including a sub-section that has taken a special interest in civil-military matters (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 21), with the media particularly important as a watchdog on military affairs. 1988, inclusive of minimum ages for children working. Such good intentions have to be converted into practical actions, however. 14

15 The adequacy and effectiveness of such measures has been questioned, however, especially during the eight-year civilian rule of President Rawlings and the NDC, converted from ruling military Council into a political party. In the view of one commentator, the presence and influence of the military remained strong and visible (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 10). Serving military officers were appointed to government positions, and soldiers continued to engage in partisan politics (ibid.: 9). 10 Additionally, Rawlings continued to rely on the personal loyalty of one section of the military, the specially trained and better equipped 64 th Regiment, as an instrument of control both within the military and of the civilian population. 11 In Agyeman-Duah s (ibid.: 10) view, Rawlings seemed more committed to upholding the supremacy of the military and its abrasive tradition than subjecting the institution to democratic control. After the election of President Kufuor and his NPP government in late 2000, one concern was the response of the armed forces and whether it would respect constitutional rule, given its association with the NDC. Subsequently, various policies have been announced by the NPP government with the stated aim of making the military truly professional and a politically non-partisan institution, including: the banning of the ACDR and all other political organisations from the barracks; soldiers were withdrawn from policing duties, where brutalities against civilians tended to occur most; the 64th Regiment was redeployed on international peacekeeping duties; facilities at barracks have been upgraded and retirement conditions improved (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 28-29). Additionally, the Minister of Defence has aimed at strengthening civil-military relations through encouraging interaction between the military and civil society, with dialogue taking place in public seminars and forums (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 28) The Association of Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (ACDR), converted into a wing of the NDC, remained active within barracks (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 9). 11 The command of the 64th Regiment was linked directly to The Castle, Rawlings seat of government, and it was notorious for its involvement in general disciplinary measures against civilians, including arrests and punishments meted out by its own kangaroo court (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 9-10). 12 For example, a seminar between senior military officers and media representatives was held in May 2001, and a series of public forums for civilians and all ranks of military personnel were held in the six regional capitals with garrisons in June and July 2001 (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 28-29). 15

16 Therefore, again a situation of discernible improvement in civil-military relations is evident, in which civilian control of the military would appear to be somewhat stronger and the threat of a military coup reduced. Yet, issues and concerns remain, ones where international assistance could potentially have a positive impact. First, parliamentary oversight is weak, with an urgent need to develop the capacity of Parliament to perform its oversight functions (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 20). Second, the watchdog role of civil society is relatively new and capacity building of relevant organisations, including the media, is again required. Third, the building of military professionalism could be enhanced by training on human rights, humanitarian law and the values of constitutional and democratic government (ibid.: 33). Fourth, greater understanding of the role of the military in society could be increased through its inclusion in schools educational curricula (ibid.). Finally, civil-military relations generally could be enhanced through greater opportunities for discussion and dialogue between military personnel and civil society representatives. 1.7 Decentralisation Ghana s current programme of decentralisation stems from prior to the democratic transition in the early 1990s. In 1988, the PNDC government introduced a major piece of legislative reform, the Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207). This created 110 designated districts within Ghana s ten regions, with non-partisan District Assembly (DA) elections held initially in 1989/90 (??) and subsequently every four years (1994, 1998, 2002). In addition to the two-thirds of DA members elected on an individual, nonparty basis, one-third were appointed by central government, along with a chief executive for each district (Pinkney 1997: 79). The stated aim of the 1988 Local Government Law was to promote popular participation and ownership of the machinery of government by devolving power, competence and resource/means to the district level (cited in Map Consult 2002: 35). Interestingly, the language of participation and ownership anticipated the donor speak of the 1990s, though it also had some resonance with the revolutionary rhetoric of popular participation of the earlier PNDC period. Oquaye (2001: 36) suggests that this decentralisation exercise was largely introduced to satisfy donor 16

