RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE

Transcription

1 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE A POST 9/11 PERSPECTIVE ANN-SOPHIE HEMMINGSEN STÉPHANIE JEANNERET ANDREASEN

2 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS CONTENTS Introduction 3 Radicalization what do we know? 4 An Insider Perspective 7 Home Grown Warriors - Radicalization in the Netherlands 9 De-radicalization in the Netherlands 11 Which remaining puzzles and how do we study them? 15 Conclusions 18 Policy Recommendations 19 Appendix participants 21 About DIIS and TTSRL 22

3 INTRODUCTION Ever since the events of 11 September 2001, the threat of terrorism has increasingly been on the agenda not only in USA but also in Europe.The same has been the case with violent radicalization. Attacks on European soil, such as Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, have brought attention to a disturbing tendency; namely that some of the individuals carrying out terrorist attacks have spend the majority, and sometimes all, of their lives in Europe and have thus presumably been moulded in a European, democratic context. Their processes of radicalization must be assumed primarily to have taken place in Europe. But what is radicalization? Why do some apparently well-integrated European youth become attracted to Islamist militancy? Why and when do people cross from violent talk to violent action? What makes others, who share the same beliefs and the same social and cultural backgrounds, refrain from violence? And where do we go from here? On 20 August 2007, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) hosted a one-day seminar on violent radicalization and gathered scholars and experts from Europe as well as USA to share insights into radicalization, the research of the phenomenon, and attempts at preventing or countering radicalization. The seminar was closed to the public to allow the researchers to engage in free and open discussion. With these proceedings, the knowledge, findings and recommendations are disseminated to a wider audience. The views expressed in the proceedings are those of the respective speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of DIIS.The proceedings are true to the speakers and the terms referred to are used by them. Different terms may therefore be used by the speakers to explain certain concepts.

4 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS RADICALIZATION WHAT DO WE KNOW? Magnus Ranstorp from The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defence Academy gave an overview of different studies on radicalization phases, factors and processes. The briefing also gave an insight in some of the problems concerning counterterrorism measures. The discussions gave some ideas and recommendations for further studies on the subjects. EXPERT BRIEFING Radicalization phases and factors It is difficult to extract any general trends from known cases since every case so far has been unique. It would appear that there are multiple processes of radicalization. Conducted studies, however, point to certain reoccurring phases in the radicalization of individuals. Marc Sageman has identified four reoccurring phases: 1. Moral outrage 2. Interpretation a specific interpretation of the World 3. Resonance with personal experience the notion of the West against Islam 4. Mobilization through networks Different factors play different roles in each case of radicalization.the decisive factor in one case may be only a contributing factor in another. The known factors can be divided into internal and external: Internal factors A sense of identity crisis A perception of marginalization, stigmatization, criminalization and exclusion An encounter with a charismatic radical leader Glorification of martyrdom Sociological and socioeconomic factors External factors The perceived double standards of Western foreign policy Muslim communities suffering in regional conflicts Western military intervention in Muslim countries Mass media and Cyberspace 4

5 Cyberspace appears to be an important external factor in many radicalization processes.the Internet is a virtual sanctuary where different radicalizing actors can operate. Thomas Hegghammer has identified four types of radicalizing actors: 1. The old Al Qaeda leaders or ideologues such as Osama Bin laden and Ayman al-zawahiri 2. Religious scholars 3. Strategic thinkers 4. Active militant organizations Each of the above mentioned actors express their radical views in different ways: in speeches, fatwa, or anonymous discussions on the Internet. But the Internet is not only an ideological platform. It is also a functional tool where new recruits can be trained. A collective brainstorming is taking place online, shaping, changing and reconstructing the ideology and the methods of the radical militants. Counterterrorism (CT) measures CT measures are not always effective and may, in some cases, even be counterproductive. One example is that when the Swedish branch of Hizb ut-tahrir was banned, it gained more popularity than ever before. It can be problematic that moderate mainstream Muslim communities and mosques exclude radical individuals or groups because mainstream Muslim communities, and thus society, might lose track of them. This might isolate them from the world in which they live and further radicalize them. Another problem might be the discrepancy between arrests and convictions in relation to suspicions of terrorism and the possible radicalizing effect of this. A key point is that if CT measures are to be successful, they have to be implemented on a global scale with international cooperation. DISCUSSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES Studies on radicalization should be cross disciplinary. Future studies could look into: Explaining explicitly where the lines are in terms of CT legislation. What is legal and what is illegal in practical examples; Analysing the way in which Muslim communities perceive radicalization countermeasures and CT; 5 Looking into how to gain access to militant and non-militant radical Muslim communities;

