MILITARY BUREAUCRATIC ELITE S TARGET, WEAK POLITICAL INSTITUTION IN PAKISTAN BY SYEDA Q WAQAR CO- AUTHORED BY PROF MARK OLSSEN

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1 MILITARY BUREAUCRATIC ELITE S TARGET, WEAK POLITICAL INSTITUTION IN PAKISTAN BY SYEDA Q WAQAR CO- AUTHORED BY PROF MARK OLSSEN This paper will be presented in the 22 nd Political Science World Congress in Madrid, Spain JULY 8 TH,

2 SYEDA ABSTRACT The most important facet of Pakistan s domestic political development is the role of military in the political system. The paper specifically deals with reasons as to why the political institutions within the country are in such a wretched state for the past six decades, hence compelling the military bureaucratic elite to operate and maintain internal security and cohesion in the country. The paper further scrutinizes the inability of the state to ensure a politically stable path due to the flagging of the political institutions established edifices like parliament, judiciary, and political parties. With the collapse of these structures came the implicit demise of the political course of action constitutionalism. The poor quality of political leadership, constitution and judicial weakness, socio-economic development are few factors which have brought about structural constraint in democratization and hence left a vacuum in the political institution of the country which has been filled by repeated military interventions. The paper also looks at the roots of 2

3 authoritarianism in the country, dating back to 1947, and explains the civilmilitary equation in this context. Introduction Traditionally it is the society which, as a result of its social contract gives birth to the state and also state institutions. Along with the parliament, judiciary, police and civil bureaucracy comes the military, which is one of the most fundamental state institutions. The relationship between military, political leadership and society at large has always been one of the intense intrigues. Feaver explains civil military relationship by assuming that civil military relation is primarily a strategic interaction and the civilians are principal and military is the agent. 1 Samuel Huntington also identifies civil-military relations as military security policy, which together with internal and situational security policies is an aspect of national security policy 2. A plain definition for civil military relations in one that relates to the interaction between armed forces and the rest of the society. Military s separate existence results in the development of a unique culture. In some cases it is seen that on one hand there is trustmistrust relationship between the military and the society and between 1 Peter D Feaver Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2 S P Huntington, The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations,belknap press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England,1957, p 1. 3

4 military government on the other. Military has attempted to intervene 3 in politics throughout centuries, often staging military coup d état. While talking about Pakistan the military preferred to intervene in Pakistan politics directly i.e. in the form of coups. The solidification of democracy in India and its strong political institutionalization paint a very different picture from that of Pakistan, despite the fact that both the states inherited more or less similar state institutions from the state of British India such as a civil bureaucracy, military, constituent assembly (parliament), and constitutional-legal norms and practices etc. Therefore, it naturally becomes imperative to cognize and expound the subtleties of politics and state in Pakistan and specifically the role of the military in the country s politics. Over the course since the inception of Pakistan two issues have been pivotal to Pakistan s political development: first the democratization and second the civil military relations and military bureaucracy. These two issues have been autonomous and yet symbiotic as they have influenced the politics of Pakistan. Democracy in Pakistan has not been able to take root and to understand it fully there is a need to look at the obstacles in the way of promoting democratic norms and institutions, while doing so there is a dire need to address the major 3 The terms military intervention is frequently used in the literate on civil-military relations. See for instance, Finer The Man on Horse Back, the role of military in politics 4

5 problem that why Pakistan s political culture has been undemocratic in its values, orientations as well as political attitudes. The other thing that is interlinked to Pakistan s political culture is Pakistan s military bureaucratic elite. Democratic transitions have failed primarily because of the repeated military interventions. Not one civilian government has been able to complete its tenure since independence in The malfunction of the democratic institutions in Pakistan has been typically accredited to the constitutional and judicial weakness, the poor quality of political leadership and the structural restraints imposed by the Pakistan Military on the democratic institutions. To understand this more clearly, the roots of authoritarianism in Pakistan need to be traced back to the early years of independence when a host of internal, regional and external factors tilted the civil military equation in the army s favour. 4 Politicians, diplomats, and military establishments have their own identities and interests that are not always shared by those for whom they supposedly speak 5 4 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in central Asia (New Haven: Yale university press, 2001). P K Krause &M C Williams (eds), Critical security studies: concepts and cases, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