17 demands, but Ayee imputes different, self-serving motives. In his view, the real reason for the PNDC s decentralisation policy was an attempt to increase their legitimacy and simultaneously to rid themselves of political problems (Ayee 1994: 200-2, cited in Pinkney 1997: 80). The 1992 Constitution endorsed and consolidated the 1988 reforms, establishing a threetier structure of sub-national government, comprising Regional Co-ordinating Councils (10), District Assemblies (110) and urban, zonal, town and area councils, plus unit committees (16,000) (Nkrumah 2000:59). The District Assemblies remain the key institution, however. 13 Despite the re-introduction of multi-partyism at national level, the 1992 Constitution retained the non-partisan nature of local elections, as well as the proportion of non-elected members. Thus, District Assemblies are composed of 70 per cent elected members, with candidates standing as individuals and political parties banned, and 30 per cent appointed members by the President, in consultation with traditional authorities (chiefs) and other interests in the district. Additionally, the local MPs from the district are non-voting Assembly members. The appointment of the District Chief Executive (DCE) by the President was also retained, though with the consent needed of two-thirds of DA members. The standing of the District Assembly is clearly stated in the 1992 Constitution as the highest political authority in the district, [with] deliberative, legislative and executive powers [Article 241(3)]. In terms of responsibilities, the DA was given 22 functions that were undertaken in the past by central government, including roads, forestry, agricultural extension, secondary education, health service delivery, fire prevention, town and country planning (Nkrumah 2000: 60). As regards resources, the Constitution established the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), determined annually by Parliament, but with allocations not less than five per cent of the total revenues of Ghana [Article 252(2)]. Additionally, DAs have limited revenue-raising powers, but from low-yielding local taxes such as market tolls (Nkrumah 2000: 61). Concerning 13 Regional Co-ordinating Councils are essentially a co-ordinating body comprised of representatives from the districts within each region; various area councils and unit committees are mostly the implementing agents of the District Assemblies (Nkrumah 2000:59). 17

18 staffing, the officials in the previously deconcentrated central government departments at district level remain as members of the national civil service (USAID nd: 5). These departments and their civil servants have been due to be re-positioned under the authority of the DAs since 1993, but, as yet, the provisions of a Local Government Civil Service Bill have not been enacted / implemented (USAID nd: 9). This is partly due to resistance by career civil servants to work for local government, arising from fears about security of employment and general terms and conditions (Nkrumah 2000: 60). How can decentralisation in Ghana be characterised and how democratic is it? Three forms of decentralisation are commonly differentiated: Deconcentration (of authority) i.e. the re-location of central government officials to sub-national branches of ministries; Fiscal decentralisation i.e. authority over budgets and financial decisions ceded either to deconcentrated officials and/or unelected appointees or to elected politicians; Devolution (of power) i.e. the transfer of resources, tasks, and decision-making to sub-national authorities which are both (relatively) independent of central government and democratically elected; (Manor 1995: 81). Whereas deconcentration can be a means of increased control over local areas by central government, there are some democratic implications in fiscal decentralisation, especially where control is in the hands of elected politicians, and devolution, if fully implemented, represents democratic decentralisation. Aspects of all three types of decentralisation are evident in Ghana, though the degree of devolution is limited. The earlier emphasis on deconcentration remains, especially with the failure (to date) to transfer deconcentrated central government departments to local government control. A degree of fiscal decentralisation has occurred, especially with the creation of the Common Fund, although the adequacy of financial resources transferred to local government is severely questioned, and democratic control is limited by the sizeable proportion of unelected DA members. Some devolution of power is apparent, given the clearly stated principles in the 1992 Constitution. However, the non-partisan elections and the involvement in decision- 18

