Simulation Background

Transcription

1

2

3 1 Simulation Background Wikistrat is the world s first Massively Multiplayer Online Consultancy (MMOC). It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a patent pending crowdsourcing methodology to provide insights unavailable anywhere else. This online network offers a uniquely powerful and unprecedented strategic consulting service: the internet s only central intelligence exchange for strategic analysis and forecasting, delivered, for the first time, on a real-time, interactive platform. Our network of hundreds of experts follows our scenario-driven, crowdsourced policy planning methodology to generate unique intelligence products. In December 2012, Wikistrat ran a three-week simulation where over 85 analysts collaboratively explored possible scenarios for the future of Iraq. The main aim was to explore the drivers and constraints that will determine Iraq s role in the Persian Gulf, OPEC and the Arab world by scenarioizing Iraq s possible geostrategic paths over the next decade. Wikistrat s primary concern was not to generate a narrative for Iraq from now to 2023; instead, Wikistrat asked the community to imagine what kind of Iraq may be possible 20 years post-saddam, taking into account the following assumed structural elements: 1. The likely rise in Iraq s oil production, which may double its current oil production of 3 million barrels per day (according to the International Energy Agency forecast; Iraq s government has even more optimistic goals) 2. Internal political and ethno-religious trends 3. The evolving regional situation (Iran s reach for the bomb, the post-arab Spring Middle East, Turkey s Neo-Ottoman policy, increasing Shi a-sunni polarization) 4. The role of main international actors such as the U.S., EU, China and Russia Plotted on the X axis is Iraq s role in the international arena, and its ability to develop a dynamic and independent foreign policy. Can Iraq stand as an active and independent actor in the regional geopolitical arena? What are the perceptions and political approaches of other regional/international actors? Plotted on the Y axis is the solidity of Iraq as a unified state structure. By 2023, has Iraq survived as a unified state? Or does the international community have to cope with its fragmentation? What roles do ethno-religious sectarianism and oil revenues play?

4 2 Master Narratives MN I: One Thousand and One Nights Baghdad MN I-A: Pan-Arab Iraq MN I-B: Shi a Crescent MNII: Bold Sectarianism MN III: End Game MN IV: Quiet Force

5 3 Master Narrative I One Thousand and One Nights Baghdad Sailing through the Perfect Storm + Active Regional Player Eventually, competing sectarian dynamics and foreign interests work out for the best for Iraq. The country achieves internal stability, after having danced on the verge of the abyss for years. A mix of steady increases in oil production, economic growth and foreign direct investments allows Iraq to appear as an increasingly stable and prosperous state that is deeply interconnected with the international community. This narrative is bisected by an ethnic-sectarian discriminant: In MN I-A (Pan-Arab Iraq), an emboldened Arab-Iraqi political elite adopts a strong pan-arab agenda, having papered over their domestic sectarian rifts in favor of a new form of Arabcentered political narrative. In MN I-B (Shi a Crescent), the Shi a Arab majority consolidates its control over the country, pursuing an active pro-shi a foreign policy in some connection with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Example Scenarios: Money and power spill over from the sand, thanks to international technical and economic support (MN I-A / MN I-B): Oil production, economic growth and foreign direct investment allow for the reduction of ethnic and sectarian tensions and the improvement of the population s living conditions. Time is the best healer for all sectarian scars (MN I-A / MN I-B): The rise of a new generation of political leaders and rapid economic growth, led principally by the oil sector, ameliorate all sectarian and ethnic tensions. Iraq as a Pan-Arab Champion challenges Iran (MN I-A): The identity divide does not cross intrareligious boundary (Shi a-sunni polarization); instead, it follows the historically-rooted Arab nationalist feeling. Najaf strikes back (MN I B): The core element of this scenario is the failure of the clergy s rule in Iran, which favors Najaf due to its role as center of the Shi a religion.

6 4 Master Narrative II Bold Sectarianism Iraqi Fragmentation + Active Regional Player Divisions amongst Iraq s ethno-religious communities produce either a strong, sectarian central government or sub-national entities that adopt an aggressive sectarian policy in connection to the growing polarization between Sunni and Shi a political identities both within the Middle East and Islam as a whole. Oil revenues are not used to stabilize the country, but rather to foster domestic differences and crush the opposition, in connection with regional geopolitical and economic jockeying. International actors support the various factions, favoring a progressive weakening of institutional ties among Iraq s provinces and communities. Example Scenarios: The irresistible attractiveness of power makes Shi a clerics discharge religious quietism: Iraq s Shi a clergy gradually shifts into a more direct active political role. Staying friends after divorce: Reinventing Iraqi ethno-religious relationships: After too many years of violence, Iraq splits into three new states, based on the idea of the three old administrative vilayets established under the Ottoman Empire. Crushing the Rebels : A stronger Iraqi government orders its security forces to crush Kurdish militia units (peshmerga) and occupy a great part of Iraqi Kurdistan. General Lee was right after all; America takes side against Unionists: When Arab-Shi a extremists end up controlling Iraq, the United States decides to weaken Baghdad by supporting Kurds and Sunni Arab centrifugal policies.

