Interest Groups and the Great Recession: The Strategic Framing of the Crisis

Transcription

1 Interest Groups and the Great Recession: The Strategic Framing of the Crisis presented at ECPR Joint Session Warsaw The paper examines the strategic framing of the crisis 2007ff. by interest groups, focusing on business organizations and trade unions. Crises are societal decision situations, i.e. actors feel (time) pressure to act in order to restore (or change) the functioning of an existing institutional set. Interest groups feel different needs (not only) in times of crisis: they must ensure that their members trust their competencies in solving the crisis; they need to frame the crisis according to their interests and vice versa; they may need to proof their own relevance in a system of industrial relations against claims of their opponents. Investigating press releases (understood as strategic interventions in the public sphere), this paper analyzes how these problems were targeted by German social partners (construction sector, metal sector, and umbrella organizations). In other words, the framing of the crisis by German social partners is explained by underlying organizational logics of membership, of effective implementation and of goal formation. this paper is not for publication. Introduction Investigating the Euro-crisis 2007ff. and its causes as well as examining this crisis' social and political consequences needs to build on a comprehensive understanding of crisis. Reading a randomly chosen newspaper, crises seem to happen almost every day: there is a crisis in Sudan, in Syria, in the Ukraine, there is a crisis of the European social model, of social democracy, of political participation. Even one's favorite football team might be in a crisis at some point of the season. What is meant by attributing these social situations as crises? What do the Euro-crisis and other crises have in common in terms of the structure of the respective social situation? Is crisis just some difficult situation? But for whom, then, is it a difficult situation? And who says a situation is difficult? These questions are even more pressing for what was referred to in the beginning as Euro-crisis : it started as a financial crisis, became an economic recession and from there moved on to develop into a state debt crisis with its center in the Euro-zone. This crisis further triggered social crises in some countries and even political crises as governments and European Union bodies had serious difficulties solving the complex problems on their desks. With the framing of the crisis the attributed causes and consequences changed, too, as well as responsibilities and accountabilities. Taking the concept of crisis for granted, it seems, falls short of understanding the meaning of an actor calling a situation a crisis. The suggestion here is to adopt a 1

2 concept of crisis that takes actor's construction of crisis into consideration. Such a knowledge-sociologically informed investigation can explore the semantics of the crisis, i.e. the observations and framing by the actors, as well as these actors themselves and their relative positioning. The hypothesis of the research project this paper is based on summarizes these assumptions: Actors try to strategically frame crises in order to push for decisions (and, more specifically, crises policies) favoring their interests. This framing, it is assumed, thereby follows two general logics as the crisis framing is aimed to persuade in two arenas according the central organizational interests of social actors (for the following see Schmitter & Streeck 1999, p. 11): On the one hand regarding the logic of membership, organizations have to produce a minimal degree of internal cohesion, a sense of solidarity in spite of existing internal divisions, and legitimate leadership strong enough to impose discipline and individual sacrifice on their members. On the other hand, to cope with the logic of influence organizations have to be able to formulate their goals in terms of commonly accepted values, or, to put it more bluntly, they need to frame their interests as public interest. Thus two principal addressees of strategical framing by social actors can be identified, namely members and external stakeholders (including strategical opponents, the state, or the general public). Following these assumptions, research questions include: Which argumentative strategies do actors implement to frame the crisis? In opposition to whom do they position themselves and with what reasons? Which aims do they pursue, how do they describe and explain the crisis and what solutions are advocated? The paper suggests a framing perspective on crisis (1), reviews literature on the social construction of the crisis (2) and lays out a research agenda for the German case (3). Finally, some preliminary results are presented (4) and analyzed in the context of Schmitter and Streeck's distinction of different organizational logics (5). 1 The concept of framing How crisis is socially constructed and crisis metaphors work can be analyzed with different analytical tools adopted and advanced in media studies, cultural studies (e.g. Lodge and Wegrich 2011) and especially discourse analysis 1. A predestined analytical framework is Goffman's Frame Analysis (Goffman, 1986) which suggests to distinguish a motivational, a diagnostic and a prognostic frame. In simple terms, the motivational frame tells about the characteristics of a 1 For examples of (linguistic) discourse analysis of the crisis see the thematic issue 6 (2) of Aptum. Zeitschrift fur Sprachkritik und Sprachkultur of 2010 which features articles on the media coverage of the crisis in Austria, Germany, the UK and Switzerland (Scharloth et al., 2010; Posch, 2010; Wengeler 2010; Ziem 2010; Koller and Farelly 2010). 2

