#2 DECEMBER 2013 AFGHAN ENDGAME: WHAT COMES NEXT

Transcription

1 #2 DECEMBER 2013 AFGHAN ENDGAME: WHAT COMES NEXT

2 Russia Direct 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, or by any information storage and retrieval system. The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of Russia Direct.

3 EDITOR S NOTE Ekaterina Zabrovskaya Editor-in-Chief Russia Direct, one of the leading online destinations for analysis on Russian foreign policy and U.S.-Russia relations, is pleased to present the second edition of RD Quarterly. The report looks at post-withdrawal Afghanistan and explores possible scenarios of regional development. In addition to providing an overview of what to watch for in 2014, it also considers the implications of NATO withdrawal for the key stakeholders in the region: Russia, the U.S., China and the states of Central Asia and the Arab Gulf. These scenarios analyze the potential destabilizing impact of Islamic extremism in the region. A group of RD experts Mark Katz of George Mason University, George Joffé of the University of Cambridge, Alexander Sharavin of the Russian Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Alexei Pilko of Lomonosov Moscow State University and Evgeny Pakhomov, former special correspondent to Pakistan and India, present their views on the future of this geopolitically important region after Following our motto, Converting monologues into dialogue, we are presenting expert views from both Russia and the West on post-withdrawal Afghanistan to understand the issue better. It s up to you to decide whose argument is more persuasive. The report also provides a list of specific policy recommendations for Washington and Moscow and serves as a great resource on important books, articles and Twitter feeds you need to stay current on developments in Afghanistan. We invite you to read this December issue of RD Quarterly and share your opinions with us. Please send your thoughts, as well as any questions regarding Russia Direct and its products, to me directly at e.zabrovskaya@russia-direct.org. Thank you, Ekaterina Zabrovskaya RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 1

4 CONTENTS Part I. 6 Overview: NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan Ambitious goals Ambiguous results What could have been done differently? How will the withdrawal impact the situation in Afghanistan? What to watch for in 2014 Part II. 10 Hard road home: withdrawal routes for NATO troops from Afghanistan Pakistani route Northern route New routes under development Part III. 16 Consequences of NATO withdrawal: the view from Russia Five key factors to watch Two polarizing scenarios: conservative and alarmist How the U.S. views post-withdrawal Afghanistan How Russia views post-withdrawal Afghanistan How China views post-withdrawal Afghanistan How Pakistan views post-withdrawal Afghanistan The lurking threat of global Islamic revolution Part IV. 26 Consequences of NATO withdrawal: the view from the West Implications for Afghanistan Implications for Pakistan Implications for Iran Implications for Central Asia Implications for China Implications for the Arab world Implications for Russia Implications for the United States 29 Policy recommendations 30 Recommended books and articles on Afghanistan 31 Top 10 Twitter accounts for #Afghanistan COVER PHOTO: REUTERS 2 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

5 ABOUT THE AUTHORS George Joffé George Joffé is a research fellow at the University of Cambridge in England, specializing in the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa within the Department of Politics and International Studies. Previously he was deputy director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). He is also attached to St. Anthony s College at the University of Oxford and Kings College at the University of London. He holds a professorial fellowship at London Metropolitan University and at the Royal United Services Institute in London. Mark N. Katz Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in He is the author of many books and articles, including "Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan" (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). Links to many of his publications can be found on his personal website: Evgeny Pakhomov Evgeny Pakhomov is a journalist specializing in the political, social and religious issues of South Asia, Afghanistan and neighboring regions. He worked as a correspondent for Russian news agency RIA Novosti in Pakistan and India. He graduated from the Institute of Asian and African Studies (IAAS) at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Before entering journalism, he was scientific secretary of the Center of Buddhist and Indological Studies at the IAAS. Alexei Pilko Alexei Pilko is an expert on the theory and history of international relations. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the History Faculty of Lomonosov Moscow State University and has a Ph.D. in history. He is the author of a monograph on the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as a number of specialized research articles. He is the co-author of the textbook Fundamentals of the Theory of International Relations. Alexander Sharavin Alexander Sharavin is a Russian military analyst and political scientist. He is a professor of political science in the Faculty of Applied Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and has a Ph.D. in political science. He is a member of the Academy of Military Sciences and Rector of the Institute of Political and Applied Analysis. He is also a member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 3

6 Executive Summary #2 DECEMBER 2013 AFGHAN ENDGAME: WHAT COMES NEXT With the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan scheduled to end in 2014, the world s major powers including the U.S., Russia and China are contemplating the potential consequences of the withdrawal of NATO combat troops from the region. A number of political scenarios are possible, ranging from the alarmist to the conservative. Much depends, of course, on how the government in Kabul is able to deal with the dangerous tendency toward Islamic extremism both in Afghanistan and the surrounding states in the region without the direct presence of NATO troops. Against this backdrop, Russia Direct asked a number of foreign policy and foreign experts to give their take on what comes next in Afghanistan and to consider the potential implications of NATO withdrawal from the perspective of all the key stakeholders in the region the U.S., Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, the Central Asian states and the Arab States. What becomes clear is that the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will be a long, costly and potentially destabilizing process with the ability to tilt the geopolitical balance of power in the region for years to come. While the future of Afghanistan appears uncertain, there are ten specific steps that the U.S. and Russia can take to ensure that regional instability remains contained: These ten steps are outlined as a series of policy recommendations for Moscow and Washington. REUTERS 4 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

7 REUTERS AFP/EASTNEWS AP AP AP RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 5

8 REUTERS Part 1 Mark N. Katz OVERVIEW: NATO WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN If it accomplished nothing else, ISAF will have succeeded if it results in helping the Afghan people strengthen themselves sufficiently to resist the Taliban. 6 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

9 Assessments of what has been achieved in Afghanistan since the beginning of the U.S.-led intervention are starkly different After more than a dozen years, the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan that began in October 2001 just a few short weeks after 9/11 is finally in the process of being wound down. By the end of 2014, almost all American and Coalition forces will have withdrawn from Afghanistan. A few thousand American troops may remain beyond this, but only if an Afghan-American bilateral security agreement (BSA) can be agreed upon (something that the U.S. and Iraq failed to do in 2011, thus resulting in the complete withdrawal of American forces from there by the end of that year). But whether or not Washington and Kabul can agree upon a BSA, the large-scale American military presence in Afghanistan that began in 2001 will definitely end in AMBITIOUS GOALS When the George W. Bush Administration launched the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan, there were several goals that it sought to achieve. Among the most important of these was the destruction of the Al Qaeda network which had made use of its sanctuary in Afghanistan to carry out the 9/11 attacks on the United States as well as other terrorist operations elsewhere. In addition, the U.S. sought to destroy the Taliban regime which had granted sanctuary to al-qaida and which had refused to turn over its leaders including, most notably, Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks. As secondary goals, the U.S. sought to replace the Taliban regime with a democratic government that would enjoy popular support domestically and would cooperate with international efforts to combat extremism and terrorism. Finally, Washington hoped for the emergence of a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan that would prove to be infertile ground for Islamic extremist movements such as those supported by the Taliban and al- Qaida. AMBIGUOUS RESULTS To what extent did the U.S. achieve these ambitious goals that it set for itself in Afghanistan? A pessimist would say: It did not achieve any of them. Afghanistan is neither peaceful nor prosperous. America s attempt to build democracy in Afghanistan has been forestalled in large part because the American-backed president, Hamid Karzai, and his regime are both corrupt and incompetent. The Taliban which appeared to have been nearly defeated at the end of 2001 has been able to retake or render ungovernable much of Afghanistan. And while American forces killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and al-qaida may no longer have much of a presence in Afghanistan, it and its many allies are able to operate against U.S. allies and interests from the territory of many other countries (including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Mali). Further, enormous costs were paid by America, its allies, and the Afghan people to produce these meager results. Not everyone, however, shares this pessimistic assessment. The newly formed Alliance in Support of the Afghan People (ASAP) argues forcefully that the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan has had many positive results, including many in the socioeconomic sphere: 1) School enrollments have now risen to over 8 million Afghan children (including 2.6 million girls); 2) The infant mortality rate has been cut in half and life expectancy has risen from 40 to 60 since 2001; 3) The Afghan media has flourished since the downfall of the Taliban regime; 4) Access to reliable electricity has quadrupled since 2001 and over 19 million Afghans now have mobile phones; and 5) Women play an increasingly active role in Afghan public life. 1 Further, not only has the Afghan economy grown tremendously since 2001, but the discovery that Afghanistan possesses deposits of $1 trillion to $3 trillion of oil, gas, gold, copper, iron ore, and other natural resources 2 gives it the potential for sustained prosperity. These two assessments of what has been achieved in Afghanistan since the beginning of the U.S.-led intervention are starkly different. Yet, both of them are valid. For the truth of the matter is that while the U.S. did not achieve all of the ambitious goals it set for itself in Afghanistan, its actions did serve to improve the quality of life for millions of Afghans. Further, this simply would not have occurred if the Bush Administration had decided against intervening in Afghanistan after 9/ Afghanistan: A Nation Transformed, Alliance in Support of the Afghan People, 2. Melissa L. Skorka, Afghanistan s Untold Success Story, The AfPak Channel, ForeignPolicy.com, October 22, 2013, posts/2013/10/22/afghanistans_untold_success_story RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 7

