IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD and IBRD-77810) ON AN ADAPTABLE PROGRAM LOAN(I) AND ADDITIONAL FINANCING LOAN

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2685 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD and IBRD-77810) ON AN ADAPTABLE PROGRAM LOAN(I) AND ADDITIONAL FINANCING LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA FOR A PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT March 13, 2013 Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit Colombia and Mexico Country Management Unit Latin America and Caribbean Region

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective: March 13, 2013) Currency Unit=Colombian Peso COP$ 1= US$ US$ 1.00 = COP$1, FISCAL YEAR ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACCI Colombian Agency for International Cooperation (Agencia Colombiana para la Cooperación Internacional) AF Additional Financing Loan/Project APL Adaptable Program Loan ASOPATIA Regional Association of Municipalities in Alto Patía (Asociación Supradepartamental de Municipios de la Región del Alto Patía) BANCOLDEX Bank of Foreign Commerce of Colombia (Banco de Comercio Exterior de Colombia) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDD Community Driven Development CDPMM Peace and Development Corporation of Magdalena Medio (Corporación de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio) CGR Contraloría General de la República CONPES National Council on Economic and Social Policy (Consejo de Política Económica y Social) CONSORNOC New Society Corporation of Northeast Colombia (Corporación Nueva Sociedad de la Región Nororiental de Colombia) CMAIPD Municipal Councils for Internally Displaced Population s Integral Attention CMU Country Management Unit CPS Country Partnership Strategy CRIC Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca) DAPR- Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic for ACCION Social Action and International Cooperation (Departamento SOCIAL Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional) DDHH Human Rights DNP National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) DPS Departamento para la Prosperidad Social EMF Environmental Management Framework EMP Environmental Management Plan

3 ERL Rapid Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Rápida de Impacto Ambiental) EU European Union FARC Guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) FEF Front-End Fee FM Financial Management FRDPMM Montes de María Peace and Development Network Foundation (Fundación Red Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de María) FSL Fixed-Spread Loan FTA Free Trade Agreement GOC Government of Colombia ICO Organizational Capacity Index (Indice de Capacidad Organizacional) ICP RPDP s Capacity Index (Indice de Capacidad de PO) IDA International Development Association IDP Internally Displaced Population IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IE Impact Evaluation ISR Implementation Status Report NDP National Development Plan M&ES Monitoring and Evaluation System NGO Non-Governmental Organization OM Operational Manual OP Operational Policy OS Social Organizations OU Beneficiary Entity/ies(Organización Usuaria) PCU Project Coordination Unit PDF Indigenous Peoples Development Framework PDP Peace and Development Program PET Strategic Territorial Development Process (Proceso Estratégico Territorial) PIU Integrated Master Plan (Plan Integral Unico) PO Partner Organization (Organización Socia) (legal entities representing the RPDP) POT Territorial and Land Use Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial) PRODEPAZ Oriente Antioqueño Development Program for Peace (Programa de Desarrollo para la Paz del Oriente Antioqueño) REDPRODEPAZ Red de Programas Regionales de Desarrollo y Paz RSS Network of Social Solidarity (Red de Solidaridad Social) RPDP Regional Peace and Development Programs SISBEN Sistema Nacional de Estratificación de Población SNAIPD National System of Integral Attention for the Displaced Population (Sistema Nacional de Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada) SS Summary Sheet SOE Statement of Expenditures

4 TU VALLENPAZ WB Territorial Unit (DPS) Valle del Cauca in Peace Corporation (Corporation Valle del Cauca en Paz) World Bank Vice President: Country Director: Acting Sector Manager: Project Team Leader: ICR Team Leader: ICR Main Author: Hasan A. Tuluy Gloria M. Grandolini Marisela Montoliu Muñoz Natalia Gomez Natalia Gomez Luis D. Santos (Consultant)

5 REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Table of Contents Data Sheet A. Basic Information... i B. Key Dates... i C. Ratings Summary... i D. Sector and Theme Codes... ii E. Bank Staff... ii F. Results Framework Analysis... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs... vi H. Restructuring (if any)... vi I. Disbursement Profile... vii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Stakeholder Workshopsand Beneficiary Survey Results Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Annex 7. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents Annex 9. Map... 65

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7 A. Basic Information Country: Colombia Project Name: Peace and Development Project (1st Phase APL and AF Project) Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-72320, IBRD ICR Date: 03/13/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instruments: Original Total Commitment: APL and Additional Financing Loan Revised Amount: USD 37.41M Environmental Category: B Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA USD 30.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 37.41M Implementing Agencies: Departamento para la Prosperidad Social(DPS) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: European Union(EU) Corporación Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio (CDPMM) Asociación Supra-departamental de Municipios de la Región Alto Patía (ASOPATIA-CRIC) Corporación Vallenpaz (VALLENPAZ) Fundación Red Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de María (FRDPMM) Corporación Nueva Sociedad Región Nororiental de Colombia (CONSORNOC) Corporación Programa Desarrollo para la Paz (PRODEPAZ) B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 10/16/2003 Effectiveness: 12/23/ /23/2004 Appraisal: 04/15/2004 Restructuring(s): 08/12/2009 Approval: 06/10/2004 Mid-term Review: 08/15/ /02/2011 Closing: 03/15/ /15/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Satisfactory Moderate Satisfactory Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderate Satisfactory i

8 Quality of Supervision: Overall Bank Performance: Satisfactory Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Overall Borrower Performance: Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project No at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Yes Moderately Satisfactory Quality at Entry (QEA): None Quality of Supervision (QSA): None Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Adult literacy/non-formal education Crops Other industry Other social services Sub-national government administration Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction Improving labor markets Other public sector governance Participation and civic engagement Urban services and housing for the poor E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy David de Ferranti Country Director: Gloria M. Grandolini Isabel M. Guerrero Acting Sector Manager: Marisela Montoliu Muñoz John Redwood Project Team Leader: Natalia Gomez Jairo A. Arboleda ICR Team Leader: Natalia Gomez ICR Primary Author: Luis Daniel Santos Pinzon ii

9 F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives, PDO (from Project Appraisal Document) The Peace and Development Project (PDP) development objective is to assist vulnerable, low income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities in the conflictaffected regions in order to reduce the risk of their exposure to conflict and mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects. The project assumes that building assets is a measure that contributes to mitigate the risk of displacement, and that restoring a basic safety net to displaced families is a vital first step in their social and economic stabilization. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Government of Colombia, GOC manifested its interest in consolidating the first phase of the Adaptable Program Loan(APL I) through an Additional Financing Project (AF), before considering a second phase APL (APL II) with a larger program expansion that would reach the current 19 Regional Peace and Development Programs (RPDP). The AF aimed to consolidate the results achieved already by the peace building strategy that has been developed through the APL I, expand its activities to the Department of Valle del Cauca, and meet one of the triggers for the follow-up APL II operation (the number of community subprojects incorporated into Integrated Master Plans (PIU). There was a change in this trigger agreed upon during the Mid Term Review of the original Project. The change accepted that 60% of subprojects supported by the Project are incorporated into municipal development plans or in the budget of public programs (instead of only PIU). (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Value quantitative or Qualitative) Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) iii Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years PDO Outcome indictor (APL I & II): Lower annual incidence of net displacements in the regions served by the Project as the share of nation-wide annual net displacements, adjusted by violence indicators. Percentage of Internally Displaced Populations(IDP) in PDP regions as a total share of the national IDP: 20% (Displacements by municipality and violence indicators available for each municipality). Percentage of IDP in PDP regions as a total share of the national IDP: 7% (Lower than in municipalities not targeted by Project). Date achieved 03/31/ /15/2012 This indicator was conceived for the two phases of the APL, but only phase I (APL I) Comments and an AF phase to APL I were actually implemented. However: i) Displacement (incl. % evolution per RPDP demonstrated that the percentage of IDP in the Regions where the achievement) project operated,vis-à-vis the national total (2,236,963)dropped considerably between

10 2004 (18%, equivalent to 55,785 IDP)and 2009(11%, equivalent to 20,416 IDP), and between 2009 and 2012 (7%, equivalent to 252 IDP), even though the result cannot be attributed solely to the Project.ii) The APL I benefitted 25,600 ID familiesout of a total registered IDP in the 6 regions (355,637 IDP, equivalent to 16% of the national total of IDP) where the project operated.iii) 98% of beneficiary families under the APL I correspond to families Sisben 1 (88%) and 2 (10%), and 52% of beneficiary families had at least one member that was affected by forced displacement(source: DNP, IE 2011). (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Component A. Developing Social, Economic and Environmental Assets in Priority Areas: At least 60% of target beneficiaries of Component A (poor and vulnerable families) benefit from social, economic or environmental subprojects financed by the Project. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 59,000 poor and vulnerable beneficiary families in 5 regions benefiting from social, economic and environmental subprojects) 62,904 poor And vulnerable beneficiary families in 6 regions benefiting from social economic and environmental subprojects. Total poor and vulnerable beneficiary families: 63,767 (APL I: 59,000; AF: 4,767) Date achieved 06/30/ /30/ /12/ /15/2012 Comments 100% achieved. The goal (60%) of the total target of vulnerable beneficiaryfamilies (incl. % (equivalent to 37,742 families) was achieved. achievement) Component B (Component A of the AF). Support for internally displaced (ID) families in the process of return and relocation: At least 80% of target ID familiesof Indicator 2 : Component B (returned or relocated families) benefit from food security, basic sanitation and productive subprojects. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 25,600 ID families The AF merged into one all the activities under Components A and B of the APL I. 25,600IDbeneficiary families Date achieved 06/30/ /30/ /12/ /15/2012 Comments 100% achieved. The goal (80%) of the total target of ID beneficiary families (equivalent (incl. % to 20,480 ID families) was achieved. achievement) Component C (Component B of the AF). Strengthening institutions and governance at the local level: i) PO attain at least 60% of their respective targets for capacity Indicator 3 : improvement (based on their score in the ICP) between time 1 (baseline) and time 2. ii) OU reach at least 60% of their respective targets for capacity improvements based on iv

11 Indicator Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values their score in the ICO between time 1 (baseline) and time 2. 1.Scores on ICP applied to 5 POin 2005: ASOPATIA: 5.4 CONSORNOC:5.3 MAGDALENA MED: 7.3 MONTES DE MARIA:6.4 PRODEPAZ: 7.8 VALLENPAZ: n/a 2. Scores on ICO applied to OU 1. ICP applied to 5 PO 2. ICO applied to 100% of OU in two different times. 1. ICP applied to the additional PO (Vallenpaz) 2. ICO applied to 100% ofouarticulated to the strategic territorial plans Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years 1. ICP applied to 6 PO (100%) in time 1 (2005); time 2 (2007) and time 3 (2011) 5 PO attained increased capacity (from 5.4 to 7,4 in average between 2005 and 2011). 2. ICO applied to 100% of OU in 2006 (565) and to 60% in 2010 (337). 242 OU out of 337 (72%) with ICO applied in 2010, increased their capacities. Date achieved 11/30/ /30/ /12/ /15/ % achieved: 1. The ICP was applied to 100% of the PO in three different times (2005, 2007 and 2011). PO increased their capacity above 70%.One PO, the Asopatía-CRIC, operating in Comments the Macizo Colombiano-Alto Patía Region, stopped operating in (incl. % 2. The ICO was applied to 100% of the OU (565) in 2006 and to 60% of the OU (337) in achievement) 2010, increasing 7 points in average between time 1 and 2. 55% of the OU (183) ended up with a medium capacity index in 2010, and 25% of the OU (85) ended up with a high capacity index in Component D (Component Cof the AF).Project Management and M&ES: 100% Indicator 4 : implementation of Annual Operation Plans in each of the 6 regions. PO financial and procurement audits are satisfactory, and 70% of beneficiary entities implementing subprojects comply with the Operational Manual. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0% implementation of Annual Operation Plans (AOP) in each of the 6 regions. 100% 100% implementation of implementation AOP in each of the 5 of AOP in each regions. of the 6 regions. PO financial and procurement audits are satisfactory. 70% of beneficiary entities implementing subprojects comply with the Operational v PO financial and procurement audits are satisfactory. 70% of beneficiary entities implementing subprojects comply with the Implementation of AOP in each of the 6 regions (until1 PO stopped participating in 2010). PO financial and procurement audits were satisfactory. 100% of PO and OU complied with OM.

12 Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Manual (OM). Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years OM. Date achieved 06/30/ /30/ /15/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) 100% achieved G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 12/17/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory /29/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory /25/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory /21/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory /03/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory /15/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory /07/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory /28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory /29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory /19/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory /01/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /27/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /28/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /11/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring DO IP Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made 08/12/2009 Y S S Additional Financing If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Satisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Satisfactory vi

13 I. Disbursement Profile vii

14 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The internal armed conflict in Colombia and the high rates of violence have had a negative impact on the social and economic development of the country. The external economic crises have exacerbated this situation. The armed conflict has caused the forced displacement of more than two million people since 1995, of which 51% are women, 49% are under 18 years of age, and 14% are indigenous and Afro-Colombian; 90% are from rural areas and 35% are small landowners 8. The destruction of the underpinnings of social organization and its effect on human capital, increased poverty and vulnerability. Thirty-one per cent of displaced households live in extreme poverty and 54% are on the threshold of poverty. The conflict, which is waged primarily in rural areas and over control of territory, takes place in regions characterized by weak institutions and, in many cases, corruption and cronyism, high levels of impunity, expansion of illicit crop cultivation, and weak civil society links to public administration due to lack of opportunities for participation. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 2. Assist vulnerable, low income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities located in conflict-affected regions, in order to reduce the risk of their exposure to conflict and mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects. 1.3 Revised PDO(as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 3. The GOC manifested its interest in consolidating the program (APL I), through an AF, before considering a second phase APL (APL II) with a larger program expansion that would reach the current 19 RPDP. The AF was deemed the most effective instrument to respond to the immediate demand and opportunity to enhance the development impact of the PDP, through scaling up a well performing project and consolidate the program. The AF aimed to: i) consolidate the results achieved already by the peace building strategy that has been developed through the APL I, providing additional benefits to 3,904 families; ii) expand the PDP coverage to the Department of Valle del Cauca, and iii) meet one of the triggers for the follow-up APL II operation (the number of community subprojects incorporated into municipal PIU). There was a change in this trigger agreed upon during the Mid Term Review of the original Project. The change accepted that 60% of subprojects supported by the Project are incorporated into municipal development plans or in the budget of public programs (instead of only PIU). PIU in the small and poor municipalities of the project did not exist. This was another wrong assumption based on information provided by the government during preparation. In fact, the Project actually supported the formulation of a number of such PIU. 1

15 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 4. Poor and vulnerable families, as well as displaced people that return or are relocated; community organizations, small producer associations and micro-businesses, municipal governments; partner organizations (PO), the legal representatives of the RPDP. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 5. The project components are: Component A: Developing Social, Economic and Environmental Assets in Priority Areas (US$10,627,364) Carrying out of investments in priority areas for purposes of, inter alia: i) Promoting the production of basic staple food crops for self-consumption, to benefit around 40,000low- income families. ii) Generating employment opportunities through farm and non-farm productive services and smallbusiness activities to benefit around 10,000 low-income families. iii) Enhancing the social network in priority areas to benefit around 9,000 low-income families to: (a) facilitate the access of vulnerable and low-income populations to basic social services; (b) promotejobopportunities for youth; (c) improve housing and sanitary conditions for low-income families; (d) promote a culture of peaceful co-existence among populations of priority areas in the context of regionaldevelopment and the sense of belonging. iv) Developing social andeconomic activities to protect the environment. Component B: Support for Internally Displaced (ID) Families in the Process of Return and Relocation (US$10,822,636) Carrying out of investments inthe conflict affected regions for purposes of, inter alia: i) Promoting the production of basic staple food crops for self-consumption, to benefit around 8,000 displaced families. ii) Facilitating the access to public health and education services to displaced populations. iii) Developing social and economic opportunities for about 17,000 families as they begin to stabilize. iv) Providing basic sanitation to ensure that around 6,000 displacedreturning households have at least a minimum acceptable access to safe water, sanitation and basic housing conditions. Component C: Strengthening Institutions and Governance at the Local Level (US$5,589,961) i) Strengthening of the institutional capacity of partner organizations and Territorial Units of the RSSthrough, inter alia: (a) provision of technical assistance and training to management and administrationteams for the purposes of developing better procurement and financial management systems; and (b)provision of technical assistance, training and 2

