"U.S. Policy in the Middle East Faces the Arab Spring" Maria do Céu Pinto EEG University of Minho Portugal

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1 "U.S. Policy in the Middle East Faces the Arab Spring" Maria do Céu Pinto EEG University of Minho Portugal Paper delivered to the IPSA 2012 Congress Panel on Democratic Movement in the Arab World: The Parodoxical Role of the West The Obama administration s response to the democracy upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa has been fairly conflicted. Although democracy promotion is a major component of the US foreign policy, it has been persistently undermined by the American presidents who have endorsed it due to overriding security and economic concerns. The same holds for President Obama, although he did not enter the White House with a firm conviction on working for democratic reform in the Middle East. He assumed that the damage done to relations with the Muslim world by President George W. Bush's freedom agenda was a mistake that needed to be repaired and that he needed time to remove the negative taint democracy promotion had acquired. Ironically, despite the fierce opposition of Obama to his maligned predecessor, there is a surprising policy continuity as regards Middle East democratic reform. Like Bush, Obama has focused almost exclusively on building bridges with leaders and governments. The difference is that he never presented himself as a democracy paladin. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the administration s response was disjointed: grudgingly supporting the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, unenthusiastically backing limited military action in Libya, projecting a nuanced attitude to the unrest in Bahrain, and confounding U.S. (United States) traditional allies. I argue that the Arab Spring has shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. It is already remarkable in itself the notable absence of the United States from these events and its hesitant approach to their aftermath. They have called into question America s continued capacity for global leadership in this vital region. To examine this assertion, I will first review Obama s initial track record on democracy in the Middle, bearing in mind, in particular, his legacy from the Bush administration. Secondly, I will take issue with his 2009 Cairo speech in what pertains to democratic development in the area. The paper will then discuss the administration reaction to the Arab Spring events, focusing on the processes taking place in a number of selected Arab countries, followed by an analysis of the major difficulties, dilemmas and strategic considerations the U.S. had to weigh. The paper will conclude with discussion of the overall Obama approach towards democracy in the Middle East. Obama and the Bush legacy As far as democracy promotion in the Arab world is concerned, a major challenge that the Obama administration faced was re-establishing the credibility of U.S. democracy assistance after the flawed and inconsistent approach of the Bush administration. Indeed, Bush's persistent association of democracy promotion with the intervention in Iraq and regime change did much 1

2 to malign the concept and help to foster a perception in many parts of the world that democracy assistance was a mere euphemism for aggressive U.S. interventionism. President Bush's rhetoric on promoting democracy in the BMENA (Broader Middle East and North Africa) was bold and ambitious, receiving a high profile never enjoyed before. However, the implementation of his "forward strategy of freedom" has been rather more tortuous. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US reviewed its traditional stance on the Middle East of favouring stability at the expenses of political and economic freedom and made democratization and political freedom in the region a major goal of U.S. policy and a national security priority. In the reassessment of its security perceptions, US policy makers agreed that authoritarianism and economic stagnation in Arab countries had contributed to the increase of radicalism and terrorism. Following its invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Bush administration consistently reiterated the centrality of democratisation to winning the war on terrorism. The Bush Doctrine was based on the neoconservative paradigm of democratisation. It lays out the key propositions put forward for military intervention in the Middle East. In 2003, in preparing to topple the Iraqi regime, the Bush administration argued that installing a democratic regime in Iraq would unleash a democratic wave in the region. The claim was laid that, as a result of regime change and the establishment of democracy in Iraq, a democratic domino effect would occur in the Arab Middle East. The Bush democratization policy had many inconsistencies and led the administration to a rhetorical trap. Despite the belief that the lack of democracy and freedom were the reasons for policy failures in the past, the Bush administration continued to favor the maintenance of friendly authoritarian regimes, which were supportive of the war on terrorism. The refusal to recognize the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority