NEW APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF STATE CAPACITY AND REGIME CHANGE 1. Andrei Melville. National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow

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1 NEW APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF STATE CAPACITY AND REGIME CHANGE 1 Andrei Melville National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow amelville@hse.ru Draft Introduction State, stateness and state capacity remain in the focus of comparative politics for, at least, several decades. Recently, a new emphasis in the literature became quite visible - the relationship between state capacity and varieties of political regimes in general and regime change in particular (Tilly 1990, Mann 1993, Spruyt 1994, Linz and Stepan 1996, Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; Schmitter with Wageman and Obydenkova 2005, Fukuyama 2004, Tilly 2007, Back and Hadenius 2008, Frye 2010, Hendrix 2010, Charron and Lapuente 2010 and 2011, Fortin-Rittberger 2014, etc.). State capacity becomes one of the key concepts in the study of regime change and sequencing of reforms, political development and modernization, economic growth, state building and state failure, quality of governance, etc. However, there is no agreement on the definitions, conceptualizations and measurements of state capacity. Components and variables included in concepts of state capacity vary from bureaucratic quality, control of corruption, military strength, administrative capacity, and tax extractive capacity, GDP/cap., contract intensive money, physical integrity rights and many others. This paper attempts to contribute to the analysis and evaluation of existing approaches to the conceptualization and measurement of state capacity and the problem of sequencing 2 (building state capacity before or together with democratization). It also provides an attempt to develop a new index of state capacity which is empirically tested using the postcommunist sample. The paper concludes with possible outline for future research. State Capacity: Conceptualization and Measurement Current discussions of state capacity have produced a variety of approaches and no widely recognized definitions yet 3. One possible conceptual departure point in this regard may be found in Huntington s seminal distinction between forms and degrees of government 4. Within the 1 Paper prepared for RC33 panel on Concepts and Measurements in the Study of Political Transformations, IPSA 24 th World Congress of Political Science (Poznan, July 25, 2016). Earlier version of this paper was presented at 16 th April International Conference on Modernization of Economics and Society, HSE, Moscow, April 8, This problem is addressed in intensive scholarly and political debates (Fukuyama 2004a; Fukuyama 2007; Carothers 2007; Berman 2007, MacLaren 2009, etc.) 3 State capacity remains a concept in search of precise definitions and measurement (Hendrix 2010: 273). 4 The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government (Huntington 1968: 1). 1

2 context of the problems under consideration in this paper this distinction calls for special emphasis on the relationship between levels of state capacity and particular political regimes, as well as their mutually related dynamics. To proceed with this analysis, state capacity needs to be conceptually decomposed and its components need to be defined in a measurable way. Helpful suggestions for this purpose are provided in Tilly s basic argument according to which the key functions of the state are its capacities to extract resources and create administrative structures to manage those resources in order to wage wars (Tilly 1990) 5. At least implicitly this argument contains a particular understanding of state capacity resulting from the quality of implementation of the two abovementioned state functions. Current debates on state capacity are also heavily influenced by Mann s differentiation of despotic (or coercive ) and infrastructural capacities of the state (Mann 1984). The first one at least partly refers to Weber s monopoly on legitimate violence as a sine qua non of the state. The second reflects the capacity of the state to formulate and implement its economic, social and other policies. This understanding of infrastructural capacity implies possible criteria for comparative evaluation of different states and largely remains at the core of current research on state capacity (Fortin-Rittberger 2014; Soifer 2008; Soifer and Hau 2008, etc.). According to particular empirical research focus, state capacity may serve as a dependent or independent variable. As a dependent variable it helps understand how various factors economic, social, political, and demographic and others affect different qualities of state capacity in different countries or at different periods of time. In case of an independent variable, state capacity is considered as a factor which may influence different effects and outcomes including levels and types of economic and social development, provision of public goods, human capital development, status and influence of states in the international system, state building and state failure, political regime dynamic, etc. There is extensive recent literature exploring both research options, however, causality arrows remain unclear. This rich literature presents various definitions and conceptualizations of state capacity, including its functions and components. Probably, the most general definition of state capacity can be found in Kjaer and Thomsen: State capacity is generally defined as the ability of the state to formulate and implement strategies to achieve economic and social goals in society (Kjaer and Thomsen 2002:7). Conceptualization and Definitions However, when it comes to more detailed definitions, there is significant variation in approaches. For example, Roberts and Sherlock (1999) suggest that state capacity may be conceptualized on the basis of three dimensions institutional, political and administrative (which are, however, not sufficiently defined). Fukuyama s (2004) concept of stateness and state capacity includes such functions as defense and security, provision of law and order, guarantees of property rights, protection of the poor, effective macroeconomic management, provision of public goods like health and education, and also financial regulation, redistributive pensions, environmental protection, unemployment insurance, etc. Back and Hadenius (2008) tend to define stateness as the capacity of state entities to maintain sovereignty. For Hendrix (2010) state capacity includes 5 This argument is advanced today by Gennaioli and Voth (2015). 2