10 WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY? Even though the U.S. has recorded some important achievements in Afghanistan since 2001, continued Pakistani support for the Taliban (which Islamabad assisted in its rise to power in 1996) was clearly detrimental to American efforts in Afghanistan. The American-led military intervention would undoubtedly have been more successful if Washington had somehow been able to induce (either through persuasion or more forceful means) Pakistan not to aid the Taliban. However, given the Pakistani conviction that support for the Taliban was the surest means of preventing its archrival India from gaining influence in Afghanistan as well as American dependence on Pakistan for logistics support to the huge U.S. and Coalition military presence in neighboring Afghanistan, it is doubtful that Washington could have either persuaded Islamabad to stop supporting the Taliban or successfully employed more forceful means. Either of these steps would have risked cutting off American access to Afghanistan via Pakistan. In addition, given how poor a leader that Hamid Karzai has turned out to be, Washington might have done better in Afghanistan if it had not pressured the Afghans into accepting him as their new president but had chosen someone else or (more dramatically still) allowed the Afghans themselves to AP have made their own choice. Yet even if Washington had done either of these things, it is not clear that anyone else the U.S. may have picked would have proven to be any better than Karzai, or that the Afghans would have done a better job assuming they actually could have agreed upon someone. The biggest factor that worked against the U.S. achieving its goals in Afghanistan may have been the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Had the resources that the U.S. spent on Iraq been devoted to Afghanistan instead, the U.S. would have been in a much better position to pacify, develop and, perhaps most importantly, concentrate on Afghanistan. Indeed, perhaps the biggest error in judgment made by the Bush Administration in the period from late 2002 to early 2003 was convincing itself that the war in Afghanistan was so close to being won that America could go ahead and intervene in Iraq without damaging its efforts in Afghanistan. Of course, even if the U.S. had not intervened in Iraq, it is by no means certain that it would have devoted the resources spent there on Afghanistan. Even if it had, the U.S. would still have had to face the problems of weak Afghan leadership and Pakistani support for the Taliban as well as continuing concern over Saddam Hussein s intentions vis-à-vis neighboring states allied to the U.S. Even if America had not intervened in Iraq, that country would still have distracted the Bush Administration from focusing on events in Afghanistan. America s ability to significantly improve the circumstances under which it intervened in Afghanistan, then, may not have been all that great. Even if Washington had done things differently and circumstances had been more favorable, achieving the Bush Administration s ambitious goals in Afghanistan would still have been difficult due to that country s relative inaccessibility, harsh terrain, internal fractiousness, extreme poverty, lack of education, and cultural barriers between the intervening Western forces and the Afghans they sought to assist. Indeed, perhaps what is most puzzling in retrospect is not that the U.S. achieved so little in Afghanistan, but that it managed to achieve as much as it did despite all the daunting obstacles which it faced. HOW WILL THE WITHDRAWAL IMPACT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN? However much or little the U.S. actually achieved in Afghanistan, these accomplishments now appear to be at risk of being lost once American and Coalition military forces are withdrawn from there. It is the desire to avoid this result that motivates ASAP (among others) to lobby in favor of continuing American support for Afghanistan after 2014 in the form of continued international support for civil society efforts, investment in Afghan institutions and organizations, commitment to financial transparency and the rule of law, and 8 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

11 Russia, India, the Central Asian states, and even Iran might increase their support for Kabul after the drawdown of American and Western forces prevent its return to power. Nor are they without the means to do so. As ASAP recently noted, Afghan security forces are in the lead of 90% of all operations, and are responsible for security in nearly 90% of the country. Moreover, Confidence among Afghans in the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police is over 80%. Almost two-thirds of Afghans say they have no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups. 3 WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2014 efforts to increase the Afghan government s financial selfsufficiency. How willing the U.S. government, Congress, and public opinion are to do this, of course, remains to be seen. Governments, parliaments, and public opinion in other Western states may or may not be willing to remain involved in Afghanistan even if the U.S. remains involved there, but they certainly will not be if America isn t. America and the West, of course, are not the only parties that do not wish to see the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan. Regional powers including Russia, India, the Central Asian states, and even Iran might well increase their support for Kabul after the drawdown of American and Western forces. It is doubtful, however, that these governments will be as concerned about preserving (much less increasing) Afghanistan s quality of life gains (especially women s rights and press freedoms) as America and the West have been. Having experienced the viciousness of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, many within Afghanistan have a strong incentive to The single most important factor in maintaining relative stability in Afghanistan after the withdrawal next year will be the popular legitimacy and managerial effectiveness of the country s new leader who emerges from the 2014 Afghan presidential elections. Another important determinant of whether the gains that have been made in Afghanistan can be preserved will be the relative effectiveness of the Kabul government s armed forces vis-à-vis the Taliban. If the U.S. ends all support for them, then the level of effectiveness they have achieved could degrade quickly. Certain regional powers, of course, could attempt to fill in the gap left by the departing American and Coalition forces assuming, of course, that they are both willing and able to do so. But for all those concerned with preventing the Taliban from reasserting control over Afghanistan and with minimizing its presence there, these goals are more likely to be achieved if the U.S. continues to provide arms, training, and other support to Kabul than if it does not. If it accomplished nothing else, the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan will have succeeded if it results in helping the Afghan government and people strengthen themselves sufficiently to bear the primary burden of preventing the Taliban from re-imposing its misrule over them. But in order for the Afghans to do this after the withdrawal of American and Coalition forces, then continued support from the U.S. and others will be necessary. 3. Political and Security Horizons, Alliance in Support of the Afghan People. Accessed on November 18, RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 9

12 REUTERS Part 2 Alexander Sharavin HARD ROAD HOME: WITHDRAWAL ROUTES FOR NATO TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN Today it is obvious that NATO will not hastily withdraw its troops from Afghanistan as it is an unprecedented challenge in terms of scale and cost. 10 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

13 Tens of thousands of foreign soldiers are still in Afghanistan, and most of them must return home by the end of 2014 The withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan is an unprecedented challenge in terms of both scale and cost. This applies to the quantities of weapons and military equipment involved, as well as the number of vehicles and shipping containers required to send everything back home. It also applies to the necessary level of cooperation to make the withdrawal a reality, given the number of different countries involved in the withdrawal of troops. Tens of thousands of foreign soldiers, members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), are still in Afghanistan, and most of them must return home by the end of At the same time, the Obama administration has been careful to note that the U.S. will not hastily withdraw its troops if it threatens the hard-won results of the intervention. As U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated earlier, any rush to withdraw troops would endanger the significant military progress that has been achieved in Afghanistan. This success will be brought to naught if the transfer of the responsibility for providing security in the country to the Afghans is not carried out in an organized and coordinated manner, he said. That being said, NATO officials estimate the cost of military equipment being used in Afghanistan at $30 billion. In addition, the forces also have to take out computers, food, medical equipment, etc. Just the Bundeswehr (German military) alone has 1,700 vehicles and 6,000 shipping containers that are to be sent home. As for the U.S., the Americans have to bring 72,000 pieces of equipment and 150,000 shipping containers out of the country. American experts have estimated that this process can drag on for three years, at the rate of exporting 150 containers a day. There are several obvious questions: What will be transferred to Afghan security forces? What is to be destroyed? What will be taken out of Afghanistan and in what order? Logistics problems are enormous, so there is a need for the creation of an entire system to provide security and logistical support for the entire length of the routes. PAKISTANI ROUTE When developing routes for the withdrawal of troops, NATO has to take into account both geography and the transportation infrastructure. There are no seaports and almost no railways in Afghanistan. Although many roads are in poor condition, ground transport is the preferred means of transportation, mainly due to costs. According to experts, transportation of the existing cargoes by air would cost ten times more than ground transportation. Routes through Pakistan are the closest, but after Pakistan closed its border to protest against an American air strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the U.S. military began delivering about 60% of their cargoes through the northern routes, while the remainder was delivered to Afghanistan by air. Despite the fact that interruptions in deliveries were virtually avoided, this measure led to an increase in costs by about $100 million per month. In order to carry out the operation for the return of NATO troops successfully, the United States and Great Britain want to use neighboring Pakistan again, as the nearest port, Karachi, is located there. In 2011 alone, the United States brought 35,000 containers to the Hindu Kush via this route. In particular, the United States plans to transport about 60 percent of its cargoes through the routes running through here. Currently, however, the Pakistan direction is not safe and secure. Pakistan has closed this route before, because of conflicts with the U.S. military, and no one can guarantee that it will not do so again in the future. The question remains open how much the international community will have to pay for the achievement of a mutual understanding with Pakistan. NORTHERN ROUTE The situation is hardly easier in the north. Even if Russia agrees to a transit route through its territory, it still has to be accessible. That is, a number of Central Asian republics have to be crossed before passing into Russia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. This is not easy and also very expensive. Despite the fact that the U.S. delivered more than 75,000 soldiers through Russian airspace during the entire time of operations in Afghanistan, the United States does not intend to use the transport hub in Ulyanovsk in the withdrawal of troops and cargoes from Afghanistan. In an interview with Itar-Tass in Washington, the head of the Transportation Command of the U.S. Armed Forces, General William Fraser, said that the United States had concluded several bilateral agreements on the transit of cargoes from Afghanistan by mixed modes of transport. As a result, the U.S. did not press for the use of Ulyanovsk as a combined transit hub. The question of whether the United States planned to begin exploiting the potential of the hub in Ulyanovsk in full, in the RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 11