government, in particular, has led Arabs to conclude that the United States was not sincere in its call for change. The American government was accused of hypocrisy by the Arab public opinion and of being interested in democratic development only to the extent that this process would bring to power groups and individuals that meet the approval of the U.S. Recognizing the difficulty of having both a democratic Middle East and a pro-american one, the Bush administration eased off calls for more democratic reforms across the region, fearing that democratic elections would produce governments that did not favour U.S. policies in strategic allies. The Bush legacy has undeniably resulted in a situation where the very concept of democracy assistance was often cast in a negative light, even though the actual content of the programme had many positive facets and the legitimacy and intrinsic value of U.S. democracy promotion was undeniable (Carothers, 2007: 11). Obama s opening act The new-elect President Barack Obama promised to turn the page in U.S. relations with the Middle East and Muslim world. During his first 100 days in office he made good on that promise with a number of initiatives in which he reached out to Arabs and Muslims across the globe. When Obama called for a "new beginning" in U.S. relations with the Muslim world on the 4 the June 2009, he picked Cairo as the setting for his speech. In the speech, Obama declared 2

3 his commitment to governments that reflect the will of the people and said to Arab leaders that must maintain their power through consent, not coercion (The White House, 2009). However, he did not press the issue further. Indeed, this fleeting reference mirrored the fact that Obama s democracy rhetoric was softer than that of his predecessor, and, indeed, at least in the initial months, the administration backed off from democracy promotion. Carothers says that the minimization of the democracy agenda is not a fault of Obama: it is the reflection of a changed international landscape, which has become multipolar and brimming with a new set of diversified and imposing threats. This has led to the downplaying of the democracy narrative in US policy. Previous U.S. presidents intertwined democracy promotion into the three central narratives of U.S. foreign policies of the last several decades. Even Bush tied the democracy priority with the war on terrorism. This analyst posits that the U.S. no longer has a central engagement to democracy promotion at the heart of its geostrategy, similar either to role of the struggle to end Soviet oppressive system or the early post-cold War efforts to help implant democracy in postcommunist Europe (Carothers, 2012a, 47). On the other hand, Obama vision, spelled out while he was a presidential candidate, put forward a new policy paradigm: not one based on hardpower alone, but on the recognition that in a multilateral power structure and against the backdrop of a relative U.S. decline, soft power and multilateralism are tools that need to be reactivated (Celso, 2012, 2-4). A year after the Cairo speech, Egyptians were wondering if Obama really meant what he said. As Egypt headed into controversial parliamentary elections in late 2010, the Obama administration kept the usual policy, cultivating relations with the Mubarak regime. It cut democracy assistance spending in Egypt by half, agreed to veto assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development to groups that lacked the government's stamp of approval, and aired at the creating of an endowment (Dunne and Kagan, 2010). Although, the Obama s first annual budget request for FY 2010 provide for large increases in funding for programmes to support democracy, governance, and human rights in the BMENA region, however, it also shifted funds in the Arab world away from partnerships with local civil society actors and toward other initiatives, including rule of law and governance programmes and cut bilateral democracy and governance aid to Egypt and Jordan by more than 40% (McInerney, 2009:2-3). When administration officials privately raised questions about democracy or human rights with the Egyptian government, their carefully calibrated quiet diplomacy was dismissed or ignored. U.S. officials obviously worried that Mubarak might withhold cooperation on regional peace and stability if Washington pressed him too hard by expressing concern for human rights abuses. To be true, Obama never delivered significant pressure on Mubarak to reform. U.S. diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks (Wikileaks, 2010) show that the U.S. administration raised human rights issues in private, but also show a wariness about antagonising Mubarak, especially by bringing up the issue in public (Lister, 2011). The Obama administration's Middle East experts concluded that there was no chance of serious reform - much less revolution - under Mubarak. So they assumed playing a long game of slowly nurturing grass-roots movements and promoting civil society, in preparation for the day when Egypt might be 3