19 making of non-elected members and the DCE, as presidential appointees, undermine the democratic credentials of the District Assembly. An NPP election pledge was for full (multi-party??) elections for DA members and DCEs, but this appears to be less of a priority now that they are in power (Map Consult 2002: 38). Other related issues concerning the current decentralisation programme include the following. Lack of local government autonomy. Central government influence is exercised through the presidential appointees, in particular through the powerful position of the DCE, also acting as chair of the Executive Committee, the most significant body in terms of decision-making. Nkrumah (2000: 64) states categorically that notwithstanding the excellent legislation on decentralisation and democracy, in practice, central government s dominance is unquestionable. Lack of fiscal independence. Despite the minimum financial base provided by the Common Fund, DAs remain in a weak financial position vis-à-vis their responsibilities. This is heightened by their limited capacity to raise additional revenue through local taxation. Inadequate financial accountability. Resources are not only scarce, but questions have been raised concerning their efficient use, with improved mechanisms of financial accountability required. Poor human capacity, intensified by the reluctance of formerly deconcentrated officials to work for local government. Representation of women and gender issues. Concerns here are two-fold. First, the representation of women in the DA system is very poor. Figures (prior to the 2002 elections) show that women made up only five per cent of elected members, only three out of 110 Presiding Members (equivalent of the Assembly chair), only 12 of 110 District Chief Executives and only three of 110 District Co-ordinating Directors (the top civil servant in each district) (Ofei-Aboagye 2000: 3-4). Numbers of women Assembly members were increased somewhat by the central government directive in 1998 that at least 30 per cent of appointed members should be women. Second, such 19

20 woeful underrepresentation clearly impacts negatively on the responsiveness of local government to women s needs and to gender concerns. Position of chiefs. The separation of local government from the traditional authorities (chiefs) would seem consistent with democratic principles. Nevertheless, given that the influence of traditional leaders remains considerable in some areas of Ghana, a reconsideration of a meaningful role for chiefs in local government has been suggested (Nkrumah 2000: 65). Whether the democratic nature of decentralisation is enhanced or not depends on the relative strengths of those most able to influence the process. Is decentralisation in Ghana primarily motivated by benign democratic intentions or by self-serving aims, such as the cultivation by national politicians of local elites as political allies, the offloading of central government tasks, or keeping donors happy (Manor 1999: 37-9)? Ultimately, the degree of devolution attained is dependent on central government s political will to devolve power, and on the balance of forces at the local and national levels that press for genuinely democratic local government. Has attention been given to the support and encouragement of such forces? 1.8 Civil Society Ghana would appear to have a relatively thriving civil society, especially in terms of associational life at the local level, for example, producer associations (farmers, fisherfolk), trade associations (artisans, hairdressers), and community development groups (home town improvement associations). A small subset of civil society organisations are more closely involved with the democratisation process, tending to share the following characteristics: national orientation, but Accra-based; elite-focused; relatively autonomous from the state but engaged with national policy-making processes; predominantly male membership; externally funded (reference??). Some such organisations are well-established with a history of confrontation with different ruling regimes, for instance the Ghana Bar Association, while others are of more recent origin, benefiting from the opening of political space that accompanied the democratic transition of the early 1990s, for example, Ghana Alert. 20

21 During the PNDC era, independent civil society organisations endured repression, while the regime simultaneously sponsored supposedly non-governmental organisations (such as the 31 st December Women s Movement) in an attempt to capture and keep watch over societal groups. The democratic transition of the early 1990s drastically changed the environment, enabling the more independent and oppositional civil society organisations to operate again. First, the constitutional order transformed the political context, not only providing the safeguards that enable the operation of more politically-oriented organisations, such as the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement, but also specifically recognising the role of NGOs by mandating their representation on the governing boards of several statutory bodies (Gyimah-Boadi & Oquaye 2000: 10-12). For example, the National Union of Journalists is one of a number of civil society organisations represented on the National Media Commission. The same report cites the success of the Network of Domestic Election Observers (NEDEO), itself comprising 23 national organisations, in monitoring the elections of 1996 (and subsequently in 2000) as an example of how well civil society has taken advantage of the democratic opening to assert itself and to play a leading role in the consolidation of that process (ibid.: 23). Second, the regulatory framework for CSOs is not a significant constraint, regarded as a fairly easy process by which both local and foreign NGOs can gain legal status and commence operations (ibid.: 17). 14 Financial constraints are stringent, however, and there is considerable financial dependence, notably on external donors. In such a domestic context, advocacy organisations are able to engage in macro-level policy formulation, and a virtuous circle of democratisation would appear to be outlined whereby CSOs are able to take advantage of the enhanced political space and to contribute in turn to the consolidation of democratic processes. Two wider questions remain, nevertheless. First, such positive analysis appears limited to the examination of a relatively small group of Accra-based, elite-oriented, organisations. Yet, what are the levels of engagement of local, community-based organisations with democratic 14 One problematic issue is the cost of $200, prohibitive for many small, rural organisations (CDD-Ghana 2000c: 17). 21