6 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Creating exit-strategies out of militant as well as non-militant radical groups. In this it might be relevant to look into the experience of rehabilitation strategies from North African countries and Saudi Arabia; Examining court-records from terrorism cases in Europe to shed light on known cases of radicalization; Group dynamics and leadership in the militant and non-militant radical groups; Comparing Islamist militancy today with left-wing militancy in the 1960 s and 70 s; Examining how we create trust between authorities and communities in order to create effective measures. FURTHER READINGS Sageman, Marc; Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists, United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs June 27, Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, NYPD, 2007, Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf Hegghammer,Thomas; Global Jihadism after the Iraq War, Published in The Middle East Journal, vol. 60 no. 1 (2006), pp , PET Conference April 2007, 6

7 AN INSIDER PERSPECTIVE Kamran Bokhari from Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) in Washington gave a briefing on his personal past experiences and observations as a former member of Hizb ut-tahrir. The briefing focused on the nature of Islamist movements, the difference and rivalries among them and the recruitment of young people to radical groups with focus on al-muhajiroun, an off-shoot of Hizb ut-tahrir. The discussions gave an insight into potential future problems concerning radical groups that should be looked into. EXPERT BRIEFING Islamist Movements The definition of an Islamist is: A Muslim political actor (individual/group) who seeks to establish an Islamic state a state which implements the shariah. What an Islamic state is and how it is to be achieved is the root of intra-islamist contention. Significant ideological rivalries exist within and between Islamisms and the disagreement over how to achieve the political aim is essential. Moderates, Radicals & Militants: Integrationists: The majority of Islamist groups are integrationists.they accept the structural functionalism of the nation-state(s) in which they operate. In other words, they embrace both the state and society seeking to establish an Islamic state through participation in the democratic process. Interactionists: A second type of Islamist group is the interactionists. Those who reject the state but interact with society. These radical (but non-violent) Islamists reject both the concept of the nation-state and democracy. Instead they work among the masses trying to shape public opinion against the status quo and seeking support from select elements within the state, hoping to pave the way for a revolution, which will replace the current polity with a new forming the nucleus of a transnational caliphate. Isolationists: The third main type of Islamist groups is the isolationists.these militant Islamists reject both the state and society, operating at a clandestine level. Instead they call for jihad (armed insurrection) as the appropriate modus operandi to establish their envisioned Islamic state. 7 Why do People Join? The members of a radical group such as Hizb ut-tahrir (HUT), which has experienced a revival in the West even though it does not enjoy strong support in the Arab countries, are mostly found among the Western diaspora. The members often join for political or religious reasons combined with a search for empowerment.the youngsters can, in some cases, also find a sense of identity that their

8 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS parents have not been able to provide them with and a possibility to achieve social upward mobility. The radical groups, however, are often characterized by a revolving door phenomenon. Very few of the individuals who join the groups stay there in the long run. This was the case for Kamran Bokhari himself, who was introduced to HUT by a fellow student and friend at the age of 18 as a college student in the early 1990 s. The HUT community was perceived as a cool community because the students could be modern and good Muslims at the same time. The motivation for attending HUT-meetings was the possibility to meet friends and sometimes also a shared sense of indignation about the situation of Muslim communities around the world. Kamran Bokhari never became a full member. He was excluded from the meetings when he began asking critical questions of the HUT interpretation of the history of the Muslim people and thus he went through the revolving doors. DISCUSSIONS PROBLEMS TO BE LOOKED AT IN THE FUTURE: The discursive struggle between moderate, radical and militant Islamists over how to achieve political and religious aims and goals; Define mainstream Islam and not focus on radicals versus moderates; The need to develop a Western Islam and give legitimacy and support to moderate Muslim leaders and communities which are trying to give young Muslims a sense of a Muslim Western identity without alienating them from the surrounding society or from their parents; Encouraging and supporting local moderate communities but at the same time maintaining a safe distance to not de-legitimize them; The problem of access to militant and non-militant radical individuals and communities. 8