3 military capacity, bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and the quality and coherence of political institutions. Charron and Lapuente (2010 and 2011) equate state capacity with the quality of government. Thompson (2014) understands state capacity as state strength which includes coercive capacity, fiscal capacity, legitimacy and political stability. There may be many other definitions and understandings of state capacity in the literature. Anyhow, in empirical research one also needs to come up with concrete measurements and indicators of different components of state capacity. Obviously, particular conceptualization of state capacity may lead to the selection of different indicators (Soifer 2008; Cingolani 2013). But on the whole, there is a more or less general agreement in the literature that these indicators can be divided into two major groups first, resources available to the state for achievement of its strategic goals and second, institutions which are necessary for this purpose. However, attempts to empirically measure resources and institutions run into several methodological problems. Measurements One of these problems is how to measure available resources. In some cases GDP per capita (WB, IMF, etc.) is used as criteria, although it certainly may be related not only to state capacity but to other variables. For example, Gehlbach (2008) suggests levels of tax extraction as a measure of resources in defining state capacity. This would seem an appealing approach which is recommended by many other authors (Besley and Person 2010; Schmitter with Wageman and Obydenkova 2008). However, we need to take into account that tax share of GDP may reflect the structure of the national economy, rather than the extractive capacity of the state in particular when dealing with resource oriented economies and their political preferences and institutions. Besides, this approach may not resolve the issue of shadow economy and its impact on state capacity (Ottervik 2013; Hendrix 2010). It is also important to note that in many cases, particularly when dealing with postcommunist and developing countries, missing or insufficiently reliable data becomes a significant hindrance for comparative empirical studies. Second problem has to do with the choice of different measurements of institutions and their quality. One option here is to use available composite indices measuring quality of institutions of governance or some of their components for example, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Quality of Government (QoG), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), etc. Possible doubts in such cases are related to the often discussed issue of methodological integrity of these indices and the validity of using some of their separate components. Despite some concerns, many authors, nonetheless, prefer to rely on such composite indices (Charron and Lapuente 2010 and 2011; Bratton and Chang 2006; Back and Hadenius 2008; Thompson 2014). Another option also explored in the literature is to select particular proxy variables to measure institutional quality in the empirical study of state capacity. For example, among such favorite proxies is protection of property rights, contract enforcement (Soifer and Hau 2008), and control of corruption (Back and Hadenius 2008). Another possible proxy contract intensive money (CIM) can be used as a measure of trust in financial and other institutions of the state (Fortin 2010) 6. Also physical integrity rights from Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project 6 See also Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1999). 3

4 (CIRI) measuring the ability of the state to provide guarantees of personal security irrespective of the regime type can be used as a proxy for measuring important aspects of state capacity. In addition we should note that in certain current research cases different sorts of public opinion data is used as measurements in the study of state capacity (Magalhaes 2014; Luna and Soifer 2015). In principle, this measurement approach may be useful, however, taking into account its possible methodological vulnerability due to inevitable subjectivity factor. State Capacity and Democratization: Sequencing? Whatever the choice between available varieties of conceptualizations and measurements of state capacity, the crucial issue in this paper is the problem of sequencing of state-building and democratization should the task of enhancing state capacity before building democratic institutions come first or can both complement each other? We continue this paper with the overview of various approaches in the literature. Approaches The basic thesis which regards state, stateness and state capacity as prerequisites for democracy and democratization is commonplace in comparative politics literature (Rustow 1970; Tilly 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Fukuyama 2004, 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Moller and Skaaning 2011, etc.). This assumption leads to important theoretical and practical implications, including the so-called sequencing argument, which suggests that the effective and competent state must come first, followed by democratization later. But in what sense are state, stateness and state capacity prerequisites to democracy and democratization? States are not alike, in the real political world there are different types of states with different evolutionary stages, resources, capacities, priorities, and political regimes (Melville et al. 2010). Are there any types of states that are particularly disposed to further democratization? This problem of sequencing is of special importance for transitional states of the third wave that face the simultaneous challenges of state-building, nation-formation, economic reforms and regime transformation. Important conceptual and policy questions emerge in this context. Can state building and democratization complement each other instead? Can democratization start and be successful at low and medium levels of state capacity? Extant literature dealing with the abovementioned problems is enormous indeed. The basic mainstream argument is, put simply, as follows: No state, no democracy. This argument seems to be theoretically and empirically unquestionable. There is hardly any doubt that democracy assumes a capable state and cannot exist in a vacuum of stateness and state capacity. However, recent debates have outlined different and alternative approaches to various forms of relationships between types and levels of state capacity and regime change, including the problem of sequencing. Several approaches in the literature can be identified: (1) Stateness and State Capacity First This powerful argument advances the mainstream logic: high levels of state capacity (availability of necessary resources and effective institutions) are necessary prerequisites for democracy and 4