16 ii) equipment to management teams for the purposes ofenhancing their capacity to promote community-led social, environmental and economic-financialactivities. Strengthening of the institutional capacity of the National System of Integral Attention for the Displaced Population (SNAIPD) by partner organizations, through inter alia: (a)provision of technical assistance and trainingto management teams in its territorial committees to designand implement Integrated Master Plans (PIU); and (b) provision of technical assistance and training tomanagement and administration teams for the purposes of enhancing their programs of assistance todisplaced populations. Component D: Project Management. Monitoring and Evaluation (US$1,764,495) Provision of support for overall Project coordination, evaluation, supervision and implementation, including, inter alia: i) The strengthening of the capacity of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to comply with its responsibilities as described in Annex 6; ii) The provision of training to PCU staff to enhance their knowledge on Bank's procurement and financial managementpolicies and procedures; iii) The carrying out of audits acceptableto the Bank as described in Annex 7; iv) The carrying out of Project studies, including, inter alia, performance reviews and impact evaluations; and v) The implementation of a program to monitor and evaluate the carrying out of the Project. 6. The eligibility criteria for community-led subprojects in Components A and B were: (i) the proposal arises from a participatory process agreedupon at the community level such as the citizens nuclei of Magdalena Medio, the participatory planning nuclei of Prodepaz Corporation in Antioquia or the mesas de trabajo (working groups) coordinated by the RSS; (ii) implementation is the responsibility of a community organization or association of producers; (iii) the proposed subproject is linked or relatedto the respective Integrated Master Plan, Municipal Development Plan or Indigenous Life Plan; (iv) the subproject isfeasible according to technical, environmental and financial criteria; (v) the community organization contributes in cash or kind to co-finance the initiative; (vi) the proposal presents a description of genderissues; and (vii) the organization demonstrates transparency of budgeting and accounting for the use offunds. 1.6 Revised Components 7. In the framework of the AF, the original Project components were reviewed and amended as follows: Component A: Developing Social, Economic and Environmental Assets and Community Support for Displaced and Vulnerable Families in the Priority Areas of the Conflict Affected Regions through Strategic Territorial Development Processes (US$4,427,000) i) Promoting the production of basic staple food crops for self-consumption. ii) Generating employment opportunities through farm and non-farm productive services and small business activities. 3

17 iii) Enhancing the social network in priority areas to: (a) facilitate the access of vulnerable and low-income populations to basic social services; (b) promote job opportunities for youth; (c) improve housing and sanitary conditions for low-income families; and (d) promote a culture of peaceful coexistence among populations of Priority Areas in the context of regional development and the sense of belonging. iv) Developing social and economic activities to protect the environment. v) Facilitating the access to public health and education services to displaced populations. vi) vii) Developing social and economic opportunities for families as they begin to stabilize. Providing basic sanitation to ensure that displaced/returning households have at least a minimum acceptable access to safe water, sanitation and basic housing conditions. Component B: Strengthening Institutions and Governance at the Local Level (US$1,302,000) i) Strengthening of the institutional capacity of PO, Territorial Units and public and private local institutions in areas directly related to their core activities for purposes of enhancing their management teams capacity to promote community-led social, environmental and economic/financial activities, specifically through the provision of technical assistance, Training and equipment. ii) Strengthening of the institutional capacity of SNAIPD by PO, through inter alia: (a) provision of technical assistance and training to management teams in its territorial committees to design and implement Integrated Master Plans; and (b) provision of technical assistance and training to management and administration teams for the purposes of enhancing their programs of assistance to displaced populations. Component C: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation i) Subcomponent C.1. (US$814,000). Provision of support for overall Project coordination, evaluation, supervision and implementation at the national level, including, inter alia: (a) the strengthening of the capacity of the PCU; (b) the provision of training to PCU staff to enhance their knowledge of Bank s procurement and financial management policies and procedures;(c) the carrying out of audits; (d) the carrying out of Project studies, including, inter alia, performance reviews and impact evaluations; and (e) the implementation of a program to monitor and evaluate the carrying out of the Project. ii) Subcomponent C.2. (US$1,269,000). Provision of support for Project management, monitoring and evaluation at the local level by PO, including goods, services, Non- Consultant Services, Operating Costs and Training in the areas of: (a) procurement and financial management procedures; (b) safeguard procedures; (c) monitoring and evaluation; and (d) other Project-specific supervision and management activities. 1.7 Other significant changes 8. The AF i) expanded the territorial coverage, incorporating Valle del Cauca and a new PO (Vallenpaz); ii) combined original Components A and B into one (Component A); iii) began implementation of specific institutional strengthening subprojects under Component B (original 4

18 project s Component C); vi) strengthened the strategies for PO s support of the OU, and v) included additional results associated with the consolidation of the Strategic Territorial Processes (PET) Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 9. The financial instrument chosen was a two phases APL, which aimed to scale the lessons learned from the two Learning and Innovation Loans (LIL) in the Magdalena Medio RPDP, but the GOC decided not to continue with Phase II of the APL, preferring to continue with an AF for Phase 1 of the APL. This decision resulted in a more limited scope of the PDP and an almost mandatory consolidation of processes and subprojects in the territories, which were still not sufficiently mature for it. The limited amounts of the AF prevented the program from having a greater impact as expected, based on the long term indicators proposed to be used to evaluate the impact of the entire Program (APL I and II) The Project integrated in a single intervention model both the territorial focus and the population focus with an emphasis on the displaced population, which constituted a technical and political challenge.the lack of experience of the PO in assisting displaced populations led to delays in achieving the goals of Component B (phase I), and local tensions were generated by competition for resources among the communities. The design adaptations made during the implementation of the first phase (2006), associated with the execution of joint initiatives for the vulnerable and displaced populations (subprojects AB) were effective. The AF was adapted to this lesson, combining in a single Component, Components A and B of the original project. 11. Tools of the GOC s displacement attention policy were incorporated into the design of the intervention model, but there were not operational at the territorial level.tools such as the Municipal Councils for Internally Displaced Population s Integral Attention (CMAIPD), PIU, IDPs Registry System (SUR)were not functional on the ground.the Project that was supposed to benefit from the SNAIPD and its tools ended up contributing to the operationalization of this System.There was a design problem with the key indicators selected for the Results Framework, due to the unavailability of information about IDP s. The team assumed that the government system designed to identify and track IDP (called SIPOD) produced timely and reliable information at local, regional and national levels. This was not the case and thus, the team was unable to accurately construct indicator 1 of the PDO. In addition, the impact of a good number of the planned and implemented activities would not be captured by this indicator such as those dealing with self-confidence, trust, and collective problem solving, among others. However, these constraints did not affect the overall performance of the Project. 12. Component C of Phase 1 was designed to strengthen the capacities of the PO and User Organizations (OU), a central element of the intervention model, but the resources were insufficient. The mitigation strategy included: i) the reallocation of resources to the incremental teams of the PO; ii) implementation of a robust strategy for the provision of national assistance to 1 See Project Paper, Report No: CO, page 17, Expected Outcomes (Chapter VI). 2 See Project Appraisal Document, Report No CO, page 5. 5

19 the PO, and assistance from these to the OU; iii) allocation of a specific budget for activities devoted to the strengthening of the OU funded in the subprojects; and (iv) the leveraging of additional resources with the cooperation of the EU for the operation of the PO. 2.2 Implementation 13. There were two national and two regional elections during the execution of the Project, which affected its implementation. In some cases, planned agreements on subproject s counterparts were altered. The PO mitigated the effects through: i) rigorous monitoring to shield community processes from political dynamics; and ii) a strategy of approaching candidates in order to coordinate the Project with their platforms. 14. The target regions faced an escalation of the armed conflict as a result of the implementation of the Government s Democratic Security Policy ( ).This context tested the intervention methodology, demonstrating that it was possible to continue working in development actions in the midst of the conflict. The subsequent improvements in security conditions (2007 onwards) facilitated the stabilization of the supported processes and the continuity of the operation, except in the Macizo Colombiano-Alto Patía region, where the violence was intensified because of the reconfiguration of the armed conflict. 15. The government agency responsible for the execution of the Project went through two administrative, operational, budgetary, institutional management and policy transformations 3. The Project was affected by: i) changes in the structure of the national team responsible for the Project, and staff turnover and reductions; ii) greater operational burdens and less assistance on the ground 4 ; iii) slowed implementation and disruption in the flow of funds; iv) changes in the financial and technical operational processes; and v) loss of trust between the DPS and the PO. 16. The process of implementing the Project, especially the AF, was slower than expected. There were delays in the technical and financial execution, as well as operational tensions. The following mitigation measures were taken: i) extension of the execution period with the entry of the AF; ii) intensification of the assistance provided to the PO, and by these to the OU, in order to accelerate the execution at the local level. 17. The Project suffered the loss of a million dollars due to the strong revaluation of the peso in Under this scenario, unallocated resources were used. The deficit affected the achievement of goals and the ability to support a larger number of subprojects. There were financial and administrative lags in the execution of the AF associated with delays in the allocation of resources to finance the PO by the national government. 3 The first was with the creation of ACCION SOCIAL through the merger of the RSS and the ACCI, and one year after completing the execution of the AF, ACCIÓN SOCIAL was transformed into the Administrative Department of Social Prosperity (DPS). 4 The UCP i) assumed responsibility for the implementation of related programs: Peace Laboratories of the EU; AFROPAZ of the WB and Legión del Afecto; and ii) had to become administratively and operationally aligned with the new institutional structure of ACCION SOCIAL and later had to adopt new changes to the DPS, which posed additional internal organizational, planning and strategic management challenges. 6

20 18. One PO was cancelled and the respective Region remained headless.because of administrative deficiencies of one of the six PO (the ASOPATÍA-CRIC), not associated with the management of the PDP s resources though, disclosed by the Comptroller General s Office and the DPS, the project no longer worked with this PO in the Macizo Colombiano-Alto Patía region after the end of Phase 1, according to instructions received by the DPS. Despite this, the project was properly implemented in this region through the direct implementation of subprojects by the OU and with direct assistance and supervision from the DPS. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 19. The M&E design was innovative because its decentralized nature, but lacked functionality. It had a structure supported by different modules for the collection and analysis of information and the presentation of results. It included an information system built with the participation of the PO and the GOC. However, there were delays in its implementation due to the lack of an information management culture in the PO and resistance to change; ii) the use of parallel monitoring tools; and iii) the GOC s decision to incorporate information from the Peace Laboratories into the same modules, which affected the availability of real-time information. This problem was partially overcome by the fact that the PO learned about the usefulness of the M&E through trainings and technical assistance. However, the level of appropriation of the system by the PO was not as expected, and the system overload interfered with the management of updated and timely information. On the contrary, the IE, led by the National Planning Department (DNP) was innovative and served the purposes of the entire program, including the Peace Laboratories funded by the European Union (EU), with two measurement moments over time (cohorts). 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 20. The project s Financial Management (FM) practices complied with the WB s regulations; resources were managed in a transparent manner at all levels, according to the reports of the competent entities, but the FM performance of the Project was Moderately Satisfactory (MS) for most of the implementation. This, due to issues such as: i) the information monitoring system not being fully operational, ii) delays from the PO in justifying expenditures; iii) slowed down in project implementation due to the restructuring of the former Acción Social; iv) high rotation of the technical and financial analysts supporting the project; v) lack of supervision and provision of technical assistance to the PO; and vi) significant delays in signing the agreements and transferring the funds to the PO. These conditions improved during 2012, allowing the opportune accountability by the PO and closing of the project. The external auditors issued unqualified opinion on the project financial statements from 2005 to 2007 and qualified opinions from 2008 to 2011, mainly due to important expenditures incurred by the PO which were not reported or recorded in a timely manner by the DPS. The final audit of the project is expected to be delivered by June The environmental safeguards (including) integrated pest management, as well as the indigenous peoples safeguard, were carried out satisfactorily, as reported by the Bank s supervision missions (See Annex 2). 7

21 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 22. The GOC felt that the APL I had successfully demonstrated how to do participatory development leading to peace, in the midst of conflict, and that the APL I had been instrumental in leveraging significant funding from the EU to join the Peace and Development Program of the GOC. In a way, the success of Phase I did away with Phase II. Despite the fact that the Government decided not to continue with the second phase of the APL: i) some of the existing processes continueto be supported through EU-funded interventions and other international cooperation funds; ii) many of the participating families are enrolled in subsidiary social programs, which reinforced the socioeconomic stabilization initiated by the PDP, iii)all the RPDP continue to operate after the end of the Project and several of them are playing a key role in the formulation and implementation of peace and development related policy, particularly victims, rural development and participation; iv) several lessons were incorporated in strategic public policies for reconciliation and national peace (See Annex 8), and v) the triggers for moving from APL I to Phase II were achieved. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 23. The objectives, design and implementation of the Project corresponded to the challenges of the country, the goals of the Government and the main commitments undertaken by the World Bank Group Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) with Colombia in the different periods (between 2004 and 2012). 24. One of the pillars of the current National Development Plan, Prosperity for All, is the consolidation of peace, supported by, among other guidelines, fullrespect for human rights and transitional justice. In addition, it incorporates citizen participation as one of its strategic foundations, highlighting the need to strengthen civil society, including the RPDP. The PDO maintains a relationship with these commitments, as well as with the objective of the most recent CPS, which incorporates the National Government s support for activities related to the promotion of peace, including support in improving strategies to provide comprehensive and sustainable assistance to displaced persons, a fundamental objective of the PDP. 25. In October 2012, the current government initiated a dialogue with the FARC in an effort to end the armed conflict. Among the five main points of the agenda is comprehensive agrarian development and compensation for the victims of the armed conflict. The PDP and its territorial intervention model are considered to be important because of their contribution to the promotion of peace conditions and the sustainability of peace over time. 26. The GOC has undertaken a plan of structural reforms that will contribute to peacebuilding and national reconciliation. Illegal armed groups continue to dispute some territories, which continue to generate displacement, among other violations of the civilian population s rights. A significant number of IDP will have to face the challenges of returning and socioeconomic stabilization. The intervention methodology of the PDP during eight years of implementation has proven to be effective in relation to the national agenda, in scenarios of both armed confrontation and transition, allowing the recovery of poor communities affected by the violence, as well as the 8

22 generation of conditions for the arrival of more robust institutional interventions.in recent years, the lessons generated by the PDP have been employed for the design of public policies, as well as the active participation of the PO in various endeavors (See Annex 8). 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 27. The results of the PDP are satisfactory. The Project promoted a flexible, highly participatory, decentralized intervention model that was supported by a strategic alliance among the Government, civil society (PO) and the Bank. It demonstrated achievements in: i) reducing the risk of displacement and mitigating its effects, through the installation of basic assets; ii) socioeconomic stabilization of the participants through income generation and the recovery of a social support network; iii) institutional and organizational strengthening at the territorial level; and iv) preventing violence and reducing vulnerability, through the strengthening of democracy. These results are consistent with the guiding premises contained in the initial Project s design, as well as with the purpose of the Project s Components, and they are highly significant because they involve a socially vulnerable population that is living in very precarious socioeconomic conditions The PDP in total benefited 89,367 families and 565 grassroots organizationsparticipating in the implementation of 718 subprojects. The AF benefited 4,767 families and contributed to the development of 37 PET, through the implementation of several subprojects. The AF expanded the project to one additional Region (Department of Valle del Cauca) and incorporated an additional PO (Vallenpaz). See Annex 2. Due to the fact that: i) the phase II of the APL was not materialized; ii) the institutional turnovers at the national level affected seriously the implementation of the PDP, particularly during the AF phase, and iii) one PO (the Asopatía-CRIC) was cancelled and one of the region s remained headless, the rating of the Project is not highly satisfactory. 29. Some of the main objectives achieved by Components are the following: Components A and B (APL I) or Component A (AF).Developing Social, Economic and Environmental Assets and Community Support for ID and Vulnerable Families in the Priority Areas of the Conflict Affected Regions through PET.Social, economic and environmental assets were generated for a total of 89,367families (APL1+AF), (25,600 out of them corresponding to IDP).More than 60% of them were enrolled in income-generation and social, cultural and environmental management subprojects, while 80% were enrolled in food security, habitat improvement and income generation subprojects benefitting in particular IDP that returned to their places of origin or relocated in other regions.according to the IE, these results generated conditions for socioeconomic stabilization, which helped to strengthen ties to the territory and thereby discouraging participants from moving.outcomes and results from 718 subprojects implemented under the APL I, were consolidated in the AF through the support to 37 PET (See Annex 2). Component C (APL I) or Component B (AF). Strengthening Institutions and Governance at the Local Level. The capacities of both the POand OU were strengthened. The Capacity Planning Index (ICP) was applied to the six PO, which increased their capacity 5 With respect to the Project s baseline, the IE reported that 84% of the participants were below the poverty line and 58% were in extreme poverty. Forty-eight percent were displaced, and 43% of households experienced food insecurity. 9