9 HOME GROWN WARRIORS RADICALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS Atef Hamdy from the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands gave a briefing on the characteristics of Islamist extremism and patterns of radicalization in the Netherlands based on his own fieldwork and research on Islamist extremists and democratic Muslims. EXPERT BRIEFING The Dutch context Three historical events have had an important impact on the Dutch perception of radicalism. The first one was the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the globalization of terrorism. The second was the murder of the populist right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002.This event changed the way the Dutch society perceived the radical threat. The third was the assassination of the film-maker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 which created the notion of an enemy inside and a fifth column approach to migrants, and particularly Muslims, in Dutch society. The political scene in the Netherlands reacted by either ignoring the problem or by linking the assassinations to other issues such as the role of religion in public space, the threat to the freedom of expression and to failed integration. Extremisms Extremism has come in many different forms: Left wing, Right wing, Religious and Single issue extremism among others. They differ greatly but do share some characteristics. Common characteristics of extremisms and extremists: They thrive on fear, threats and perceived marginalization; The dominant order of the state is often associated with evil, injustice, deprivation, de-humanization and marginalization; Most radicalisms and extremisms offer an alternative future in the form of a Utopia ; A small core has the economic means, charisma, organizational capacity and also the ability to translate and express dissatisfaction; Extremists legitimize un-democratic instruments and violence in their struggle against the state or society, by holding it responsible for their marginalization. Islamist extremisms: 9 Religion is viewed as marginalized in political and social life; Government and public figures are held responsible for this marginalization;

10 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Religious and political elites are viewed as collaborating with the system, which makes them betrayers ; It is argued that fundamentals, values and norms of religion should be strictly followed and reinstalled in political and social life; Own religion is perceived as superior; A sense of urgency is perceived, it is now or never ; Utopia is formulated using metaphors such as Ummah, Jihad, Khilafah, holy war, peace, prosperity and justice; Own uniqueness is emphasized and the others are demonized; The World is viewed in absolutes. Just versus unjust, good versus evil, the followers of God versus the followers of Satan; Legitimization of own struggle and the use of any means necessary, including violence. The research project, of which Atef Hamdy has been part, has identified three different paths of radicalization: 1. The first one is a political-ideological path; its core issues are injustice and socio-economic deprivation; 2. The second path is religious; it focuses on religious identity and spirituality; 3. The third path is social-cultural; it is concerned with binding and preserving the Muslim cultural uniqueness. The project revealed that there are crucial differences between Islamist radicals in the Middle East and Islamist radicals in a Dutch/European context. DISCUSSION POLICY-RECOMMENDATIONS Find inspiration in the confetti-approach/the New Dutch model, which supports many different micro-projects; Muslim clerics should be strengthened in their ability to: Form moderate Islamic religious elites in the West and fill the apparent theological void by fighting religious illiteracy among Muslims and providing spiritual guidance and teaching Make an ideological besiegement of extremists. Muslim clerics will be able to play this role because they use a familiar language, they have the theological resources and the religious authority; Look into the role of non-militant groups such as Hizb ut-tahrir are they bulwarks or conveyor-belts to militant groups? FURTHER READINGS 10 Buijs, Frank and Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy: Home Grown Warriors: Radical and democratic Muslims in the Netherlands, Amsterdam University Press, 2006

11 DE-RADICALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS Marco Zannoni from the Dutch Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (COT) gave a briefing on the Dutch response to Radicalization. The discussions gave some policy recommendations to preventing radicalization and to de-radicalization in a European context. The problem is not that there is a supply of radical ideologies. It is that there is a demand for them (Zannoni) EXPERT BRIEFING Definition of radicalism The Dutch General Information and Security Agency s (AIVD) definition of radicalism is The growing willingness to pursue and/or support far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect). This definition therefore implicates much more than just terrorism and violence but also a democratic dimension. Policy initiatives In the period , different initiatives have been taken in the Netherlands concerning increased awareness, intervention and de-radicalization as well as conducting research.the next step is to look at the current risks, which are that radicalization is still increasing and that polarization is a long-term risk to social cohesion. Countering radicalization Countering radicalization calls for various actions on various levels; it requires more than just the de-radicalization of radicalized individuals. Depending on which groups to handle there are several combinations of strategies to choose from: 11 Countermeasures at a national and local level such as micro-projects; Countermeasures against violent and anti-integrative developments; Strategies focusing on the prevention, repression and de-legitimization of militancy; Countermeasures on the societal level, the group level and the individual level Strategies focusing on the cooperation and communication between Government, civil society, Islamic organizations and organizations of Muslims; Strategies focusing on creating opportunities and explaining boundaries for Muslim communities;