3 phenomenon (how severe is the crisis?), the diagnostic frame tells about the causes and who is to blame, and the prognostic frame eventually tells what and what not to do about the crisis to solve it. Snow et al. (1986) have further developed this approach for research on social movement and emphasized the importance of frame alignment processes for actors to join be it participation in a group or the group's participation in the public discourse. For German trade unions and business organizations it can be shown based on the organization's press releases how their assessment of the crisis differs at all three levels of analysis according to their position, not only between capital and labour but also between low-skill, low-wage, domestic industries and high-skill, high-wage, exportoriented industries (Kiess, forthcoming). Lischinsky analyzed annual reports of economic actors and by looking at the framing of the crisis can show how these actors shape public perceptions of critical events by routinely emphasizing the role of certain agents and stakeholders while ignoring others (Lischinsky, 2011, p. 153). 2 In the theory of speech act (see Austin, 1975), the focus lies on the technical characteristics of crisis framing. Nagel et al. (2008, p. 307) differentiate in their study on apocalyptic rhetoric the apocalyptic semantics, meaning the images used, the apocalyptic syntax, referring to the dramaturgic construction, and the rhetoric function of the speech act and whether this act is 'illocutionary' (aimed at a specific goal) or perlocutionary (having an impact on alter). In each of the approaches, all of this happens in the public sphere and is also communicated through the media. This is especially true for crises: we can hardly imagine a crisis without it being discussed in the news. A crisis without attention in the public sphere would hardly be understood, commonly, as a crisis. Furthermore, the usage of the word crisis calls on interpretational frames (e.g. Scharloth et al. 2010, p. 99). Crises are in this sense always socially constructed. How, then, can a certain understanding of crisis be constructed? Coleman uses Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatic action to picture how to make a drama out of a crisis (Coleman, 2013). Societal actors act in scenes or within a setting. What is more, [t]he scene must be set [ ]. Turning a situation into a crisis entails a performative construction of meaning which relies not only upon words spoken, but tonal inflections, images, gestures and appeals to memory. (ibid., p. 330) The initial perception or thematization of a crisis is then already changing the interpretative frame: To [ ] say that what to do about a crisis is pragmatically inseparable from setting the crisis scene. The expressive resources and techniques employed in scene building are no different from those 2 In a study on general crisis communication strategies of German non-profit organizations, those responsible for press relations see the image of the organization, its stabilization, threats to central aims of the organization, and, to a lesser extent, the image of the sector represented, as well as the image of the organization's members all as relevant for their crisis communication strategies (Schwarz and Pforr, 2010, p. 360). 3

4 used in scene shifting. (ibid.) Every actor seeking to make a crisis walk and talk draws upon a repertoire of postures, gestures, phrases and gazes that symbolically entextualise a sharable notion of a particular historical situation. (ibid., p. 334) Moffitt most recently argued, to give an example, that it is not only that crisis triggers populism, but that It can also be observed that populism triggers crisis while crises are framed and pictured by populists (Moffitt, 2014). He further proposes a model of populist performance of a crisis which follows six stages: 1. Identify failure. 2. Elevate to the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension. 3. Frame the people vs. those responsible for the crisis. 4. Use media to propagate performance. 5. Present simple solutions and strong leadership. 6. Continue to propagate crisis. (Moffitt, 2014, p. 10) Of course, emphasizing the 'social construction of crisis' does not mean that there is no 'real' crisis. However, to say that a situation is real is not the same as saying that its reality is self-evident. The ways in which a situation is named, described, explained and historically positioned both shape its context and determine the plausibility of one contextual account over another. (Coleman, 2013, p. 330) To give an example, Davies has collected 38 theories on why the crisis happened, including national inequality levels, international inequality, laissez faire regulation, casino banking, rating agencies, inefficient markets, or simply greed (Davies, 2010). With each diagnosis and theory comes a narrative, an idea of who is to blame, and a strategy of how to solve the crisis: So there are no innocent descriptive presentations that should be taken just at face value: the shape of the political imagination is too important for this to be the case. (Thompson, 2009, p. 520) In the remainder of this section, the framing approach is introduced and its (more systematic) implementation for the study of industrial relations is proposed. At the core of the concept of framing lies the rejection of a thorough norm of objectivity. From a constructivist or also a systemtheoretical point of view, objectivity is not possible, since every transmission of information entails selection: selection is itself, however, already an evaluation since it expresses a preferences for something particular and since it ignores everything else in that moment. (Matthes 2007: 22) The framing approach is mostly used in media and communication studies, mainly for media analyses. Another important field of application is social movement research. In the different lines of research, the focus repeatedly is to examine meaning, its construction, its prevalence, and its changes over time. In the most widely used concepts, frames consist of three to four elements. Following Goffman's conceptually fundamental book Frame Analysis (1974), Benford and Snow (2000) identify three basic elements of intentional framing by social movement actors: diagnostic framing (description and cause attribution), prognostic framing (prescriptions for action), and motivational framing (why 4