23 above 70%. The Organizational Capacity Index (ICO) was applied to the subprojectexecuting organizations (OU), 565 in total, which increased their capacity indexes above the initial levels. The PET strengthened regional processes and linked them to local political and economic agendas, and some subprojects were incorporated into government platforms. The PET contributed to increase citizens participation and to strengthen democracy. The Project also contributed to strengthen the SNAIPD through the reactivation of around 50 CMAIPDs, through: i) the involvement of leaders of OU supported by the Project; ii) the assistance from the UT of Acción Social (today DPS) and the PO; and iii) the formulation of 70 PIUs, with a leading role played by the CMAIPDs.During the AF, 5 PET were implemented under Component Bbenefitting 5 PO, 32 OU and 682 community leaders trained in citizens participation, participatory planning and budget accountability. Component D (APL I) or Component C (AF).Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation.Incremental costs permitted the permanence of professional teams at the regional level (about 130 people), providing technical assistance to project beneficiaries during the entire project s implementation period and a PCU adequately staffed at the national level, although affected in times by high rotation and disruptions in project implementation. The audit results were satisfactory, and the guidelines of the OM were fully applied by the PCU, PO and OU.Although the results of the M&ES were mix, the Impact Evaluation (IE) represents an innovative methodology to assess this type of operation. The IE was officially declared by the DNP to be strategic because of the innovative way in which it measures effects related to development and peace. It included in its two phases a quasi-experimental design with random samples and control groups and introducing innovative measurement instruments such as economic games. See detailed outcomes by Component in Annex Efficiency 30. The PDP s financial structure provided administrative efficiency by reasonably balancing the investment with the operating costs. It is estimated that of every US$100 of the allocated budget, only US$7 was spent on operation, while the rest was invested in subprojects, technical assistance and institutional strengthening. There was also greater efficiency associated with the costbenefit relationship, in comparison with initiatives of similar scope, such as the Peace Laboratories of the EU, sector-wide initiatives, and the governmental Food Security Network (Red de Seguridad Alimentaria RESA).See calculations and analysis in Annex Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 31. The design developed for fulfilling the proposed objectives, based on an innovative intervention methodology, was effective. This enabled the Project to efficiently achieve its development objectives, despite the high level of poverty/vulnerability of the target population and the adverse security conditions faced during the implementation. The design, which remains relevant in the current context, enabled the Project to surpass its result indicators, and to have close to 87% of the resources executed on the ground directly by the OU with low transaction costs, which was made possible because of the ongoing comprehensive community-tailored assistance, among other reasons. The Project s flexibility made it possible to make adaptations along the way (see Section 2), and 10

24 theflexibility in the design enabled the Project to respond better to the circumstances in the territories in conflict. 32. The approaches and principles that guided the implementation werekey in fulfilling the objectives. The alliance among the Government, PO and the Bank was maintained through the end of the operation in a growing relationship of mutual trust, which was fundamental for the implementation of the Project. This approach has been incorporated into the design of new public initiatives. The proposed long-term approach (an 8-year operation) was validated by the IE, which stressed that projects designed to consolidate a stable social base should not have a short-term duration. 33. The IE also confirmed that the greatest impact was made on beneficiaries with greater exposure to the Project. A total of 718 subprojects were selected through decentralized mechanisms (ad hoc territorial committees) contained in the Project s design, through more than 38 sessions of these committees, and helped to strengthen the relationship of trust, dialogue and coordination among the PO, the community and the Government at the territorial level. The comprehensive, multi-sector approach contained in the Project s design was put in practice during the implementation by the communities themselves, facilitated by the flexible nature of the intervention, which demonstrated its relevance in poor communities affected by the violence. The multi-actor approach, another essential element of the design, was positively validated, despite the precarious social and institutional conditions in the target areas. The indicators and main outcomes of the IE are detailed in Annex Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 34. The Project had positive impacts on overcoming poverty, which included: i) direct effects on the early stabilization of the vulnerable and IDP, whose living conditions were exacerbated by the armed conflict (see Section 3.2); ii) greater social capacities for confronting poverty, and vulnerability associated with greater social integration, the strengthening of social organizations and networks, and an increase in community reciprocity; and iii) an increase in the level of trust and community relations with public institutions, helping 7 out of 10 participants to enroll in State social programs associated with the fight against extreme poverty and the provision of assistance to the displaced population. 35. The PDP made valuable progress in terms of gender equity, as demonstrated in the final report of thegender and IDPs: Integrating Gender into Colombia Peace and Development Project (PE-P SPN-TF095198).According to the EI, 50% of the project s beneficiaries were women, displaced and heads of households (40%). Around 10% were young people, participating mainly in social, cultural and environmental subprojects. In addition, 16 subprojects involved Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, benefiting 1,011 and 2,477 families, respectively. (See Annex 2) 11

25 (b) Institutional Change/ Strengthening (particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development): 36. The Project strengthened the State at the local level, as it increased citizen and political participation, and effectively involved the OU in matters of municipal life, as demonstrated by the IE (see Section 3.2). The Project increased the participation of citizens in elections and enhanced their impact on the preparation of development plans. In some cases, the increase in the number of leaders (682 trained by the PDP) and their capacities, allowed for lessons from the PDP to be transmitted to the municipal administrations, strengthening public planning and management. 37. The Project strengthened the SNAIPD at a territorial level, by reactivating the CMAIPDs and supporting the formulation of the PIUs 6, efforts through which capacities were installed in local public institutions and civil society 7 to enable them to coordinate assistance for the IDP. Some lessons have been shared by the PO in discussions on the implementation of the Victims Law and the Citizen Participation Law. The Project raised awareness of the GOC and International Cooperation about the need to develop a policy dialogue strategy.through the funding of incremental teams in the DNP and the PO, the Project also supported experts who identified lessons that have served as inputs for the design of public policies and international cooperation interventions 8 (see Annex 2). 38. Finally, the Project adjusted existing instruments, such as the ICP and the ICO, and validated them through several applications during the implementation of the Project. These toolshave been adopted by the DNP and applied in other similar projects and programs, including the design of a software that facilitates the application of these tools. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts: 39.The Colombia, Strengthening Human Rights in Regional Development and Peace Programs Project (TF096627), supported by a grant from the Nordic Trust Fund and the WB, concluded that the PDP had unintended impacts on the enjoyment of human rights 9 by participants and their families. This finding demonstrates that there are natural links between the development sought by communities and the enjoyment and guarantee of their rights. The advances in this area were made possible by the intervention design and methodology, whose spirit is consistent with the rights 6 The Project reactivated around 50 CMAIPDs through: i) the involvement of leaders of OUs supported by the Project; ii) assistance from the UT of Acción Social (today DPS) and the OP; and iii) the formulation of 70 PIUs, with a leading role played by the CMAIPDs. 7 The Project made the PO aware of, and involved them in, the forced displacement agenda, and they became valuable actors in assisting the displaced population in the territory, which enabled this population to become involved in the POs social networks and strategic agenda. 8 These included the national policy to strengthen the Community Action organizations of the Ministry of the Interior, the Community Reintegration Strategy of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR), the Peace and Stability Regional Development Program, the European Union s New Peace Territories Program, and the Program for the Institutional Strengthening of Afro-Colombian Municipalities (AFROPAZ) of the Japanese Fund World Bank. 9 This project s initial report documents how the PDP: i) made significant contributions to the target population s enjoyment of their rights, mainly through the support and implementation of development subprojects that incorporated elements of participation, transparency, empowerment and equality, characteristics of the rights approach for development; although ii) these contributions were not always planned or evidenced; and iii) the elements of the rights approach were not incorporated in the design of the subprojects in a consistent and deliberate manner. 12

26 approach, which is central to the ability to intervene in areas affected by significant violence and exclusion. Also, the environmental safeguards and integrated pest management were internalized and appropriated by the PO and OU, and are today employed by some of them in the habitual design and monitoring of their initiatives. The indigenous people sframework (IPF) was also appropriated by the PO, thanks in part to the coherence of the PDP s intervention model within the WB s IPF (see Annex 2).The APL I leveraged 30% of cofinancing (US$11,6 million) from others parties different from the EU. Of this total, US$7,9 were provided by OU and US$3.7 million were provided by actors other than the OU (mayor s offices, departmental authorities, others) (Source: DPS, APL I Final Report, 2009). 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 40. A survey was conducted to fifteen key people (see Annex 5) and three field visits and focus groups were undertaken. As a result of these exercises, it was concluded that: i) the bottom-up and learning by doing approaches were effective in the work performed with communities affected by the violence. Also, the Project s focus on innovation and learning provided sufficient flexibility and the necessary conceptual framework for the construction of a model that can promote a type of local development that is conducive to peace. Consequently, the PDP has left the country with a completely new and innovative methodology that has inspired other programs; ii) the Project increased the capacity for dialogue and trust-building among actors generally assumed to be antagonistic, favoring the generation of alliances around common issues of national and local interest; this in itself is a contribution to peace; iii) citizen participation as a mechanism for defending community demands was strengthened, despite the polarization generated by the violence and the historical use of social mobilization and physical violence; iv) the Project encouraged the PO and OU to develop long term regional development proposals and to manage them through participatory processes; iv) the fact that the WB and national public institutions supported the grassroots organizations created a cascading effect of raising awareness about organizations of vulnerable and IDP, and generating new leaderships; and v) there are now examples of sustainable businesses led by peasant farmers and indigenous peoples, partnerships between peasants and business people, and more politically adept grassroots organizations of all types that are having an ever greater impact on the fate of their own regions. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 41. Several types of risks may affect the PDO, as described below. However, when balancing them with the capacities that have been installed in the territories (including strengthened public, private and community-based organizations, new leaderships, strong social networks and democracy, enrollment of project beneficiary families in other governmental programs) and a battery of new laws and policy directives in favor of vulnerable, poor and IDP, that have been inspired and formulated following the lessons of the PDP, the risk to development outcome is considered Moderate. 13

27 Environmental risks: Between 2010 and 2011 Colombia suffered from the severe effects of global climate change, characterized by an extraordinary and prolonged increase in rainfall 10. All of the regions in which the Project was implemented were affected. The subprojects, especially those related to agriculture, continue to be vulnerable, despite the fact that the OU appropriated the Project s environmental safeguards and implemented agro-ecological practices on their land. Security Risks: The armed conflict has been reconfigured. Criminal gangs (BACRIM) associated with drug trafficking are present in the areas in which the Project was implemented. Urban violence has increased because of the growth in drug micro-trafficking and youth gangs. The GOC strongly supports the land restitution policy in the framework of the Victims Law, and some promoters of restitution have been murdered. These situations have created risks at the local level that could affect leaders who were trained and supported by the Project and the overall security in the regions where the PDP operate. However, precisely, because of the outcomes of the Project, these areas and populations are better equipped to resist to violence and cope with its negative derived effects. Political risks: While the PDP contributed to the strengthening of participatory democracy, local public institutions have still not been able to efficiently respond to the demands of the OU, whose level of citizen participation and empowerment were raised by the Project. In some regions, these dynamics have generated tensions among PDP leaders who are trying to promote institutional changes following the principles of the PDP. Some of these leaders currently hold government positions or serve on municipal councils. These dynamics, in scenarios in which sectors that use violence to maintain control of local power still exist, pose risks for politically active communities. The level of vulnerability could increase with the withdrawal of the Project. However, the social solidarity networks created and strengthened by the PDP contribute to mitigate the risk. Economic risks: The recent Free Trade Agreements (FTA) 11 pose a risk for the continuity of several initiatives supported by the PDP 12 which still do not have the levels of competitiveness required to face foreign competition. The lack of policies for adapting the rural economy to the new economic context is an additional factor that will make the OUs more vulnerable once the Project has been completed. Institutional risks: The consolidation of the processes installed by the PDP still requires assistance and funding. The original design of the Project included a Phase II of the APL, which had this scope andcontinues to be necessary. This aspect constitutes a risk for the continuity of the processes supported by the PDP, which the beneficiaries themselves have warned about in field visits and surveys.however, 70% of the families supported by the Project have been enrolled in social programs subsidized by the State and new international cooperation initiatives. Nevertheless, these do not provide support for the PO, which, despite having operating resources, have reduced assistance to the OUs because of a lack of funding. 10 According to Colombia Humanitaria, this emergency situation affected 90% of the national territory (1,060 municipalities), impacted 21% of the population, and caused considerable damage to physical and social infrastructure, which, according to CEPAL, amounted to US$1.3 billion. 11 Colombia has signed FTAs with the United States, the EU, Canada and Panama, and is preparing new FTAs with South Korea, China, Japan and Turkey. 12 Clothing, beekeeping, horticulture, corn and small dairy farming, among others. 14

28 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 42. Beyond its role as financier, the WB was directly involved in the design and implementation of the PDP, acting as a partner and ally of the GOC and civil society, and making available its expertise, knowledge and qualified technical team. The WB provided important assistance in promoting the political-institutional dialogue on the formulation and adoption of the peace and development model. The WB s convening services materialized with the entrance of the EU to support the Peace and Development Agenda in Colombia with a 98 million euro operation through the Peace Laboratories (I, II and III), building a strong partnership with the WB and the GOC to enhance the impact of the development and peace strategy in the territories where the PDP operated. 43. Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies): Around 18 supervision missions ( ) were conducted by the WB team, demonstrating ongoing monitoring and assistance. This process made it possible to expose and overcome bottlenecks, as well as to promote and deepen the dialogue and trust between civil society and the GOC, thereby contributing to joint decision-making, to support the implementation of the PDP and to promote the formulation of public policies for peace building and coexistence. The role of the WB was and continues to be highly valued by all of parties, as verified in the consultations carried out and in the Borrower s comments to the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). 44. Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance: In light of the above-described contributions, the solid design of the Project and its proper implementation, the results achieved by the Project, and the strategic partnerships developed, the Bank s overall performance is rated as Satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 45. During the startup and implementation of Phase I of the APL, the GOC (DPS and DNP) played a fundamental strategic role in building a political dialogue with civil society and regional governments 13, as well as in designing, implementing and making an impact on public policies based on the lessons generated by the Project. Regrettably, this good performance was not reflected during the AF. On the contrary, institutional changes, the high turnover of directive and technical personnel, 13 One positive aspect is the relationship that was developed between municipal and departmental administrations through their participation in the ad hoc committees. These were responsible for prioritizing subprojects, including some in the development and investment plans actions and co-finance them. Nevertheless, in some cases, the counterpart contributions were not provided in the expected times and amounts. 15

29 and administrative weaknesses, generated deficiencies in the strategic and operational management of the Project and a lack of trust between the PO and the DPS. 46. Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance: Because of the administrative weaknesses that affected the pace of execution of the Project in general, and that had an important impact mainly on the implementation of the AF phase, the Borrower s performance rating is considered Moderately Satisfactory. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory 47. The PO ensured the provision of assistance that was tailored to community needs and that was effective in rebuilding their social capital; this gave legitimacy to the Project in violent areas, and facilitated regional dialogue and the coordination of actions with the public sector. In addition, the PO were fundamental in generating key lessons for the design of public policies. One key aspect to highlight is the transparency of the PO in managing public funds. Their efficient and committed performance, including taking over responsibilities that went beyond the obligations that they were supposed to assume under the agreements signed with DPS, for example, the contribution with additionalcounterpart funds and human resources, to ensurethe continuity of the local teams and the supervision of the Project at the local level at all times, even during periods in which the flow of funds from the DPS was interrupted. Other example is the effortthat the POdid to leverage additional funds to strengthen their RPDP, as it was the case of Prodepaz that leveraged funds from the private sector, particularly from the energy company (Interconexión Eléctrica SA, ISA); FRDPMM from UNDP, and Consorcoc from the territorial administration, the Department of Norte de Santander. 48. Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower/ Implementing Agencies Performance Based on the factors described above, the combination of performances between the Borrower and the PO (as implementing agencies at the regional level), overall Borrower/Implementing Agencies Performance is considered Satisfactory.The effective operation of the PO contributed to mitigate some of the difficulties caused by broader institutional transitions at the national level. The PO ensured the continuity of the local teams and supervision of the project at the territorial level at all times, even when the flow of funds from the national level was interrupted due to institutional changes and high turnover of directive and technical personnel in the DPS. 6. Lessons Learned 49. After eight years of implementation of the PDP, the Project generated multiple lessons in different areas of development and peace-building, many of which are set forth in Section 3 and Annex 2. This chapter is focused on lessons that are relevant to the challenges of implementing, especially at a local level, the recent legislative framework presented by the GOC as a strategy for national reconciliation 14. In addition, it is very important that the lessons of the PDP be collected at a 14 Victims and Land Restitution Law, Citizen Participation Law and the proposed Rural Development Law. 16