14 foreseeable future, was answered negatively by General Fraser. At the same time, he evaded a direct answer to a request to comment on reports in the Russian press that Russian transport companies, having access to the Ulyanovsk hub, allegedly tried to charge high prices for their services to the United States and NATO. Assuming that Pakistan will not close its border in the future, American and NATO commanders will still have to deal with the withdrawal of at least one-third of cargoes from northern Afghanistan through an extensive network of railways and roads that cross the former Soviet Union. These routes present strategic risks themselves. Any access to these transit routes depends on the whim of several Central Asian leaders. There is no doubt that some of them have used their position to formulate specific requirements. For example, Uzbekistan tried to capitalize on its status of being the only country having a railway connection with Afghanistan, and tried to get paid an additional 50 percent for the transit of military cargoes from the conflict zone, insisting that this supplementary premium was the amount being received by its neighbors. Moreover, the cost of international delivery of cargoes through the northern routes is almost three times more expensive than the shorter Pakistani routes. 12 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

15 Despite all that, the northern route is one of the two main options. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, all materials can be reloaded onto trains and as it is the case with the Bundeswehr sent directly to Germany. Another option is the delivery of cargoes to the ports of Riga and Vladivostok, and then transporting them by ship from there. In this case, transit states will receive a great deal of money for issuing transport permits. A senior logistics specialist in the U.S. Army, Vice Admiral Mark Harnitchek, who developed the northern routes, said that he was confident that the network would remain a reliable route for the withdrawal of troops. If you designed a system for entering Afghanistan, you would certainly not do it through the north, but this route proved to be resilient, said Mr. Harnitchek, who heads the Logistics Administration in the Ministry of Defense. These countries are remarkably cooperative. NEW ROUTES UNDER DEVELOPMENT Some of the NATO alliance members can choose alternative routes of withdrawal for their troops. For example, the simplest solution for France may be air transportation on two routes. The first is already in use by transport aircraft to Abu Dhabi, and then by sea. The second one has yet to be established by air to Russia or Kazakhstan, and then by railway or road. NATO also discussed, at a high level, the possibility of using the railway Baku-Tbilisi-Kars for the withdrawal of troops, but this route was recognized as inconvenient, although some units were withdrawn by this route. Be that as it may, any options for withdrawal will require considerable time. The U.S. Army believes that if the political authorities so require, the terms can be shortened to no more than a few months, and a maximum of six months, if we want security to remain untouched. And that is under condition that the roads through Pakistan are opened once again. In any case, the Obama Administration has secured the consent of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to transit U.S. military equipment and other cargoes exported from Afghanistan through their territories. This was announced at a Congressional Hearing by the head of the U.S. Transportation Command, General William Fraser. He said they studied several ways to transport to the United States tens of thousands of armored vehicles and containers, in connection with the deterioration of relations with Pakistan, through which run the main routes for delivery of goods to U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. According to the Pentagon, 48 percent of the goods (including fuel and lubricants) were delivered through Pakistan to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), while 30 percent was delivered directly to U.S. troops. Meanwhile, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) the railways in the territories of Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan accounted for 52 percent of goods delivered to the ISAF and 40 percent of the goods delivered to U.S. troops. Another 30 percent primarily heavy military vehicles, artillery systems and ammunition was transported by the Pentagon by air to Afghanistan. Another possible way to exit Afghanistan, which has no outlet to the sea, would be transportation by air. However, this is an even more expensive alternative, being 10 times more expensive than transportation via the Pakistani route. According to the Military Transportation Command of the U.S. Air Force, direct non-stop flights of the military transport aircraft C-5M Super Galaxy have been successfully implemented from the U.S. Air Force base in Dover (Delaware) to the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. For the first time, aircraft of the U.S. Air Force flew via the northern route from the United States through Canada and the Arctic Circle, and then through the airspaces of Russia and Kazakhstan to Afghanistan, reported one of the press releases of the command. According to the U.S. Air Force, the aircraft flew through the airspace of Kyrgyzstan on the way back from Afghanistan, stopping at Manas International Airport near Bishkek. The flight, which took more than 15 hours, was made possible thanks to refueling the C-5M aircraft in the skies over northern Canada. Representatives of the U.S. Transportation Command, responsible for planning the withdrawal, said that the implementation of the flight allows them to begin studying new possibilities to strengthen the northern corridor. According to the specialized aviation publication Aviation Week, the U.S. Air Force uses new air routes that originate in major points of the United States and Europe, pass over the North Pole and then the airspace of Russia and Kazakhstan to deliver cargoes and personnel. The U.S. Air Force also plans to carry out flights through the polar route from the McChord Air Force Base in Washington state, in addition to flights from the Elmendorf and Eielson Air Force bases in Alaska. RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 13

16 AP Part 3 Alexei Pilko and Evgeny Pakhomov CONSEQUENCES OF NATO WITHDRAWAL: THE VIEW FROM RUSSIA The situation in Afghanistan will depend to a certain extent on how relations within the U.S.-China-Russia triangle develop. 14 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

17 It would not be an exaggeration to say that Afghanistan s fate lies largely in the hands of external forces, rather than intra-regional ones In just over one year s time, the UN-sanctioned and NATOled international coalition in Afghanistan will pull out of the country. The implications are still unclear, although there is no shortage of predictions. However, Afghanistan and forecasts do not go hand in hand. The country and the entire surrounding region of Great Central Asia (which can be said to also include Pakistan and the five former Soviet republics) is today a unique geopolitical space, where the interests of Russia, the U.S., Europe, China, India, Pakistan and Iran not to mention the likes of al-qaida all intersect. Therefore, it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty what sort of Afghanistan will emerge. Much depends not only on the regional situation, but also on the level of agreement between the external powers, whose relations traditionally breed cooperation and conflict in equal measure. In other words, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Afghanistan s fate lies largely in the hands of external forces, rather than intra-regional ones. FIVE KEY FACTORS TO WATCH In this regard, several factors can be singled out that will have a profound impact on both Afghanistan and all of Great Central Asia. First, how events play out in the country is strongly influenced by the situation in Pakistan. Today, large swathes of Pakistan s territory are not controlled by the government, but rather, by various armed groups. The Afghan-Pakistani border has long been arbitrary, leading to the formation of a vast zone of instability that reaches into both countries. Second, much will depend on the stability of Afghanistan s borders with its neighbors to the north the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. If internal fault lines or external assistance cause these countries to crumble, the future of Afghanistan will be very bleak indeed, lying as it would inside a ring of instability with no obvious exit strategy. As observers point out, the preconditions for such a scenario essentially exist already both socio-economically (the low standard of living of most people in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, the possible effects of the global financial crisis, etc.), and politically (the authoritarian nature of the ruling regimes, the possible war of succession that could follow the departure of today s crop of leaders). Third, it is impossible to ignore the American factor, since it does not intend to withdraw from Afghanistan completely, but to maintain a certain (albeit low-profile) military presence in the country. The matter relates, primarily, to U.S. bases on Afghan soil. The U.S. will be able to use them to assist the regime of Hamid Karzai, mainly through training Afghan soldiers, and carrying out reconnaissance and special operations. However, it is hard to say how effective this support will be in restoring government control over the entire country. The presence of U.S. forces could be used either to impede the actions of Karzai s opponents or, conversely, if U.S. interests demand it, to exert pressure on him and draw concessions. In other words, after NATO s withdrawal, Afghanistan will remain dependent on Washington for some time, with very limited sovereignty and potential for independent action. Moreover, for the U.S., the situation in Great Central Asia is framed inside the global geopolitical context. Washington has already begun de facto to create a system of containment in relation to China, in which Afghanistan and other Central Asian states play a more than passing role. It is likely that this U.S. strategy will require active use of the territory of Afghanistan and neighboring countries in order to put pressure on Beijing and divert its attention from the Asia-Pacific region. Depending on the situation, the Afghan bridgehead could also be used to exert influence on Russia; for example, if Moscow were to snub the anti-china coalition that the U.S. is trying to create on an informal basis. In this connection, it is clear that the situation in Afghanistan will depend to a certain extent on how relations develop between Washington and Beijing, and even within the U.S.-China-Russia triangle. Fourth, the situation in Afghanistan and Great Central Asia is being increasingly influenced by China. According to some reports, Chinese representatives are working closely with both the Afghan central government and regional authorities. The interests of China in the region are plain to see: Beijing is heavily dependent on energy exports from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and fears that a destabilization of Afghanistan will create problems in those countries, impacting the operations of Chinese firms. Furthermore, Beijing is attempting to seize the initiative from the U.S. and to neutralize the threat of U.S. hegemony in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. Therefore, a clash between Chinese and U.S. interests in the region, intermingled with those of Russia and other actors, is almost inevitable. For the time being, the rivalry between China and the U.S. remains RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 15