5 should one care). Most scholars in communication and media studies refer to Entman's definition which proposes four (main) elements: To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (Entman 1993, italics in original, cf. Scheufele 2003, Matthes 2008) Furthermore, it is emphasized that these elements of frames are by no means plain facts, but discursively formed and as such always a matter of conflict about meaning (Raupp 2013: 184; cf. Entman 2003; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Also, framing is distinguished from pure agenda-setting: The primary difference on the psychological level between agenda setting and priming, on the one hand, and framing, on the other hand, is therefore the difference between whether we think about an issue and how we think about it. (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007, 14, cf. Entman 2007) The frames of social actors thus contain offers for identification for members, followers and potential partners, provide idealogical orientation, connect to normative principles of the group, and may relate to shared historic knowledge. They aim not least at emotions and affective (dis)approval, based on shared values, resentments, prejudices, myths, etc.) as well as respective action. (Koch- Baumgarten 2013: 35) The strategic framing of social actors [...] is not so much about the creation of new ideas or the presentation of the greatest truth, but splicing together of old and existing ideas and the strategic punctuating of certain issues, events, or beliefs (Noakes & Johnston 2005: 8). Its success is dependent i.a. on access to and control over resources, the existence of strategic alliances, as well as knowledge and abilities the actors can build on to support their frames (Pan and Kosicki 2001: 44). Only in a second step, after the strategic framing by actors, the (re)framing and (re)structuring by the media happens which is the focus of most media studies. There is a growing literature on crisis related policy reactions in Germany, also for the field of industrial relations (in a rather wide understanding) (Bieling 2013, Bonatti & Fracasso 2013, Bosch 2011, Busch et al. 2013, Clauwaert & Schömann 2013, Glassner & Keune 2012, Lallement 2011, Urban 2012). No emphasis, however, seems to lay on frame articulation by social actors and there are no systematic studies in this respect even though the role of (individual) interest groups in the bargaining on growth programs and new regulations is, of course, discussed (e.g. Heinrich 2014) and is addressed predominantly by discourse analytical studies (see e.g. on financial markets regulations Hegelich 2010; on EU trade policy De Ville & Orbie 2014; on every day discourses Kuhn 2014; from a linguistic perspective Kutter et al. 2013; from a communication studies perspective i.a. Quiring et al. 2013; see also Thompson 2009). Also the communicative power of the unions as a form of trade union soft power (Urban 2012: 222, cf. Urban 2010) was studied in 5

6 other contexts. This paper seeks to add to this literature with a systematic investigation of social actors' framing of the crisis. 2 The social construction of crises As was already suggested in the introduction, the Euro-crisis 2007ff. was indeed changing over time more concrete, its narrative changed. Whereas the framing perspective is mostly ignored, the literature does thematize the social construction of the crisis, the interests behind this construction and, most dominantly, the change of narratives over time. Based on a newspaper analysis, Kutter (2013) reconstructs different stages within the public debate, most importantly the financial market crisis from 2007 to 2009 and after 2009 the emergence of a state debt crisis a change in narratives with consequences. For the German context, Quiring et al. report that the media framed the crisis as being provoked by economic actors that now suffer from it. Furthermore, these economic actors now profit from extensive state intervention whereas the public and the political system have to carry the cost and risks of these interventions. They further add that public opinion mirrors media coverage. (Quiring et al., 2013, p. 77) Another very influential frame or picture of the crisis is the Greek economic crisis. As a trope, the Greek crisis resonates across Europe as synonymous with corruption, poor government, austerity, financial bailouts, civil unrest, and social turmoil and it transcends local and national borders. (Knight, 2013, p. 147) The externalization of the crisis plays an important role for example for the German case (Kiess, forthcoming) but also in the public discourse in Austria the crisis was externalized as a natural event or wartime event (Posch 2010, p. 136). Every policy in complex modern societies needs a narrative, i.e. scenarios and arguments which underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policymaking in situations that persist with many unknowns, a high degree of interdependence, and little, if any, agreement. (Roe, 1994, p. 34) This is also true for crisis policymaking. In early 2009, Thompson goes on, there were two academic and four popular frames in play that were used to make sense of the crisis. The two academic frames were 'epochal change' and 'conjunctural rupture'. Even though he does not go into detail about how they formed, it is clear that both readings imply very different consequences. Epochal change may mean that the dominance of modern financial capitalism and neo-liberalism eventually comes to an end, conjunctural rupture only calls for transitional interventions for a system that basically is still running. The 'popular' frames connect here, for example, with the attempt to re-install a business as usual narrative as quickly as possible. The suggestion made is that the main task is to resecure the stability of the financial system, stimulate the consumer boom once again ( maintain 6