12 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Possible leads for interventions Underlying factors Home situation Personal environment Organisation Leader figure Radical material Group membership Followers Physical act (violence, intimidation) Speech Writings Internet/virtual PERSON INCIDENT EFFECT Ideology Ideas Drivers View on society Emotional state Psychological state Character Location Private In public In school At work Direct victims Indiretct victims (fear) Eyewitnesses Material damages Strategies focusing on increasing social and religious resilience and countering negative societal developments (breeding ground theory); Strategies focusing on legal actions and administrative actions. Opportunities for interventions and de-radicalization Multiple tasks are to be handled in a de-radicalization process. A key point is to acknowledge that different authorities should undertake different tasks in any de-radicalization process at different points in the process. Any intervention involves multiple sets of tasks such as preparing, preventing, spotting, gathering information, monitoring, interpreting and responding to radicalized individuals. For example the roles of a teacher or a social worker are quite different from the roles of the Police and those roles are crucial at different points in time. 12 Any intervention should be targeted at an individual who might be radicalizing, but additional interventions are needed. Those have to be targeted towards the individual s context/situation. Possible leads for radicalization, but also for intervention, can be found in the radicalizing/radicalized individual s immediate surroundings: at school, at work or when they perform acts such as writing messages on the internet. (See model above)

13 As a consequence representatives from those different contexts must be involved in the processes. Some of the basic conditions for de-radicalization are: access to the radical environments; expertise; jurisdiction and insights into both the personal situations of, and the drivers of, the radicals as well as their views of the world. De-radicalization, intervention and countermeasures involve challenging political issues such as freedom of speech, personal freedom, protection of the private sphere, freedom of religion and also whether radicals who cooperate should be rewarded. Exit-strategy: learning from anti right-wing strategies? De-radicalization takes place on a daily basis without being defined as such. Dutch research by Grunenberg and Van Donselaar has been looking into a number of de-radicalization programmes in Germany targeted at right-wing radicals in order to see what can be learned from these programmes and if a similar policy can be applied in the Netherlands.The key lesson learned from this is that the ones that got out, wanted to get out. The radicals voluntarily contacted de-radicalizing organizations looking for help. In general they wanted to exit the radical groups because their partners put pressure on them or because they experienced difficulties in their daily life such as impending court cases or drinking/drug problems or difficulties in their working lives due to their radicalism. DISCUSSIONS POLICY-RECOMMENDATIONS 13 There is a need for a scientific focus on which interventions are available; De-radicalization must be part of an overall action plan including prevention; De-radicalization must be aimed at various phases in radicalization processes; De-radicalization involves insights into personal drivers, ideology and personal experiences; De-radicalization may involve help from a Muslim community, such as cooperation from radical leaders; There is a need to look into why American Muslims are not radicalized to the same degree as European Muslims; The European community must look into whether it has created a subsidizing system providing people with the opportunity to radicalize; The radicalization problem differs greatly between European countries. The countries different policies and de-radicalization initiatives are important factors in this; A comparative study of Islamist radicalism in different European countries should be made to clarify whether Islamist radicalism takes different forms as a consequence of interactions with different contexts; There is a need to educate teachers and social workers to understand Islam, Islamism and Islamist radicalism because teachers and social workers are central actors in any de-radicalization process.

14 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS FURTHER READINGS Grunenberg, Sara and Jaap van Donselaar: Deradicalisation: Lessons from Germany, options for the Netherlands? chapter 8 in Racism & extremism monitor: seventh report, ed. by Jaap van Donselaar and Peter R. Rodrigues, Department of Public Administration, Leiden University, General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD): From dawa to jihad. The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order, General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD): The radical dawa in transition. The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands,