18 in the background, but it has been there ever since the U.S. penetrated the region in Fifth, a lot depends on the position of Moscow, which in recent years has taken on an increasingly active role in international affairs. If evidence were required of the importance of the Central Asian region for Russia, the fact that the largest Russian military base outside its own borders is located in Tajikistan would more than suffice. Moscow also intends to expand its existing airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. Given this presence, Russia is quite capable of conducting an independent foreign policy in the region. What is more, Moscow s special interest in maintaining stability in the Central Asian region stems from the fact that a negative turn of events would threaten Russia s key ally, Kazakhstan, which today acts as a kind of buffer zone between Russia and Central Asia. It should also be noted that the situation in Afghanistan and Great Central Asia is influenced by other (short-term but highly relevant) factors. For instance, the position of Iran, India, and some European countries with regard to Afghanistan. In this case, the increase in India s political activity could be a direct result of the processes taking place in Pakistan. Tehran, meanwhile, is concerned about the Afghan authorities loose control over the Iranian-Afghan border. Another crucial factor in any analysis of the situation in Afghanistan is the rising potential for conflict in the Middle East. Syria, for instance, has become a model of destabilization (infiltration of militants and active external support for their activities), which could be successfully replicated in Afghanistan. Structurally, this model can be described as follows: the tools of destabilization are the radical groups that in fact make up most of the armed wing of the Syrian opposition. Their activity is backed by the sponsors of destabilization external actors in pursuit of their own geopolitical and economic goals. The civil war in Syria has shown that even a well-organized army (one of the strongest in the Middle East) cannot handle an inflow of trained and heavily armed mercenaries. It is not hard to imagine what would happen if external actors decided to impose the Syrian model of destabilization on Afghanistan. In such a scenario, it is inconceivable that the government of Hamid Karzai could cling on to power for more than just a few months. According to official Syrian (and a few independent) sources, the ranks of the opposition groups in Syria contain mercenaries from Afghanistan. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Aleppo and Damascus are being used as a training ground to sharpen the tools of destabilization for subsequent deployment in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. TWO POLARIZING SCENARIOS: CONSERVATIVE AND ALARMIST In view of the above, Afghanistan will reach an important fork in the road after Of all the available paths, the two extremes are the conservative and alarmist options. The latter is a cause of great concern within the expert community, especially in Russia and the CIS. It foresees the overthrow of the government of Hamid Karzai after the withdrawal of NATO troops, and the return to power of the Taliban in Kabul. Thereafter, having assumed control of the whole country, the Taliban will become militarily involved in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, or try to organize a march on Islamabad. The consequence will be the Somalia-ization of this vast region and severe problems for its neighbors. The opposite scenario foresees the continuation of the current political regime in Kabul (with or without Karzai). It is possible that some moderate Taliban leaders will get a seat in parliament and ministerial portfolios. In other words, the Islamic radicals will be integrated into power to a certain degree. Subsequently, civil peace and accord in Afghanistan will gradually become entrenched, and the country will join the growing band of modern democracies. The above scenarios are polar opposites, and the likelihood of either taking root in its pure form is relatively low. The true picture most likely lies somewhere in between. Whether or not the final script is optimistic or pessimistic in tone largely depends on the policy pursued in respect of Afghanistan by the main external actors: the U.S., Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, and others. HOW THE U.S. VIEWS POST-WITHDRAWAL AFGHANISTAN REUTERS The U.S. has at its disposal a fairly wide range of options for action in Afghanistan and Great Central Asia as a whole. The most likely course, as mentioned above, will be to gradually draw the region into its system of containment vis-à-vis China. However, Afghanistan may well end up playing a different role in U.S. policy. For example, it is quite feasible to use the country to put pressure on Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Washington may also decide not to retain any signifi- 16 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

19 cant influence in Afghanistan, and to focus on other problems instead. The latter variant will most likely prevail if the socio-economic situation in the U.S. deteriorates and the domestic political difficulties facing the Obama and post-2016 administrations continue to mount. Moreover, the potential for the situation to worsen in other global regions viewed as more important from the U.S. perspective than Afghanistan and Central Asia remains, although there is no visible trend in that direction at present. On top of that, the shale revolution of recent years could hand the U.S. a much greater degree of energy independence in the near future. This, in turn, could mean a sharp curtailment of the country s dependence on the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which, depending on the circumstances, could cause Washington to rethink its Middle East policy. At the same time, given the current development of U.S.-Iranian relations, the focus could well shift toward Tehran. If Iran really were to become a key partner of the U.S., it could radically alter the lay of the land in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The U.S. is reported to be in active negotiations with Iran in an attempt to settle the disputes between the two countries. Theoretically, a U.S.-Iranian partnership is in the interests of both Washington and Tehran. If the dialogue is successful (although there is still a long way to go), the U.S. can restore its positions in the Middle East, which were badly hit by the string of failures in Iraq, Egypt and Syria. However, it is clear that countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia will make every effort to thwart any rapprochement between Iran and the U.S. Regarding Iranian-Afghan relations, it should be noted that the current situation in Afghanistan (namely, the growing influence of the Taliban) threatens Iran, too. For Tehran, it is all too clear that the Taliban are enemies of the Shia, and if the militant group were to establish full control over the western provinces of Afghanistan, Iran would have to pay serious thought to the issues of border security and neighborly relations. What is more, the matter relates not only to Iran s border with Afghanistan, but also with Pakistan. As shown by the incident in November this year, extremist attacks against Iran can (and do) originate from Pakistan. On this basis, we can conclude that the U.S. and Iran are willing to cooperate on Afghanistan. However, the situation may yet take another twist. The fact is that the U.S. sees Afghanistan as a bridgehead for wielding influence over the Iranian leadership. If the U.S. can stir up trouble for Iran in the east, its activity in the west (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf) will be kept in check. But it remains to be seen how far the U.S. is willing to go in its courting of radical forces in Afghanistan. HOW RUSSIA VIEWS POST-WITHDRAWAL AFGHANISTAN Events that occur in Afghanistan and in neighboring states directly affect the interests of Russia, which is a key player in the region of Great Central Asia. Destabilization of the region stretching from China to the Caspian Sea is absolutely unacceptable for Moscow, because it inevitably means that Russia will have to intervene. An intervention in the region would divert resources from other important directions that determine Russia s development. Nevertheless, Russia is proceeding with extreme caution on the Afghan problem. First of all, it should be understood that Central Asia represents a single region for Russia only geographically, but not politically or economically. Central Asia is divided into three conventional spaces. Kazakhstan is Russia s closest ally, with which Russia is building a new integration project, the Eurasian Economic Union. The second space is the former Soviet Central Asian republics, which Moscow interacts with to some extent. Moscow and these republics have complex military, economic and political ties. These relations refer to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both of which are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as well as candidates for entering the Customs Union, and possibly in the future, the Eurasian Union. In addition, Russia has a special interest with regards to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The third area is Afghanistan itself. Since the stability of this country influences the stability of Russian Central Asia, the Afghan direction is extremely important for Russia. However, Russia s leadership is far more interested in maintaining influence in the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) than in the performance of a control function over the situation in Afghanistan. This state of affairs implies the following rational policy scenario for Russia in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country, Moscow will make an effort to monitor and neutralize any threats that emanate from Afghanistan towards Russian Central Asia. This involves a Russian military presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as expanding security cooperation agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It should be noted that such a policy is already being implemented to a large extent. Russia has announced the expansion of its military infrastructure in Tajikistan (which implies an increase in the contingent of Russian Armed Forces in this country). Further development of the Kant Base in Kyrgyzstan is also planned. Thus, the first steps in this direction have already been made. One can predict that in the future, especially in the second half of , Russia will undertake additional efforts to expand its military presence in Central Asia. Having Kazakhstan as its closest ally, Moscow will also strengthen its military cooperation with this country. From the point of view of Russia s interests, this state acts as a kind of buffer that protects Russia from exports of instability from the Central Asian region. Any threat to Kazakhstan, especially a military one, is clearly seen in the Kremlin as a direct challenge to the vital interests of the Russian Federation (which requires an appropriate subsequent response). RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 17

