I. Introduction Pakistan presents one of the most interesting democratic puzzles in the world. The country is an

Transcription

1 Pakistan s Failure at Democratic Consolidation: Explaining the Cyclical Pattern of Civilian and Military Rule (Prepared for the IPSA World Congress July 16, 2009) I. Introduction Pakistan presents one of the most interesting democratic puzzles in the world. The country is an intriguing case as it has continuously attempted and failed to break the democratic consolidation threshold for over six decades. Interestingly however, Pakistan s experience has neither been one of lack of successful transitions to democracy, nor of relentless authoritarianism. Rather, the country has exhibited a cyclical pattern between civilian and military rule, each lasting approximately a decade but for one exception. 1 The recurring cycle does not fit general theories of democratic transition and consolidation widely applied in comparative politics literature. This paper addresses the failure of democratic consolidation in Pakistan, thus seeking to fill the void in existing arguments regarding the case. To date, Pakistan s failure to consolidate democracy has been largely studied in terms of a civilian-versus-military dichotomy. The overbearing presence of the military or the inability of political parties to challenge the status quo (or various combinations of arguments around these themes) has been used to explain the country s six decade long political journey. However, none of the existing explanations accord a robust causal explanation of the recurrent cycles of democratic and military rule. In this paper, I argue that the overwhelming importance accorded to the civilian-military dichotomy is misplaced. The factors causing Pakistan s failure to consolidate democracy are common to both civilian and military rule for the most part; this calls for a recasting of the framework along a centralization-versus-decentralization axis. Disclaimer: This manuscript is a work in progress. At this point, it is only a skeleton document which provides the background of the research and the key [tentative] findings. I hope to benefit from the feedback I receive at the conference and to incorporate it as the work progresses. 1 The only significantly shorter period was the civilian rule of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ( ) which was brought to an abrupt end through a military coup. 1

2 II. Cases and Methods The research essentially puts forth three inter-connected questions to underscore the role of the centralization-decentralization axis in explaining Pakistan s democratic cycles: (i) why have both civilian and military rulers failed to decentralize political power and grant autonomy in economic planning; (ii) how is it that both civilian and military rulers manage to ensure periodic, bloodless democratic transitions and reversals respectively; and (iii) why has Pakistan not moved either towards consolidated authoritarianism or democracy. The time period of the research spans Pakistan s entire history. The narrative is woven around each of the country s democratic transitions (and reversals). Consequently, the country s political history is divided into six phases: the initial decade after independence, the period from the first military takeover to the ouster of the particular military leader ( ), the return of civilian rule in 1971 to the military coup of 1977, the period under military rule ( ), the third attempt at democracy ( ), and the latest period under a military regime ( ). While the periods leading up to a particular transition receive special attention, in order to test my hypotheses, I examine each ruler s entire tenure. I focus on the political coalitions, moves aimed at centralizing or decentralizing political power, the economic policies adopted and the relative importance accorded to various economic actors, the role of the military in manipulating politics in times of civilian rule, the relationship with India (and other regional threats) during each period, the trajectory of growing resentment among the populous, the specific trigger events or causes of social mobilization against the incumbent, the make up of the mobilizing cohort in each instance, and the nature of pacting that facilitated a progressive (or regressive) transition. I contrast the manner in which events unfolded in each time period. 2

3 In order to conduct this research, an extensive process tracing exercise was (is being) undertaken for each period. Both primary and secondary sources have been utilized. Apart from the macroeconomic trend and performance analysis which is based on published data since 1947 and the generation of an index based on newspaper reports to gauge the level of disgruntlement with political and economic policies of incumbents in the build up to the transitions, the relative importance of the type of sources used depended on the time period under study. There is voluminous literature recounting relevant aspects of the first two and a half decades of Pakistan s existence. The various theories explaining Pakistan s democratic record are all contained in comprehensive works that trace the country s progress, or lack thereof, towards democratic consolidation. For the literature covering this initial period, I rely on these secondary sources. Apart from the academic literature, the memoirs or biographies of leaders have also been utilized to understand the constraints and objectives under which they operated. In addition, I have contacted scholars who have written the most influential pieces on Pakistan s political history covering this period. I am interviewing them to gain further insights. While there is substantial literature on the post-1971 period as well, much of the debate about transitions merely builds on existing premises and fails to provide the kind of rich description found in the initial years. Therefore, to analyze this period, I rely much more heavily on interviews with actors who were directly involved in the process. Four sets of individuals are being targeted for the interview exercise. First, I seek to understand the mindset and moves of all major political parties, both nationally and regionally-oriented, by interviewing their leadership. The aim is to determine the rationale behind political and economic policies of parties that were in power in the past and the means, nature, and objectives of social mobilization by those who 3