7 aggregate demand ), re-capitalize the banks so that they can reestablish credit circulation and, hopefully, re-stimulate the housing market. (ibid., p. 521). Narratives are also connected to the construction of legitimacy, as a comparative project assessing Germany and Greece is aiming to show based on public discourse analysis 3. It is also argued in the literature that institutional frameworks matter, for example categorizations like the varieties of capitalism approach. Germany, the UK, and the United States are usually considered to be different in these ways, yet the analysis of the observed patterns across the three societies indicates that the same kind of reform arguments are dominant in all of them. (Lodge and Wegrich 2011, p. 726) One general narrative seems to repeat in the context of the crisis since 2007 and is common to most studies: immediately after the outbreak of the crisis the dominant reading concentrated on what was called the financial crisis. Critique focused on the anglo-american model of capitalism that had failed and re-regulation, first and foremost of the financial markets, was identified as the most urgent task. Crisis framing also needs to reduce complexity. Quiring et al.'s study concludes by emphasizing that the relatively narrow number of thematic frames they found is due to the need for status, resources, thematic connection and a sense for a cultural point of connection to establish them. (2013, p. 182) In this first phase of crisis interpretation, what was dominant almost from the beginning were economic readings of the crisis. This might seem as trivial, but a knowledge-sociological account of crisis should try to elaborate on what it means to speak of the crisis as an economic problem. In general, the question is, [w]hat institutions, patterns of knowledge and expertise are included and excluded respectively? (Kessler, 2013, p. 58 own translation) Kessler answers this question in two respects. First, there are three central assumptions in the discourse: the conceptualization of uncertainty as risk; the replacement of epistemological with ontological contingence; and the efficient markets hypothesis. (ibid., p. 65) Secondly, since 2008 the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Financial Stability Board all continuously repeat in their publications that the crisis lies in insufficient regulation of practices of financial actors and not in the practices themselves. (ibid., p. 61) If the practices themselves would have been the problem, the crisis immediately would have become political in the sense that fundamental principles of modern capitalism would have been put into question Based on a linguistic discourse analysis, Koller and Farelly argue that the phenomenon that a crisis caused by the private financial sector could be re-interpreted as a crisis of public spending and state debt and which thus asks for measures to support the neoliberal order can be explained by looking at the 3 See for further information. 7

8 semiotic and structural heritage of neoliberalism: This encompasses the dialectic of pathdependency and path-shaping, in the light of which interpretations of the crisis lead to the construction of system-conform answers. (2010, p. 191) In this process, emotions play a big role, as Kushner and Kushner's take on the UK case shows. Although national debt numbers were relatively moderate until 2010 (lower national debt than the other G7 members Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USA), government reaction moved towards austerity with comparisons to Greece and with the following story: Our national debt is higher than it's ever been. Our deficit and debt interest payments are unmanageable. Our debt crisis was caused by the overspending of the previous government's. We are on the brink of bankruptcy. (Kushner and Kushner, 2013, p. 8) The capability of this story to gain traction with ordinary people, is rooted in fear, anxiety and the almost effortless way in which the personal is woven into the national (ibid., p. 9). Stirring up fears of national financial apocalypse, the clamour of the debt narrative had drowned out dissenting voices and had established a political consensus including 75% of the public and all three relevant parties (labour, conservatives, and liberals) (ibid., p. 13). The crisis being a window of opportunity for actors, the question arises why little has changed as significant demands for more oversight have not led to significantly more oversight (Lodge and Wegrich, 2011 p. 730). Two studies try to explain the relative resilience of institutions, ideological frameworks and policy accounts through the crisis. De Ville and Orbie argue that the trade discourse within the European Union has been subtly adapted to the changing crisis environment: from defensive, over offensive-desirable and offensive-necessary towards necessary-but-notsufficient at the time of writing. This limited policy changes and also legitimized continuity in that policy field (De Ville and Orbie, 2014, p. 149). Blyth argues that the passing of time and the lack of an alternative theoretical paradigm hindered institutional change, not least because the people who were in charge before the crisis were still in charge in and after the crisis and could hardly be expected to turn around and tear it all down so easily, no matter the weight of the evidence. (2013, p. 208ff) Blyth concludes that it is politics, not economics, and it is authority, not facts, that matter for both paradigm maintenance and change. (ibid., p. 10) In respect to economic paradigms, it seems clear that [m]ainstream economics is the main ruler, and thus both pro-growth and nogrowth can be considered alternative discourses trying to change the reproduction of meaning exercised in business as usual. (Urhammer and Røpke, 2013, p. 69) In the beginning of this section it was already highlighted that speaking of crisis differs between the actor's position and his/her intentions. Kiess (forthcoming) showed this for German trade unions 8