20 The best solution would be for Russia to support Afghanistan through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization However, Russian policy towards Afghanistan itself will be different. The Kremlin has repeatedly expressed its concern about the withdrawal of NATO troops from that country before all the assigned tasks of the United Nations were completed. The increased violence in Afghanistan and the strengthening of the Taliban indicates that the alliance has failed in its mission. However, Russia, by no means wishes to replace NATO. The country would prefer to be part of a new system of international control over the situation in Afghanistan. The best solution would be for Russia to support Afghanistan through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, this would mean an increase of Russian and Chinese positions in Afghanistan, which is absolutely unacceptable for the United States. At the same time, a long-term U.S. military presence in the country is also contrary to Russian and Chinese interests. Therefore, most likely, Russia will operate in Afghanistan after 2014 as follows. First, it will try to establish a dialogue within the Russia China U.S. triangle and coordinate with its partners the basic policy principles in Afghanistan (the so-called rules of the game ). Second, Russia will begin an intensive dialogue with the major players in the region Pakistan, Iran, and India aiming at their active involvement in the Afghan project. Third, Moscow will seek maximum involvement of the UN in finding solutions to the situation in the country. Generally speaking, Russia is expecting serious instability after the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. The question now is whether this instability will give rise to new opportunities to satisfy interests in the region that are the most important for Russia. For now, Moscow considers the possibility that the situation in Afghanistan in the coming years may develop in a completely unpredictable manner, and thereby negate even the most objective forecasts. HOW CHINA VIEWS POST-WITHDRAWAL AFGHANISTAN Much will depend on China or rather how keen Beijing will be to intervene if the situation escalates. At present, it is consciously focused on economic cooperation, doing whatever it can to avoid becoming entangled in Afghanistan s internal affairs. Here, it is safe to say that the collapse of the current political regime in Afghanistan and the coming to power of the Taliban stand in stark contrast to Chinese interests. And not simply because Central Asia would suffer. It could sow the seeds for potential conflict in China itself, namely the restless Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, for the time being, the Taliban s push into Xinjiang can be classified as a purely theoretical assumption. Even if problems were to arise, China should be able to muster sufficient manpower and resources to exert full control over the territory. Therefore, in the near future, China is likely to tiptoe along the same cautious lines as in recent years. To cover its back, Beijing will actively seek allies with the aim of shared responsibility. This means, above all, deeper consultations with Russia and the U.S., as well as with China s traditional ally in the region, Pakistan. HOW PAKISTAN VIEWS POST-WITHDRAWAL AFGHANISTAN Pakistan, meanwhile, is alarmed by the sense of elation among Islamists. Everyone knows that NATO is not leaving the region because it has accomplished its mission. Quite the contrary, Afghanistan has become a de facto defeat for the North Atlantic alliance. Radical forces in the region have long developed their own refresher course in world history, which essentially holds that Western crusaders have regularly tried to conquer Afghanistan, one of the few remaining strongholds of true faith. And every time, they say, the Almighty bestows victory upon us! According to this outlook, the world s superpowers have taken turns to invade and retreat: the British Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Soviet Union at the end of the last century, and now the U.S. It is not surprising that Pakistan is voicing particular concern about the euphoria among the Taliban. The country is joined to Afghanistan by the Pashtun tribal belt. The Federal Administration Tribal Area (FATA) is older than Pakistan itself. Here, the law of Pakistan has no sway, and power lies in the hands of the Pashtun leaders. The territory was created in the early 20th century by the British Viceroy, Lord Curzon, who proposed self-rule and money for the ungovernable Pashtun leaders in exchange for loyalty. The system proved very successful, and independent Pakistan left it unchanged. As a result, there are seven administrative units in existence today, each a kind of tribal mini-state: Bajaur, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, Khyber, and North and South Waziristan. Here, 18 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

21 too, runs the British-drawn Afghan-Pakistani border, which, after Britain s withdrawal, was not recognized by any Afghan government (the mountain dwellers, meanwhile, refuse to recognize any demarcation at all). These mountains have become a place of refuge for Taliban fighters forced to flee Afghanistan and for local Pakistani supporters of the Taliban, acting against their own government. It is obvious that the Islamists are also preparing for the withdrawal of Western troops from the region. Pakistani police note with concern the radicals fundraising activity: kidnappings for ransom are up (this method of replenishing the party coffers is a Taliban favorite), and so too is armed robbery, among other things. Funds are being raised to continue the Islamist war after regions, where the Taliban s ideology of true Islam could find many adherents. Furthermore, Islamabad desperately fears a new influx of refugees from Afghanistan in the event of civil war in that country. In the 1980s, when the Soviet Union had a military presence in Afghanistan, several million Afghan refugees crossed the border into Pakistan. According to estimates, more than a million of them remain in Pakistan today. Islamabad has already stated that it is not willing to open its borders to another wave of refugees. The situation in Afghanistan is being followed no less intently by India Pakistan s neighbor and archenemy. New Delhi is actively developing relations with the Karzai government, seeking to gain a foothold on the other side of the Pakistani border. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has already stated that India will not cease to support the people of Afghanistan, stopping short of other promises. New Delhi has clearly adopted a wait-and-see approach. THE LURKING THREAT OF GLOBAL ISLAMIC REVOLUTION REUTERS the withdrawal of NATO. The only consolation for Pakistan s political elite is the thought that the Taliban s main target may be Afghanistan, where the Islamists will potentially seek outright victory. The Pakistani press, judging by recent publications, is in no doubt that a fresh civil war looms large in Afghanistan, the vortex of which Pakistan cannot hope to escape. Many in Islamabad fear that the Taliban could try to exit the tribal zone and push into non-pashtun areas, which would be unprecedented. Until now, the Islamist insurgency has been localized in the northwest regions of the country the tribal belt and neighboring territories. Outside of these regions, the Taliban still confines itself to suicide attacks, albeit nationwide. But Taliban militants have yet to penetrate Punjab or Sindh. That, however, is the most pessimistic of all the forecasts. Many believe that the militants would not dare to engage the vastly superior government forces in open battle. According to various estimates, the militants in the tribal zone, mostly armed with makeshift weapons, number a few tens of thousands, while Islamabad alone is ringed by a 100,000-strong professional force with aircraft, tanks, and artillery. In total, Pakistan s armed forces can call upon more then 600,000 troops. A more realistic threat is the partial Talibanization of Pakistan, especially the Pashtun In summarizing the outlined scenarios, the only certain fact is that no one knows for sure how Afghanistan will develop post The world s powers all have the potential to influence the region, and all seem to be pulling in different directions. Therein lurks a hidden danger: as long as the fate of Afghanistan and neighboring countries lies in foreign hands, new security challenges will emerge. In this regard, fears stemming from the rising ideological influence of the radicals should not be ignored. If NATO s departure emboldens Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to poke their heads over the trenches, the whole region will once again become a center of propaganda for the ideology of true Islam and the terrorism associated with it. The popularity of Islamist slogans is growing against a backdrop of corruption, and chronic economic and social problems. Islamists speak of equality, social justice, and government corruption, prescribing a true Islamic state as the only remedy. Recall that under Taliban rule, Afghanistan became a haven for militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Islamists from Tajikistan and other Central Asian states. Many subsequently made their way to Pakistan, where they gained practical experience of war and theoretical training. In northwest Pakistan, madrassas indoctrinated their foreign students in true Islam. Generally speaking, the activation of Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan could lead to a new surge in popularity for the ideas of global Islamic revolution, which could affect all the actors involved in the Afghan game. And that threat is likely to be far more potent than the Taliban s hypothetical march on the Volga. RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 19

22 REUTERS Part 4 George Joffé CONSEQUENCES OF NATO WITHDRAWAL: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST The departure of ISAF will have implications for the region around Afghanistan and will affect states even further away. 20 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