5 indispensable preconditions for successful democratization (Back and Hadenius 2008, Moller and Skaaning 2011, Fortin 2010 etc.). D Arcy and Nistotskaya (2016) have recently advanced this argument demonstrating empirically that credible enforcement is a precondition for credible commitment and that democratization may be more effective after state capacity attains a particular level. This conclusion is hardly arguable and is in line with other research findings, but the problem of sequencing is somewhat different can both processes advance together and reinforce each other? Among the propositions related to the issue of state capacity and regime change and quite widespread in literature the J-curve is quite notable. Its theoretical grounds may be found, for example, in Tilly s (2007) classification of crude regime types along two axes (state capacity and democracy): high-capacity/undemocratic (example Kazakhstan); low-capacity undemocratic (example Somalia); high-capacity/democratic (example Norway) and lowcapacity/democratic (example Jamaica). Tilly s theoretical proposition seems to be confirmed by empirical research (Back and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Fortin 2011; Moller and Skaaning 2011, etc.). The argument is the following: the highest levels of state capacity are attained in developed democracies, but its substantially high levels can be found in autocracies and they are much higher than those in transitional regimes. In a way, this is an argument in favor of the Stateness and State Capacity First approach in the sequencing debate under consideration. One may go on with this reasoning and presume that there is certain logic in the sequencing of reforms in countries undergoing transitions. It implies a priority of building a strong state and strengthening the vertical of power eventually followed by democratization which otherwise is fraught with the risk of losing control, chaos and even collapse of a state. If this is true, then one of the major problems of the democratic transition is how to get through this danger zone as the political and economic reforms may contribute to the deterioration of socio-economic situation, degradation of governance and growing discontent among large groups of population that do not gain anything from the reforms. (2) Democratization without a State This is a logically possible but practically and substantially almost untenable hypothesis. Tansey (2007 and 2009) gives only few examples, which still look dubious: Kosovo and East Timor. Scheuerman (2009) refers to globalization and transnationalization as factors that may eventually decrease the relevance of sovereign stateness to democratization. In any case, this is a pretty marginal argument in the literature. (3) Democratization Backwards/Building a Ship of State at Sea Some authors point at historical regularity in European state-building starting from at least the 16th century. According to this argument, modern states ( born in blood as Tilly and others would say) appeared first, and democratic practices and institutions came about gradually later. Other authors, though, question the universal character of such regularity at least within the context of the last decades of the third wave and argue for so-called democratization backwards, i.e. parallel and complimentary to the processes of state building in new transitional states. Rose and Shin (2001) provide empirical grounds to the thesis of the possibility of 5