6 Origins of Military Bureaucracy in Pakistan Political organization cannot exist in social chaos and something very near to social chaos marked the advent of the new state 6 When the British handed over the power to Pakistan in 1947, the Muslim League was assigned with the task of nation building in a multi-cultural state. With very limited resources and almost zero patronage in the areas that constituted the post-colonial state, the league leadership had to stick to centralized rule, swiftly adopting the government of India act 1935 as an interim constitution which provided for a federal parliamentary structure but one with highly centralized features and minimal autonomy for the federating states 7. 6 R.D.Campbell, Pakistan: Emerging Democracy (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), p Samina Ahmed, The fragile Base of democracy in Pakistan, in Amita Shastri and A. Wilson (eds). The postcolonial states of South Asia: democracy, identity, development and security (Surrey: Curzon press, 2001), p.42. 6

7 `Muslim leagues organizational machinery was weakest precisely in the areas which became part of Pakistan. With the commencement of military row with India over the north Indian princely state of Kashmir, it became predominantly imperative for the Pakistani leadership to avow central authority over the provinces. Enormous socio- economic disarticulations as a result of the demographic changes and communal massacre that accompanied partition, the provinces were indisposed to surrendering their limited financial resources. Country on the whole was in a difficult situation. Difficulties were not only confined to politicians and bureaucrats who had failed to control the situation but also there was unrest in the eastern wing propagated by Sardar patel. This all led to a flimsy political system within the country. Lack of proficient leadership after the death of Quaid-e- Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan and less organized, poor and weak political parties brought about the downfall of the political institutionalization within Pakistan. Even at that moment military enjoyed a distinct position as it was called upon many times during the calamities the brand new nation faced, and undertook relief rescue and maintained law and order.military had inherited all the British traditions of civilian hegemony. Traditional edifices like judiciary, political pressure groups, parliament and political parties could not flourish during the periods of chaos and distress 7

8 within the country right after Pakistan faced security pressures from Afghanistan as it had territorial disputes and erratic unrest in tribal areas was too much to handle. All these glitches placed Pakistan military in a very advantageous position. High defence budget and military training improved military s professional character and beefed up its status. This created imbalance in the civil- military equation and weakened the political institutions within the country. The military, started to expand its role and, by 50 s it had become a very powerful part of state institution which had its say in domestic, security and defence related issues. Also it was the interaction between domestic, regional and international factors during the late forties and the fifties, the close ties with the USA- that served to grind down the position of parties and politicians within the embryotic structure of Pakistani state by tipping the institutional balance towards the civil bureaucracy and the military. Political history from the very beginning in Pakistan showed a different story, history proves that there was a political vacuum which could only be filled by an organized institution within the country, and that institution could be none other than Pakistan military, as only it had inherited the high standards of British training, it encompassed all the rich experience of two world wars and managerial experience, as military had rescued the civilian sector a number of 8

9 times. For number of reasons Pakistan military enjoyed respect in the society as all the other political institutions seemed to have failed to control chaos within the country. They were unable to control the military as it had become too powerful to tamper with. So whenever the Military wanted to take over it would dismiss the civilian government and they did so five times. Pakistan s Military has always had an effective role to play in the domestic and foreign affairs of the country even during the civilian rule. It has been successful by penetrating into the civilian institutions, economy and politics as it was efficacious to dominate the political process by legitimizing the martial law and playing an active role in policy making on high levels. Politicians have been often held accountable for the military coups in Pakistan. On the other hand Military has always vindicated its intrusion in the political system by the peril of state subversion and they do so in the name of doctrine of necessity. S.E.Finer talks about the factors about the armed forces that make it superior, Armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms 8 8 S.E.Finer, the Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (US: West view Press, 1988), p.5. 9

10 The links which the top echelons of the military and the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan enjoyed with the centres of international system in London and Washington during the height of the cold war were of vital importance. The military- bureaucratic alliance chose to tear down the facade of Parliamentary democracy. The shamble state of political institution gave military more power and sadly praetorianism remained a very distinct feature which permitted the military to act outside its normal sphere of activity. Elections were mostly avoided and when they did they were calamitous. Succession generally took place through mass agitation and military take over rather than through ballot box 9. 9 William L Richter, Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan s Third Military Regime, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, autumn 1978, p