4 have been part of anti-incumbent agitations (the two overlap for some outfits). The parties tapped include the PPP, PML(N), JI, JUI (F), ANP, MQM, PML (Q), BNP, and JWP, among others. The second set of actors being interviewed includes members of the military establishment. I am interviewing retired military officers who were in charge of manipulating political coalition building and electoral outcomes during the 1980s and 1990s. These include high ranking officers in Pakistan s intelligence outfit, the Inter-Services Intelligence. Moreover, military officers who worked closely with either the Gen. Zia-ul-Haq government in the 1980s or the Gen. Musharraf government post-1999 have been contacted. An area of special interest will be to understand the mindset of the military decision makers at the time of the institution s withdrawal from power. Third, I interview technocrats among the civil bureaucracy and other individuals managing the government s economic policies over the years. My emphasis is on planners and executors in the Central government. I inquire primarily about reasons for the hesitation in allowing the provinces (or local governments) a relatively unconstrained space to manage their economic affairs. Finally, this cohort as well as business and landed elite are being questioned on the interests and interactions of capitalists vis-à-vis the state to determine just how much influence they have had on official economic policies over the years. II. Existing Theoretical Debates Carved as an independent state out of British India in 1947, Pakistan began its journey as a resource-starved democracy facing a real and present territorial threat from the larger and more powerful India on its Eastern border and irredentist claims by Afghanistan in the West. The military soon became the predominant actor and intervened directly for the first time in Democratic rule returned in 1971 after a catastrophic loss of war to India the war was an extension of the year-long civil war between East and West Pakistan and dismemberment of the country s eastern wing. The second military coup took place in 1977; military rule lasted till 4

5 1988. Pakistan s longest experiment with civilian rule then ensued until 1999 when the third coup left a military ruler in charge for another eight years. Civilian rule returned to the country in Pakistan s case is anomalous in light of most existing explanations of democratic change. Pakistan has managed a highly cohesive, integrated, and disciplined military where internal factionalism is absent. Yet, the military has continuously interfered and influenced politics defying any clear division of labor between itself and the civilians (contrary to Huntington 1957). Even more paradoxical is the fact that the military s predominance has not allowed it to take the country down the path of junta-style authoritarianism. Nor has Pakistan transcended into a permanent bureaucratic-authoritarian state (O Donnell- in Collier 1980). Adding to the puzzle is the fact that Pakistan has not had any case of a failed transition. It has repeatedly managed to create successful elite pacts (O Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski 1991); the democratic progression has only reversed after five to ten years of civilian rule. Explanations that focus on Pakistan provide a number of plausible accounts of the country s democracy deficit. However, they fail to adequately explain the causes behind the recurring cycles of civilian and military rule. Centralization does show up as a major theme but it is construed solely as a power amassing and interest guarding move by the elite (Talbot 1999; Jaffrelot 2002). Ayesha Jalal argues that a fundamental institutional imbalance between the military and non-military enclaves has led to an interest driven military-bureaucratic alliance, in turn resulting in centralization and consequent stifling of political participation along Pakistan s natural ethnic and linguistic fault lines (Jalal 1990; Jalal 1995). Moreover, the dynamics surrounding the alliance s interests have created a political economy of defense which has distorted economic outputs (Jalal 1990). The latter argument is further crystallized by 5