9 and business organizations and Lischinsky (2011) for a set of economic actors respectively. Scharloth et al. argue that in the Swiss case it were political parties that proclaimed the crisis rather than the media (2010, p. 107). Also, the left parties Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP) and Greens speak more often and earlier of the crisis than their counterparts Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) and the Liberals (FDP) and also bring in topics adding to the economic crisis like food crisis (SP) and crisis of environment (Greens). By using metaphors, actors develop crisis scenarios that appear threatening and dramatic (Ziem 2010, p. 167). In the UK case it can be shown that the boulevard newspaper Daily Mail was more eager to produce fears than quality newspapers like The Guardian or the Financial Times (Koller and Farrelly 2010, p. 189). In summary, actors, their beliefs, strategical aims, and their power resources matter for every assessment of crisis because it is them who define what a crisis is about. However, these were the crisis interpretations only after the first months of the crisis. Soon, at the end of 2009, most public and political attention shifted to the so called state debt crisis or eurocrisis. Bieling even argues that the re-focusing of the debate was organized by inter alia financial market actors, the European Commission, as well as the creditor and surplus member states, first and foremost Germany (Bieling, 2013, p. 320 translation by JK; cf. Lehndorff, 2012). A similar accusation is made by Colin Hay: after initial irritation, the preferred economic policies of the British government are clearly austerity and deficit reduction following the now established reading of the crisis as a crisis of debt instead of a crisis of growth debate that Hay himself wants to establish as a response (Hay, 2013). This very different course of the crisis discourse, especially compared to the Keynesian 1970s, was only possible, as Pontusson and Raess argue, because of the political influence of sectorally based coalitions of firms and unionized workers demanding protection or compensation in the 1970s and the absence or weakness of such coalitions in And this crucial contrast can be seen, in part, as a result of deindustrialization, globalization, and the decline of organized labor since the early 1980s. (Pontusson and Raess, 2012, p. 15) In other words, the interests of actors and their ability to build coalitions seems to shape crisis reactions, not the objective severeness of a crisis (cf. also Heinrich & Kutter 2014). 3 Strategical framing in the German case: a research agenda To investigate the industrial relations in Germany in light of the crisis, three principal actors are relevant, namely business associations, trade unions, and the state. There are three main data sources for their strategic framing efforts which all offer different perspectives and complement one another. Even more so, in light of different logics (logic of membership, logic of influence) which 9

10 imply different addressees, each source alone gives only a partial picture. Data triangulation in general, of course, reduces respective biases. Thus, the research project includes: press releases of the actors in the sample (aimed at general public, opponents and potential allies but also (potential) members and supporters), newsletters for members (aimed specifically at members, supporters), and interviews (providing insights on the general strategies, contextual information). However, not all of this can be presented within the scope of one paper. In the following, I concentrate on trade unions and business associations and their press releases and analyze them in light of Schmitter and Streeck's conceptual framework of membership and influence logic. Schmitter and Streeck developed the idea of differing logics of membership and influence for Business Interest Associations in particular, however, the two logics and its often contradicting pressures do challenge all sorts of social actors, including trade unions and soccer clubs (Wilkesmann et al. 2002). Press releases can be regarded as strategic interventions in the public sphere which transport prescriptions that define the crisis and propose solutions according to the interests of the speaker. However, published press releases and their effects also affect, of course, the membership logic, as members and supporters are part of the public. The data set used here consists of a collection of press releases disseminated by German social actors from 2008 to On the trade unions' side, the IG Metall, by membership the most powerful industrial trade union in the world, the IG BAU, representing the construction and agrarian sectors, and the DGB, the umbrella organization of the German trade unions, are included. The employers associations Gesamtmetall, representing the metal industry, Hauptverband der deutschen Bauindustrie (HDB) for the construction industry and the BDA, the umbrella organization of German employers associations, represent the capital side. The sector organizations were selected because both sectors were explicitly targeted by the German economic growth packages to tackle the crisis. Moreover, they represent two very different cases, since the German metal industry is a high-wage, high-skill, and export-oriented sector (cars, machinery, etc.), whereas the construction sector is mostly low-skill, low-wage, and domestic. These differences can be expected to have effects on the framing of crisis. On the basis of the data set used here, it is not possible to measure the success of such strategies, i.e. whether the hegemony of certain interests in public discourse has an impact on government policies in reacting to the crisis. The constellation involving organizations, the public, the media, and politics is far too complex to permit such an analysis (Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). However, it is possible to show how the crisis was framed and, indeed, socially constructed by actors, while they tried to pursue their own agendas following the logic of membership as well as the logic of 10