11 Coup Date and year Coup maker(s) Dismissal 1. 7 October 1958 President Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan PM Feroz Khan Noon March 1969 Maj General Yahya Khan 3. 5 July 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto October 1999 General Pervez Musharraf PM Nawaz Sharif 5. 3 November 2007 General Pervez Musharraf Emergency rule 11

12 Military Coups and weak political institutionalization On 24 th October 1954, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad disbanded the assembly, after it tried to curtail his powers. The country first constitution in 1956 envisioned general elections within two years. The first coup was staged on 7 th October The military rule continued one way or the other till 24 th march President Iskander Mirza in 1958 in the coup proclamation pointed out the reasons for the coup which were problems of law and order and economy. On 27 th October 1958, the military under Ayub khan ousted President Iskander Mirza to assume direct political power. He quickly moved on to ban political parties and muzzle the press. At that period foreign aid helped Pakistan achieve impressive economic growth rates. Ayub began his tenure confidently to restore dignity and integrity to public life. Even military leaders need a way of legitimizing their rule and have to win the support of at least a section of people. So in 1962 he lifted the martial law and allowed certain parties to function in his new political order. The 1962 constitution rooted on the basis of controlled democracy, made the President even more powerful and to be 12

13 elected by the 80,000 basic democrats. The 1965 war, the Gibraltar infiltration in Kashmir, Tashkent declaration increased discontentment among the public. Within a decade later the negative fallout of military s misadventures started to take a toll on Ayub s regime. There was mass public opposition prompted by the populist forces like Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto. Even in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) there were widespread grievances over the unequal distribution of political and economic resources, a popular movement under Sheikh Mujeeb of Awami league had erupted in East Pakistan. Ayub handed over the power to General Yahya khan in March 1969 who called for general elections in General Yahya was to diminish the economic and political hitches and control the political unrest in eastern and Western wings of the country. In the general elections 1970, PPP (Pakistan people s Party) won the elections in West Pakistan, and in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Awami league swept the polls. The military bureaucracy was reluctant to transfer the power to Civilian politicians and especially not to East Pakistan, Yahya sent out military in East Pakistan to crush the popular unrest, but unfortunately the civil war turned out quite deadly and India intervened, 13

14 ultimately paving the way for East Pakistan s secession from Pakistan in December Yahya s miscalculations costed him a lot. Yahya s administration came to regard Bengalis as revolutionary rabble. They considered Mujeeb s inflexibility in the matter of six points to be the root of the crisis but failed to realise how crucial they were to him, the Awami League and the people of Pakistan. 11 Since the paper focuses on the military s targets in Pakistan politics therefore the period from the civilian chief martial law administrator is excluded from the coup narrative. The civilian rule under Bhutto remained short lived and on 5 th July 1977 General Zia ul Haque imposed martial law. It was imposed on the basis that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto failed to steer the country out of politicaleconomic crises, and military promised to conduct fair elections in October 1977 which was postponed almost for eight years. Zia s regime ingenuities were on the basis of Islamization, denationalization of economy and bring law and order. Zia s government adopted the same structure of Basic democracy as was taken up by Ayub s regime. He got all the support form religious parties and embarked on a mission of islamization programme, introducing Islamic shariat court. The Islamist vision became 10 For details, see Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan - The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994). 11 Brian Cloughley, A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp

15 ensconced in the state during the Zia-ul-Haque era ( ). 12 During soviet invasion in Afghanistan, General Zia s policy to help Mujahedeen with the help of USA, created domestic insecurities within the country. A large number of refugees from Afghanistan crossed the border to Pakistan. Islamization and support for the Afghan mujahedeen s created a lot of violent sectarianism within the country. After the eight amendment to the 1973 constitution which empowered the president to dissolve national assembly, judges of superior court and also provisional governors, Zia formally lifted the martial law in In 1988 Zia died in a plane crash. The new civilian government was formed by Benazir Bhutto leader of PPP. Military transferred the power to PPP only on the basis that it would still have a certain autonomy and monopoly over domestic and foreign policies. After only two years President Ghulam Ishaq khan dismissed the government in 1990 on the basis of corruption inefficiency and nepotism. Two successive civilian governments one in , Nawaz Sharif (PML-N), and PPP government were dismissed on the same charges corruption, nepotism and inefficiency. 12 Shahid javed burki and craig baxtor, Pakistan under the military: eleven years of Zia-ul-Haque(boulder, CO: westview press,1991) 15