6 Ayesha Siddiqa who argues that the military s stake in the political process manifests itself in the control of economic resources; Army s business networking is seen as its vehicle to power (Siddiqa 2007). The arguments of an overbearing military cum bureaucracy dominated state are also resonated in Hamza Alavi s (1973) thesis of the overdeveloped state which, he argues, leaves the national bourgeoisie powerless and dependent on the state. Haqqani (2005) presents an even more extreme argument whereby the military is seen as intrinsically linked to the ultra-right conservative outfits in a deliberate project aimed at retaining power and stifling genuine democracy at the provincial level. Only a minority of writers have taken a sympathetic view towards the military; Cloughley (2005) for instance pins the blame of lack of democratic consolidation on the incompetence of the politicians which forces a reluctant military into the limelight time and again. Finally, in one of the few attempts that directly seek to address the cyclical pattern, Staniland (2008) explains Pakistan s lack of democratic consolidation through a combination of resentment against centralization by military incumbents and consequent competitive social mobilization that forces the military to withdraw on the one hand and the salience of the natural ethnic and linguistic cleavages that while allowing the mobilization to gather momentum initially do not to lend themselves to the creation of an enduring governance coalition among the civilians. The military s move to pull back in the face of mobilization is explained through the institution s ultimate raison de etre, i.e. obsession with the external threat from India which may be compromised were the military to embroil itself irreversibly in politics. III. Tentative Findings 6

7 Explaining Centralization All the above explanations provide plausible accounts of the democracy deficit in Pakistan. However, the cyclical pattern still remains puzzling. Theses like Jalal s that stress a fundamental institutional imbalance should have led Pakistan towards entrenched bureaucraticauthoritarianism, leaving little room for a non-repressive military and periodic, successful mobilization against military rule. Alavi and Wilkinson are unable to explain the recurring successful bottom-up mobilization that results in the ouster of both military and civilian incumbents. Moreover, if Pakistan s polity is inherently divided along various ethnic and linguistic fault lines, what explains the ability of the civilian elite to forge successful pacts at times of transition and hold on to power for half of Pakistan s six decade long history despite internal divisions? Staniland does make some headway but his explanation of a mass social mobilization each time an incumbent is ousted does not stand up to empirics. Moreover, his propensity to fall back on the Indian threat specifically to explain the military s withdrawal under pressure is problematic; in at least three of the four cases of a military ruler s withdrawal in 1969, 1988, and 2008 there was no obvious reason for the Pakistan military to suddenly refocus attention on India rather than retaining its control of domestic politics. The model I develop builds upon the existing explanations. However, it brings together various independent explanations in a comprehensive, holistic thesis that focuses attention on the centralization-versus-decentralization debate. In its essence, the argument is structural; it highlights the entrenched constraints that force both military and civilian rulers to operate along virtually identical lines in terms of centralizing power. Centralization in turn, underlies the periodic anti-state mobilization and eventually leads to a fresh transition. The state read incumbents have persistently faced three types of constraints to effective decentralization. These relate to political, economic, and national security concerns. 7

8 Politically, the centralizing tendency is not an outcome dictated solely by power amassing desires of rulers. Rather, it is driven by the disparate, vague, and dynamic nature of Pakistan s real political fault lines. Pakistan s current administrative lines (provincial or district) do not approximate the fault lines along which real power wielders are situated at the decentralized level. Moreover, contrary to popular perception, the natural ethnic and linguistic fault lines no longer fit neatly with the political fault lines either. Compounding the problem is the fact that political fault lines are dynamic and in some cases are structured such that granting relative autonomy to the real power brokers would defy all benchmarks of governance efficiency. For example, in the province of Balochistan, 2 the political power structures are demarcated along tribal lines, none of which have enough clout at the provincial level to rally the society behind the state. Decentralization to the tribal level on the other hand would leave the province completely unmanageable. In Sindh, the division is ethnic but again, it does not conform to the present administrative demarcations; moreover the internal power balance has continued to shift, making the state s support to either of the two major ethnic groups problematic. In essence, while devolution of political power to administrative units both provinces and districts is the best hope for efficient governance, power realities dictate that such moves are likely to undermine rather than enhance the Center s legitimacy. Indeed, virtually all attempts by leaders in the past to support provincial elite have backfired due to resentment by those left out and have ended up creating even deeper cleavages. The constraints to decentralization in the economic realm are linked to the above. Centralization is a consequence of the concern with economic efficiency. Since political power has never been decentralized, province and local government institutions especially in the peripheral provinces like Balochistan and the North West Frontier have remained weak. In fact, 2 Pakistan has four provinces, the Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and North West Frontier. 8