30 time of increasing expectations related to the initiation of peace talks between the GOC and the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). a) Lessons related to methodologies, instruments and institutional arrangements for promoting development and peace at the local level: i. The PDP methodology is useful for generating development processes that are conducive to peace, meaning processes that are: i) decentralized; ii) highly participatory; iii) multi-sectoral and comprehensive; iv) flexible; v) with a long-term approach, vi) with ongoing assistance; vii) coordinated with the public and private sectors; viii) with a community focus; and ix) oriented towards grassroots organizations, in the midst of acute violence or in post-conflict scenarioscharacterized by political polarization, social fragmentation, poverty/exclusion and heightened institutional distrust. ii. Interventions in areas of conflict, supported by alliances among the GOC, international community and civil society, generate greater legitimacy from the outset.the legitimacy of the partnership was based on transparency, gradual building of trust, and respect of the territory s decisions.for the GOC, the work performed in alliance with the PO, understood as partners 15 and not as State contractors, is a key element that enabled a close link withthe communities with which the RPDP were already working with. It also made possible to coordinate existing community processes with the programs and efforts of public and private entities in the territories, thereby generating opportunities for dialogue, the recovery of trust in the State, the reduction of conflict and the achievement of greater local impacts. iii. Consensus-building based on trust in the midst of contexts marked by violence and polarization, has the potential to influence local development processes. iv. Working together with regional partners (PO) reduces transaction costs,contributes to create local capacities, generate appropriation and guarantee sustainability. POtook advantage of the social networks that they have contributed to create, even before the PDP; thisfacilitated the implementation of the subprojects on the ground. Also, the POcontinued to promote the existing social processes as part of their mission. The RPDP supported by the PDP continue to work in thepdp s regions, multiplying the capacity installed in grassroots and second-level organizations. v. The PO profound knowledge of the territories, their knowledge of the socioeconomic and political dynamics, imprinted realism to the PDP s interventions. The vision of regionalpartners incorporates the principle of reality, contributing to formulate and implement effective interventions.legitimate regional PO that are trusted by grassroots organizations, make it possible to identify and assess risks and detect unexpected effects. vi. Building on lessons from Learning and Innovation Loans (LIL) to scale up the program using an APL was particularly useful in supporting a long term peace and 15 The concept of partner organization (PO) in this Project refers to a civil society organization whose mission is not profit neither non-profit, but rather the promotion of inclusive social processes in a territory, processes that have been i) in operation since before the arrival of a project; ii) are associated with development and peace, and iii) are recognized by local and regional public and private actors. The PO s relationship with the GOC and the World Bank is horizontal, which means that decisions related to the project are made jointly. The financiers and donors subordinate their financial support to the demands of the territory channeled through the PO, under the premise of going beyond a focus on needs and humanitarian/emergency assistance to individuals, to the construction of long-term processes and social capital. 17

31 development agenda. In support of the long term engagement that accompanied this complex development program, the Bank used a combination of different lending instruments over time. It piloted interventions with a sequence of LILs 16, and then developed the APL program from this experience.the Bank realized the importance of taking a learning and innovation approach to support the GOC with its long term peace and development agenda. The LIL permitted to the GOC and to the Bank, the possibility to test and validate an innovative intervention methodology to work in conflict affected regions in Colombia that demonstrated over the years that it was possible to improve the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable populations, including IDP, in the midst of conflict. This was key for scaling up the program to 5 regions with the APL I, for the GOC to leverage funds from other donors as the EU, and for other PO to create RPDP in other regions of Colombia. As of today, 19 RPDP operate in Colombia inspired on the PDP s methodology that the Bank contributed to design, validate and mainstream. b) Lessons related to attention to victims of violence: i. Support to victims of violence with a focus on development that is conducive to peace 17, generates long-term effects that result in restitution and effective enjoyment of rights 18. The actions associated with this development approach go beyond humanitarian assistance and the classic concept of reparation, effectively helping to overcome vulnerabilities 19, strengthening autonomy, and contributing to social integration and active citizenship. The Project demonstrated that IDPwere able to overcome their situations and become social and economic actors with strong capacities for participation,and for influencing local development.examples include e.g. the clothing cooperatives of Eastern Antioquia and CONFEREDEPAZ in Norte de Santander, whose main actors are displaced women. ii. Working with a territorial approach to development, contributes to achieve higher impacts of the interventions.the PDP not only worked with a highly inclusive approach, as it involves grassroots organizations promotingsocial networks and opportunities for dialogue and consensus-building at all levels, but promoted an approach that included a long term view and multi-sector interventions that went beyond thelimited politicaladministrative boundaries. iii. The development of community driven subprojects, promoted jointly by vulnerable and displaced population groups, contributed to reintegrate victims of the violence into recipient communities, to reconstruct the social fabric torn by armed violence and to promote reconciliation at the local level. The Project confirmed that positive discrimination in favor of individuals affected by the violence, such as IDP, is not 16 Two LILs for the Magdalena Medio Region Peace and Development Program, one LIL for the Rural Enterprise Zones Project and one LIIL for the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta Region, all working on conflict-affected regions by violence and land and natural resources management conflicts. 17 Development that is: i) decentralized; ii) highly participatory; iii) comprehensive; iv) flexible; v) long-term, vi) with ongoing assistance; vii) coordinated with the public and private sectors; vi) community-focused; and vi) oriented to grassroots organizations. 18 See Section3.5, Subsection (c). 19 Some of the survey responses by community leaders indicated that the IDP feel safer when social processes are undertaken in conjunction with communities that resisted and decided not to displace, than when such processes are developed individually or by organizations composed exclusively of victims. 18

32 convenient, as it breaks from community logic, promotes competition for resources, generates fractures in the local social order, increases the risk of re-victimization and can create more risks of exposure for IDP. After a year of implementation of the Project, it was evident that the natural tendency in the territory is to develop common initiatives among vulnerable populations, including IDP (62% of all funded subprojects). These initiatives had a high level of community support, and were given priority over subprojects devoted exclusively to IDP. According to the victims themselves and IDP, working together with vulnerable populations that resisted displacement increased their perception of security and generated a sense of protection from the latent conflict. Among the most important community experiences of this type we find the subprojects led by Asociación Villapaz and by ASOCAIDENA in the Macizo Colombiano Region, and by Asociación ASOAGRO in the Montes de María Region. c) Lessons related to the strengthening of social capital and the promotion of citizen participation: i. Citizen participation by excluded populations in the context of conflict is promoted most effectively within the framework of locally built long-term processes. These processes should be focused on: i) strengthening community organizations and social networks as tools for improving living conditions, empowering groups, and managing the interests of the local communities; ii) promoting civic and democratic actions that facilitate formal participation and create opportunities for social dialogue even in the context of weak institutions; and iii) promoting a citizen culture that is conducive to the construction of longterm agreements among public, private and social actors. The PDP has supported innovative experiences 20 of citizen participation at a local and regional level that are still ongoing, including the Regional Planning System of Eastern Antioquia, the participatory budgeting in the municipality of El Peñón in the same Region; the roundtable on land and the municipal proposals in Magdalena Medio; the Red Montemariana and its Local Facilitating Boards (Juntas Facilitadoras Locales) in Montes de María, and the Youth Network (Red de Jóvenes) and the Community Radio Network (Red de Emisoras Comunitarias) in Norte de Santander. ii. The development of social capital in the midst of conflict is achieved more effectively by strengthening existing community organizations. This requires ongoing assistance that promotes the progressive creation of social networks, roundtables and other opportunities for dialogue with public and private institutions in order to address citizen demands. The PDP found that this dynamic contributes to unify the territory, to encourage citizen participation, to enhance democracy, and to promote collective vision and action with respect to development and peace. iii. The strengthening of grassroots organizations is more effective when carried out through specific subprojects that can be appropriated by the beneficiaries. This requires: i) subprojects to be identified and designed in a participatory manner; ii) resources to be managed directly by the communities; and iii) subprojects to deliberately incorporate actions necessary for the development of the community-based organizations. Apparently unfeasible 20 Some of these experiences developed their own methodologies and instruments, some of which have been systematized. 19

33 subprojects implemented by weak or inexperienced local organizations 21, shown to be viable thanks to ongoing assistance provided by a territorial partner (PO), and these subprojects became the cornerstone for the construction of long-term processes. A diagnostic and planning instrument called ICO was used and it ended up being adopted by the GOC as an instrument for assessing social organizations capacities and formulating sound organizational strengthening programs. d) Lessons related to rural development: Most of the lessons generated by the PDP are relevant to rural development: i. In addition to a strong emphasis on agriculture, other areas are fundamental for the generation of multi-sector territorial dynamics in rural areas, such as income generation subprojects that include food security, social and cultural management, citizen participation, natural resources management and habitat, like the peasant farms (finca campesina) supported by the PDP 22. ii. The implementation of farm models tailored to the conditions and commitments of each territory demonstrated that it is possible to have a sustainable peasant economy, which increases income and effectively enables the participating families to enjoy their rights. Processes of this nature smooth the way for overcoming poverty in the countryside and creating a rural middle class in Colombia. The nationwide amplification of these lessons is central for the consolidation of peace in the country, especially when this is part of the agenda of the peace talks between the Government and the FARC.For this reason, the manner in which the PDP intervenes is itself a methodological lesson that could be useful for the implementation of peace agreements in areas historically afflicted by violence. 21 This refers to grassroots organizations (whether or not formally created) that are characterized by: i) a high level of risk from the armed conflict; ii) being territorially scattered (without geographical continuity) in areas that have geo-strategic value for the conflict; iii) being emblematic at a local/regional level; and/or iv) having a high capacity for social mobilization in the territory. 22 A PDP peasant farm can be defined as a productive socioeconomic unit supported by a rural family that: i) has chosen to live in the countryside; ii) has land and aspires to formalize its ownership; iii) respects and protects the environment; and iv) produces in a sustainable manner food for its own consumption or for local exchange/sale (food security) and year round tropical products for the agro-industry. The peasant family forms part of a community organization that promotes similar initiatives and actively participates in the construction of public policies and subprojects at the local level. The community organizations are linked to regional organizations (or second-level organizations) that have been created during the process in order to support the association of producers. The entire process is assisted in a comprehensive manner by the RPDP, not only to support agro-productive efficiency, access to land, to credit, to technology and to achieve economic profitability, but also to strengthen the family, empower the grassroots organizations and facilitate their participation in a regional project that involves the entire community. The most emblematic examples of the peasant farm model have been developed in Magdalena Medio (peasant farms with commercial products such as oil palm, cocoa and fruits); in Montes de María (Montemariana peasant farm); in Norte de Santander (integrated peasant farm); and in Macizo Colombiano (agroecological peasant farm). 20

34 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 50. DPS presented a final report as a main input for the ICR. This report highlights the main results, learning and conclusions of the PDP. Nevertheless, due to: i) the two institutional reforms that transformed the RSS into Acción Social and then Acción Social into DPS, and ii) the high staff rotation not only at the directive level, but at the technical level, DPS had serious difficulties to keep the history of the PDP and the traceability of the information. Therefore, the preparation of the final report for DPS was a real challenge. Nevertheless, it provided useful inputs to prepare the ICR. In addition, DPS provided comments to the draft ICR aimed to: i) confirm the number of Project beneficiaries under the AF phase and ii) explain the constraints of the monitoring and evaluation system that, in opinion of DPS, provided a value added particularly to the PO (due to its decentralized nature, generating trust and accountability by facilitating the collection of information), but was not functional enough at the national level to prepare annual reports, undertake thorough assessments and guide decision-making processes. 51. DPS submitted a letter on March 4, 2013 (see Annex 6) providing an overall balance of the 14 years of support from the Bank through the PDP. The letter i) thanks the Bank for the support to the GOC in developing and implementing the peace and development agenda; ii) acknowledges the contributions of the PDP to the improvement of livelihoods of thousands of poor, vulnerable and displaced families affected by conflict; iii) explains the contribution of the PDP to the preparation and design of several policy documents and public strategies to consolidate peace and coexistence, and iv) recognizes the benefits of partnering with national and territorial entities, civil society organizations and donors for achieving important outcomes and impacts in the context of peace consolidation in Colombia. 52. DNP provided general and specific comments, thanks to the contributions of the technical team working in the Peace and Development Group of the Direction of Justice, Security and Governance, since many years ago. This was a factor contributing to the continuity of policy dialogues, knowledge exchange, relevant and strategic participation in IE activities, Project s final assessment and reflection on learnings to inform and influence public policies related to citizen security and participation, victim s reparation and restitution, among others. DNP comments were focused on: i) format and editing aspects that were very helpful in finalizing the ICR and enhancing the document s quality (e.g. introduce more data to support statements, avoid repetitions, clearly distinguish between outcomes and learning in specific sections, and ii) the need to strengthen the mention to policy documents that the PDP contributed to inspire and formulate, e.g. National Development Plans (NDP); Laws, Policy Documents (CONPES) and National Policy Plans issued and in preparation (See Annex 8). (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A 21

35 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD equivalent) for the Peace and Development Project (Loan 7232-CO) Components Appraisal Estimate (expressed in USD) Actual/Latest Estimate (expressed in USD) Percentage of Appraisal 1. Goods under Parts C and D of the Project 246, , % 2. Consultants services under Parts C and D of the Project 5,848,000 6,560, % 3. Training 759, , % 4. Goods, works and consultants services for Social and Economic Subprojects under Part A of the Project 5. Goods, works and consultants services for displaced Families Subprojects under Part B of the Project 10,627,000 14,693, % 10,823,000 6,911, % 6. Operating costs (a) For the PCU 161, , % (b) For the Partner 535, , % Organizations 7. Unallocated 1,000, Cancelled 129, Total Project Costs 30,000,000 30,000,000 (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD equivalent) for the Additional Financing of Peace and Development Project (Loan 7781-CO) Components Appraisal Estimate (expressed in USD) Actual/Latest Estimate (expressed in USD) Percentage of Appraisal 1. Goods, works and consultants services for Investment Subprojects under 4,427,000 4,283, % Part A of the Project 2. Goods, Consultant Services and Training under Part B of the 1,302, , % Project 3. Goods, Consultant Services, Non-Consultant Services, Training and Operating Costs (a) Under Part C.1 of the Project 814, , % (b) Under Part C.2 of the Project 1,269,000 2,073, % 4. Cancelled 274, Total Project Costs 7,812,000 7,812,000 22

36 (b) Financing for the Peace and Development Project (Loan 7232-CO) Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal Borrower International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD % (b) Financing for the Additional Financing of Peace and Development Project (Loan CO) Borrower Source of Funds International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Type of Cofinancing European Union (Peace Labs) Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal % IBRD % 23

37 Annex 2. Outputs by Component 1. The PDP contributed to the socio-economic stabilization of 89,367 beneficiary families, (including 25,600 ID families), through 718 subprojects for the provision of basic solutions and the generation of social, economic and environmental assets; the strengthening of 6 PO and 565 OU implementing subprojects, and the training of 682 community leaders.the project was very effective in: i) rebuilding the social capital fragmented by violence,ii) strengthening the capacities of community-based organizations and partner organizations,iii) fostering community leadership and empowerment, as well as political and citizen participation, and iv) promoting the transformation of the relationships between communities and between communities and public actors. These results were magnified in those communities with greater exposure to the Project, and are consistent with the Project premises 23 and the results of the IE. 2. Components A and B (of the APL I) or Component A (of the AF). Developing social, economic and environmental assets and community support for vulnerable and ID families in the priority areas of the conflict affected regions, through PET processes. 3. These Components benefitted 89,367 families (63,767 poor and vulnerable families and 25,600 ID families), through social, economic, and environmental subprojects. These Components contributed to create conditions for the socio-economic stabilization of the vulnerable populations, including IDP, strengthening their ties to the territory. The PDP demonstrated that populations with greater social, economic and environmental assets are less likely to choose to displace themselves when they perceive the risk of exposure to conflict, because they have more means to mitigate the potential negative impact of that exposure. 4. Of a total of 63,767 poor and vulnerable families, 18,293 families benefitted from income generation subprojects; 14,485 from food security subprojects; 22,988 from social and cultural subprojects; 4,000 from improvements in housing and 4,001 from environmental subprojects. Regarding IDP in particular, the PDP benefitted 25,600 ID families that returned to their original sites or that were relocated. Of the total of IDP, 14,800 ID families benefited from social and income generation subprojects (8,000 from income generation subprojects, 6,500 from social subprojects and 300 from environmental subprojects); 7,500 ID families benefited from food security subprojects and 3,300 from housing subprojects. The number of IDP in the regions where the Project operated (355,637 IDP) as percentage of the national total (2,236,963), was reduced from 18% in 2004 to 7% in Although not all can be attributed to the Project, there is evidence that the beneficiary families achieved socio-economic stabilization, consolidated their social organizations, and gained influence in public affairs at the local level. 5. Many subprojects that were implemented by the PDP attended both IDP and vulnerable populations, favoring social cohesion and reducing the level of risk for IDP and facilitating their permanence in the territory. 92% of the participants expressed their intention to remain in their municipality, which is concomitant to the increase in monthly income by US$31 (in rural areas) and US$56 (in urban areas). This facilitated: i) increased spending on food (over 70% of income); ii) 23 See PAD Report No CO, page 5. 24