15 WHICH REMAINING PUZZLES AND HOW DO WE STUDY THEM? DIIS gave a brief introduction to the research conducted by the research unit Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization headed by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen. The introduction gave an overview of the existing methods and theories applied to studies of radicalization and the remaining puzzles. The discussion gave some recommendations and ideas for further studies. EXPERT BRIEFING Background for the research The research unit Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization at DIIS is a group of researchers working with the general research question, When, why and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against civilians and what can be done about it? and zooming in on Islamist Militancy in Europe. The research unit focuses on the apparently recent developments in which the processes of violent radicalization seem to be happening over a short period of time and mainly in European countries.these developments question the traditional sociological assumptions on violent radicalization about deprivation, repression and prolonged periods of indoctrination within camps or violent subcultures. What we already know Thus far, research and knowledge on violent radicalization in Europe into Islamist Militancy can be divided into four categories: 15 Sociological explanations (examples are Gilles Kepel, Farhad Khosrokhavar and Olivier Roy) focusing on the role of globalization, marginalization, socioeconomic exclusion and perceived humiliation. This approach leaves the unanswered question Why does only a small minority of the individuals exposed to the same factors turn to violence? Social Movement Theory and Network Theory (examples are Quintan Wiktorowicz and Marc Sageman) focusing on the role of alienated individuals seeking a place to belong, social networks, movement outreach, group bonding and indoctrination. This approach leaves the unanswered question Can group-processes turn anyone into a terrorist? Empiricism (an example is Petter Nesser) is based on case studies and focuses on the role of grievances with regard to own position in society and the situation of fellow Muslims internationally, on lateral rather than top-down recruitment and on different roles in violently radical groups, particularly the role of the entrepreneur. This approach leaves the unanswered question What drives the entrepreneur?

16 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Integrative approaches (examples are Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy) drawing on all of the above mentioned. This approach leaves the unanswered question Are non-violent radical groups bulwarks or conveyor belts? Which remaining puzzles: The research unit will explore some remaining puzzles in several research projects. Those puzzles will include: What sets the minority of violent radicals apart from the majority of non-violent radicals? Are group-processes in themselves sufficient to radicalize? What drives the recruiters/leaders/entrepreneurs and what sets them apart from those who get engaged in constitutional politics? Are non-violent radical groups bulwarks or conveyor belts? Are there feedback loops to radicalization from authorities responses and media coverage? The researchers are approaching these questions from different theoretical points of departure and are thus focusing on different elements of the issue violent radicalization. The research unit has it as a declared goal to generate a broader empirical basis. Existing studies on the phenomenon tend to recycle a very small pool of empirical data. DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 16 Looking into non-violent radical groups in order to understand why and when a radical Islamist becomes violent and if the non-violent groups are bulwarks or steppingstones. It is important to keep in mind that very few radicals actually become violent; Looking into the individual motivations for becoming radical and into the individual motivations for wanting to leave radical groups; The difference between the individuals planning a violent act and the ones actually performing one; The use of speech-act theory and constructivism in the study of Islamist militancy; Defining radicalization from both a Western and a non-western perspective The challenges of access to the radical environments: Speaking the same language can in some cases be a gate-opener and make it possible to understand the radicals own understanding of concepts such as jihad

17 Interviews in prisons can be very relevant but it is necessary to remember that the ones who talk often do not know much and the ones who do know, often do not talk Focus on the surroundings, family and friends of radicals Distribute questionnaires through a gatekeeper. In some cases this has resulted in a great response frequency. FURTHER READINGS In Danish Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja and Jon A. Olsen: Voldelig Radikalisering i Europa: Hvad vi ved og ikke ved DIIS Brief, September 2007 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja and Line Selmer Friborg: Mindst holdbar til Udløbsklausuler som garant for løbende demokratisk debat om retssikkerhed og terrorbekæmpelse, DIIS Brief, June 2007 Staun, Jørgen: Mellem terror og folkelig protest Europas islamistiske udfordring, DIIS Book, December 2007 Forthcoming,Winter 2007/2008: Irani, Nadeem: Islamisk lov om sharia og andre begreber, DIIS Brief Irani, Nadeem: En kort introduktion til Islam og til den islamistiske ideologi, DIIS Brief Schrøder, Sofie: Kvinder i militante islamistiske grupper i Europa trussel eller integrationsfaktor?, DIIS Report In English Taarnby Jensen, Michael: Jihad in Denmark - An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in Denmark , DIIS Working Paper Forthcoming,Winter 2007/2008: Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja: The Elusive Root Causes: Sociopsychological and Psychological Approaches, DIIS Working Paper Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja: The elusive Root Causes: Social Movement Theory, DIIS Working Paper Staun, Jørgen: The Linguistic Turn of Terrorism Studies, DIIS Working Paper 17