9 sub-provincial level institutional capacity is so poor that even those opposed to the current centrally-driven economic policy formulation process argue that institutional development must precede economic decentralization. The fate is sealed when one examines the much-ignored pressure from capital, both landed elite and the business enclave that has constantly favored greater centralization and concentration of economic activity. It is no coincidence then that the Central governments have favored large landowners and business and industrial elite whose activity ensures macroeconomic stability; the state is out to ensure stable economic performance which leads it to accommodate these interests. The capital owners prefer this arrangement precisely because of the technocratic proficiency in policy making at the Central level that is unlikely to be replicated at the decentralized levels barring institutional transformation (admittedly, this argument is less applicable to the major province of Punjab). Finally, the third structural constraint that forces centralization on the part of the state is the inherent paranoia of the military establishment regarding a threat to Pakistan s territorial integrity. The military, despite actions to the contrary, continues to view itself as a reluctant player in politics and is ultimately concerned foremost with defending Pakistan s sovereignty. This has thrust upon the state a national security vision whereby a conservative, skeptical outlook towards Pakistan s bad neighborhood is to be kept at the forefront of any policy. Both military and civilian governments have had to adhere to this outlook. This concern ties in with centralization since the military sees a greater possibility of policy coherence if the security outlook is centralized, especially since the residents of Balochistan and Sindh, do not see eye to eye with Punjab and the North West Frontier on the external threats to Pakistan. Findings 9

10 The central argument is that the cyclical pattern is explained by a persistent failure, both of military and civilian rulers, to decentralize political and economic power to the appropriate decentralized levels of governance, a fact that has caused a periodic popular backlash and led to the ouster of the incumbent. The consistent centralizing tendency across governments is an outcome, not solely of the tendency of leaders to safeguard personal (for civilians) or institutional (for the military) interests, but mainly a result of the structural constraints to decentralization faced by the state read incumbents. This also explains the remarkable similarity in the behavior of civilian and military rulers. In support of the thesis, the preliminary analysis reveals persistence of structural reasons that thwarted actual attempts at political and economic decentralization in each period studied. Moreover, efforts that did seek to empower a particular segment of the provincial or local elite and ended up targeting a cohort that did not hold real power failed to produce dividends in terms of quashing resentment against the state. In fact, this was the norm, courtesy of the disconnect between administrative and real political lines of decentralization. Further, each transition was preceded by a protracted period of growing resentment against the Central government s performance. In at least two cases of military intervention, popular disgruntlement against the civilians was also combined by a civilian move to redefine the military s hold over the national security paradigm. Disaggregating the central argument #1: Centralization of power is the key problem. Political fault lines are not static and are only vaguely defined; in some cases, those that wield real power are structured such that it makes decentralization of power virtually impossible. Moreover, on the economic front, the interests of 10

11 the economic elite have impinged on state policies as incumbents remain overly wary of economic instability. # 2: Centralization, though caused by constraints to effective decentralization, itself backfires as it alienates those with the real power wielding capacity. Moreover, economic policies always end up benefiting the elite and thus cause disgruntlement among the disaffected. The public sentiment begins to turn anti-state (irrespective of whether the military or civilians are in power) and gradually continues increasing the pressure on the state. When military rulers are in office, a full-fledged social mobilization develops across (not along) ethnic and linguistic fault lines. For civilian incumbents, public resentment gathers momentum in an identical manner but fullfledged social mobilization is not necessary, given that the military intervenes as the arbitrator of public interest. #3: The military s propensity to both intervene and withdraw is a consequence of the fact that it continues to hold its professionalism and apolitical ideal dear to itself. Even though military intervention in politics has been proactive and military rulers have enjoyed power, as an institution, the military continues to see itself as a reluctant entrant into politics. It views its interventions as temporary - but necessary - either aimed at thwarting a crisis of civilian governance or any attempt to undermine its dominance over the national security outlook (which it sees as synonymous to the larger national interest). Its image of the self also explains its withdrawal from power in the face of a mobilized polity. Since it fundamentally sees itself as a war fighting machine, it quickly reverts to manipulating the political process behind the scenes to ensure that the national security outlook remains unaltered. 11

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