11 influence, concerning, for example, wage increases, state interventions, tight budget control, and so on. For this purpose, press releases which are issued specifically to communicate an organization s positions on particular topics can be considered the most qualified data. In a first step, all press releases and reports containing the word crisis were selected for the actual sample. Only very few were excluded, for example, if they referred only indirectly to the crisis (e.g. honoring the merits of an outgoing spokesperson during the crisis). Not surprisingly, the absolute (and relative) number of press releases referring to crisis grew in 2008 and peaked in 2009 and then decreased over the course of the rest of the period investigated (see table 1) 4. Interestingly, the number of occurrences of the term crisis in the Gesamtmetall press releases did not peak until 2010, and in the BDA press releases, the number of mentions, after peaking in 2009, again increased in 2012 and In the first half of 2009, Germany experienced the biggest decrease in GDP since World War II. The government reacted with a first growth package in late 2008, with a second one in early 2009, and with a package of comprising mostly tax reductions in late 2009, before in June 2010 an austerity package was launched to stabilize the budget IG BAU IG Metall DGB Gesamtmetall HDB * BDA Table 1: number of press releases containing crisis per year (own data). * Press releases from July to December were not available. In a second step, all documents containing the word crisis were analyzed following the three main introduced above: The motivational framing relates to the scope and intensity of the crisis. The question thus is how the respective actor evaluates the severity of the situation and how this evaluation may change over time. In the diagnostic framing of crisis, actors identify who or what is responsible for the crisis. This also includes the framing of the crisis as a financial market crisis, as a 4 The absolute numbers are difficult to compare since every organization seems to have its own pattern of press release publication. The DGB, for example, releases over 200 each year, whereas most other organizations stay below 100. Also the coverage of topics varies considerably: IG BAU and HDB are mostly concerned with their national and sectoral topics, whereas BDA and DGB as umbrella organizations of course go beyond that. 11

12 general economic crisis, or as a state debt crisis. Finally, in the prognostic framing of crisis, the consequences of the crisis, and the consequences of strategies to cope with the crisis are covered. These passages of a text include, of course, the actors own suggestions, probably in a positive framing, and strategies proposed by others, for example by political opponents, usually framed negatively. Coding also noted whether the press release contained a reference to the European level, for example, the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), etc. as this might indicates a shifting of corporatist paradigm from the nation state to the supranational European level. 4 Preliminary results: crisis framing in German social partner's press releases In this section, the framing of crisis by the six organizations under investigation is summarized based on their press releases and according to the three dimensions of framing coded, namely the motivational, diagnostic, and prognostic dimensions. Rather than providing an extensive discussion of the material, this section gives a comparative overview of how the framing differs between the actors and when and how the respective crisis framings changed. The analysis will further allow for some speculations on the reasons for these changes based on the logics of membership (hypothesis 1) and influence (hypothesis 2). At this stage of the research the line of argument is still relying on mostly circumstantial evidence (see section 6 for a short critique and the further research agenda). However, the framing of the crisis broken down to three dimensions already shows the importance of both the logic of influence and the logic of membership for the framing of the crisis by social actors. In the most basic dimension of motivational framing, the speaking actor describes the crisis in its scale and severity. Emphasizing or negating the severity of a situation increases or decreases pressure to address the problem. It is striking that the German construction sector trade union IG BAU stated in a press release in January 2007 (IG BAU PR ) that the structural crisis of the German construction sector was over. The Hauptverband der deutschen Bauindustrie (HDB, the construction sector employers organization) emphasized, just like the IG BAU, that a long crisis was just coming to an end in 2007: We definitely have to overcome talk of the construction industry as a crisis sector and our low-tech image. (HDB , own translation) In 2008, the IG BAU warned of a recession triggered by the financial crisis which might bear risks for the German economy (IG BAU ). But compared to the previous decade, during which employment in the sector declined 12

13 continuously and returns were extremely low, the situation did not look too bad. In their first crisisrelated press release in 2009, the IG BAU stated that there was no crisis in the construction sector (IG BAU PR ). In course of the year, they acknowledged that this recession was the worst in the last 80 years (IG BAU ), but according to the union, none of the industries the IG BAU represents was hit: construction, painting, and agriculture all were either not effected or wellprovided for by the stimulus packages issued by the government in late 2008 and mid This framing remained firmly in place for the remainder of the period, and it included the accusation leveled against employers that they were exaggerating the crisis unjustifiably to put pressure on wage negotiations. The union was even demanding a 7.2% wage increase for painters and varnishers (IG BAU ) and 6.5% for landscapers and gardeners (IG BAU ) to make up for the very low wage increases in previous decades. Throughout 2008, the employers perceived the financial crisis as a risk for the economy and for investment in construction, and by the end of the year a severe recession was predicted. Very quickly, however, the growth packages were apparently boosting the sector (HDB ). In early 2010 and, more clearly, in summer 2010, the crisis was declared to be more or less over, with some uncertainties persisting in industrial construction (HDB ). In 2011, the IG BAU referred directly to the state debt crisis for the first time and only now was the crisis linked to the European level in the IG BAU s descriptions. Prior to this, the situation was described as a crisis of the German economy and related to a world economic crisis almost as severe as that in 1929 but was not effecting the construction sector too much. However, the crisis and austerity reactions in the southern European member states of the euro zone were later explicitly understood to be a threat to workers in Germany: lowering standards in other countries endangered German standards as well (IG BAU ). This can be understood as a message to the members not to buy in to the blame game of other actors. In 2012 the HDB, while trying to attract young professionals, announced that the German construction sector was crisis-proof (HDB ). Europe was barely mentioned and even the state debt crisis was not a subject of discussion for the HDB. The IG Metall, like the IG BAU, was unwilling to refer to a crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008: The financial crisis was not hurting the economy and exaggerating the risks for the real economy was seen as an employers strategy to keep workers and unions demanding higher wages after the successful years 2007 and 2008 at bay (e.g. IG Metall 16 October 2008 and 01 November 2008). Instead of emphasizing the severity of the crisis which, according to macro-economic data, actually 13