38 reduction in food insecurity in 16% of the households 24 ; iii) purchase of some basic household assets; and iv) improvement in the basic conditions of housing 25. In the medium term, these conditions also contributed to discouraged Project beneficiaries to leave their farms, even at times of threats by armed actors. 6. In Phase I, 62% of the 533 subprojects were carried out jointly by IDP and vulnerable population. During the AF the population became even more integrated. These results are associated with the progress made in: i) community integration (integration in networks and recognition of leaders) 26 and ii) generation of social reciprocity 27. Both increased in the medium term and contributed to the use (by the participants) of community structures as mechanisms for conflict resolution 28, including safety nets to prevent further deterioration of their living conditions before they could start re-engaging themselves to build new assets, particularly in the case of IDP. 7. In Phase I, 100% of subprojects benefitting indigenous populations and or afro-descendants took into account their Life Plans and Territorial Community Council Plans, respectively, and applied a participatory approach in the formulation and implementation of subprojects. This was consistent with the Indigenous Peoples Framework applicable to the project. Phase I supported 16 subprojects benefitting indigenous populations (1,011indigenous families) and afro-descendants (2,477 families). During the AF, 8 subprojects benefited afro-colombians (1,363 families) and indigenous peoples (1,558 families). 8. Under the AF, no changes to the original project activities, expected outcomes and indicators were made and all continued to be relevant. Nevertheless, subprojects financed through the AF were of a more integrated nature, building on successful methodologies and in line with regional PET. 37 PET were supported through subprojects (32 under Component A and 5 under Component B) consolidating APL I s results. Additional outcomes throughout the Regions were achieved, through the implementation of subprojects supporting 7 PET (see Table 1.) These PET deserve to be highlighted, not only for their interesting results, but because they represent the core nature of the consolidation of the PDP through the AF phase. 24 This achievement is related to the implementation of income-generation and food security subprojects, and, according to the IE and testimonies by PO and OU members, their impact was magnified in areas with coordination between institutions and public food security programs, such as RESA. 25 These results were due to the direct effects of the housing improvement subprojects as well as to basic investments made by the participants thanks to the increase in income. 26 According to the IE, this indicator measures the percentage of leaders that the beneficiaries identify as such within the group of workshop participants. The impact is 3% in 6 additional months of participation in the project, which is high in comparison with the indicator baseline of 2.3% for beneficiaries with low exposure to the PDP. 27 Increase of 5% in the reciprocity index in 6 months of exposure to the project. 28 Generated an increase of 17% of the beneficiaries who believe that community structures can constitute a mechanism for conflict resolution, security and protection in the face of violence. This result is significant, because 56% of beneficiaries with low exposure to the project were of the same opinion. 25

39 Table 1. PET Main Outcomes and Results Proposed AF Additional Outcomes Consolidation of at least one second-tier association (consortium of small producer organizations) to support an integral social and productive model for clothing subprojects. Development of at least one pilot farming system model for small farmers to increase food crop productivity in order to improve food security and family income. Consolidation of at least one regional network of grassroots organizations with productive, social, or cultural objectives. Consolidation of at least one regional network of community-based communications/media initiatives that advance education and intercultural dialogue among indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombians, and peasants. Establishment of at least one regional network of youth-led arts organizations (theater, dance, arts, alternative communication media, among others) Increasing the capacity of two PDP participatory planning committees to have political voice, impact public policy, and affect the allocation of resources at the municipal level. PET 1. Strengthening of the competitive business model in the apparel sector in the municipalities of Cucuta and Sardinata, Norte de Santander. 2. Peasant Farm Model, Magdalena Medio. 3. The Montemariana Network: Consolidation of a civil society development and peace initiative in Montes de María. 4. Communication for development, Eastern Antioquia. 5. Culture and Sports: Scenarios for peace constructed by children and youth in the Mountains of Nariño, Community association of parents and musicians from the Salvador Marro Band music school. 6. Constructors of public policies and institutional strengthening, Magdalena Medio. 7. Building the capacity of political actors in human rights and civic duty, human rights and IHL in Eastern Antioquia. PET Actual Outcomes and Results - 76 beneficiary ID families - Consolidation of the Red Conferedepaz (associating 14 productive units and providing second level services). - Productivity increase (300 units per week in APL I vs. 800 units in AF). - Creation and operation of a solidarity revolving fund to reinvest and to support the organization s members. - Social welfare plan implemented and dispute resolution mechanism designed and operational. - Environmental management plan designed and operational ID families increased their income - Peasant farm model consolidated producing diversified products (cacao, fruits and avocado) - Improvement in nutrition and food habits - Substitution of illicit crops for legal agriculture - Revolving fund consolidated - Participatory diagnosis of the state of the community-based organizations and of their citizen s participatory scenarios - 25 plans for the strengthening the local structures of the Red Montemariana. - Communication strategy built local focal points strengthened through training in communication for development - Round Tables created and operating to deal with victims (Carmen de Bolívar), Peasant Enterprise Zones (Montes de Maria) and Municipal Rural Development Council (Tolú Viejo). - Red Montemariana participating in the formulation of local development plans in Montes de Maria Region. - Press agency created and operating ( OrienteApress ) - Social pedagogic strategy developed and operational in East Antioquia Region. - Communication plan for each PET of the East Antioquia Region. - Regional sport and cultural network associated to peace processes created linked to Municipal Educational Institutions and Administrations. - Young people s forced recruitment prevented, through recuperation of cultural traditions and productive use of spear time. - 3 Municipalities with communicational strategies to promote HHRR (Morales, Arenal y La Gloria). - Young people trained on HHRR and promoting HHRR in their municipalities. - 3 community radio station presenting HHRR programs. - Local participatory planning in Eastern Antioquia. - SIRPAZ 2012 updated (local planning development tool) and methodology transferred to stakeholders zoning plans updated and feeding local and regional development plans. - Partnership with UNDP, Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Medellín and Diócesis de Sonsón. 26

40 9. Component C (APL I) or B (AF). Strengthening Institution and Governance at the Local level. 10. The Projectcontributed to the institutional and organizational strengthening of communitybased and other civil society organizations. The capacities of both the PO (6) and OU (664) were strengthened. The ICP was applied to 100% of the PO, which increased their capacity above 70%. The ICO 29 was applied to 100% of the subproject-executing organizations (OU); 60% of OU increased their capacity indexes above the initial levels. The 5 PET developed under this Component strengthened regional processes and linked them to local political and economic agendas, and some subprojects were incorporated in government platforms. The PET contributed to an increase in the citizen and political participation of the beneficiaries and to the strengthening of democracy. 11. In an assessment of the PO according to a DNP report, 100% of the PO had increased their capacities according to the ICP.In fact, the ICP was applied to the PO in three different moments during the life of the Project (2005, 2007 and 2011) demonstrating capacities increase in the majority of the cases. See Table 2. Table 2. PO capacities rating ICP rating PO / Year CDPMM 7,30 8,00 8,2 FRDPMM 6,40 7,70 6 PRODEPAZ 7,80 7,70 7,6 CONSORNOC 5,30 6,00 6,67 ASOPATIA 5,40 7,90 n/a VALLENPAZ n/a n/a 8,5 TOTAL 6,4 7,5 7,4 12. According to the Phase I s final report, an assessment was made of 337 of all the OU involved in the PDP to determine the level of capacity-building (see Table 4), and found that 66% had increased their ICO. In Table 3, the ICO increased in average in 7 points between time 1 (2006) and time 2 (2010), from 54 to The Project used the ICO as an instrument to measure and monitor the organizational strengthening processes of the OU, which was improved and validated during Project implementation. The PO incorporated it as part of their intervention methodology and today it is commonly used in its processes. A training process on its use and application was also conducted for all incremental teams. The GOC has incorporated it into some public policies as a tool to monitor the support of the community organizations, including the Community Action Boards. 27

41 Table 3. OU ICO ICO ICO INITIAL ICO FINAL OU per Region / Year MACIZO-ALTO PATIA NORTE SANTANDER MAGDALENA MEDIO MONTES DE MARIA ORIENTE ANTIOQUEÑO TOTAL The permanent provision of technical assistance by the PO to the OU was key for achieving the results presented in Table 4. It allowed the OU to adopt the principles, procedures of the OM in their regular operations, including the environmental and social safeguards applicable to the PDP. According to the IE, 80% of the income generation, food security and housing subprojects that could have had potential environmental impacts, considered a basic environmental management plan and budget for its implementation. 20% incorporated activities to be developedwith the beneficiary communities. All subprojects applied good practices in integrated pest management and not a single subproject was located in critical habitats. Table 4.OU Capacity Level ICO INICIAL ICO FINAL Capacity Level Low Critical < 30% Medium-Low - Deficient > 31% <=50% Medium - Acceptable > 51% <=70% High- Sufficient > 70% % and OU (#) % and OU (#) 2% (7) 0% (0) 37% (125) 20, 5% (69) 49% (165) 54, 3% (183) 12% (40 ) 25,2% (85 ) 14. The Project also contributed to strengthen the SNAIPD through the reactivation of around 50 CMAIPDs through: i) the involvement of leaders of OUs supported by the Project; ii) the assistance from the TU of Acción Social (today DPS) and the PO; and iii) the formulation of 70 PIUs, with a leading role played by the CMAIPDs. 15. The project strengthened democracy through the increase in citizen and political participation of Project s beneficiaries which contributed to deter the occurrence of conflict. The PDP showed evidence of strengthened community leadership (increase of 19% of beneficiaries in management 28

42 positions) and social fabric through mechanisms of formal (membership in organizations) 30 and informal participation 31. These impacts enabled: i) an increase of nearly 30% of participants involved in spaces to discuss municipal issues; ii) an increase in recognition of the value of institutional paths to resolve conflicts (80% of beneficiaries); iii) the creation of conditions to articulate the OU with institutional programs, especially those associated with the fight against extreme poverty and assistance to the displaced population (70% of the participants are beneficiaries of State programs, such as Familias en Acción, Red Unidos and RESA, among others). 16. The project strengthened gender equality.according to the Final Report of the Project Gender and IDPs: Integrating Gender into Colombia Peace and Development (PE-P SPN- TF095198) the PDP contributed to strengthen gender equality through: i) greater engagement of women in the productive and food security subprojects; ii) increase and improvement in the citizen participation of women; iii) strengthening of networks and movements of women victims of violence; iv) training on sexual and reproductive rights; and v) psycho-social support in cases of domestic and sexual violence. The OU and PO continue to have a gender focus associated with working with women that affects the design of the community initiatives, which continue to emphasize male roles. The gender focus is central to projects that are implemented in situations of armed conflict, because of the differentiated impact and needs generated by the violence in women, children, older adults and youth.according to the EI, 50% of the project s beneficiaries were women, displaced and heads of households (40%). Around 10% were young people, participating mainly in social, cultural and environmental subprojects. In addition, 16 subprojects involved Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, benefiting 1,011 and 2,477 families, respectively. 17. The project also promoted significant changes in the modes of relationships among stakeholders to deal with conflicts.despite the difficult security situation that affected the PDP, the emerging local organizations increased their capabilities, and in some cases formed second-tier or sub-regional structures and created networks within sectors and populations. These achievements were possible thanks to: i) effective support by the PO that was comprehensive, constant and tailored to the community, and ii) a process of strengthening the autonomy of the OU, who proposed the initiatives, directly managed the resources, and took decisions regarding the design and implementation of the subprojects. This led to increased community trust in the project and its partners, as well as the appropriation of its principles, philosophy, procedures and environmental 32, integrated pest management, and indigenous peoples 33 safeguards. 30 An increase of 17 percentage points in the probability that beneficiaries who had been exposed for a long period of time to the current project belonged to a group, association, or civil society organization. 31 An increase of 16% with respect to the baseline data, for beneficiaries with low exposure, in the participation in spaces for dialogue to resolve community problems. 32 According to the Phase I final report, 80% of the income-generation, food security and habitat improvement (with potential environmental impact) subprojects had a basic environmental management plan and the resources to implement the plan. The remaining 20% included activities to develop one with the community. No subproject was located in environmentally fragile zones. In addition, the subprojects used sustainable integrated pest management practices (bio-pesticides, rational use of pesticides, preferably type IV, increase in correct use and disposal of containers and chemical residues). 33 All of the subprojects that involved indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations have respected the subproject cycle, including these groups in the spaces for citizen participation created by the PO, and have taken into account the Indigenous Life Plans and the Plans of the Territorial Communities Councils. During Phase I, 16 subprojects involving indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations were supported, benefiting 1,011 and 2,477 families, respectively, of these population groups. In addition, the AF supported a PET in the department of Cauca, which was implemented by the Yanacona indigenous community. 29

43 18. Finally, the PDP contributed to inspire and formulate a battery of national policies and directives (see Table 5). Table 5. PDP Incidence in Public Policies Policy Document or Law National Development Plans (PND) Laws, Policy Documents (CONPES) Laws, CONPES Documents and National Policy Plans in stage of formulation or approval. PDP incidence in Public Policy Documents or Laws a) PND and PND : Continuing support to RPDP; b) PND : Policy recommendations in the following chapters: Territorial Development; Peace Consolidation, Good Governance, Citizen Participation and Fight Against Corruption. a) CONPES 3726, 2012: Victim s Integral Reparation National Plan. b) CONPES 3661, 2010: Community Action Boards Strengthening National Policy. c) CONPES 3673, 2010: Children and Young People recruitment Prevention by Illegal Armed Groups Policy. d) Coexistence and Citizen Security National Policy. a) Citizen s Participation Statutory Law. b) CONPES Strengthening of Conditions for the Promotion of Citizen s Participation in Colombia. c) CONPES Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction National Plan. d) CONPES Corruption Prevention and Fight against Corruption National Plan. e) CONPES Integral Strategy for the Development of the Department of Cauca. f) CONPES Youth National Policy. g) Entrepreneurship National Policy h) Promotion of Democratic Culture National Policy 19. Component D (APL I) or C.1 and C.2 (AF). Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation. Incremental costs permitted the permanence of professional teams at the national level (although affected in times by high rotation and disruptions in project implementation) conforming the PCU, and at the territorial level conforming the PO incremental teams, providing technical assistance to project beneficiaries during the entire project s implementation period. The audit results of the Project were satisfactory; 100% of Annual Operation Plans were formulated and implemented, and the guidelines of the OM were fully applied by the PCU, PO and OU. Although the results of the M&E were mix, the IE represents an innovative methodology to assess this type of operation. The IE was officially declared by the DNP to be strategic because of the innovative way in which it measures effects related to development and peace. It included in its two phases a quasiexperimental design with random samples and control groups and introducing innovative measurement instruments such as economic games. 30

44 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Table 1.Economic analysis of the Peace and Development Program compared to similar initiatives Peace Laboratory II in Colombia 34 PROGRAM No. Beneficiary families Total value in USD (1USD/1800 COP) Average cost per family in USD (1USD/1800 COP) Duration in years PEACE LABORATOY II 66,058 49,910, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 81,877 37,812,500* *Does not include national counterpart contributions 1. The PDP cost less per family (US$ ) than the Peace Laboratory II (US$ ), although it had relatively similar results 37. The increased efficiency is attributed primarily to the decentralized, flexible, and highly participatory nature of the PDP, which reduced transaction costs and the number of intermediaries, which generally increase the cost of the operation, as is the case in traditional development projects. Table 2.Economic analysis of the Peace and Development Program compared to sectorwide initiatives Government Food Security Network Program RESA PROGRAM No. Beneficiary families Total value in USD (1USD/1800 COP) Average cost per family in USD (1USD/1800 COP) Duration in years RESA 865, ,980, PEACE AND 81,877 37,812,500* DEVELOPMENT * Does not include national counterpart contributions 34 In order to make a more balanced comparison, the Peace Laboratory II was used as reference. This project was implemented in the same regions and in partnership with the same territorial partners (PO) as the PDP. The total cost of this program was US$49,910,000 and it benefited 66,058 families over a period of nearly 8 years. Peace Laboratory I, which was implemented in Magdalena Medio, was not taken into account because this region had been previously exposed to the LILs I and II, which installed capacity and processes that significantly amplified the prior impacts of the European intervention, which resulted in an unequal comparison. Source: CONPES 3566, DNP, 2009 and PDP and Peace Laboratories IE, Follow-up, DNP, Source: Calculated on the basis of information provided in Project Paper AF WB, 2010; Peace and Development and Peace Laboratories Impact Evaluation, DNP 2008, Final Report Peace and Development Project, DPS, 2012, CONPES 3566, DNP, Source: Calculated on the basis of information included in the: Peace and Development and Peace Laboratories Impact Evaluation, DNP 2008; CONPES 3566, DNP, Based on information from the IE (the baseline established in 2008 and the second collection of information in 2011), one can conclude that: i) There is a tendency for Peace and Development subprojects to reduce food insecurity, while the beneficiaries of the Peace Laboratory II experienced an increase; ii) The beneficiaries of both programs increased their basic household assets; iii) The number of beneficiaries involved in formal organizations increased in Peace and Development and in Peace Laboratories II, this number decreased; iv) The number of participants that use community and institutional means as mechanisms to address conflict increased in both interventions; v) Both Projects increased the number of beneficiaries that participated in debates and discussions on the problems in their municipalities. Sources: Peace and Development and Peace Laboratories Impact Evaluation, DNP 2008, and PDP and Peace Laboratories IE, Follow-up, DNP,