23 Afghanistan is split into significant tribal groups that have traditionally articulated their own imperatives By the end of 2014, if the plans of NATO s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) do not go awry, foreign combat forces should have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. Any remaining forces will be predominantly concerned with a training mission for the Afghani National Security Forces (ANSF). Yet, the disappearance of ISAF and the end of the Western intervention inside Afghanistan is likely to have ongoing implications for Afghanistan itself and the surrounding region. After all, a major factor determining the future of the country for nearly the past fifteen years will have been removed and surrounding states will have to adjust to such a disappearance. The consequences for Afghanistan itself are unpredictable and depend very much on the ability of the ANSF to dominate the security situation. And that, in turn, depends in large part on the nature of governance that emerges there in the wake of the next presidential elections. Of course, the Karzai government in Afghanistan does not exist in isolation and the problems it faces have causes that originate outside the borders it controls. By the same token, steps taken by the government in Afghanistan in the wake of the withdrawal will have implications for the surrounding region. Perhaps the two states most directly affected will be Pakistan and Iran, but there will also be implications for the stability of Central Asian states that border Afghanistan Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as well. Beyond that, there might also be consequences for states in the Gulf which have provided funding for the Taliban and al-qaida in the past. Nor, indeed, will those states who were the leading contributors to ISAF such as the United States be indifferent to future developments in Afghanistan, particularly if al-qaida were to reestablish a base there. IMPLICATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN The Karzai government over the past decade has been characterized by an administration that is highly centralized and highly corrupt. At the same time, it has been unable to control the peripheral major population centers, so that each of them has tended to devolve into fiefdoms of their individual governors. Often, these governors are figures who, in the past, acted as autonomous warlords. Even where Kabul has been able to appoint its own personnel, it has not been able to ensure a con- tinuity or uniformity of cohesive control, with the result that provincial administration has often been far more autonomous than the central authorities would have wished. Moreover, there have been the complications of ethnic and tribal considerations. Afghanistan is split into significant tribal groups that have traditionally articulated their own imperatives. Thus, up to 40 percent of the population, concentrated mainly in the east along the border with Pakistan and spreading into southern Afghanistan, is Pashtun. This is also the tribal group from which the president comes and has been the major source of dissidence for the central government and the mainspring of the Taliban. In addition, these populations spill over Afghanistan s border with Pakistan the much-derided Durand Line into Pakistan s tribal territories, where they are also outside the direct control of the Pakistani government in Islamabad. They therefore represent a secure hinterland for the Taliban and its associated groups, outside the direct control of both governments. This has been one of the major reasons for ISAF s and now the Afghani government s failure to effectively challenge the resurgence of the Taliban. The Pashtun, however, are not the only fissiparous tribal community with which the government in Kabul must contend. In the northeast, for example, are the Tajiks. Ironically enough, this is a non-tribal community that nonetheless shares the characteristics of Afghanistan s more coherent tribes. They have long resisted Pashtun domination and, during the resistance to Soviet forces and the subsequent civil war, when they were led by Ahmed Shah Masood, they created what was effectively an independent state to the east of the Salang Tunnel in the Panshir Valley. Then, around Mazar-i-Sharif, there is a large Uzbekdominated region which still has close links with the population of Uzbekistan. The third largest tribal community in Afghanistan, the Shiite Hazara, is located mainly in the center of the country and has close ties with their religious brethren in Iran. They have always been hostile to the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, even though Iran has, in the past, covertly supported Taliban groups to embarrass American forces in the country. This tribal patchwork quilt lies over the formal structure of government and is further complicated by the fact that it is not so much formal tribal structures that determine local political action but informal patterns of local influence and power. ISAF was never able to completely master these socio-political complexities and, as a result, had less-than-perfect relations with RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 21

24 Gross school enrollment ratio in Afghanistan 19% 98% REUTERS local power-brokers, a feature which vitiated much of its attempts at winning hearts and minds. The Karzai government has failed in this respect as well, for its own reasons. The fact that it has been Pashtun-dominated has rendered it difficult to accept to the majority of Afghanis and the fact that it has prioritized Pashtun clans against other an aspect of the corruption that pervades the administration has meant that it has failed to gain purchase in Pashtun-dominated regions, too. One consequence of all of this has been to stimulate insurgency against the president s administration. Indeed, a significant part of the so-called Taliban resurgence has really been a reaction to the perceived depredations of the Karzai administration. The insurgency has undergone significant changes since it first emerged in the 1990s as a coherent movement led by Mullah Omar and based on the Deobandi seminaries amongst the Afghani refugees in Pakistan. There now seem to be at least three or four strands loosely grouped together under the Taliban rubric, not all of whom share common goals. Alongside the original Taliban movement under Mullah Omar, now based in the tribal territories of Pakistan and largely marginalized by ISAF and the new American policy of drone attacks, there are the much more active Hekmatyar and Haqqani movements, although the Haqqani Network appears currently to be undergoing something of an eclipse amongst its tribal backers. Then there is the Pakistani Taliban, a movement derived from the original movement in Afghanistan but now predominantly directed towards Pakistan itself, despite targeted American attacks upon its leadership. It, however, has made it clear that, as ISAF forces draw down, it will increasingly switch its focus towards Afghanistan. Finally, there is the localized and often fragmented resistance inside Afghanistan itself, directed against both ISAF and the Karzai government. These divisions on the ground also imply divisions in tactics and objectives. Whereas the original Taliban and its Pakistani counterpart wish to restore an Islamic emirate as part of the ultimate objective of a new caliphate an objective shared by the Hekmatyar and Haqqani groups as well the localized domestic opposition has a much more flexible agenda. Realizing that defeating the new ANSF framework would be very difficult, this domestic opposition, together with at least part of the original Afghani Taliban, seeks a role in government. To achieve this goal, these opposition groups are prepared to compromise on their objectives and to negotiate with the Karzai government or its successor. In principle, the Karzai gov- 22 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

25 The problems for Pakistan are complex and, at one level, the same as they were before ISAF decided to leave Afghanistan ernment realizes that it needs to respond positively to such initiatives, despite the threats that might pose to established interests within the regime. In practice, however, the corrupt and incompetent administration may find this very difficult to do. As a result, the one formal attempt to start negotiations in Qatar last summer remains stillborn. This could prove to be a serious setback for the country, once American and ISAF forces withdraw. It is clear that, for now at least, Afghanistan s own security forces can probably contain the insurgency but they will not be able to reverse it. Furthermore, as time goes by and unless there are significant improvements in command-and-control capabilities, the balance of power will increasingly turn against the ANSF. Eventually, the ANSF will lack the essential skills to carry the struggle to the enemy because of attrition rates, lack of heavy equipment and the skills to use such equipment to the best effect. If, as it threatens, the Pakistani Taliban joins the fight, the ANSF might well be overwhelmed and then, over time, the endgame faced by Mohammed Najibullah in 1996 may be played out again. It is possible, however, that President Karzai, if he returns to power, may feel sufficiently empowered to be able to seize the opportunity to negotiate a Taliban presence in his government that he has thus far avoided until now. IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN The problems for Pakistan are complex and, at one level, the same as they were before ISAF decided to leave Afghanistan. Strategists in Pakistan, particularly in the Directorate of Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) have long seen Afghanistan as Pakistan s strategic buffer, a convenient hinterland from which it could resist Indian pressure, should relations with its eastern neighbor suddenly worsen again. Conversely, India has seen Afghanistan as a lever to use against Pakistan if such circumstances were reversed, with Delhi seeking to prioritize good relations with Kabul in recent years. In response, Pakistan has sought to pressure the authorities in Kabul to accommodate its concerns by supporting the armed opposition against it so that, come what may, it will either have a compliant government in Kabul or a government which it helped to put in power. The ISI, which has tended to dominate Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan, has long been a major funding source for the more extreme pro-taliban groups, such as Hekmatyar s Hezb-e Islami and the Haqqani Network, partly because of shared religious values but primarily out of strategic choice. The difficulty for the Pakistani government has been that these groups have been largely based in the tribal territories along the Durand Line and, thus, outside its direct control. Furthermore, such groups have long had links with al-qaida, which is located in the same, barely-controlled region. One consequence of this has been the growth of a powerful Pakistani Taliban movement which seeks radical change inside Pakistan itself, despite the elected government there. Yet, Pakistan also has the United States as its primary ally and foreign funder and American policy is diametrically opposed to the consequences of ISI support for both al-qaida and the Taliban. As a result, Pakistan has found itself in the uncomfortable position of being forced to tolerate American drone strikes from bases on its own territory against the leaderships of the groups it supports in Afghanistan. And, if that were not difficult enough, the Nawwaz Sharif government in Islamabad must now also tolerate attacks against the leadership of the Pakistani Taliban as well at a time when it was about to negotiate directly with Pakistani Taliban leaders. There are ancillary factors, too, for Pakistan to keep in mind ahead of the withdrawal. Pakistan accrued significant funding from organizing ISAF s rear bases, since most of ISAF s supplies came in to Pakistan by sea before being shipped off to the forces in Afghanistan. This was the case as the alternative route through Russia and Central Asia was so costly and the United States had had problems with Central Asian governments over maintaining airbases on their territories. This will now end with the departure of ISAF forces from Afghanistan, leaving behind only a small support mission at best. The Pakistani authorities must now also decide if they wish to continue to support (or allow the ISI to continue to support) the Taliban, given the danger that the Pakistan Taliban might ally itself with the remnants of Mullah Omar s movement and seriously threaten the Karzai government or its successor in Kabul. For Premier Nawwaz Sharif, there is the problem as to whether he can control the ISI or, indeed, whether he should want to alter its agenda. Instead, Pakistan can act to ensure that a sympathetic government be installed in Kabul that will resist Indian blandishments. Yet, if Pakistan s leader does not challenge the ISI and its backers, can he ensure continued American support? Can he ensure that his domestic opposition (with army backing) will not turn on his own government, given the forces available RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 23