14 did hit the export-oriented industries represented by the IG Metall considerably, in 2009 the union stressed the insecure positions of young workers and temporary workers. In October 2010, from the perspective of the IG Metall, the crisis was already over (e.g. IG Metall 18 October 2010 and 01 November 2010). The European level was first mentioned in IG Metall s 2010 Labor Day address, and while the high level of unemployment rates in Southern Europe was emphasized, at the same time, the crisis was externalized. Like the IG BAU, the IG Metall tried to avoid overestimating the extent of the crisis so that wage increases would not be endangered. This downplaying of the crisis by all three actors can be interpreted as targeting both, the logic of membership in assuring the members of being safe and the logic of influence in framing the domestic sphere (and thus the institutional setting) off the pressures for change of crisis metaphors. The motivational framing of Gesamtmetall, which represents the German metal industry, can be summarized as cautiously pessimistic throughout this period. The organization pointed to the risks of the financial crisis as early as 2007 but did so in a more pronounced form in August 2008; the crisis seems to have caught the attention of Gesamtmetall earlier than that of most other actors. In the beginning of 2009, Gesamtmetall differentiated between a structural crisis and a sales crisis: The contemporary crisis was of the latter kind. While orders were increasing again in the second half of 2009 and although growth was restored in 2010 and 2011, Gesamtmetall continued to try to lower expectations by pointing to and emphasizing the sharp drop in sales in early Most pessimistic press releases were in connection with wage conflicts, so accusations made by the trade union were not unjustified. In early 2012, finally, production reached again the pre-crisis level, but now the euro zone state debt crisis was depressing growth (Gesamtmetall 06 December 2012). Gesamtmetall was clearly using the crisis to pressure for influence and to emphasize its own importance. The DGB, as the trade unions umbrella organization, first requested that the European Central Bank (ECB) lower the interest rate because of the financial crisis and the low US interest rates in 2007 and thus began addressing the crisis as early as Gesamtmetall. As early as January 2008, the DGB expected the financial crisis to have profound negative impacts on the German economy (DGB ), but their emphasis was nonetheless on other societal challenges, e.g. investing in infrastructure, education, etc. (DGB ). In addressing the ECB with its demands and focusing on societal issues that go beyond economic core issues, the DGB places itself above the sectoral trade unions with its macroeconomic and social agenda. It was not until the final months of the year, when growth packages were being discussed at crisis meetings conducted by the German federal government with the participation of DGB representatives, that the tone finally changed. 14

15 The crisis was now obviously endangering Germany s real economy. The loss of at least half a million jobs was expected in early Earlier than the IG BAU, the DGB was talking about the worst crisis in 80 years (DGB ) and cautioned against the social and political consequences of the economic crisis if people lost their trust in politics (DGB ). The DGB likewise labeled the crisis a system crisis (DGB ) and included and this is an important difference to the sector unions the European level in its analysis as early as 2009; the crisis was so severe, the DGB asserted, that it transcended national borders (DGB ). An important recurrent motif in the significatory framing is the direct reference to the crisis of 1929 or indirect references with phrases like in 80 years and since World War II (for example, in DGB , but also in other actors statements). This can be interpreted as frame amplification (Snow et al., 1986); referring to the presumably widely shared knowledge about an earlier, very serious crisis amplifies the description of the severity of the contemporary crisis. In 2010, the DGB increasingly stressed that the crisis was not over yet: We are not in year one after the crisis; this is year three of the crisis (DGB ). One year later, however, the crisis in Germany was over according to the DGB, but it had become a European crisis that threatened the whole euro zone (DGB , -82). Interestingly, during 2011 and in the period that followed, the DGB continued pointing to the difficult situation of young people on the job market and that these have to bear the consequences of the crisis, especially in Germany. This can be interpreted as a strategy to attract young people, but read in the context of German labor market policy debates, it is also a strategy to strengthen the union s own causes and thus their influence on labour market policy. Again, this might be a case of frame amplification; since youth is seen as the future and because they are not to blame for the crisis, they should not have to bear the consequences. In the last quarter of 2012 and in 2013, almost all DGB crisis-related press releases discuss the European crisis, the social dislocations within Europe, and the rising European unemployment rates. In 2011 the tide had changed and in 2012 this became evident. In the DGB s framing, the crisis is no longer an opportunity for change but rather a vehicle for neoliberal policies, first and foremost the austerity measures all over Europe. It seems that the DGB is no longer able to use the crisis to gain influence but rather that the crisis (or its political consequences) limit its influence. The risks for the German economy associated with the financial crisis were recognized by the BDA, the German umbrella business organization, by the end of September Half a year later, the crisis had hit the German economy hard (BDA & BDI 13 March 2009), but contrary to the DGB s warnings that young people might suffer from a lack of apprenticeships, the crisis did not have severe impacts in this respect (BDA ). The BDA was not negating the crisis but upheld its 15