7 5 Master Narrative III End Game Iraqi Fragmentation + Passive Regional Player After years of drifting, the Iraqi government finally collapses amid mutual recriminations over the failure of its state architecture and economic ruin. This fragmented, weak territory is an acquiescent pawn for external actors, who use it as a battleground for their proxy wars. The lack of security deeply affects oil production, drying up Iraq s hopes of economic recovery. International investors flee from Iraqi markets. Example Scenarios: The Balkanization of Iraq: The worst-case scenario for Iraq. After years of ethno-religious and sectarian violence, a general civil war breaks out and Iraq finally collapses. The truth behind the curtain: Institutional kleptocracy, tribal/political fiefdoms and sectarian logic prevail: The corruption in the Iraqi government reaches such endemic levels that Iraq is no longer considered a democracy, but rather a kleptocracy. No security, no oil, no friends: The security situation worsens, as Iraq plunges into low-level civil wars among its ethno-religious communities and becomes a battleground for regional proxy wars. Civil wars in the Levant end when a new Sunni Mashriq state forms: The polarization of the Sunni- Shi a dichotomy in the Middle East results in the alteration of the post-1918 Middle East map, and leads to the creation of a new, wider Sunni-dominated state encompassing large portions of Syrian, Jordan and Iraq.

8 6 Master Narrative IV Quiet Force Sailing through the Perfect Storm + Passive Regional Player Iraq manages to find a domestic political and institutional balance, either through a sustainable agreement among its ethno-religious communities or thanks to international actors policies. Sectarian violence is largely a thing of the past, but it does not mean that the population gets fair political representation. Economic growth is what allows for a sustainable long-term stability. The Sunni-Shi a divide enhances its historical role of contended gateway (from the Byzantine-Sassanian wars and the Ottoman-Safavid confrontations to current geopolitics) between Arab, Iranian and Turkish sectors of the Middle East. Example Scenarios: The Finlandization of Iraq: Iran finally achieves its nuclear ambition, completely rewriting the Middle East s balance of power and exerting a strong influence over Baghdad. The Watchtower along the Shatt-al-Arab: A stable and stronger Iraq provides Washington with its best opportunity to counter Iran s geopolitical power. Chinese Harmonious Wind blows over the Two-Rivers land: Iraq chooses China as its ethno-political equalizer, while the role of other international actors becomes less important. Iran puts its hands on Shi a-dominated Iraq: The Shi a Arab majority in Iraq gains control over the country and its oil resources. This is accomplished mainly thanks to significant Iranian support; as a result, Iraq becomes a key Iranian ally.

9 7 Strategic Takeaways Security Level By 2023, the United States role is generally perceived to be declining both on the military and political level. This progressively weaker grip over Iraq may spur Washington to withdraw its military assistance to Baghdad. Uncertainty prevails over the idea that the fragmentation of Iraq might serve U.S. interests, and that this solution might be more favorable than an Arab-Shi a dominated Iraq, subjugated by Iran. There are very few doubts than Iran plays a very negative role not only for Western interests, but also for Iraq itself. There is hardly any room for accommodation between their competitive interests. Sunni-Arab countries play a role that is similarly perceived as sectarian and negative, although they might favor a new form of pan-arabism in Iraq. The main factors which endanger the stabilization of the security situation continue to be internal and external sectarianism, with internal sectarian divides being exacerbated and exploited for political gain and external sectarian divides being felt through the meddling of neighboring countries. One of the most worrying aspects of the future Iraq is the sectarian contamination of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). As it absorbs Shi a Arab militias, a dangerous double loyalty may emerge inside the ISF, and ISF may come to represent more an instrument of sectarian violence than an antidote to it. Political Level Although the point is debatable, time is generally perceived as being on Iraq s side, for a number of reasons: ÖÖTime can be a natural healer for sectarian wounds ÖÖIt allows for the rise of a new generation of political leaders, less focused on sectarianism and more on institution-building ÖÖIt provides the government the opportunity to accumulate wealth needed for stabilizing the country Politically-generated violence is expected to play a role in shaping ethno-religious relations in the mediumto-long term. However, the next generation of political leaders is significantly less sectarian than the current one. Iraqi stabilization might be sped up by a major change in the makeup of the country s political leadership.

10 8 Territorial integrity is a key factor for a future stable and prosperous Iraq. But it can appear as a strategic setback for external actors in case of a polarized government of Iraq, heavily dominated by a specific faction. A sustainable agreement between Arab-Shi a and Arab-Sunni communities might increase tensions with KRG, and the Kurds might become the convenient scapegoats, especially if a crisis arises over Kirkuk and other contested areas. Iraqi Shi a hawzas have a diverging future path: Either they can become an increasingly attractive alternative to the corrupt and politically involved Iranian clergy, or they can be attracted by the wilayat alfaqih doctrine, getting closer to the positions of Iranian Shi a clergy. China is a key actor whose presence in Iraq provokes less political and sectarian turbulence than other actors might. Being perceived as less involved in Iraq s ethno-religious feuds than regional actors (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) or international ones (such as the U.S. and Russia), China also represents a potentially politically stabilizing force. Economic Level Although generally perceived as a stabilizing factor, oil production growth is not a decisive positive factor per se. An agreement over an oil-revenue sharing mechanism is the ground element for any suitable longterm development. Similarly, the expected rise in energy-related revenues does not automatically imply a similar rise in the living conditions of the population. Mismanagement, corruption and sectarian redistribution are not problems that can be solved merely by experiencing economic growth institution-building and reconciliation policies are also generally necessary. The economy is rational, but politics are not: Although oil revenue growth represents a rational stabilizing factor at political level, sectarian mistrust and fanaticism can cause the country plenty of problems. The prevalent idea is that Iraq s oil sector will remain opened to international investments, although there are some factions in the country that might seek a nationalization of Iraqi resources. China is more likely to become Iraq s leading economic investor, especially in the oil sector: Beijing is seen as less politically involved in the region than other international actors; it is not linked to any of Iraq s ethno-sectarian communities and is the most pragmatic (if not cynical) in its moves. Improved Iraq-Iran economic relations are especially useful for Tehran since they provide IRGC-related companies a perfect environment for eluding international sanctions and financing shadow activities.

11

12