22 institutions and processes, especially at the district level? Perhaps this is an area that remains to be researched. Second, what are the patterns of donor assistance to CSOs in the democracy sector? Is their support narrow in focus, mostly limited to the same small body of Accra-based, elite NGOs? What are the patterns of inclusion and exclusion along lines of political and economic policy orientation? One previous study claims that donors political aid to civil society in Ghana is in fact concentrated on those organisations that promote private sector development and economic liberalism (Hearn 2000: 2). The Media The media is a particularly important element of civil society as regards democratisation processes. Over the last decade a relatively free and independent media has evolved in Ghana, largely due to specific constitutional guarantees and the overall favourable domestic context for civil society organisations. The 1992 Constitution provides for the freedom and independence of the media, a ban on censorship, and recognition of the media s watchdog role, with the responsibility to uphold the accountability of the Government to the people of Ghana [Article 162(5)]. This led initially to the flourishing of a private print media, and later of private FM radio. While many of the private newspapers were short-lived in the immediate post-1992 period, there is now a fairly consolidated private press. The relatively fair and violence-free nature of elections in December 2000 is partly attributed to the role of local FM stations who were able to alert election monitors and party officials to any potential trouble spots (reference??). Despite this relatively favourable environment, some economic and political constraints do remain, particularly on the private press. Economically, the government retains high duties on newsprint and other inputs (Oquaye 2001: 42). Politically, access to information is limited by the lack of a Freedom of Information Act. The 1992 Constitution also provided for the establishment of a National Media Commission to regulate media affairs and to ensure media freedom (ibid.: 43). Its effectiveness has been constrained by some difficulties, including a lack of human and material resources to fulfil its mandate (ibid: 44), with the comment made by Oquaye that, this should be addressed by those who seek the deepening of democracy in Ghana (ibid.). 22

23 Women s NGOs and democratisation Taking advantage of the political space provided by the 1992 Constitution, one significant development within civil society has been the emergence of a number of Accra-based women s NGOs, focusing in particular on the implementation of the equal rights that are provided for in the Constitution. Some are concerned with the provision of legal services for women, for example FIDA-Ghana, while others campaign on issues of violence against women, for instance the Gender and Human Rights Documentation Centre (Map Consult 2002: 28). The organisation NETRIGHT has contributed to national debates about women and poverty reduction, and also co-ordinated a coalition of women s NGOs (ibid.). Thus, a relatively small number of women s organisations have made some impact on national politics, given the low representation of women at the formal political level, for example in Parliament. They have been assisted in this by significant financial support from development partners (ibid.), i.e. international donor agencies. One criticism, though, is that donors prefer to fund short-term projects rather than provide longer-term core funding (ibid.: 29), unfortunate as the latter enables institutional capacity building. Many challenges remain for women s NGOs, notably how to extend dialogue on issues of gender inequalities deeper into society, and how to improve women s influence on policy-making processes. As Shirin Rai (1996: 242) has noted, democratisation provides an exciting potential for the lives of women. Whether this potential is realised or not depends upon whether and how issues arising from women s experiences in both the public and private spheres are addressed. Clearly this relatively new group of civil society-based women s organisations will require considerable support, especially financial, to build their capacity to contribute to this task. 1.9 The Executive Government bureaucracies in many African countries are routinely portrayed as inefficient and oversized, staffed by de-motivated and corrupt officials. Ghana has been no exception to this in the past, nor has it escaped the attentions of the International 23