26 The cost of operations in Afghanistan to date has been around $673 billion $40 billion for the United States for Britain REUTERS to it? The ISAF withdrawal for Pakistan, in short, creates a major dilemma. IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN For Iran, the situation is more straightforward. Teheran s primary concerns are threefold: the security of its eastern border, control of drug smuggling across that border or via Pakistan s Baluchistan, and the protection of the Hazara as followers of the same Shi a religion. Teheran is also anxious to persuade the remaining 1 million Afghani refugees that it has housed for many years to return home. Beyond this, of course is a concern to ensure that Afghanistan should not become an extremist Sunni redoubt that would further isolate Iran inside the South Asian and Central Asian regions, not least because there are plans afoot to supply natural gas to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan or Baluchistan. The drug smuggling issue is not trivial. Iran is fighting a losing battle against drugs, especially heroin, because of Sistan-Baluchistan s proximity to Afghanistan. It has committed 42,000 soldiers, police and militia to monitoring its 1,950 km frontier with Afghanistan and Pakistan and has blockaded the region with 200 observation posts, walls and trenches at a cost of $1 billion. Between 1979 and 2003, it lost 3,140 men in battles with smugglers and the situation is getting worse, mainly in Baluchistan, where smugglers export petrol and return with drugs and illegal migrants. Although traditionally, Iran has been a transit country, it has a growing problem of domestic addiction, with the number of addicts estimated by the United Nations to be 1.25 million in 2003, compared with 1 million five years before. Iranian sources claim that the true figure is now nearer 2 million. Iranian seizures of opium-related drugs total 85 percent of all seizures of such drugs worldwide but are estimated to be no more than 10 to 20 percent of the total traffic through Iran. In 2000, Iran seized 250 tons of drugs but at least 40 percent of the drugs traffic terminates in Iran for domestic use. By RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

27 2011, seizures in Iran had risen to 400 tons and security costs annually had risen to $700 million. 1 Border security alone will be insufficient for Iran s purposes and the government in Teheran will also look for influence inside Afghanistan itself. It will cease its covert support for Taliban groups which it used to destabilize the American presence there after 2001, despite its earlier hostility to the movement. Instead it will now seek to re-establish its presence in Herat, the third-largest city in Afghanistan, just 150 km from the border between the two countries. IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA The future for Afghanistan s Central Asian neighbors is much less clear. Tajikistan maintains privileged relations with Afghanistan s Tajik community, as Uzbekistan does with the Uzbeks around Mazar-i-Sharif. The governments of both countries also maintain good relations with Kabul. But both also fear the implications of a renewal of Taliban influence and both have considerable problems over drug smuggling from Afghanistan into their territories and onward to Russia and the West. More importantly, both fear a resurgence of Islamist radicalism, particularly from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which, in the past, has operated out of Tajikistan. This, of course, will be a function of the future role of the Taliban inside Afghanistan, something which is at present very difficult to quantify with accuracy but which depends on the future nature of the governmental regime in Kabul, whether dominated by Hamid Karzai or not. Turkmenistan had has good relations with Afghanistan and the Turkoman state has ambitions to run a natural gas pipeline across Afghanistan to supply gas to India and Pakistan. For Turkmenistan, therefore, the success of the government in Kabul in maintaining itself and creating security inside Afghanistan is a priority. In essence, therefore, all three Central Asian states wish to maintain good relations with Afghanistan but will not tolerate the spillover effects attendant upon a radical takeover there. 1. World Drug Report United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 25

28 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD REUTERS In 2005, the Afghan National Police had 53,400 personnel. By July 2013, the numbers had risen to 157,000 active members. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA The sole remaining neighbor to Afghanistan China also has specifically local or regional concerns. It only shares a very short border with Afghanistan, at the end of the Wakhan Corridor in Badakhshan province, but the Chinese province abutting Afghanistan is Xinjiang, the heartland of China s Muslim community and a constant source of anxiety to Beijing. Chinese leaders have long believed that radicalism in Xinjiang is a consequence of external interference and, therefore, have viewed radical developments in Afghanistan with a very jaundiced eye. They have, however, enjoyed good relations with the Karzai government, after a period of frosty relations during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Chinese companies intend to invest heavily in the Aynak copper mines project. Were the Taliban to return to power, however, China would undoubtedly regard this as an extremely adverse development and would immediately take preventative action to minimize the consequences it would anticipate in Xinjiang. Beyond the neighboring states, other states in the region that would be concerned about developments in Afghanistan after the departure of ISAF forces would be the Arab states of the Gulf. One reasons for this would be their anxieties about any resurgence of Iranian power in the wake of the withdrawal of American forces from the region. It was noticeable that, during the first decade of the twentyfirst century, the Gulf States were comforted by the sudden emergence of an American physical presence on all of Iran s land frontiers and in the Persian Gulf. The American Fifth Fleet had been based in Bahrain at the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, for course, but American anger at the al-qaida attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 meant that, suddenly, American forces were stationed in Afghanistan and at staging posts in Central Asia. And, after the 2003 invasion, these American forces were stationed in Iraq as well. This frustrated Iranian designs to dominate the Gulf and Central Asia and had comforted the states within the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia. Now, however, American forces have left Iraq and will leave Afghanistan in 2014, thus liberating Iran, in their eyes, to pursue its hegemonic ambitions once again. Quite apart from such geopolitical concerns, the Gulf States also have more atavistic concerns. It was, after all, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with the United States, that had inadvertently presided over the birth of al-qaida inside Afghanistan in the 1980s. Moreover, it had been private sources in the Gulf States that had, alongside Pakistan, funded the growth of the Taliban. The sums that had been involved were significant it is estimated that official funding for the mujahedin resistance to the Soviet occupation had begun at $35 million in 1982, rising to $600 million by 1987 and that up to $600 million had passed through the hands of the Maktab al-khidma, the precursor to al-qaida. Much of it went to radical groups such as those organized by Ghulbuddin Hekmatyar. 2 These funds were in addition to financing for the 5 million Afghani refugees in Pakistan which came from charities and charitable funds in the Middle East, totaling a staggering $98 billion by Interestingly, with the ascension of the Taliban to power, external official aid dropped off dramatically. During the decade up to 2009, aid from the Gulf totaled only $1.337 billion a far cry from the sums that had been involved two decades before. Saudi Arabia, to the disgust of Afghani officials after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, did continue additional funding of around $250 million to spread Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies but direct political funding virtually ceased. The loss of external official aid, however, was substantially 2. Peter Bergen, Holy war, Inc.: inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

29 Since 2001, ISAF s losses included 3,393 dead, with 2,140 of them being American and 446 British. Of these, a total of 1,772 had been killed in action. Moreover, another 19,310 had been wounded. REUTERS compensated by private funding from the Gulf. American sources estimated that radical groups in the region received up to $100 million in 2010 alone, much of it provided through the untraceable hawala money-transfer system. This was in addition to the funds that radical groups involved in the resistance to the ISAF presence in Afghanistan received through the taxes and extortion they levied, particularly on the drugs trade. Indeed, these sums dwarfed the sums provided by private sympathizers in the Gulf, which represented only one-tenth of their total income, according to well-informed intelligence sources. In short, the resistance to established pro-western government in Afghanistan is now thoroughly criminalized, a factor that will make its eradication even more difficult in the future. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA After the Soviet Union s nine-year-long engagement in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Russia has been very circumspect in terms of its objectives there. Indeed, up to the end of the 2000s, relations between the two countries were very subdued with Russian concerns being predominantly linked to the possibility of radical spillover effects from the Afghani civil war in the first half of the 1990s and from Taliban rule thereafter. Thereafter, Moscow became increasingly concerned about the American presence in Central Asia and in Afghanistan after al- Qaida s attacks on Washington and New York in There were also concerns about drugs making their way into Russia as the Taliban prohibition of poppy cultivation disappeared with American backing for the Northern Alliance. Of course, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia itself was isolated from direct contact with Afghanistan by the protective ring of the new Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, all of which directly border Afghan territory. Russia s interests in Afghanistan, therefore, reflected its anxiety to recover influence over its near abroad after the debacle of the Soviet intervention there. At the same time, Moscow had a newfound interest to sustain and, if possible, improve, its links with its new southern neighbors: at one remove, they effectively protected Russia s southern borders from insecurity and instability. Not surprisingly, Moscow took an acute interest in their relations with Afghanistan. In 2008, however, Russia began to take a renewed direct interest in Afghanistan, partly because of American encouragement, agreeing to supply arms to the new Afghan National Army and to provide training to the new police force being formed there. It was not that a sudden Russian-U.S. détente had blossomed Russia retained its concerns and suspicions about NATO s ambitions in Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The United States, however, was anxious to share the burden of ensuring Afghani security and, as the possibility of ISAF s withdrawal from Afghanistan loomed ever closer, Russia was obliged to renew its involvement in the South. The timing was propitious, too, for NATO had been forced, with Russian cooperation, to open its Northern Distribution Network the expensive transit route through Russia and Cen- RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 27