6 Building the Ship of State at Sea, i.e. building new institutions of democratic governance in transitional states of the third wave (thus bypassing the preliminary phase of building institutions of effective authoritarian governance). Bratton (2004); Bratton and Chang (2006) and Carbone and Memoli (2012), come to similar conclusions using different methodologies. Fortin (2011) underlines the problem of endogeneity in the issues under consideration and, since the direction of causality remains unclear, tends toward the conclusion that state-building and democratization may complement each other. Mazzuca and Munck (2014) provide empirical evidence that democracy and democratization may contribute to state-building in developing countries. This conclusion is supported by Slater (2008). Important issues, however, remain undisclosed. For example, some authors raise the problem of a minimal threshold of stateness, understood as effectiveness of governmental institutions, which is indispensable for the beginning of democratization (Capelli 2008; Hanson 2012; Fortin 2011). This important problem is formulated in the literature, though adequate theoretical and empirical arguments are largely insufficient. Further, quite important issue has to do with the stability or variability of state capacity within the context of postcommunist transformations. Fortin (2010), for example, argues in favor of relative invariability of state capacity over time. This is an important question since, in the instance that this is accurate, we would need to control for quite different ( non-stateness, nonstate capacity ) variables in the comparative analysis of postcommunist transformations. As one can see, from the conceptual point of view, these alternative approaches may be hardly compatible as there are sufficient pros and cons working both ways. However, the review of current theoretical and empirical literature on state capacity and regime transformations, including the sequencing debate within the context of postcommunist transformations, leads to the following hypotheses which are further addressed in this paper in an experiment of empirical analysis. Hypotheses H1. Contrary to the mainstream literature, high levels of state capacity are not always indispensable prerequisites for democratization. Democratization may start and proceed at relatively low levels of state capacity, although democratic consolidation occurs at its high levels. Postcommunist democratization and state-building (enhancement of state capacity) may complement each other. H2. Despite the mainstream generic argument in the existing literature, postcommunist nondemocracies do not demonstrate higher levels of state capacity and institutional quality than transitional and hybrid regimes. H3. Levels of state capacity may change considerably during periods of radical socio-economic and political transformations in postcommunist countries. An Experiment in Empirical Analysis Data and Methodology 6

7 This paper concentrates on postcommunist countries from the beginning of the Velvet Revolutions (1989) up to The sample consists of 27 countries, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The abovementioned hypotheses are tested using two indices (1) state capacity and (2) democracy/autocracy. Taking into consideration actual limitations and methodological problems with the selection of indicators to measure postcommunist state capacity we use GDP per capita as criteria of available resources. To measure the quality of economic/financial and political institutions two variables are used: the Contract Intensive Money index (which reflects quality of financial institutions and in some degree people s trust in national bank system) and the Physical Integrity Rights index from Cingranelli Richards dataset (as a reflection of the rule of law, irrespective of the characteristics of the political regime). Democracy/autocracy as another key variable in this paper is measured by an average of two indices Polity IV and Freedom House 7. Analysis Two scatterplots with data on democracy/autocracy and state capacity in post-communist countries during two periods from the beginning of the transition in till are overlapped (Figure 1) in order to present rough trajectories of the dynamic of 27 postcommunist countries. This data can be used to test the three hypotheses presented above. In particular, it affords to make several conclusions about state capacity and regime change in postcommunist countries related to the problem of sequencing. Figure 1. Dynamics of state capacity and trajectories of postcommunist regime change 7 This approach was previously developed and tested in collaboration with Denis Stukal (see Melville and Stukal 2012 and Melville, Stukal and Mironyuk 2014) and may be reassessed in further research. 7

8 Legend: ALB - Albania, ARM - Armenia, AZB - Azerbaijan, BEL - Belarus, BUL - Bulgaria, CRO - Croatia, CZC - Czech Republic, EST - Estonia, GRG - Georgia, HUN - Hungary, KZK - Kazakhstan, KYR - Kyrgyz Republic, LAT - Latvia, LIT - Lithuania, MCD - Macedonia, MLD - Moldova, MNG - Mongolia, POL - Poland, ROM - Romania, RUS - Russia, SRB - Serbia, SVK - Slovak Republic, SLV - Slovenia, TAJ - Tajikistan, TUR - Turkmenistan, UKR - Ukraine, and UZB - Uzbekistan. First, this empirical analysis confirms the widespread conclusion about a relatively solid correlation between levels of state capacity and political regimes: democracies demonstrate higher state capacity than autocracies. This conclusion, though, at least within the postcommunist sample, contradicts some abovementioned theoretical and empirical J-curve arguments in favor of autocracies with high state capacity and calls for additional research using wider samples. Second, countries with relatively high levels of state capacity are leaders in postcommunist democratization (as of ). These are Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, etc. However, there are dramatic anomalies countries which managed (for various reasons) to more or less successfully democratize staring from relatively low levels of state capacity Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Moldova. These cases prove that in particular circumstances (yet to be analyzed) democratization may start without effective stateness and state capacity, which at least partly confirms Hypothesis 1. However, it is important to note that in these cases relatively low levels of state capacity are nonetheless on the 8