45 2. The RESA Program has a centralized design that is supply-driven and is implemented by operators who make in-kind donations directly to the beneficiary families, following public procedural guidelines. The impacts of the RESA Program focus primarily on reducing food expenditures, increasing self-consumption and the capacity to establish synergies with other stakeholders 38. The cost per family in the PDP (US$456) is almost three times of the RESA Program (US$159). However, the PDP generates other impacts on the participants of the food security subprojects. Achieving these other impacts through a traditional subproject requires additional investments, which can exceed the costs per family described above. These impacts are associated not only with food security 39, but also with: i) building of social capital and promotion of citizen participation; and ii) transformation of the modes of relationships with community and institutional actors 40. The increased efficiency is attributed primarily to the decentralized nature of the PDP, its focus on capacity-building, as well as to comprehensive, constant and tailored support in the field, which is provided even in conditions of violence. 38 According to Perfetti (2010), 86% of the RESA participants reduced their spending on food because they consumed food produced through this program (self-consumption), modified their eating habits, and increased the variety, quality and quantity of food cultivated. Other unexpected impacts are related to the capacity of the RESA to establish synergies with public and private entities. Source: Perfetti, J. Programa RESA: strengthening of the bases of food security in the rural sector. Consulting Study: Actualización y Conceptualización del Modelo de Intervención Red de Seguridad Alimentaria. FAO FEDESARROLLO, Bogotá, Increase in food spending of more than 70% of income and a reduction of 16% in food insecurity of the participants. Source: first collection of information (2006/2007). 40 Seven of every 10 people that participated in the projects funded by the PDP are beneficiaries of other programs, including the RESA, Familias en Acción and Red Unidos. Source: PDP and Laboratorios de Paz IE, DNP,

46 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Lending Jairo A. Arboleda Consultant LCSSO Daniel J. Boyce Lead Financial Management Spec LCSFM Jose Maria Caballero Lead Agriculture Economist LCSAR Elena Correa Consultant LCSSO Beatriz Elena Franco Program Assistant LCC1A Ann Jeannette Glauber Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN3 Natalia Gomez Senior Rural Development Specialist LCSAR Daniel R. Gross Consultant AFTSG Steven P. Maber Senior Environmental Specialist EASER Hideki Mori Program Manager HDNSP Marcelo Amador Osorio Consultant LCSPT Responsibility/ Specialty Supervision/ICR YamilAbdala Mesa Consultant LCSSO Jairo A. Arboleda Consultant LCSSO Daniel J. Boyce Lead Financial Management Spec. LCSFM Suzanne Casolaro Consultant LCSHH Jeannette Estupinan Senior Financial Management Specialist LCSFM Beatriz Elena Franco Program Assistant LCC1A Natalia Gomez Senior Rural Development Specialist LCSAR Laura Kullenberg Country Manager AFMJB Miguel A. Lopez Chief Admin. Officer SARRM Jose M. Martinez Senior Procurement Specialist ECSO2 DiomedesBerroa Senior Operations Officer LCSPT Andrew R. Morrison Lead Economist PRMGE Francisco J. Pichon Senior Natural Resources Management Specialist AFTA1 David N. Sislen Sector Leader AFTSN Daniel M. Sellen Sector Leader LCSSD Karina M. Kashiwamoto Language Program Assistant LCC1C Luis Daniel Santos Pinzon Consultant LCSSO 33

47 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY FY Total: Supervision/ICR FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY Total:

48 Annex 5. Stakeholder Workshopsand Beneficiary Survey Results This ICR aims to provide more extensive analysis and lesson learning based on the findings of a beneficiary/stakeholders survey and focus groups 41. Results from these exercises are presented by stakeholder in Annex 5. Nevertheless, hereby we present a brief of the main findings of such exercises; both developed using as framework the same questions/themes presented below: Strengthening of Capacities a) Do you believe that the PDP strengthened the RPDP model and the capacities of the PO and OU? In your opinion, what capacities were strengthened the most (e.g. administrative, managerial, and organizational)? The answer of all stakeholders is positive. Thanks to the PDP the RPDP were strengthened and the PO and OU gained capacities to: i) dialogue and negotiate with the State; ii) define and carry out their mission objectives; iii) participate in spaces such as the committees for attention to IDP; iv) provide a comprehensive support to other organizations and beneficiaries. The learning by doing approach was adequate and very powerful. Trust building a) Do you believe that the PDP strengthened the trust between civil society, the government, and international cooperation? If so, what do you consider to be the elements most important to generate trust between the government and civil society? Several features of the PDP s intervention model contributed to build trust around the PDP and between different stakeholders, e.g. i) the direct administration and implementation of subprojects by the OU; ii) the co-responsibility and accountability in the management of resources; iii) the participatory processes to identify, formulate, implement and evaluate subprojects; iv) the empowerment of local stakeholders to exercise political, social and economic control. The PDP contributed to: i) establish mechanisms for solidarity and cooperation between the IDP and receiving communities that did not previously exist; ii) recognize and legitimate the role of leaders of the PO and OU, and iii) coordinate actions and access of communities to the services offered by public institutions, generating credibility in public policies and institutions, all of these contributing to building trust. PDP s intervention model a) What do you think about the implementation model versus the target groups of beneficiaries? 41 A survey was prepared and applied to around 20 people, including Directors of PDP, OU representatives, community leaders, project beneficiaries, Redprodepaz members and Government officials (at the national level DPS/PCU and local level municipalities-). Three focus groups took place in three different regions: Montes de María (San Juan Nepomuceno), Magdalena Medio (Sur del Cesar) and Norte de Santander (Cúcuta and Chinácota). 35

49 The PDPuses an intervention model that was tested and validated as useful for working with vulnerable populations and in regions affected by violence. It proposed a participatory process at different levels that strengthened the institutional presence and governance.it is innovative, distinct from traditional schemes. It changed the paradigm that it was only possible to work with legally constituted organizations. It is especially relevant that it allowed the management of funds directly by OU, which strengthened their capacities and trust. b) What elements do you consider the added value of the PDP compared to other government programs that seek to assist the vulnerable, displaced and/or peasant farmer population, e.g. Familias en Acción, Red Unidos, RESA, Oportunidades Rurales, among others. The PDP had a medium-term perspective and enabled the construction and consolidation of economic and social assets.other existing programs are welfare-oriented, while the PDP is comprehensive and beyond providing better life conditions to poor and vulnerable populations, invests in social capital. Compared to other government programs the PDP has a political element associated with empowering and recognizing the role of civil society and other stakeholders, providing them the opportunity to participate and decide, and strengthening capacities through the learning by doing approach. Main results and other outcomes/achievements a)what do you think was the most important result of PDP? The PDP made the State understand that peace is fundamentally a development issue that can be achieved throughparticipatory process and partnerships to build community-driven subprojects at the local level and more horizontal relationships. The PDP contributed to the State recognizing and legitimating the civil society as guarantors of development process conducive to peace.it changed the paradigm to assist IDP implementinga territorial approach to development based on grassroots organizations, instead of provision of conditional cash transfers or subsidies that are not sustainable. b) What relevant impacts or achievements of the PDP do you believe have not been sufficiently highlighted by the evaluations and monitoring reports of the PDP? The impact of the PDP in the prevention of displacement.the discussion about policies, which was carried out around a complex relationship within civil society, among delegitimized public institutions, and in the midst of conflict.the contribution of the PDP to the formulation of local and regional public policies.the PDP built collective and individual capacities in participants to dialogue with the local, regional and national governments. The effects of food security subprojects in the welfare of participating families. WB performance a) What aspects of the World Bank s role during implementation, supervision and/or evaluation of the Project would you highlight? What aspects could be improved in future projects? 36

50 The WB introduced the concept of Learning and Innovationoperations in 1998 through loans granted to the Colombian State. This instrument provided sufficient flexibility and the conceptual framework necessary to construct the PDP model. The WB contributed positively to influence the State s social policy. The dialogue through the WB missions led to rapprochement with the communities and the WB accompaniment to the territorial actions during the process was encouraging and motivated the PDP s implementing agencies and beneficiaries. The WB has shown solidarity and respect for all parties involved in the PDP. The WB could have offered more training to the persons in charge of implementing the PDP on participation and empowerment methods and safeguards, in order to standardize concepts and procedures, and it could have offered methodological tools to increase the impact of the project.more regular missions with systematic feedback were desirable. Government s performance a) What aspects of the national government s role would you highlight (Acción Social/DPS, DNP) during implementation, supervision and/or evaluation of the Project? The national government made significant efforts by installing professional teams which enabled the implementation of a large and complex number of subprojects. The GOC enabled the coordination of the international cooperation efforts in peace and development regions in favor of governance, particularly with the entrance of the EU s Peace Laboratories. The GOC contributed to generate trust through dialogue and participatory spaces for building consensus. It provided the necessary tools/arrangements for the implementation of the PDP, giving a key role to civil society organizations (PO). b) What aspects of the role of the national government could be improved in future projects? The national government should: i) implement an efficient monitoring and evaluation system for these type of operations; ii) incorporate lessons learned in successful decentralization processes such as the PDP into public policies, to better reach the territorial levels; iii) guarantee constant and continuous presence, and iv) improve the coordination and development approaches between public institutions. c) What aspects (positive and negative) of the role of municipal administrations/mayors offices and regional/governors offices in the implementation of the peace and development and peace project would you highlight? The municipal administrations permitted political advocacy to social organizations, in order for them to put certain topics on the agenda, participate in the electoral debate processes, participate in the formulation of Local Development Plans, POT, to participate in participatory budgeting and accountability, etc., including the participation in some spaces that did not exist before, such as the Youth Councils. The municipal administrations were key; they created territorial agendas based on the PDP processes and they enhanced the effects of the PDP. On the negative side, the municipalities failed in some cases to provide counterpart funding, with negative impact on subprojects and development impacts, plus frustration in local communities. The 37

51 agenda of sectional and local leaders is too short compared to the PDP s intervention model which implies medium-long term processes. The change in administrations during Project implementation caused some problems and retarded some processes. Implementing Agencies performance a) What aspects of the role of the PO during the implementation, support, monitoring of the Project would you highlight? What aspects of civil society s role could be improved in future projects? The PO are strategic for creating partnerships on the basis of coordination between institutions and communities.the role of civil society as PO, with voice and vote, generating co-responsibility and ownership, contributed to achieve PDP s objectives. The PO generated a safe and trustworthy space for citizen participation in conflict affected areas. The PO would benefit from: i) incorporating more systematically in their interventions the lessons learned on issues such as technology innovation, market development and establishment of partnerships with other economic actors; ii) having a monitoring and evaluation system, with clear results and impact s framework with their respective indicators, and iii) continue improving their administrative and technical capacities. Most of the PO have left these issues up to the resourcefulness of each team member and for this reason the quality of some of the processes was not consistent. The PDP and impact on IDP a) What do you think about the work of the PDP and the public institutions at the local/regional level to strengthen to municipal Committees to assist the displaced population, formulation of the PIU and support to the displaced populations? The municipal administrations, the Public Ministry, the Church, humanitarian aid agencies, public security forces and police, IDP organizations, among others, were represented in the reactivation of the municipal committees to assist the displaced population (CMAIPD). The PDP increased national interest about the issue of displacement and the different ways to provide support or prevent it at the territorial level. The PDP contributed with coordination efforts between the institutionality, but its support and resources were scarce, limiting the impacts of the PDP in support to IDP. The inclusion of IDP in the PDP was not a good idea because it made difficult to manage two different policies: peace and development and humanitarian assistance. Main lessons a) Mention the two lessons learned through the PDP that you believe are most relevant? The main lessons are: i) public and private investment offered higher yields to society in a context of inclusion, participation and partnerships among communities, the State and the business sector on the basis of regional consensus; ii) the inclusion of the target population in the formulation of proposals generates empowerment and a sense of ownership; iii) the meaning of teamwork and solidarity has benefits and has an impact on the enjoyment of human rights; iv) learning by doing 38

52 as a mechanism to build technical capacities to implement any proposal; v) the communities always find creative solutions to the serious problems deriving from the conflict, poverty and violence. However, they need assistance and protection to implement them. Sustainability a) What do you consider to be the main risks faced by the organizations and the initiatives funded, without the support of the PDP? Without the PDP, there is a risk for the participant territories of not consolidating peace through long term, inclusive and participatory development initiatives, taking into account that behind these initiatives there are vulnerable populations with high expectations, especially young and women in rural areas, requiring long term assistance. There is also a risk for the continuity and sustainability of the subprojects financed by the PDP. The end of the PDP may prevent the PO to continue supporting the OU. b) Do you know of any public policies and/or programs that have been directly inspired by the PDP model? Some Project stakeholders, mainly government officials and national civil organizations like RedProdepaz, clearly identified national policies, programs and development plans, (e.g. the AFROPAZ Project (Japanese Social Development Fund Grant, administered by the World Bank), Colombia Humanitaria, livelihood and emergency employment projects, the Development and Peace Committee in the context of the National Peace Council, Local and National Development Plans, the National Development Plan, etc.), while others, mainly beneficiaries and OU, responded negatively or did not respond. c) In your opinion, what is the legacy of the WB-funded PDP leave in the country? How can it be taken advantage of to address the future challenges of lasting peace? The PDP s legacy is the construction of a platform to recognize the populations that have been marginalized and stigmatized by the armed conflict in Colombia. The PDP should be systematized, improved and disseminated in order to build a lasting peace, but also for the fight against poverty, for protection of natural resources, and the construction of a national culture based on diversity and respect. The PDP demonstrated progress in recognizing civil society as a relevant stakeholder in peace-building and in the sustainable development of the country. The PDP contributed to the public institutions to recognize the importance of working together with the civil society. This is a way to achieve horizontal connections between actors who are generally assumed to be antagonistic, which is in itself a contribution to peace. The PDP should be disseminated and replicated in other regions. In matrix below results are shown by type of stakeholder: 39

53 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL Do you believe that the PDP strengthened the PRDP model and the capacities of the OS and OU? In your opinion, what capacities were strengthened the most? Administrative Capacities Management Capacities Organizational Capacities Political Capacities: Group of people with experience Technical Capacities: People with capacity to intervene that know the regions. Economic Resource Capacities. Capacity to learn by doing was crucial for motivating the PO to fulfill their dreams. The bottom-up approach was strengthened, which does not happen in other cooperation peacebuilding initiatives. Strengthening participation. Strengthening the bottom-up approach. Strengthened the relationship in the territory with communities and departmental and municipal administrations through the ad-hoc committee. Strengthening of participation in spaces such as the committees for attention to the displaced population. Strengthening of the OU s leadership capabilities. BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS Strengthening of the capacity of the OU/PO to dialogue and negotiate with the State. Increase in technological capital for micro-businesses. Generate hope and the possibility of reestablishing dignified living conditions. There have been many changes in the OU. Administrative and organizational capacities with a management model. FORMER PDP DIRECTOR Strengthening the capacity of the PO to provide comprehensive support to OU. Capacities to define and carry out the mission objectives. Administrative, monitoring and planning capacity strengthened. Do you believe that the PDP strengthened the trust between civil society, the government, and international cooperation? If so, what do you consider to be the elements most important to generate trust between the government and civil society? The direct administration The capacity for dialogue, in and implementation of a complex relationship on projects by the OU. shared territory. The role of communities as managers of their own development. Strengthening the local stakeholders to exercise political, social and economic control. Respect for one another. Construction based on differences. Different ways of managing needs in the absence of effective mechanisms for participation. A do no harm approach was incorporated, raising awareness about the conflict, unifying the peace-building discourse. The positive interaction between Cooperation agencies and the national and sectional and local governments has positively driven the transformation of the issue of peace-building. Dialogue and interaction between civil society and the government. Co-responsibility and transparency in the management of resources. Coordination of actions and access of communities to the services offered by the institutions, generating credibility in public policies and institutions. Establishment of partnerships around issues of common interest at the national and local levels. The process of collective construction, which created channels of communication between the players. Greater awareness that peace and development cannot be addressed only as a political issue that it is difficult to build consensus on. Creativity in finding solutions to problems during implementation. The regular delivery of reports and public accountability. A process of solidarity and cooperation between the receiving population and the displaced population that did not previously exist. Recognition and legitimacy of the leaders of the PO and OU. Transparent funds management. Planning as a trust mechanism. 40