4 ready for real reform. That corresponded to administration officials view that it would be both wiser and more productive to invest more in bolstering the place of democracy support in the normative and institutional frameworks that undergird international politics (Carothers, 2012a, 23) instead of conspicuous initiatives and political interventionism (Carothers, 2012a, 23). The Green Revolution: not meddling President Obama vowed to pursue tough diplomacy towards Iran but refused to meddle in the turmoil that ensued the June 2009 presidential elections in Iran. Protests erupted following the vote against the disputed victory of Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and in support of opposition candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. He chose to keep his distance, providing only mild rhetorical support. In an interview after the protests began, he said that the difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi in terms of their actual policies may not be as great as has been advertised (News Wires, 2009). After days of criticism from Republican leaders who said the president wasn't showing enough support for the Iranian demonstrators, Obama said he was appalled and outraged by the threats, beatings, and imprisonments of the past few days. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton threw light on its awkward approach: she said that the U.S. was trying to strike a balance, between being publicly supportive of efforts in Iran to promote democracy without doing anything to "either endanger or undermine those very same people (Jackson, 2009). Despite the tough words, Obama only took it so far. Behind Obama s avoidance of interference in Iran s domestic affairs, namely avoiding tainting the protesters domestic image by associating them with U.S. support, there was another pragmatic concern: engagement with Iran. In fact, Obama started out his presidency with the determined purpose of patching up relations with Iran. When the regime cracked down harshly on the Green Movement, tensions erupted between engagement and democracy priority. Inhibiting the U.S. reaction to those events was linked to worries over harming the chances for engagement on the broader strategic agenda (Carothers, 2010, 11b). The Arab Spring: talking like an idealist, acting like a realist After the fall of the Tunisian president, Zine el-abidine Ben Ali, the revolution spread to Egypt. Throughout January 2011, as pressure mounted for the demise of Mubarak, the willingness of the Obama administration to break with the existing order and embrace its radical transformation was only too equivocal. Arguably, Egypt is a lynchpin of the American security architecture for the greater Middle East. Egypt, the world's largest Arab nation, is critically important to U.S. foreign policy and to major goals the Obama administration is pursuing in the Middle East: the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, containment of Iran's influence and nuclear ambitions, and counter-terrorism. It also helps guarantee Israel s interests. Omar Suleiman played a key role in helping Israel seal off Gaza in their common effort to dislodge the Hamas government there. Successive administrations have invested heavily in Egypt to secure its regime. A radical Islamic takeover in Egypt would constitute the worst possible scenario for Washington and Tel Aviv. 4

5 The balancing act performed by Obama and the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, was excruciating to watch as it exposed the inherent contradictions of an administration trying to simultaneously encourage and contain the forces of revolution. The administration s confused and timid reaction reflected all too clearly the dilemma it faced. The mixed message was confusing and at times embarrassing: a reflection of a policy that, by necessity, was made up on the fly. Obama wanted to position the U.S. on the side of the protesters, but he also feared that the uprising could spin out of control. Simultaneously, he also wanted to assure other autocratic allies that the U.S. would not hastily abandon its friends. The Obama administration apparently concluded that the longer Mubarak hanged on, the less likely it would be that Omar Suleiman, the intelligence chief whom Mubarak had chosen as his vice president, would be seen as a plausible interlocutor, capable of presiding over a transition to elections and political reform. Days of watching the protests mushroom on the streets of Egyptian cities convinced administration officials that Mubarak probably would not weather the political storm and that this was compromising Suleiman's standing. Until early February, the Obama administration tried to walk a fine line between positioning itself `on the right side of history, as one senior diplomat put it, and not unceremoniously dumping a leader who has supported American policy on key policies (Miller, 2011). The U.S. tried to quietly press the newly designated Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman his counterpart to urge Mubarak to step aside so that he could begin negotiating a transition to a new government with a coalition of opposition figures, including the Muslim Brotherhood (Miller, 2011). AS the protests mounted, the White House had clearly decided that Mubarak's days were numbered, and that the sooner he left, the better the chances that other figures in the regime, could negotiate