18 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUSIONS The seminar made it very clear that radicalization processes, de-radicalization processes and counterterrorism measures are very complex issues that follow different paths and take on different shapes in each individual, group or country. Even though radicalization processes are multiple, it is possible to extract some general trends and identify both internal and external factors that play roles in the radicalization of an individual. The perception of personal marginalization combined with the perception of Western double standards in foreign policy appears to play a crucial role. Additionally, individuals often join radical groups for political or religious reasons and in a search for empowerment but also in search for friendship and a sense of social belonging. There is a need to cooperate internationally in research as well as in de-radicalization or radicalization-management and in counterterrorism. But there are challenges when cooperating across borders.there are differences between the countries definitions of concepts such as terrorism and radicalization. The differences in definitions are not only between Western and non-western countries but also between the Western, and even European, countries.these differences must be overcome. Many different counterterrorism measures have been launched - on national or local levels, focusing on the individual, the group or on society and legislation. Counterterrorism measures can however be counterproductive because they may strengthen or give further legitimacy to radical groups, as was the case with the banning of the Swedish branch of Hizb ut-tahrir. As a consequence, there is a need to do research on the effects of counterterrorism measures. There is a need to learn from the experiences of other countries and from past experiences with other types of radicalization, always bearing in mind that differences between contexts, countries, communities or groups may cause a need for alterations or make experiences less useful. 18 Dutch experiences and research show that de-radicalization strategies need to involve the cooperation of different authorities such as teachers, social workers and the police. Authorities at every level need to acquire basic knowledge of Islam, Islamism, Islamist militancy and radicalization to know the differences and to be equipped to handle different tasks in the different phases of de-radicalization or prevention of radicalization. It is equally crucial to involve the Muslim communities, radical and moderate alike, in order to reach radical youngsters before they become militant or violent.

19 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS PREVENTING RADICALIZATION There is a need to explain explicitly where the lines are in terms of counterterrorism legislation. It must be clarified by giving examples of what is legal and what is illegal so that individuals do not unknowingly get involved in illegal acts; There is a need to look into how counterterrorism measures and counterradicalization measures are perceived by relevant communities to evaluate whether these measures are effective or if they are, in fact, supporting or giving legitimacy to violently radical views; There is a need to look into how trust can be created between authorities and relevant communities in order to make effective counter-measures; There is a need to support the development of a European Islam by encouraging and supporting local moderate communities but at the same time maintaining a safe distance to avoid de-legitimizing them in the eyes of individuals who are sceptical of authorities; It is recommended to find inspiration in the confetti-approach/the New Dutch model, which consists of supporting many micro-projects. DE-RADICALIZATION De-radicalization must be part of an overall action plan including prevention and aimed at various phases in radicalization processes; There is a need to provide teachers, social workers etc. with basic knowledge of Islam, Islamism, Islamist militancy and radicalization so they know the differences and are equipped to handle different tasks in the different phases of the de-radicalization of individuals or in preventing radicalization. They are central actors in these processes; There is a need to involve the Muslim communities - radical and moderate alike in order to reach radical youngsters before they become militant or violent; There is a need to focus on individual programmes of actual de-radicalization. This may be demanding and costly but very few individuals can potentially do great damage if nothing is done. On the other hand such individuals can later contribute to de-radicalization or to the prevention of radicalization if this task is successfully carried out. 19

20 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS STUDYING RADICALIZATION WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? There is a need to produce theoretically and methodologically well-founded research based on new empirical data. The challenge in gaining access to violent and non-violent radical individuals and communities: There is a need to gather experiences and learn from other studies on how to gain access to violent and non-violent radical communities in order to do proper research on radicalization; Since access is a major obstacle in this type of research, it would be recommendable that authorities assist researchers in gaining access whenever they can. This would involve facilitating access to imprisoned individuals and to court records from trials in Europe. Theoretical approaches: There is a need to define radicalization; Studies on radicalization should be cross-disciplinary and involve different theoretical approaches; There is a need to focus on the role of group dynamics and leadership in violent radical and non-violent radical groups. Comparative studies: There is a need to do comparative studies of radical Islamism in different European countries to clarify whether it takes on different forms when interacting with different contexts; There is a need to look into why American Muslims are not radicalized to the same degree as European Muslims; There is a need to do comparative studies of today s Islamist militancy and left-wing militancy of the 1960 s and 1970 s. Focus on the radicalization process: There is a need for more focus on different individual paths and different motivations for radicalization; There is a need to look into non-violent radical groups in order to understand why and when an individual or group becomes violent and if the non-violent groups are bulwarks or steppingstones; There is a need to look into the personal motivations of individuals for entering radical groups and for wanting to get out again; There is a need to look into the differences between individuals planning violent acts and individuals actually performing them. 20