16 On 12 th October 1999 General Pervez Musharraf stage another military coup. In his own words as he addressed the nation on 12 th October I [the military] shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy, but to a true one our armed forces are fully equipped and ready to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity. We have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled state institutions lie demolished Like all the other military rulers before him, he also tried to justify his rule on the basis of number of factors like reviving the economy, depoliticising state institutions, eliminate corruption, bring law and order and establish genuine democracy. He held a controversial national referendum on 30 th April 2002, which extended his term to five years. In his own words In Pakistan s politics army had always played an important role. In the past, the head of the army had always been called to help when there were problems between the president and the prime minister. So why should we be so shy and not institutionalize this reconciling role Mushraff set to win fresh term today, the Dawn newspaper,( may 7,2002) 16

17 Musharraf created (NSC) National Security Council in April 2004 as a supraconstitutional body that institutionalized the role of Military in the governance of the country. 14 Devolution of power plan was introduced to provide opportunity to underprivileged middle class to join politics. He also presented 29 constitutional amendments under the banner of legal framework order which would empower him to dissolve the elected government and engage military services chiefs and approve appointments to the superior bench. He closed down many radicalized madrasas within the country during War on Terror. Even as he banned most of the militant groups, in effect they remained active under changed identities and grew in power. 15 International support boosted his standing in Pakistan. The military regime deployed NAB (national accountability bureau) to pressurize opposition parliamentary candidates to join his force ultimately creating PML-Q. Musharraf s NRO (National Reconciliation ordinance) with Benazir Bhutto which ended all the cases against Benazir and her husband made PML (Q) unhappy. Musharraf had failed to implement democratic value by issuing NRO, only for his political survival. Musharraf proclaimed emergency on 3 rd November The narrative period of this coup ended on 18 th August Ayesha siddiqa Military INC: Inside Pakistan s military, Economy, (Karachi: Oxford university press,2007) 15 Najum Mushtaq, Islam and Pakistan, Foreign Policy in Focus, December

18 Pakistan during Musharraf s period went through a lot of unrest and persistent political instability. He had suspended the constitution, removed the chief justice which created ripple effects and thus started the judicial activism. Pakistan was not doing enough to tackle the militants and stop Taliban raids in Afghanistan from tribal areas along Pakistan. Separatist movements in Baluchistan, suicide bombing in the whole country, unrest and violence throughout the country as a result of assassination of Benazir Bhutto put Musharraf in an awkward position. The elections were to take place at the end of 2007 which got postponed to February 18, The result of these elections was a surprise for Musharraf and his men. Although in these election PPP and PML (N) emerged binding forces both the party leaders Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif could not reconcile, thus the alliances collapsed. Mr Zardari was elected as the 11 th President of Pakistan. Pakistan s undemocratic political culture As mentioned earlier Pakistan s colonial political heritage and its postindependence development is responsible for its failure of contitutionalization. The military leaders have tried to reorient the political system towards some sort of presidential form of government, though the 1956 and

19 constitutions of the country reflected parliamentary forms of democracy. Disfiguring of the constitution is one important factor which has led to undemocratic values, the parliamentary consensus on the constitution was undermined by the insertion of 58 2(b) under the eighth amendment. It changed the whole meaning of 1973 constitution. Similarly Judiciary in Pakistan is not free and independent which is a basic factor that helps any country to follow strong democratic values. It is weak and has been facilitating military regimes. Judiciary has been a part of undemocratic forces in Pakistan. In Pakistan, judiciary is identified as power broker. It has been facilitator under the cover of the law of necessity 16 Another important factor that has a direct relationship to crippling the political institution of the country has been the weak political parties, most of the political parties with a few exceptions are dominated by the Elites, feudal lords and thus they secure votes on the basis of their family history and social standing in the community. To be a political leader in Pakistan one needs to hail from an affluent family with political background, thus a dynastic leader, which is a big handicap for the democratization of political parties. This sort of 16 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed swords: Pakistan its army, and the Wars with in (Karachi: Oxford university Press 2008). P.xxxxiS 19