54 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR Spaces for understanding between state policies and the needs of the communities. FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR Horizontal relationship that led to co-responsibility for actions taken. FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR What do you think about the implementation model versus the target groups of beneficiaries? Innovative, distinct from traditional schemes, commits to generating trust with different organizations. This model changed the paradigm that it was only possible to work with legally constituted organizations. The basic model proposes that a social organization visualize a possible future, identify a path to realize this dream, and gradually build the capacities necessary to take action. PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR This is an inclusive model for minority groups. REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL A model that worked with populations and in regions affected by violence. It proposed a participatory process at different levels that strengthened the institutional presence and governance. BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS Especially relevant the management of funds directly by OU, which strengthened their capacities and trust. FORMER PDP DIRECTOR Handing over responsibility and providing systematic and comprehensive support enabled the organizational strengthening. The criteria to classify the OU are appropriate. What elements do you consider the added value of the PDP compared to other government programs that seek to assist the vulnerable, displaced and/or peasant farmer population, e.g. Familias en Acción, Red Unidos, RESA, OportunidadesRurales, among others. The methodology and its applicability to working with grassroots organizations. It was constructed from the territories, which implies taking differences into account, with the clear application of coresponsibility. The lessons learned for working with weak organizations and communities that have higher levels of organization and capacity, such as those that were generated by the PDP. It responds to the needs of the communities to develop an initiative, such as their Life Plan, which generates a sense of ownership. The coordination between the different programs to strengthen the communities affected by political violence. The complementarity between the programs becomes a collaboration to establish synergies in the territory. This is not welfareoriented and its economic contribution to the organizations and families is linked to an issue of strengthening institutions and networks. In this sense, compared to other government programs it has a political element (associated with recognizing civil society stakeholders). The opportunity to participate and decide. Beneficiaries received training on different topics that strengthened their leadership and business capabilities. Peace and development led to the autonomy of the communities. The implementation is done taking into account the customs of the community, as an additional element of trust. In organized communities the methodology promotes the development of projects, multiplies resources and increases trust and legitimacy. The Program had a medium-term perspective, and enabled the construction and consolidation of economic and social assets. What relevant impacts or achievements of the PDP do you believe have not been sufficiently highlighted by the evaluations and monitoring reports of the PDP? The families joined forces. Improving the communications and internal relations. Other existing programs are welfareoriented. The PDP is comprehensive. 41

55 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR Prevention of displacement FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR The discussion about policies, which was carried out around a complex relationship within civil society, among delegitimized public institutions, and in the midst of conflict. FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR The potential for the political transformation of the territories, in peace-building, fight against corruption, deepening of democracy, protection of the environment, and improvement of local and regional governments. PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR The development and growth of the participants and the notable improvement of their relationships. What do you consider to be the main risks faced by the organizations and the initiatives funded, without the support of the PDP? Consolidation, taking into account that behind these initiatives there is high expectation, and the vulnerability of the population, especially in the case of the young people, in rural areas. The support and participation in order to continue making decisions to reduce the conflict. Weakening of the experience. The risk that it will not be included in a long-term development policy. That the State does not show interest in these community empowerment processes as the basis for lasting peace. That the State will not support the leaders,who run the risk of possible aggression. The weakening of the PDP, which would prevent support to the OU. REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL Contribution to the formulation of local and regional public policies. That the local and regional public institutions delegitimize the initiatives/subprojects, which would mean that they could not achieve sustainability and will have limited impact on territorial development. BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS Building of collective and individual capacities of participants to dialogue with the local, regional and national governments. The sustainability of the subprojects. There are risks that derive from the competition within the territories that generates competition and not mutual cooperation. What aspects of the World Bank s role during implementation, supervision and/or evaluation of the Project would you highlight? What aspects could be improved in future projects? Its influence over the State s social policy. The support to the different peace initiatives that seek to reduce the conflict. The support of the World Bank to project leaders during decision-making. Its solidarity and respect for the other party. The World Bank introduced the concept of Learning and Innovation in the loans granted to the Colombian State. This instrument provides sufficient flexibility and the conceptual framework necessary to construct the model. It left clear and non-negotiable points of reference to ensure the transparency of the exercise. I would highlight the flexibility, adaptability and accessibility of the PDP. The dialogue through the WB missions, which led to rapprochement with the communities. Accompaniment to the territorial actions during the process. The building of collective and individual capacities and working as a network of the OU. Slow advance of the processes, which prevents them from being key in the territorial dynamics. Support to training the teams of the PO. FORMER PDP DIRECTOR The effects of the food security activities for participating families. The dependency that results from the immobility of the actions. Return to a top-down approach. The flexibility and trust. 42

56 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR To be improved: the WB could have offered more training to the persons in charge of implementing the PDP on participation and empowerment methods, in order to standardize the concepts, and it could have offered methodological tools to increase the impact of the project. PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL To be improved: visits, more regular missions with feedback exercises. BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS What aspects of the national government s role would you highlight (Acción Social/DPS, DNP) during implementation, support supervision and/or evaluation of the Project? It identified policies for rural investment. It provided support by technical and professional teams that corresponded with the type of subprojects. The trust generation process and spaces for building consensus. It provided the necessary tools for the implementation of the project. The national government made significant efforts by creating increasingly professional work teams, which have enabled the implementation of a large and complex number of projects. What aspects of the role of the national government could be improved in future projects? Implement an efficient monitoring and evaluation system. Incorporate the lessons learned in the decentralization processes into the policy, in order to be more inclusive and apply the concept of the public sector. Create a tracking and monitoring system throughout all stages of the process. Gradually incorporate more lessons learned, in order to modify existing programs. There is no broad peace-building or regional development policy that incorporates the lessons learned by the PDP. The teams always received advice and support on key issues. The presence of the national government should be constant and continuous. It enabled the coordination of the international cooperation in favor of governance. It enhanced the support and monitoring of projects through partnerships. A model that maintains the national-level advisors in the regions plus accompaniment to the regions. Accion Social played a leading role as government entity in charge of this topic. DID NOT RESPOND DID NOT RESPOND DID NOT RESPOND FORMER PDP DIRECTOR The members of the support teams were friendly, open and helpful. Improve the coordination and approaches between the public institutions. What aspects (positive and negative) of the role of municipal administrations/mayors offices and regional/governors offices in the implementation of the peace and development and peace project would you highlight? 43

57 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR Positive: the territorial entities offer counterpart resources and the technical secretariats, accompany the process, and involve the Council. Interest was generated on issues such as illicit crop substitution, prevention of displacement, and income generation subprojects. Negative: The cronyism in the allocation of resources by some officials. FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR Positive: Municipal administrations committed with the intervention philosophy, even when the origin of their Development Plan is totally different. Negative: The failure of some local administrations to provide counterpart funding. FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR Positive: the growing capacity for political advocacy of the social organizations to keep certain topics on the agenda, the electoral debate processes, the participatory formulation of the Development Plan, the formulation of the POT, accountability, etc. and spaces that did not exist before, such as the Youth Councils. Negative: The agenda of sectional and local leaders is too short compared to the project intervention, which implies medium-long term processes. PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR Positive: the municipal administrations were key, because they enhanced the effects of the PDP. DOES NOT MENTION ANY REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL Positive: The support of the municipal administrations in the formulation of the PIU to assist the displaced population enabled the participation of the local public institutions in the design of strategies and activities for this population group. Negative: Lack of constant and ongoing participation. BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS Positive: The creation of territorial agendas based on the PDP process. DID NOT RESPOND What aspects of the role of the PO during the implementation, support, monitoring of the Project would you highlight? What aspects of civil society s role could be improved in future projects? The commitment to strengthen the social processes and work towards community goals. The role of civil society as partners with a voice and vote generating coresponsibility and ownership, making the proposed objectives viable. Generate a safe and trustworthy space for citizen participation in areas of conflict in the country. The combination of stakeholders has neutralized the polarization in these regions and has enabled civil society to exercise qualified and substantiated leadership, guiding the future of their communities. This implies commitment by the PDP technical personnel that reinforces lasting ties with the population. The PDP, with its proposal for regional development, has allowed the community organizations to go beyond the scope of their local surroundings and think in larger terms, seeking partnerships with other regions, even at the national level. The PDP are strategic partners for actions and activities to create partnerships on the basis of the coordination between institutions and communities. It enabled leadership in planning and participation processes, with the purpose of engaging all sectors present and contributing to the development and strengthening of the beneficiary organizations. Together with the Territorial Units of Accion Social, they constituted a channel of communication between the PDP at the national level and the regions, allowing the Project to be implemented in accordance with the established needs. FORMER PDP DIRECTOR Positive: The coordination with territorial entities in the initial phase of the PDP. Negative: The change in administrations during Project implementation caused some problems. The willingness of the PO to build consensus, learn, take corrective action and attend all requests from the different levels. 44

58 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR Aspects to be improved: The relationship of civil society with the institutions and strengthening of the administrative and technical capacities of the organizations. FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR Aspects to be improved: No mandatory basic training has been established for the staff in charge of working in community spaces. Most of the PDP have left this issue up to the resourcefulness of each person and for this reason the quality of the processes is not consistent. FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR Aspects to be improved: The incorporation of lessons learned on issues of technology innovation, market development and establishment of partnerships with other economic actors. The lack of a clear framework to formulate results and impact, with their respective indicators, for the construction of a monitoring and evaluation system. PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR Aspects to be improved: Document the narratives of the experiences of the members of the communities, to illustrate, appreciate and learn about the processes, in order to guide decision-making in policy formulation. REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL Aspects to be improved: Perform an evaluation from the perspective of do no harm, to systematize lessons learned. BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS Aspects to be improved: The preparatory phase, with regard to administrative, procedural (resource management, accountability, etc.) before beginning the full implementation of a program. What do you think about the work of the PDP and the public institutions at the local/regional level to strengthen to municipal Committees to assist the displaced population, formulation of the PIU and support to the displaced populations? FORMER PDP DIRECTOR It increased national interest about the issue of displacement and the different ways to provide support or prevent it. It created coordination but lacked institutional support with allocation of resources. It developed different forms of resolving conflicts between institutions and civil society. What do you think was the most important result of PDP? The inclusion of the issue of assistance to the displaced population within the PDP was a bad decision by the government because it meant the difficult to manage combination of two completely different policies. It improved leadership, enabling effective participation in the processes to formulate the PIU. The municipal administrations, Public Ministry, Church, humanitarian aid agencies, public security forces and police, IDP organizations were represented in the reactivation of the municipal committees to assist the displaced population. DID NOT RESPOND The trust generated and the participation of the stakeholders in public spaces. DID NOT RESPOND Recognition and legitimacy by the Colombian State of civil society as guarantors of development process. It changed the paradigm in the processes for assistance to the displaced population, to a territorial approach and based on grassroots organizations. It made the State understand that peace is fundamentally a development issue that it can be addressed and build projects at the local level, and with more horizontal relationships. The building of the social fabric that opened up opportunities for the vulnerable population. It generated coordination between actors in the regions, which was manifested by support to the poor, vulnerable and displaced population in areas affected by violence. Civil society organizations with strengthened capacities and government entities with capacity for dialogue, trust, and reach agreements with civil society. Build self-esteem and trust that enabled empowerment and participation as actors of their own development. Strengthening the capacities for selfmanagement of the grassroots organizations. Mention the two lessons learned through the PDP that you believe are most relevant? 45

59 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR The credibility of the grassroots organizations. The focus on the grassroots organizations as managers of their own development, matching them with State policies. FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR Trust building as the cornerstone for generating processes. Individual and collective growth as a tool to generate processes for a lasting peace. FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR Public and private investment offered higher yields to society in a context of inclusion, participation and partnerships among communities, the State and the business sector on the basis of regional consensus. The communities always find creative solutions to the serious problems deriving from the conflict, poverty and violence. However, they need assistance and protection to implement them. PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR The participatory construction of an integrated development model. The establishment of public-private partnerships that seek to generate strategies for sustainability of the processes being implemented in the regions. Do you know of any public policies and/or programs that have been directly inspired by the PDP model? DOES NOT KNOW OF ANY The AFROPAZ Project (Japanese Social Development Fund Grant, administered by the World Bank). Colombia Humanitaria in social management processes, such as livelihood and emergency employment projects. Creation of the Development and peace committee, in the context of the National Peace Council. Local and National Development Plans. The National Development Plan incorporated the concept more clearly, proposing an exercise to identify and characterize the model promoted by the PDP. DOES NOT KNOW OF ANY REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL Strengthening of the leadership capacity of user organizations. The coordination between civil society and other public actors, with respect to a common issue. DOES NOT KNOW OF ANY BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS Flexibility when implementing programs with a territorial perspective and with a civil society I the midst of an unresolved conflict. The joint efforts required to make a process such as this sustainable. DID NOT RESPOND In your opinion, what is the legacy of the WB-funded PDP leave in the country? How can it be taken advantage of to address the future challenges of lasting peace? The meaning of teamwork and solidarity with others has benefits and has an impact on the realization of human rights. Commitment, relevance with regard to the trust deposited. DID NOT RESPOND FORMER PDP DIRECTOR The inclusion of the formulation of the target population proposals generates empowerment and a sense of ownership to undertake actions. Learn by doing as a mechanism to build technical capacities to implement any proposal. Fundación Camino de la Esperanza Project in Villavicencio. 46

60 FORMER PDP ASOPATIA-CRIC ADVISOR FORMER UCP -ACCION SOCIAL (NOW DPS) COORDINATOR FORMER RED PRODEPAZ DIRECTOR PDP CONSORNOC ADVISOR REGIONAL ADVISOR UCP- ACCION SOCIAL BENEFICIARIES USER ORGANIZATIONS FORMER PDP DIRECTOR A model for support to poor areas that generates empowerment and State recognition of the community. It should be systematized so that it may be incorporated into national policies. An innovative methodology that prefers the voice of the communities. Peace and Development has given the country a lesson on trust as an instrument to synchronize the development of processes for individual growth that will lead to lasting peace. The construction of a platform to recognize the populations that have been marginalized and stigmatized by the armed conflict in Colombia. It should be systematized, improved and disseminated in order to build a lasting peace, but also for the fight against poverty, for protection of natural resources, and the construction of a national culture based on diversity and respect. The hope of living in a society that is inclusive and respects diversity. Progress in recognizing civil society as a relevant stakeholder in peacebuilding and the development of the country. It should be disseminated and replicated in other regions. The re-establishment of relationships, generating forgiveness and forgetting and recuperation of territory by civil society. The recognition by public institutions of the importance of working together with civil society. This is a way to achieve horizontal connections between actors who are generally assumed to be antagonistic, which is in itself a contribution to peace. Improved relationships between public institutions and civil society. Leaderships that enable building upon differences. It has left the hope for a better world. Social organizations that contribute to nation-building, that respect cultural differences, and that work towards an objective. 47

61 Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The Department for Social Prosperity (DPS) thanked the Bank on behalf of the Republic of Colombia for 14 years of support to the Colombia peace and development agenda, through several operations (two LIL, one APL (I) and one AF Project), and for having believed in the capacity of the Partner Organizations (that led the implementation of the Peace and Development Program at the territorial level) and the GOC to promote development and peace through an innovative approach to territorial development, conducive to poverty reduction, and to peace and coexistence in conflict affected regions. The Bank s support to the PDP created an opportunity to assess the dynamics of conflict and their impacts, introducing a transformational approach to the analysis of the conflict which traditionally was solely focused on its violent expressions. The transformational approach allowed opening the scope to introduce the regional and territorial dimension to the national agenda and the PDP has become a key component of the conflict resolution strategy. Today, the PDP approach to peace and development is materialized at the territorial level through several activities and projects that have triggered organizational processes, citizen participation, and strengthening of social capital. In addition, these projects have generated the basis for an institutionality that works in alliance with the communities, generating trust in the State, which was inexistent in the past. The PDP is a landmark in the foundations of the process that Colombia started for sustainable development and peace. This process has been continued by the Peace Laboratories, the Development, Peace and Stability I and II Programs and the New Peace Territories Project financed by the EU. The strong partnership that the PDP built and supported along so many years, among the GOC, the Bank and the EU, has demonstrated the effectiveness of the international cooperation when objectives are shared and efforts are combined with a long term approach. Social and community based organizations, with the support of the Partner Organizations implementing the Regional Peace and Development Programs at the territorial level, are now articulated thanks to the scenarios that the PDP promoted for sharing experiences. These organizations, through the implementation of more than 718 subprojects financed by the PDP, have strengthened their capabilities (demonstrating efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public funds), and are influencing public policies at the local level. DPS also wants to recognize the importance that the Bank s social and environmental safeguards applicable to the PDP, which guaranteed environmentally friendly approaches to rural/agriculture productive initiatives and valued the particularities of working with women, young and indigenous populations. 48

62 Finally, it is worth mentioning the contribution of the PDP to the design, implementation, and validation of several tools to strengthen civil society and community based organizations for building peace and coexistence. PDP has inspired a great variety of individual, community, regional and national processes, and has contributed to create an integral vision of the implications of poverty, of the armed conflict and of other related matters in the livelihoods of thousands of poor families in Colombia. The learning and outcomes that the PDP have generated are important inputs for the GOC to continue generating public policies conducive to sustainable peace, through reducing the structural causes of the domestic conflict. 49

