How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain"

Stephany Morgan
5 years ago
Views:

1 How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain Elena Llaudet Harvard University APSA Conference August 29, 2013

2 Incumbency Advantage Incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over their challengers in developed democracies Sources still unknown The literature has mostly focused on the activities that the incumbents personally engage in focus on constituency service ideologically align themselves to constituents bring pork to the district raise more campaign funds increase their name recognition scare-off high quality challengers

3 Elections to the Spanish Senate In Spanish senatorial elections, the commonly studied sources of incumbency advantage are very unlikely to be present The Spanish Senate has very little legislative power The ideological positions of senators make little difference No senator can credibly take credit for legislation Senators do not have access to many resources Senators do not provide constituency services Senators do not raise or control electoral campaign funds Electoral campaigns tend to be party-centered As a result, their name recognition is very low If we find any incumbency advantage, it must come from a different source

Contribution Identify the actions of parties as a source of incumbency advantage worth considering, especially in high-stake elections where parties are powerful Analyze Spanish senatorial elections

4 Contribution Identify the actions of parties as a source of incumbency advantage worth considering, especially in high-stake elections where parties are powerful Analyze Spanish senatorial elections from 1977 to 2008 Find a small but significant incumbency advantage estimated to increase the probability of being reelected of all incumbents by almost 25 percentage points but that of vulnerable incumbents by more than 50 percentage points Find that the main source of such advantage comes from the strategic behavior of the parties, who help their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring that they be placed first on the ballot

5 The Analytical Model Exploiting the multi-member district system of the Senate in Spain, we can estimate the incumbency advantage by comparing the electoral outcomes of incumbents to those of their co-partisans non-incumbents running in the same race

6 The Analytical Model Following Hirano and Snyder (2009): Vote Share Candidate ipdt = β 0 + β 1 Incumbent ipdt + θ pdt + ɛ ipdt where: Vote Share Candidate ipdt is the vote share that candidate i from party p received in the district d at time t; Incumbent ipdt is a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate is an incumbent; θ pdt are fixed effects for each combination of district, party, and year; and ɛ ipdt are the usual residuals

7 Spanish Senator s Incumbency Advantage Estimated at.7 percentage points on average Estimated to increase as the popularity of the party in the district decreases Argument: The observed incumbency advantage comes from the strategic behavior of the parties, who position vulnerable incumbents first on the ballot so as to boost their chances of electoral success Percentage Points (of the Candidate's Vote Share) Estimated Incumbency Advantage First Most Popular Second Most Popular Popularity of the Candidate's Party in the District

8 In Spanish Senatorial Elections, the Popularity of a Candidate s Party in the District is a Strong Predictor of the Candidate s Vulnerability Candidate's Probability of Being Elected 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Party's Popularity & Candidate's Vulnerability First Most Popular Second Most Popular Popularity of the Candidate's Party in the District Candidates of the most popular party are almost guaranteed to be elected. They tend to take all except one of the seats in the district Candidates of the second most popular party usually end up competing among themselves for the remaining seat. Whoever ends up winning does so by a small margin

9 There are Large Ballot Positional Effects Candidates listed first on the ballot receive a vote share 1 percentage point higher than co-partisans listed second Candidates listed third on the ballot receive a vote share.6 percentage points lower than co-partisans listed second

10 Ballot Positional Effects are Especially Consequential for Vulnerable Incumbents Percentage Points (of the Candidate's Probability of Being Elected) Effects of Being Placed First on the Ballot First Most Popular Second Most Popular Popularity of the Candidate's Party in the District For candidates of the second most popular party, being placed first on the ballot increases their probability of electoral success by 66 percentage points For candidate of the most popular party, ballot positioning has only small consequences

11 Vulnerable Incumbents are Very Likely to be First on the Ballot Percentage Points Incumbent's Likelihood of Being First on the Ballot First Most Popular Second Most Popular Popularity of the Candidate's Party in the District Incumbents from the second most popular party are 57 percentage points more likely to be placed first on the ballot than their co-partisan non-incumbents Incumbents from the most popular party are 23 percentage points more likely to be placed first on the ballot than their co-partisan non-incumbents

12 Accomplishing this Requires a Specific and Deliberate Candidate Selection Process from the Part of the Party Leaders In the elections under study, the placing of the candidates on the ballot was done by law in alphabetical order of last names Distribution of Last Names of Candidate's of Second Most Popular Party Incumbents Non Incumbents In order to ensure that a vulnerable incumbent be placed first on the ballot, parties had to choose his or her co-partisans based, at least in part, on last name A H Q Z

13 The order of the candidates on the ballot is very important. [When the ballot order was alphabetical,] the last name of the incumbent used to condition who his or her running mates could be. Choosing the running mates of vulnerable incumbents based on last name was a practice that all political parties used to engage in. It simply made sense. It was logical. Jordi Cornet i Serra Secretary General of the Partido Popular in Barcelona

14 The Strategic Placing of Incumbents on the Ballot Explains Almost All of the Observed Incumbency Advantage Estimated Incumbency Advantage Percentage Points (of the Candidate's Vote Share) Without Controlling for Positional Effects After Controlling for Positional Effects First Most Popular Second Most Popular Popularity of the Candidate's Party in the District

15 Conclusions From 1979 to 2008, Spanish senators enjoyed a small but significant incumbency advantage The main source of such advantage was the strategic behavior of the parties, who helped their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring that they be placed first on the ballot The actions of parties are a source of incumbency advantage worth considering, especially in high-stakes elections where parties are powerful

16 Thank You

17 Example PSOE candidates for the 2004 Elections to the Senate in A Coruña: Francisco Jose Vazquez Vazquez Maria Carmen Vila Blanco Jorge Luis Yaez Fernandez

18 Example PSOE candidates for the 2004 Elections to the Senate in A Coruña: Francisco Jose Vazquez Vazquez Maria Carmen Vila Blanco Jorge Luis Yañez Fernandez

19 Example PSOE candidates for the 2004 Elections to the Senate in A Coruña: Francisco Jose Vazquez Vazquez Maria Carmen Vila Blanco Jorge Luis Yañez Fernandez

20 Example PSOE candidates for the 2004 Elections to the Senate in A Coruña: Francisco Jose Vazquez Vazquez Maria Carmen Vila Blanco Jorge Luis Yañez Fernandez

Parties Strategic Behavior as a Source of Incumbency Advantage: An Analysis of Spanish Senatorial Elections from 1977 to 2008

Parties Strategic Behavior as a Source of Incumbency Advantage: An Analysis of Spanish Senatorial Elections from 1977 to 2008 Elena Llaudet Department of Government Harvard University August 18, 2013 I