20 pattern does not allow any new fresh leadership from any social background to participate in the politics. There also have to be checks and balances within any form of government, whether they are institutional, formal or informal for instance they can be in the form of effective opposition, organized party systems, party discipline, civil society, controlled free media etc. Conclusion The problem with attempting to explain coups, or any other political phenomenon in the developing country like Pakistan, is that there is often an almost infinite number of casual factors and variables in play. The factors often listed are so diverse controversial and wide ranging in their impact that creating a working theory of coup risk becomes a daunting task. Prominent theories of Pakistani coups are Benevolent Modernization By (Huntington 2006, 203), Civil Society Penetration,Combat Civilian Corruption (Ferguson 1987,44), Ideology ( Cohen, 1984,105),Personal Power (Kamal,2001,21), Path Dependency ( Aziz, 2008,59), External Insecurity (Wilcox,1972,35), Foreign Policy (Zaheer,1998,28), Ethnicity (Cohen, 1986,316). Theories of why coups in Pakistan occur repeatedly are complex and multivariate. These factors and explanations are manifold and may be grouped together into broader 20

21 categories. To create a general hypothesis of Pakistan s risk of coups, potential variables and influences can be summarized as follows: R(coup Pakistan) =f(i,x,c,n) I= Institutional interests (military spending, autonomy, ideology) X=External threat (War, instability, regional insecurity, foreign policy) C= Civilian Governance (for example the legitimacy, Ideology, corruption, interference in military affairs by Civilian government) N= Internal Threat (for example regional, religious, language, ethnic conflicts). In other words, the risk of military launching a coup is high if it perceives a threat to its institutional interests, nation s external security or domestic integrity, or perceives the civilian government to be illegitimate, encroaching on military prerogatives. Pakistan has seen so many years of military rule. Whenever the military came in power its chief goal was actually to maintain law and order, and to change the political infrastructure so that the state can flourish economically and develop genuine norms of political institutions. Looking deeply into the 21

22 question of why military has always intervened; I will conclude by drawing attention to few factors. 17 Firstly, the military and bureaucracy at the time of independence acquired a predominant position in the structure of state power. This was due to the fact that institutions in civil society during the colonial period remained weak.the predominant situation of bureaucracy and the military in the newly formed Pakistan had upper hand primarily because of the freedom struggle the Muslim league went through. Military bureaucratic elite was the backbone of Pakistan right after its emergence on the map. This dominance was also due to the fact that unlike Indian national congress, Muslim League was more of a movement and could not institutionalize the political and governance framework during Pakistan movement. Muslim league s policy was based on a political culture which could safeguard the importance of representative political government in the composition of state power and was backed by majority. After the untimely death of prominent leaders like Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, the will and power of political leaders to follow ahead was weak. Second factor that hindered the progress towards the political institutionalization in Pakistan is the India- Pakistan dispute. Right after the independence of both the nations the hostilities grew even stronger. Both 17 Ibrahim,Amina, Gurading the state or protecting the economy?, Development studies Institute,Feb 2009, 22

23 India and Pakistan have had 3 major wars and few armed skirmishes. Kashmir was and still is the bone of contention between the two nations. Heavy expenditure on defence budgets had put military in a position where they could influence the power within the state, and whenever there were conflicts with India, they had to be called upon to effectively deal and resolve these conflicts. Consequently, military grew stronger and was able to intervene and dominate in key areas of state affairs including defence, finance, economics, security, domestic and foreign policies. Some scholars are of the view that unless Kashmir issue is not resolved, military will keep on coming to power and intervene in the defence and security policies of Pakistan. Third factor is feudalism in Pakistan and how it affected and still is affecting the political institutions. Feudal lords own the land, and hence the production of food, grain and they have a very strong control on police and judicial system. More recently, many of these feudal lords have become industrialists and thereby influencing business and economics of state. Feudalism is deep rooted in Pakistani society, and has had a strong grip on political parties from the start which has further undermined the ability for the party to create any political framework. Further to this a dynastic trend has emerged within the 23