a smooth transition to an as yet uncertain future. The administration apparently concluded that stability could only be restored quickly in Egypt if Egypt entered a smooth transition period. The administration feared that protests rocking Egypt could change the political landscape of the entire Arab world and beyond. Possible outcomes could range all the way from pro-democracy forces taking charge in Cairo to, in a worst case scenario, regional war and instability bringing in Israel and Iran. In between, there could be a long period of instability that could breed economic chaos across the region, derailing economic recoveries in the U.S. and Europe (Lizza, 2011b). As for Libya, the administration resisted intervening militarily until it had no choice, preferring at first to use diplomatic means and economic sanctions to signal that Qaddafi s use of force would not help keep him in power. The military intervention came when those instruments failed and Qaddafi s forces were closing in on Benghazi to crush the rebels. The rationale was encapsulated in the president s statement: this is the greatest opportunity to realign our interests and our values (Hamid, 2011: 19A). The president was referring to the broader change going on in the Middle East and the need to rebalance U.S. foreign policy in order to accommodate a greater focus on democracy and human rights. Obama was moved by the judgement that, had the international community not acted when it did, thousands would have been slaughtered in Benghazi and other rebel 5

6 strongholds in the East as the world watched. Among Arabs, there was also a broad consensus backing international intervention to protect the Libyan people. The strategy also came in the face of domestic U.S. criticism that the administration sent mixed messages at first in Egypt, tentatively backing Mubarak before deciding to throw its full support behind the protesters demanding his ouster. Likewise in Bahrain, the U.S. decision to throw a lifeline to the ruling family came after sharp criticism of its handling of protests there. Obama's stance in Libya differs significantly from his strategy regarding the other Arab revolutions. In Egypt and Tunisia, Obama chose to rebalance the American stance gradually backing away from support for Mubarak and Ben Ali and allowing the popular movements to run their course. In Yemen, Bahrain and Syria where the uprisings turned violent, Obama did not even utter a word in support of armed intervention - instead pressing those regimes to embrace reform on their own. The Obama administration took a cautious, incremental approach refraining initially from calling for a regime change. In the case of Damascus, the administration vainly held out hope for a managed transition before coming out and declaring Assad s rule illegitimate. Initially, Washington was sceptical that the uprising would overthrow the regime. It also believed it lacked the leverage to affect the situation in the country. There were other strategic calculus affecting the administration s appraisal: for one, Syria is critical to Obama's attempt to end Iran s nuclear programme and to promote Arab-Israeli peace. Ever since it took office, Obama had been trying to engage Syria - Tehran s greatest ally in the region -, to persuade Iran s leaders to end its nuclear programme and its support of anti-israeli terrorism and, if not, even end its alliance with the Ayatollah s regime (Landis, 2009). Finally, there was little support in the U.S. for another military adventure in the Middle East. In deciding to attack Libya, Obama has charted an entirely new strategy, relying on U.S. hard power and the use of force to influence the outcome of Arab events. One must bear in mind that suspicion of Western motives for intervening run deep. If Libya is a one-off intervention, it will reinforce the perception that the U.S. acts only when the targets are delusional anti-american autocrats. What about pro-american autocrats? What about Syria, where there is a massacre taking place and no move from the international community? Trying to square a circle Speaking at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum in March 2011, Hillary Clinton provided some insights to clarify the U.S. approach, stating it strongly supports democratization in the region, although rejecting a one-size fits all approach ( Secretary Clinton, 2011) to the Arab uprisings. Clinton said the administration aimed at reorienting U.S. policy in the Middle East to focus more on people and less on governments, but qualified that the response to the democracy movements would vary from country to country. Indeed, U.S. policy looks different in Bahrain and Syria than it does in Libya, because American interests are very different in each arena (Clinton, 2011). Obama has thrown his weight behind attempts by the royal family of Bahrain to survive, although protesters say their demands have not been met (Wehrey, 2012). Bahrain is a major concern for U.S. policymakers because of its sectarian divide and location. Not only is it linked to Saudi Arabia s Eastern 6