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67 Annex 7. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Comentarios Generales al texto Borrador del ICR Proyecto Paz y Desarrollo y Financiación Adicional Febrero 8 de 2013 Consideraciones Generales: 1. El documento en algunas ocasiones se torna confuso y repetitivo. Es necesario agrupar la información que se presenta repetida, con el propósito de desarrollar mejor las ideas del documento. 2. Es necesario incluir en el informe datos que respalden las afirmaciones expuestas en el documento, por ejemplo, en la página 10 se hace mención al aumento de la violencia en las ciudades, en cuáles escenarios de posconflicto? 3. Es pertinente revisar los contenidos cuando se hace referencia a resultados y aprendizajes, en algunos caso se logran confundir. 4. El documento sigue presentando generalidades en lo que concierne a los resultados y aprendizajes obtenidos, no se logra evidenciar los mensajes concretos, las buenas prácticas, las metodologías y herramientas específicas que se construyeron e implementaron en las distintas regiones. Se trata de hacer un esfuerzo en la última sección del informe cuando se relacionan las experiencias con los aprendizajes en las temáticas específicas. 5. En el documento se reconoce los aportes realizados por el Gobierno Nacional (DPS DNP) y el Banco en la implementación del Proyecto, sin embargo, no se hace alusión al papel que tuvo la Redprodepaz durante el tiempo de ejecución del mismo. 6. Consideramos relevante aclarar, desde la perspectiva del DNP y para aportar en la elaboración del texto del ICR, cuáles son los documentos de política formulados y en proceso de formulación en los cuáles se han introducido recomendaciones de política pública derivadas de la implementación del proyecto Paz y Desarrollo (teniendo en cuenta que dichos aprendizajes se extrajeron de manera conjunta con las acciones adelantadas en el marco de otros esfuerzos de apoyo a los PRDP, principalmente, de los Laboratorios de Paz): Planes de Desarrollo: 54

68 a) PND y : Inclusión de la importancia de dar continuidad al apoyo a los Programas de Desarrollo y Paz. b) PND : Recomendaciones de política incluidas en los capítulos de Convergencia y Desarrollo Territorial ; Consolidación de la Paz ; Buen Gobierno, Participación Ciudadana y Lucha contra la Corrupción, (particularmente en relación con los apartes de Participación Ciudadana y Capital Social, y Fortalecimiento Institucional). Leyes, Documentos CONPES y Planes Nacionales de Política formulados: e) Documento CONPES 3726 de 2012: Lineamientos, Plan de Ejecución de Metas, Presupuesto, y Mecanismo de Seguimiento para el Plan Nacional de Atención y Reparación Integral a Víctimas. f) Documento CONPES 3661 de 2010: Política Nacional para el Fortalecimiento de los Organismos de Acción Comunal. g) Documento CONPES 3673 de 2010: Política de Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes por parte de Grupos Armados al Margen de la Ley y Grupos Delictivos Organizados. h) Política Nacional de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana. Leyes, Documentos CONPES y Planes Nacionales de Política en proceso de formulación o aprobación: i) Ley Estatutaria de Participación Ciudadana j) Documento CONPES Fortalecimiento de las condiciones para la promoción de la participación ciudadana en Colombia. k) Documento CONPES Plan Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial. l) Documento CONPES Plan Nacional de Lucha y Prevención de la corrupción. m) Documento CONPES Estrategia Integral para el Desarrollo del Departamento del Cauca. n) Documento CONPES Política Nacional de Juventud. o) Política Nacional de Asociatividad y Emprendimiento rural p) Política Nacional de promoción de la Cultura Democrática (Cultura Ciudadana, Convivencia Ciudadana y Cultura de Paz) 7. En la página 12 se mencionada como efecto del proyecto el fortalecimiento de las capacidades de las OU y OS. Si bien el ICR hace referencia al valor de este esfuerzo en el marco de la generación de condiciones de desarrollo y paz consideramos que, así como se presentan los logros en términos de familias beneficiadas o impactos sobre variables del capital social como la confianza y la reciprocidad, valdría la pena reseñar los resultados del ICP y el ICO en relación con cuáles fueron esas capacidades adquiridas por las organizaciones? Por ejemplo, en el informe de 55

69 resultados elaborado por el DNP, se hace alusión a aspectos como la planeación, los ejercicios de seguimiento, afiliación a otras organizaciones, entre otras. ConsideracionesEspecíficas: 1. En el apartado 1.1: Bajo el entendido que el ICR pretende dar cuenta del Proyecto Original y la Financiación Adicional creemos pertinente incluir el contexto de esta última parte del proyecto en relato. En efecto, a lo largo de esta sección solo se señalan las condiciones de contexto del país en 2004 y no aquellas que incidieron en la financiación adicional para En el apartado 1.5: Falta complementar la información relacionada con las actividades y objetivos del componente A. 3. En el apartado 2.3: Se reconoce la importancia del sistema de seguimiento y monitoreo a nivel central, sin embargo, se recomienda incluir los aportes y avances generados por los PDP con sus propias herramientas para la medición y caracterización de los proyectos en los territorios. Ejemplo de ello: La experiencia del SIRPAZ en Oriente Antioqueño. 4. De igual modo, es necesario hacer claridad sobre un asunto que advirtió el Documento CONPES 3566 de 2009 Aprobación del endeudamiento para la fase adicional de Paz y Desarrollo y las mediciones del ICP; esto es, además de las variables identificadas en el ICR es necesario reconocer que parte de los obstáculos en la obtención de información de seguimiento, evaluación y gestión del conocimiento en tiempo real y/o con valor agregado para la comprensión de las dinámicas regionales, se encuentra relacionada con los diferentes criterios y metodologías de reporte en el avance de los proyectos que los distintos financiadores colocan sobre las Organizaciones Socias. 5. En el apartado 3.1: Sugerimos iniciar la reflexión de la relevancia del Proyecto en los retos actuales de Colombia desde una mirada al Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y sus componentes de Consolidación de la Paz, Participación Ciudadana y Desarrollo Rural, luego ahondar en las políticas específicas que contribuyen a mejorar las condiciones de vida de la población vulnerable y víctima del conflicto armado y, finalizar haciendo referencia al escenario político actual de negociaciones con las FARC. Sobre este último asunto, creemos relevante en este aparte introducir una mención en torno al valor de explorar caminos para la construcción de condiciones de desarrollo y paz en un esquema de gestión Estado-Sociedad Civil-Cooperación Internacional. En últimas, este modelo de cambio ratifica la idea que es posible, negociando con los actores armados o sin negociar, contribuir a la generación de 56

70 condiciones de desarrollo y convivencia pacífica mediante iniciativas centradas en la reconstrucción del capital social, la generación de procesos de inclusión socio económica y el fortalecimiento de la noción de protección de la vida como principio fundamental de desarrollo en el país. Por ello, el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo fija entre sus objetivos estratégicos la atención y reparación a víctimas, la profundización de la gobernabilidad y, los procesos de desarrollo rural. Ahora bien, sumado al este reconocimiento, puede ser útil mencionar que el Proyecto Paz y Desarrollo y su Financiación Adicional cobran alta relevancia sí se tiene en cuenta que los resultados de los caminos explorados han sido sujeto de mecanismos y escenarios de aprendizaje por parte del Estado. De este modo, el proyecto también ha permitido al Gobierno Nacional perfilar un conjunto de información-base de especial relevancia para la fase 3 del proceso de negociación, esto es, la implementación de los acuerdos de cese del conflicto. 6. En la página 11, corregir el CONPES para apoyo a las Juntas de Acción Comunal por, CONPES 3661: Política Nacional para el Fortalecimiento de los Organismos de Acción Comunal. 7. En la página 13, hace falta el pie de página No En la página 16, el pie de página No 34 está incompleto. 9. En el apartado 3.5, en el punto (a) la información que da cuenta del impacto (iii), es la misma que se menciona en el pie de página No 33. En ese orden de ideas, es necesario unificar la información reportada. 10. En la página 17, se hace referencia a los impactos logrados en los asuntos de género, para la DJSG es relevante que en el informe se logre precisar esos casos concretos que sirven de referencia para los documentos de política que se están diseñando o implementando, como el CONPES de Mujeres. 11. En relación a los diálogos de políticas, además de los encuentros realizados en Paz y DDHH y Tierras y Territorios, se realizó dos encuentros adicionales de alto nivel. Un tercer encuentro giró alrededor de temáticas de prevención, protección y participación ciudadana en población juvenil. Los insumos generados en dicho espacio han sido tomados como referentes para la elaboración del CONPES de prevención de la delincuencia juvenil, el documento CONPES Política Nacional de Juventud, y el proceso de revisión de los avances del Sistema de Responsabilidad Penal Adolescente. El cuarto se centro en la generación de recomendaciones para la formulación del capítulo Convergencia Regional y Desarrollo Territorial del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo

71 12. Finalmente, los estudios de caso que se elaboraron con el apoyo de la Fundación Social y otros elaborados por el equipo de Paz y Desarrollo del DNP, recogen elementos claves en los temas de participación ciudadana, víctimas y fortalecimiento organizacional que serviría como complemento a la información reseñada en el informe. 58

72 BRIEF ON DNP s COMMENTS TO DRAFT ICR Peace and Development Project and Additional Financing Project I. General comments: General comments were focused on format and editing aspects and were very helpful in finalizing the ICR and enhancing the document s quality (e.g. include more data to support statements, avoid repetitions, clearly distinguish between outcomes and learnings in specific sections). II. Specific comments: 1. Policy documents that the PDP contributed to inspire and formulate, should be included in the ICR, e.g. : National Development Plans (NDP): c) NDP y : Importance of continued support to the PDP. d) NDP : Policy recommendations in the following chapters: Territorial Development; Peace Consolidation; Good Governance, Citizen Participation andanti- Corruption; Building Social Capital y Institutional Strengthening. Laws, Policy Documents (CONPES) and National Policy Plans: i) CONPES 3726, 2012: National Plan National for Victims Attention and Integral Reparation. j) CONPES 3661, 2010: National Policy for the Strengthening of Communal Action Organizations. k) CONPES 3673, 2010: Policy for Illegal Armed Groups and Criminal Bands Children and Youth Recruitment Prevention. l) National Policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security. Laws, Policy Documents (CONPES) and National Policy Plans in preparation: q) Citizen s Participation Statutory Law. r) CONPES Strengthening conditions for the promotion of citizen participation in Colombia. s) CONPES National Consolidation Plan and Territorial Reconstruction. t) CONPES National Plan to Prevent and Fight against Corruption. u) CONPES Estrategia Integral para el Desarrollo del Departamento del Cauca. v) CONPES Youth National Policy. w) National Policy on Rural Entrepreneurship. x) National Policy on Promotion of Democratic Culture (Citizenship Coexistence and Peace Culture). 59

73 2. The report recognizes the contributions of the National Government (DPS and DNP) and the Bank during the implementation of the Project, but did not mention the role of Redprodepaz. 3. In section 1.1: The ICR should expand the content of the country context in 2004 and the one for the AF in The ICR should mention in more detail the results of the application of the ICO and ICP regarding the capacities of the OS, OU, particularly in planning, monitoring and evaluation skills, among others. 5. In section 2.3: It will be good to include the contributions that the OS did to monitoring & evaluation through their own tools, like the Peace Regional System (SIRPAZ) of the Eastern Antioquia PDP. 6. On M&E many of the difficulties to obtain information for m& e and knowledge management purposes in real time, has to do with different criteria and reporting methodologies requested by several donors to the OS. This was reported in CONPES 3566, 2009 Authorization to request a loan for a PDP AF Project and in ICP measurements. 7. On section 3.1: DNP suggest to initiate the reflection with the relevance of the Project for the current challenges of the National Development Plan and particularly for the Peace Consolidation, Citizen Participation and Rural Development components; then describe in depth specific policies to improveliving conditions of vulnerable and armed conflict victims, and finalize referring to the context of the current peace talks with the guerrillas of the FARC. 8. This section could introduce the value of exploring paths for the construction of conditions for development and peace using a State-Civil Society-International Cooperation partnership. It is possible to generate conditions for development and peace through social capital reconstruction initiatives, socio economic inclusion processes and strengthening of livesprotection strategies. That is why the National Development Plan provides for victims attention and reparation, good governance and rural development. 9. It could be also worth mentioning that the PDP has served the Government to learn and count with relevant information to progress towards expected phase 3 of the peace talks with FARC, regarding the implementation of cease-fire agreements. 60

74 10. On page 17, references are made to impacts of the PDP on gender issues. This is particularly relevant for DNP seffort in preparing policy documents, such as the Women sconpes. 11. Regarding the policy dialogues that DNP has been promoting in the last few years, in addition to the workshops on Peace and Human Rights, Land and Territories, two more events were developed: one on prevention, protection and citizen participation and youth. The other one on regional convergence and territorial development. The outcomes of these events have served for the preparation of CONPES documents on youth crime prevention, the CONPES about National Youth Policy and the review process of the Youth Penal System, and on the territorial development chapters of the National Development Plan. 12. Finally, the case studies prepared by the Peace and Development Group in DNPwith the support of the Fundación Social and others, provide key elements for citizen s participation, victims andorganizations strengthening strategies that could serve as a complement for the ICR. 61

75 Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents 1. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, (2006) Manual Operativo: Versión Ajustada y no Objeción del Banco Mundial Bogotá. 2. ACCIÓN SOCIAL hoy DPS, (2009) Manual Operativo: FA y no Objeción del Banco Mundial Bogotá. 3. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, ( ) Planes Operativos Anuales Paz y Desarrollo Bogotá. 4. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, ( ) Informes de Avance, Estado General Bogotá. 5. ACCIÓN SOCIAL hoy DPS, (2009) Informe Final de Cierre Fase I Paz y Desarrollo Bogotá. 6. ACCIÓN SOCIAL hoy DPS, (2013) Informe Final de Cierre ICR Bogotá. 7. BANCO MUNDIAL, (2004). Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$30 million to the Republic of Colombia for a Peace and Development Project, Report No CO. 8. BANCO MUNDIAL, (2004) Loan Agreement7232 in the Amount of US$30 million to the Republic of Colombia for a Peace and Development Project. 9. BANCO MUNDIAL, (2009) Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Loan in the Amount of US$7.812 million to the Republic of Colombia for a Peace and Development Project, Report No CO. 10. BANCO MUNDIAL, (2009) Loan Agreementin the Amount of US$7.812 million to the Republic of Colombia for a Peace and Development Project. 11. BANCO MUNDIAL, ( ) Ayudas Memoria Visitas de Seguimiento y Supervisión. 12. BANCO MUNDIAL, (2011) Proyecto: Colombia. Fortaleciendo los derechos humanos en los Programas Regionales de Desarrollo y Paz (TF ) 13. COLOMBIA HUMANITARIA Informe Ola Invernal < 14. COMISIÓN EUROPEA, Convenios de Financiación Laboratorios de Paz I, II y III, Desarrollo Regional Paz y Estabilidad I y II y Nuevos Territorios de Paz. 15. CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA Ley de Participación Ciudadana junio

76 16. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2004) Documento CONPES 3278 Concepto favorable a la nación para contratar un empréstito externo con la Banca Multilateral hasta por USD$ dólares o su equivalente en otras monedas, destinado a financiar la Fase I de Paz y Desarrollo, < > 17. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2009) Documento CONPES 3566 Concepto favorable a la nación para contratar un empréstito externo con la Banca Multilateral hasta por USD$ dólares o su equivalente en otras monedas, destinado a la Financiación Adicional del Programa Paz y Desarrollo, < aspx> 18. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2010) Documento CONPES 3661 Política Nacional para el Fortalecimiento de los Organismos de Acción Comunal Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2008) Evaluación de impacto de los Programas Paz y Desarrollo y Laboratorios de Paz: Línea de base e impactos preliminares Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2003) Plan Nacional de Desarrollo , Hacia un Estado Comunitario Bogotá. < 21. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2007) Plan Nacional de Desarrollo , Estado Comunitario-Desarrollo para Todos, Bogotá Departamento Nacional de Planeación, (2011) Plan Nacional de Desarrollo , Prosperidad para Todos Bogotá. < 23. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Documento de caracterización nacional de las capacidades organizacionales de los entidades facilitadoras de los programas regionales de desarrollo y paz focalizados por el Proyecto Paz y Desarrollo Financiamiento Adicional: Hacia una lectura de los resultados del índice de capacidad del programa ICP Aplicación MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR. Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras Y%20RESTITUCI%C3%93N%20DE%20TIERRAS70.PDF 25. REDPRODEPAZ, Naturaleza 63

77 26. VALLENPAZ; Barón, L et al, (2010) Encuentro de acciones colectivas por la paz en el Suroccidente de Colombia. Estudio sobre buenas prácticas para el desarrollo de proyectos sociales de Vallenpaz, Recuperación de la Finca Tradicional en el Norte del Cauca. Vallenpaz, Cali (Valle), 2006, 103 pág. d&tabid= Intercambio de Comunicaciones y no objeciones emitidas por el Banco Mundial- DPS-OS 64

78 Annex 9. Map INTERVENCION PAZ Y DESARROLLO FINANCIACION ADICIONAL 2012 PANAMA _,.,.,, VENEZUELA..-o.---..,.-... b - ~..~---, , EClJADOR S~ASIL t LEYENDA D DEPARTAMENTO D MUNICIPIOS PYD/FA e_idps ~ _..._._:n::;:;..:;:::;... PERU.. 16 VI t 1: ,. - 65