21 APPENDIX PARTICIPANTS Erik Andre Andersen Analyst, Research Department Danish Institute for Human Rights Stéphanie Jeanneret Andreasen MA political science Freelancer Edwin Bakker Head of Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme Clingendael Kamran Bokhari Director of middle East Analysis Strategic Forecasting, Inc. Atef Hamdy Fellow Clingendael Martin Harrow PhD-student Danish Institute for International Studies Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen PhD-student Danish Institute for International Studies Ulla Holm Senior Researcher Danish Institute for International Studies Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen Senior Researcher, Head of the research unit on Political Violence,Terrorism and Radicalization Danish Institute for International Studies Dennis de Hoog Senior Advisor and Researcher COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management Annette Haaber Ihle Postdoc University of Copenhagen Nadeem Irani Head of Section Danish Institute for International Studies Martin Fernando Jakobsen Student Assistant Danish Institute for International Studies Michael Taarnby Jensen Project Researcher Danish Institute for International Studies Jon Alix Olsen Research Assistant Danish Institute for International Studies Birgitte Kofod Olsen Head of National Department Danish Institute for Human Rights Magnus Ranstorp Research Director of Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies Swedish National Defence College Sofie Schrøder Student Assistant Danish Institute for International Studies Jørgen Bæk Simonsen Professor University of Copenhagen Jørgen Staun Researcher Danish Institute for International Studies Tinka Veldhuis Intern Clingendael Marco Zannoni Senior Advisor and Researcher COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management 21

22 DIIS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ABOUT DIIS AND TTSRL DIIS S STUDIES IN TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM This publication is part of DIIS s Studies in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, a project funded by a research grant in the Danish government s plan of action for countering terrorism, The project runs from 2006 through The research focuses on processes of radicalization, particularly in Europe, and on the effectiveness and possible side effects of different national and international measures to counter terrorism. Research subjects are formulated in consultation with the Danish Council for Strategic Research as well as with representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Justice. The actual research and the conclusions of the research are entirely independent, and do not necessarily correspond to the views of the ministries involved or any other government agency, nor do they constitute any official DIIS position. We aim to conduct high quality research and to communicate our findings broadly. Therefore we publish in a variety of forms, from DIIS research briefs to articles in international journals. The main publications published by DIIS are subject to peer review by one or more members of the review panel. Studies published elsewhere are reviewed according to the rules of the journal or publishing house in question. 22 Review Panel Andersen, Lars Erslev. Senior Lecturer, Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark. Crenshaw, Martha. PhD, Professor of Government, Wesleyan University. Hansen, Birthe. PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. Jenkins, Brian Michael. Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation. Neumann, Peter. PhD, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London. Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge. PhD, Senior Fellow, Adjunct Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Ranstorp, Magnus. PhD, Research Director, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, Swedish National Defence College. Scheffler, Thomas. Dr.phil., Assistant Lecturer, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen. Simonsen, Jørgen Bæk. Dr.phil., Professor, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen. Vestergaard, Jørn. Lic.jur., Deputy Dean, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen.

23 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM, SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (TTSRL) The Trans-European research project Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law is aimed at framing the current nature of the threat of terrorism as it exists within the EU, and at generating insight into the various response options to terrorism that are available to European governments. The research bridges the gap between the general scientific approach to terrorism and insight into the effectiveness of the various available response options. It focuses on a broad range of topics, including the development of the European security-discourse as a consequence of contemporary terrorism, terrorism s broader societal consequences such as radicalisation, its effects on civil order, as well as the way in which these issues are framed and affected by the media. The outcome of the efforts will thus be a better understanding of the issues at hand, as well as recommendations as to solutions to some of the most pressing policy issues arising from the threat of terrorism in the EU. The research is conducted by a consortium made up of six research institutions from four member states of the European Union. This allows the institutions not only to combine their broad range of knowledge and expertise but also to approach the issues at hand from varying European perspectives. The consortium consists of: 1. COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (the Netherlands) 2. Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO (the Netherlands) 3. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (Spain) 4. Danish Institute for International Studies (Denmark) 5. Danish Institute for Human Rights (Denmark) 6. Institute of International Relations Prague (Czech Republic) 7. Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations (the Netherlands) The European Commission (co-)finances the research efforts of the individual participating institutions under the 6th framework program. For further information visit 23

24 This publication is part of DIIS s Studies in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, a project funded by a research grant in the Danish government s Plan of action for countering terrorism, 2005.