9 average somewhat higher than in most of autocracies which did not democratize. In principle, this may reinforce the abovementioned argument about the minimal threshold of stateness and state capacity necessary for the start of democratization. Third, one common trend of two decades of postcommunist transformations is gradual increase of state capacity, regardless of regime characteristics, There are again exceptions, such as Ukraine or the Czech Republic which have advanced during the period analyzed on democracy score but not in state capacity, or Armenia, Uzbekistan and Russia, which have fallen (although to different degrees) both in the indices of state capacity and democracy. Apparently, different factors may have impact on these dynamics, including the growth of the GDP without the improvement of the quality of institutions. Particular policy choices as well need to be considered as important factors influencing the dynamic of state capacity. Fourth, despite some very marginal increases in state capacity in authoritarian Kazakhstan and even to a lesser extent in Azerbaijan and Belarus, two decades of transformations did not result in the emergence of postcommunist autocracies with high levels of state capacity 8. These findings support Hypothesis 2 9. Fifth, these findings indicate that levels of state capacity may actually change, and sometimes quite substantially, during periods of radical political and socio-economic transformations (which contradicts some conclusions about relative invariability of postcommunist state capacity developed by Fortin 2010). The overall effect of successful postcommunist democratizations is correlated with gradual increases in state capacity and quality of institutions, although of very different degrees, which supports Hypothesis 3. These empirical finding largely confirm our hypotheses, but may not be in tune with some important premises in existing literature and call for further research. Conclusions and Prospects for Further Research State capacity and regime change remain in the focus of intensive discussions in comparative politics literature. Various approaches to conceptualization of state capacity reflect its multidimensional character and lead to different measurements used in current empirical studies. More efforts are needed to develop deeper conceptual understanding of state capacity and adequate sets of empirical indicators. An experiment with the index of state capacity based on three variables (GDP per capita, Contract Intensive Money and Physical Integrity Rights) provided in this paper confirms general correlations between state capacity and political regimes which can be found in existing literature. However, when it comes to regime change, this paper demonstrates some more nuanced findings, including varieties of postcommunist trajectories and dynamics of state capacity. 8 See more details in Melville, Stukal and Mironyuk (2014) and Melville and Mironyuk (2016). 9 It should be noted that relatively low levels of state capacity, compared with the leaders of democratization, do not mean that post-communist autocracies lack resources for extensive economic development (in contrast, the majority of them are rich in natural resources, however, the proceeds of their export are distributed very unequally) or repressive capabilities. They may have both. However, the quality of their institutions does not improve. 9

10 This paper also contributes to the discussion of the sequencing problem by suggesting empirical evidence in favor of possible complementarity of state (re-) building and democratization and against the universality of Stateness and State Capacity First approach. It further demonstrates that the J-curve argument is not confirmed in case of the postcommunist sample. Postcommunist (or rather post-soviet) autocracies successfully withstand democratization and do not produce high levels of state capacity and quality of institutions. Moreover, some post-soviet hybrid and transitional regimes demonstrate higher state capacity and better governance than autocracies. These conclusions need to be tested using a larger sample and wider time-series which may become a prospective goal for further research. References Back H. and Hadenius A. (2008) Democracy and State Capacity: Explaining a J-Shaped Relationship // Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 21 (1). Berman Sh. (2007). The Vain Hope for Correct Timing // Journal of Democracy 18 (3). Besley T. and Person T. (2010). State Capacity, Conflict, and Development // Econometrica 78 (1). Bratton M. (2004) State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together? Afrobarometer Working Papers 43. Bratton M. and Chang E. (2006). State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together? // Comparative Political Studies 39 (9). Capelli, O. (2008) Pre-Modern State-Building in Post-Soviet Russia // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24 (4). Carbone G. and Memoli V. (2012) Does Democracy Foster State Consolidation? A Panel Analysis of the Backwards Hypothesis ( 19_G.%20Carbone%20e%20V.%20Memoli.pdf). Carothers Th. (2007). The Sequencing Fallacy // Journal of Democracy 18 (1). Charron N. and Lapuente V. (2010). Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government? // European Journal of Political Research 49 (4). Charron N. and Lapuente V. (2011) Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government? // Studies of Comparative International Development 46 (4). Cingolani L. (2013). The State of State Capacity: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and Measures // Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth: IPD WP 13. Clague Ch., Keefer Ph., Knack S. and Olson M. (1999) Contract Intensive Money // MPRA Paper

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