16 narrative of a structural shortage of skilled workers (BDA ), which they linked to one of their most important political projects in recent years: raising the retirement age. In the first quarter of 2010, the worst was over and the economy was growing again, yet the BDA continued to emphasize risks to the economy. From late 2011 until mid-2013, effectively all crisis-related press releases by the BDA addressed the crisis as a question of state debt and by doing so externalized the crisis as not directly a German problem while also shifting attention towards the state level. In the diagnostic dimension of crisis framing, the causes of the crisis are named, and specific actors are frequently blamed for not having done enough to prevent the crisis or for actually having caused it by their actions. In the very beginning, the IG BAU stated that the crisis originated in the financial markets. In its 2009 Labor Day address, the union went beyond this position to assert that the root of the crisis was not the toxic papers and the US housing crash in other words, irresponsible behavior by individual financial actors but instead 25 years of market radicalism and the shift towards shareholder-value-based capitalism (IG BAU ). The diagnostic frame consists in many respects of a clear critique of capitalism and pure profit maximization (for example, IG BAU ). In 2012 the critique became more concrete, while the focus shifted to the European state debt crisis. The IG BAU emphasized that it was not Greek workers and unions that were responsible for the crash but the financial markets, the greed of bankers and the rich (IG BAU ) as well as the austerity measures that were themselves fueling the crisis (IG BAU ). This framing obviously did not target the union s own strategic goals, be it wage increases or a socially oriented rather than profit-oriented economic system. This clear critique might even hurt the interests of the IG BAU in the influence dimension (on the influence dimension it is not so much about general critique but about pragmatic solutions) but was targeting the members and potential supporters. The diagnostic framing of the building sector employers (HDB) concentrates clearly on the impact of the growth packages. Because of the state interventions, the press releases repeatedly emphasize, the situation was not dramatic. The causes of the crisis themselves are hardly addressed. With its motivational framing of the crisis, the construction sector was clearly fighting for recognition and was thus interested in talking about its own importance, rather than about others. On the one hand, both construction sector organizations of course know about their dependence on the domestic market and for big investments in that sphere, on the government. On the other hand, differences prevailed regarding the general organization of capitalism and also concerning European solidarity, which is not an issue for the employers. This points at similarities regarding the logic of influence and differences regarding the logic of influence. 16

17 The IG Metall s diagnostic framing follows patterns similar to the IG BAU s diagnosis. After initially identifying the causes of the crisis in the financial system, critique focused more and more on the emphasis on profit maximization (IG Metall 26 February 2009, 17 March 2009) and shareholder value (IG Metall 04 September 2009). Speculation was not only the cause of the initial crisis but was also triggering the state debt crisis; banks that had been rescued by states two years earlier were now earning double-digit profit rates by lending money to Greece (IG Metall 01 May 2010). With regard to the fast recovery, the IG Metall pointed to the wage restraint exercised especially in the metal and machinery industries (IG Metall 01 May 2011) but also the positive effect that the wage increases in 2009 had had by stabilizing domestic demand (IG Metall 10 October 2011). This can be interpreted as answering both logics: the members are addressed by explaining the success of the wage policy of the trade union, and influence is legitimized by pointing at the reliability of the trade union in difficult times. In 2012 the IG Metall also emphasized that workers in Europe had not caused the crisis and that it was unfair to make them pay instead of the crisis perpetrators in the financial centers and those with great wealth (IG Metall 14 November 2012). This reveals a fundamental difference between capital and labor organizations: Gesamtmetall, especially in the beginning, was especially careful about assigning blame for the crisis. Until 2010 the only diagnosis they offered was that their own activities to maintain high employment levels were the right approach and the union s criticism of working and economic conditions was causing unnecessary trouble. In early 2011, however, they emphasized the close cooperation between both parties and lauded the reasonable wage increases. By late 2011, finally, Gesamtmetall s diagnostic message had become much more explicit: We don t have a euro crisis, we have a debt crisis (Gesamtmetall 30 December 2011). The crisis, at this stage, was completely externalized: it was not Germany and its strong economy that had caused the crisis, but rather the misguided fiscal policy of the crisis countries (see for example Gesamtmetall 21 September 2012). However, Gesamtmetall and its public relations and think tank organization INSM (Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft) pinpoint Germany s generous spending as the biggest risk for growth and economic prosperity their emphasis on the debt crisis therefore does not come as a surprise. It appears that the conflict between capital and labor is articulated more intensely in the high skill sector, which may result from the fact that the metal industry social partners have more influence on German politics due to the importance of the sector. The BDA s first explicitly diagnostic statement released in summer 2009 argues that higher 17