7 Province, but it is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which guards the Persian Gulf and its vital oil traffic. The fleet also is a buffer between Iran and the region s fragile sheikhdoms and emirates. From that base, some 3,000 U.S. military officers oversee 30 ships and 30,000 sailors. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said the U.S. has evidence of Iranian meddling in Bahrain and other Middle Eastern countries hit by political turmoil (Hodge, 2011). As for Yemen, the White House initially limited its critiques of a government which was considered an ally in the fight against al-qaeda. The Americans initially supported President Ali Abdullah Saleh, even after that government opened fire on demonstrators, but then, seeing the writing on the wall, began to distance themselves from the regime. Obama's most comprehensive response to the uprisings sweeping the Arab world came on 19 th May 2011 in a landmark speech at the State Department. In that speech, he put the U.S. as squarely standing behind the struggle of all freedom and democracy, specifying that Washington supports those principles for all Arab peoples, not only for some (The White House, 2011). Obama based U.S. policy on core principles: opposing violence, universal rights and the right of people to choose their own leaders. He asserted: we can, and we will, speak out for a set of core principles - principles that have guided our response to the events over the past six months (The White House, 2011). However, he also reckoned the uncertainties the U.S. faces in the process: there will be times when our short-term interests don't align perfectly with our long-term vision for the region (The White House, 2011). In a general sense, the speech did not really resolve the tension at the heart of the question: that between Obama s rhetoric of support for reform and the U.S. clinging to Arab governments that are skirting reforms. Obama's speech left many observers and people in the region disappointed. As Leon T. Hadar has remarked: Wishful thinkers who had expected President Barack Obama to lay out a new U.S. grand strategy for the Middle East -- the so-called Obama Doctrine -- during his much-anticipated address at the State Department on Thursday were bound to be disappointed. That post-1945 American presidents were able to enunciate a series of U.S. "doctrines" to help mobilize support at home and abroad for American policy in the Middle East reflected a reality in which Washington -- driven by pressures of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict -- was advancing a set of core strategic goals that seemed to be aligned with U.S. interests and values (Hadar, 2011). The president was attempting to square a difficult circle: he wanted to reaffirm America s support for democratic aspirations, but at the same time did not want to worsen a rift with allies, such as Saudi Arabia, about the pace of democratic development. He said little about political grievances in that vital gulf country, a major oil supplier, where there were instances of violent dispersal of Shiite protesters. Human rights groups have called the Obama administration's approach to Arab Spring inconsistent, charging that U.S. policy toward some countries has a double standard (Human Rights First, 2011). The speech tried to combine policy interests which are not easily reconcilable and might even, at times, produce different outcomes inimical to American interests: the fact that America s interests are not hostile to people s hopes; they re essential to them and [that] we will keep our commitments to friends and partners (The White 7

8 House, 2011). Obama also acknowledged that these interests will mean that sometimes the U.S. may not always take the most aggressive stand in favor of democracy and freedom: There will be times when our short-term interests don t align perfectly with our long-term visions for the region, but we can and we will speak out for a set of long-term principles, the president said (The White House, 2011). The speech represented an escalation of rhetoric, but failed to adequately shift policy or even render it more coherent. Conclusion Events in the Middle East are part of a long-term transformation, with important risks, including the rise of conservative political Islam in Egypt, civil war in Syria and drawn-out instability in the Middle East. The process will take decades to play out and will remain a challenge for U.S. presidents. The Obama administration s answer to the Arab Spring very much reflected the interest in not being sidelined by the events and of placing itself on the right side of history. In the process, Obama had to juggle the idealistic and realistic impulses that have marked his foreign policy. U.S. policymakers are trying to support democracy, but also worry about mounting instability in the region. The Obama administration s response to the Arab Spring has been fairly ambivalent and hesitant. Indeed, its apparent inconsistencies (for example, calling for Hosni Mubarak's departure just days after Cairo s street protests took shape, while refusing to denounce the Bashar al-assad s regime in Syria despite months in a row of ferocious repression, combined with a determination to forceful regime change in Libya), only highlighted the contrast between the administration s determined approach toward some of the Arab Spring regimes and much