30 tral Asia to supply ISAF forces in Afghanistan after the shorter routes through Pakistan had become unsafe. Russia, too, had discovered that joint initiatives for regional security in the wake of an ISAF withdrawal through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were to be stymied by Chinese disinterest and caution, leaving only the skeletal Collective Security Treaty Organization, based on Russia and Central Asia, as an unsatisfactory alternative. In November 2010, Russia collaborated with American forces in anti-drug-smuggling operations, with Afghani government approval, in the wake of the Sochi summit the previous August when President Medvedev sought to rebuild Russian-Afghani relations and Russia agreed, in principle, to supply Afghani forces with attack helicopters. These initiatives culminated in late January 2011 in a two-day visit to Moscow by the Afghani president, Hamid Karzai, the first official visit by an Afghani head of state to Russia since the Soviet withdrawal in During the visit Moscow agreed to revive uncompleted hydroelectric development projects, to refurbish the dilapidated Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush, and to construct an irrigation canal and a nitrogen fertilizer plant. Recently, in April 2013, the Russian deputy defense minister, Anatoly Antonov, announced a program to repair military equipment supplied by Russia in Afghanistan, in a new attempt to improve Afghanistan s security environment after ISAF has departed. He went out of his way, however, to make it clear that Russia had no intention of establishing military bases inside Afghanistan once NATO s forces ceased to guarantee Afghani security. Nonetheless, it is clear that Russia sees a new role for itself there in the wake of the Western departure, if only to prevent extremism, terrorism and drugs from reaching Central Asia and Russia itself. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES And what of the principal Western partners who made up the bulk of ISAF s forces and who provided its command-andcontrol structures? Will their interests in and concern for Afghanistan disappear as their forces leave the Afghani theater? This is hardly likely, given their commitments to the training of Afghanistan s embryonic security forces. The United States, in particular, will have long-term commitments to equip the new forces and its concerns about the revival of al-qaida as violence inside Afghanistan grows, will mean that its support for Pakistan to guarantee access and basing facilities for the drone campaign will continue. The sums involved are massive: In 2011, global assistance to Afghanistan was $6.5 billion, of which humanitarian assistance made up $771 million and peacekeeping $950 million, equivalent to 35 percent of Afghanistan s gross national income and dwarfing government revenues of $4.5 billion. 3 Of course, these sums will significantly decline after ISAF s departure but they will still be significant. And even though Washington may be set on its Asian pivot, it will not be able to ignore the growth of radicalism in Afghanistan, whether or not the Karzai government survives. 3. Global Humanitarian Assistance: Afghanistan. May RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

31 AFGHAN AFGHAN ENDGAME ENDGAME #2 #2 DECEMBER Conclusion POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1. First and foremost, Washington and Moscow should keep in mind that they have a common interest in preventing the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan. They should work together on this even after the completion of the NATO withdrawal. 2. Washington and Moscow should also work closely with other powers that have a strong interest in preventing the Taliban from returning to power: India, the Central Asian states, and Iran. In particular, Russia should seek to facilitate the integration of Iran into the collective process for handling Afghanistan s transition from occupation by ISAF to independent statehood. This would involve encouraging rapprochement between the United States and Iran over regional issues, including relations with Syria and the nuclear issue, as well as specific issues related to Afghanistan. 3. Washington and Moscow should persuade Beijing to work more actively to discourage Pakistan from aiding the Taliban. From Beijing s perspective, if the Taliban does retake Afghanistan, it is likely to support similar groups seeking the secession of Xinjiang from China. 4. The United States should reconsider its relationship with Pakistan in the light of its withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly the ways in which it engages with problems of extremism and terrorism. It should endeavor to develop policy responses that do not antagonize the Pakistani government, such as its controversial drones policy. 5. If Pakistan does continue to support the Taliban, then Washington and Moscow should work together to persuade the UN Security Council to enact appropriate resolutions aimed at bringing about and end to this unfortunate behavior. 6. Washington and Moscow should work together to bring about a diplomatic solution to the India-Pakistan dispute. Doing so could serve to reduce Islamabad s incentives to support the Taliban, which Islamabad now sees as an ally against India. 7. The United States should endeavor to persuade the Karzai government or its successor to pursue negotiations with the moderates in the Taliban. The goal should be incorporating these moderate Taliban elements into the government after ISAF forces have exited from Afghanistan. 8. The United States should also persuade the Afghani government to consider creating a federal structure for Afghanistan based on the key six or seven major towns that were the bases for the PRTs and acted as autonomous centers during the civil war. These centers should enjoy local security responsibilities and tax-raising powers, as well as the ability to encourage local development. The central government should concentrate on foreign affairs and defense, whilst also providing administrative institutions to ensure national unity. 9. Russia should strengthen its military cooperation and security cooperation with the Central Asian countries through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 10. Moscow should discuss measures for stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan with its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 29

32 RECOMMENDED BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON AFGHANISTAN 1. Ahmed Rashid. Pakistan on the brink: The future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West. London: Hurst, Sandy Gall. War against the Taliban: Why it all went wrong in Afghanistan. London: Bloomsbury, Jack Devine and Whitney Kassel. Afghanistan: withdrawal lessons. World Policy Journal, Fall Muhammad Saleem Mazhar. Post-2014 Afghanistan. A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann. Talibanistan: Negotiating borders between terror, politics and religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla. Afghan endgames: strategy and policy choices for America s longest war. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, Antonio Giustozzi. Decoding the new Taliban: Insights from the Afghan field. London: Hurst, Kelly Terrence. Security force assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Nick Turse. The case for withdrawal from Afghanistan. London: Verso, Scott Cameron. Assessing ISAF: A baseline study of NATO s role in Afghanistan. London: British American Security Information Council, RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

33 TOP 10 TWITTER ACCOUNTS FOR Official news updates from the International Security Assistance Force in AaPak Channel, a joint project of the New America Foundation and Foreign Policy that provides analysis of news from Afghanistan and The official Twitter account of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Analysts Network, an independent Kabul-based policy research Quentin Sommerville, BBC Middle East correspondent stationed in Cairo and tweeting on TOLOnews, Afghanistan s first 24-hours news and current affairs television Kabul Center for Strategic Studies, Afghanistan s leading source of strategic research and policy Yaroslav Trofimov, Afghanistan and Pakistan editor of the Wall Street Journal based in Dylan Welch, a Reuters correspondent reporting on Afghanistan, intelligence, terrorism and national Kathy Gannon, Associated Press special regional correspondent for Afghanistan and Pakistan based in Islamabad. RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT 31

34 AFGHAN ENDGAME AFGHAN ENDGAME #2 DECEMBER # DECEMBER 2013 Project Team Ekaterina Zabrovskaya Editor-in-Chief Dominic Basulto U.S. Editor Yuri Barmin Editor Alexander Sharavin Author Alexei Pilko Author George Joffé Author Evgeny Pakhomov Author Mark N. Katz Author Eugene Abov Director, Russia Direct, Deputy Director General, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publishing House, Publisher, Russia Beyond The Headlines Julia Golikova Director for Development, Russia Direct, Deputy Publisher, Commercial and Foreign Partnership Director, Russia Beyond The Headlines Olga Ivanova Deputy Publisher, Marketing, Russia Beyond The Headlines Ksenia Smertina Project Director Maria Shashaeva New Products Development Director Antonina Osipova Marketing Specialist Darya Karzanova Marketing Manager Dmitry Ontoev Expert Community Outreach Coordinator Andrey Zaitsev Head of Illustration Department, Russia Beyond The Headlines Andrey Shimarskiy Art Director, Russia Beyond The Headlines Natalia Mikhaylenko Designer, Russia Beyond The Headlines Maria Oshepkova Layout Designer, Russia Beyond The Headlines 32 RUSSIA DIRECT QUARTERLY REPORT

35 ABOUT RUSSIA DIRECT: Russia Direct is an international analytical outlet of Russia Beyond The Headlines launched in June of The website, russia-direct.org, features articles, white papers and monthly memos that provide the kind of nuanced understanding required by those with a deep involvement and interest in Russia-U.S. relations and Russian foreign policy. Russia Direct is fast becoming the pre-eminent forum for high-level policy makers, experts, international observers and business leaders from the U.S., Russia and other countries. Long-term, the goal of the project is to improve multilateral relations at the interpersonal, interagency and intergovernmental levels. PREVIOUS REPORTS COMING UP IN JANUARY Sochi and the geopolitics of the Caucasus #1 / August FROM COLD WAR TO CYBERWAR? #2 / September THE MIDDLE EAST: THE NEW GREAT GAME GETTY IMAGES/FOTOBANK The Arctic as a new geopolitical pivot As it warms up, the Arctic has the potential to become a new geopolitical pivot of the 21st century. Internationally recognized Arctic expert Caitlyn Antrim of the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. analyzes everything you need to know about the strategies of existing and aspiring stakeholders in the Arctic. This special Issue of RD Quarterly will analyze whether the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games can bring stability to the Caucasus region, or inflame tensions even more. U.S.-Russia relations: Year in review RD Monthly will be devoted to a yearend assessment of the Russia-U.S. relationship, with a focus on where it s headed in The author is Dr. Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. #3 / October CENTRAL ASIA: THREE SCENARIOS FOR INTEGRATION #4 / November REDRAWING EASTERN EUROPE To get this report, please contact us at contact@russia-direct.org To get these reports for free, become an RD subscriber -