24 political party which is detrimental to any new emergence of leadership from grass root level. The feudal lords have a very powerful presence within their political sphere but the worst part is that they would secure votes on the basis of their standing in the community, but when they come to power they would grind their own axe. Corruption and nepotism is one such factor which has crippled the political institutions of state. The military bureaucratic elite have had relative autonomy within the state and were largely successful in intervening and mediating in state affairs. Corruption remains a very significant stumbling block for Pakistan s progress and is still widespread and systemic. Petty corruption in the form of bribery is prevalent in law enforcement, procurement and the provision of public services. The judiciary is not seen as independent and considered to be shielding corrupt political practices from prosecution 18. Between the periods of two political leaders Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto held offices four times, and both were dismissed on charges of corruption, inefficiency, and nepotism and power misuse. This has further led to flagging of political 18 Authored by:marie Chêne U4 Helpdesk With contributions from: Craig Fagan, Sylwia Plaza Overview of corruption in Pakistan, Transparency International ( (accessed on May 11,2011) 24

25 institution in Pakistan resulting in a power vacuum, which ultimately was filled by Pakistan military. The reason that corruption is still affecting the system is because there are no checks and balances. Government anti-corruption initiatives only started to beef up after 2002, during General Musharraf s regime. NAB( National accountability Bureau) was set up which implemented the structure of NACS( National Anti-Corruption strategy), however the results were inadequate because of two major factors, political institutions infrastructure has been weak over the years and the implementation of the policy plan has not been supported by a definite plan of action. NRO (National Reconciliation Ordinance) just before the end of Musharraf s regime was a major setback which brought about further damage to the political edifices and along with it, the political norms sapped. Even now it is unclear whether the present government will be able to address these issues as they themselves have been in the shadow of corruption not so long ago. The other important cause for the flagging of political edifices has been ethnic and religious conflicts within Pakistan. Somehow the political leaders have played and manipulated the situations many times and added fuel to fire, just to stay in power. Pakistan has seen ethnic and religious conflicts on many 25

26 levels. As far as religion is concerned, it has always played an important role in the creation of Pakistan. The basis on which the Pakistan movement began was the two nation theory. During Zia s regime Islamic factor played a significant role, it was used to legitimize the illegitimate government and also to mobilize the Islamic parties for the jihad against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Zia s support for Sunni Islam alienated the Shia minority in the state, thus ever since the Sunni- Shia conflict started in Pakistan. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state, the most important ethnic conflict in the history of Pakistan has been the Bengali ethnic movement, which eventually led to the breakup of Pakistan and rise of a new state in 1971 ( Bangladesh). Ethnic movements came to challenge the Pakistani establishment. These were the Baluch Movement in the 1970s, the Sindhu Desh Movement in the 1980s, and the Muhajir Qaumi Movement in the 1990s and recent balochi separatist movements have completely dilapidated the political process to evolve and eventually forced Military to take control. Judicial and economic disparity has created undemocratic norms, and this can only be fixed once the above mentioned factors are dealt with. Judiciary has been weak and has operated on the doctrine of necessity. 26

27 Military s constant rebuttal to subject itself to legitimate civilian authority lies at the heart of Pakistan s democratic failure. Military also was never successful in strengthening the political infra-structure of the state. Rather the internal security weakened during their regimes. Whenever a coup took place it was hoped that there would be political stability, rebuilding of economy etc., but none of these goals were ever fulfilled. Probably the main reason behind that was the military bureaucratic elite s desire to remain in power for longer and implementing highly centralized policies in stately affairs. Pakistan military is organized and powerful institution and an asset to the country, but does that mean that if this is so then at any time Military can intervene in state affairs and impose Martial law. For instance many other countries in the world have organized armies but does it mean that they are also doing the same as Pakistan. The question now is will this cycle be broken? One can only hope. At present, there seems to be a civilian rule and perhaps it is still too early to pass judgement or predict the future course, we shall wait and see. 27