of the rest of its Middle East policy. The approach toward Syria contrasts markedly with its military intervention in Libya or the U.S. stance toward the brutal crackdown of pro-democracy protesters in Bahrain, a strategic U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf. The uprising against the minority dictatorship in Bahrain was largely ignored by Washington, which fears losing the headquarters of its Fifth Fleet in Manama. It is clear that Obama decided not to take a single, blanket approach in order to avoid that rapidly moving events drove administration policies. At the beginning, as regards Tunisia and Egypt, an initial cautiousness was removed and the administration was driven by the street. It was only later that a policy was formulated a policy that tries to conciliate particular U.S. interests in the region and universal American values. Obama is not the only president who, as far as the democracy agenda is concerned, has demonstrated a split personality (Carothers, 2007, 96). For decades, Washington has considered the Middle East a region of vital U.S. interest, in part because it sits atop the world s largest reserves of oil and natural gas. To maintain its strategic influence in the region, Washington has often relied on friendly Arab governments that suppressed the democratic aspirations of their people. Like his predecessors, until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Obama has focused on building bridges with Arab leaders and governments. In improving relations with the Muslim world, there is a gap between U.S. political ideals and the realpolitik of its strategic national interests. But now, with popular uprisings sweeping through the area, U.S. policymakers are looking at other ways Washington can stay relevant in the 8

9 region. The West, not least the Obama administration, have been slow to realise the limits of their influence. They are reacting to events, not driving them. U.S. policy towards the Arab Spring has been a divided policy marked by sincere but reactive support for democratic advances when it occurred, but no real proactive support for democracy where dictatorship remains (Carothers, 2012a, 37). Where political change has occurred, the U.S. has usually backed democratic change, sometimes actively, as in Libya; sometimes more reluctantly, as in Egypt. But where autocratic stability continues to reign, the administration has held fast to the decades-old U.S. policy of support for friendly dictators who are reliable on matters of security and economics (Carothers, 2012b). In its apparent inconsistency, however, the administration has tried to strike the right note of cautious optimism and seriousness of purpose in countries undergoing a democratic transition (Carothers, 2012a, 34). First, it has avoided getting involved in complex internal politics of democratic transitions. The U.S. has been cautious by avoiding to put itself in the centre of internal political change, for fear of compromising the prestige of democracy advocates, of being accused of interfering, or ultimately of assuming responsibility for an yet uncertain process. Secondly, it has accepted the popular will of Arab societies even if it takes the form of Islamist electoral victories, such as in Tunisia and Egypt. The U.S. has supported moves towards political reform and has opposed U-turns, such as the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court s June decision to dissolve the newly-elected, Islamist-led parliament. As for countries which have survived the storm, the Obama administration has settled on a strategy to help keep longtime allies who are willing to reform in power, even if that means the democratic demands of their newly emboldened citizens might have to lag behind. The admnistration s commitment to democracy and human rights is undercut by its pursuit of countervailing econ and security interests. Growing US concern about stability in the Persian Gulf and Iran s regional influence, has prompted the administration to largely put aside democracy priorities for the sake of good relations with strategic allies (Carothers, 2012a, 44). Just after the first anniversary of the onset of the Arab Spring, the Obama administration announced a huge arms sale to Saudi Arabia, $30 billion of advanced F-15 jet fighters as part of a multiyear $60 billion arms deal, a price tag greater than the annual gross domestic product of more than half the countries in the world. As the administration has out it, this sale will send a message to countries in the region that the U.S. is committed to stability in the Gulf and broader Middle East. The Obama administration eventually concluded that it must shape its response country by country, recognizing a stark reality that American national security interests in the Middle East weigh as heavily as idealistic impulses. The administration cautious response to the popular uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa is the reflection of a realist policy driven by strategic interests, such as oil security, fighting terrorism, Iran s rise in the region and, equally important, its realization of the limits of America power and its capacity to shape events. 9

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