Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies

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1 Brigham Young University BYU ScholarsArchive All Theses and Dissertations Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies Kristina Handy Brigham Young University - Provo Follow this and additional works at: Part of the Mormon Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons BYU ScholarsArchive Citation Handy, Kristina, "Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies" (1994). All Theses and Dissertations This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

2 tacit cooperation between enemies two case studies thesis presented david M kennedy center international area studies brigham young university partial fulfillment requirements degree master arts kristina handy april 1994

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4 thesis kristina handy accepted present form david M kennedy center international area studies brigham young university satisfying thesis requirement degree master arts 7 1 mf kwi MMI kni valerie M 144son 11111iiiniiiyi trl arm i n trm wf iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii f r ilip iiii ilni J J tkiiiiiiiiiiitmiii gafcigg hunson committee ah 6h chair gommittee committee member stan ataylor ommittee vmmittee ziai lo 10 WW valerie date r M hudson hudon hudin gfjbuate 18yate program coordinator mator n

5 CHAPTER 1 TACIT cooperation introduction research follows I1 attempt form framework contextualize two case studies cooperation born situations conflict like war seems studying war conflict competition players uniformly team opposing sides intricate alliances axis allied powers world war II 11 elegant black white chess board considering complexities human motivation what happen black suited pawn saw eye eye white counterpart did own king queen leader uniforms still same color dynamics game how played changed these changes particularly context war international conflict where my interests begin war tool conquest liberation defense means promoting ideologies way gain economic strength show national honor politician war both opportunity doom poet eternal

6 2 reciprocity tears john stoessinger compared war nietzsches Nietz great abyss life own war subject volumes works political scientists philosophers painters poets politics far common thread studies international rules weapons war change case studies increase each passing year while prediction prescriptions too often elude students national international conflict find our peace controlling variables our own war studies my research I1 assert cooperation spring conflict war specifically I1 propose conflict international conflictual relationship occurs resembles iterated prisoners dilemma meets certain conditions cooperation emerge cooperation conflict variables research project parameters cooperation while I1 wait until next section chapter define cooperation detail I1 want explain I1 looking incidents lower level bureaucratic cooperation I1 do question authority question controlling taken final line wilfred owens poem insensibility owen british poet killed action during world war I1

7 3 policies propelling two states situation conflict war maintaining conflict I1 avoid very large tangent selecting lower level bureaucrat actorinstigator cooperation lower level bureaucrats position agents national policy make policies themselves conflict hand originates higher source maintained levels including pawns field words national authority creates maintains conflict cooperation emerges illicitly lower ranks why I1 use term tacit cooperation cooperation mostly unsanctioned emerges source authoritative command stated above conflict conflictual situation cooperation emerges resemble iterated prisoners dilemma I1 using game describe conflict I1 borrow game theory literature initial idea use game theory comes robert axelrods axelrode Axelrods evolution cooperation evolution cooperation major source development definition what I1 term tacit cooperation book where I1 am introduced tony ashworths Ashworths research world war I1 trench warfare my first case study tacit cooperation second case study I1 use relationship

8 4 developed between paul nitze yuli kvitsinsky Kvitsinsky during intermediate nuclear forces INF talks I utilize strobe talbotts Talbotts many chronicles talks piece together events led tacit cooperation between two negotiators negotiatory though world seems far removed war like world war I1 superpower cold war conflicts passed away soviet communist rule berlin wall conflict war nevertheless incessant part human experience introduction work war change world politics robert gilpin notes although evolved through centuries technological developments those developments altered relations among states war continuing unsolved problem 7 ergo fundamental change world politics taken place 213 james rosenau takes gilpin task saying neglects possibility similar outcomes ie war may result vastly different structures processes 73 whether structures international relations changed whether war conflict inevitable outcomes human relations world system historically currently filled incidents conflict war until changes topics cooperation conflict high many peoples agendas study understand

9 5 definitions tacit cooperation lower level bureaucrat how defined terms game theory robert keohane defines cooperation mutual adjustment state policies another another scholar jerome bernstein disagrees arguing cooperation forced cooperation much result decisive policy realization limits power politics policies strategies ensue therefrom these definitions discounting many others attributed political literature part involved cooperation among political ideological allies therefore how does define collaborative association between hostile rivals enemies mentioned above cooperation I1 seek case study analysis I1 develop framework contextualize occurs among lower level bureaucrats lack power form implement policies conflict change structure conflictual relationship involved words privates army cannot make decision either end escalate battle participating tacit cooperation therefore unsanctioned even illicit act form

10 6 agreement sometimes spoken sometimes symbolized known developed agreeing parties involved tacit cooperation does necessarily demand altruistic reasons taking place reasonable assume cooperation occurs two individuals groups see benefit involved collaborative process result cooperate reason gaining personal benefit nature payoffs strategies described field game theory classic fights games debates rapoport delineates difference between fight game stating essential difference see fight idealized devoid rationality opponents while game contrary idealized struggle complete rationality opponents assumed rapoport I1 emphasize rationality indispensable game theorist body research relations between opposing entities two nations war analyzed game fight furthermore rapoport states game opponents cooperate follow rules game absolutely 11 community between opponents opponent speaks same language seen nuisance mirror image self whose interests may

11 7 diametrically opposed nevertheless exist rational being certain games prisoners dilemma stag hunt cooperation may primary choice considered highest payoff strategy time point make cooperation rational choice cooperation therefore strategy yield highest mutual payoff definition based prisoners I1 dilemma2 dilemmas 2 framework f my case study analysis next chapter contain description use research conflict conflictual Conflict relationships conflict defined terms game research important begin understanding how payoffs motivate define players interactions I1 mentioned conflict begins authoritative level nations government game policymakers involves zero sum pay off system win10 loseo lose0 boseo lower level bureaucrat involved heat conflict I1 submit 2below abelow payoff matrix prisoners dilemma B j cooperate defect cooperate defect table I1

12 game resemble prisoners dilemma payoff matrix yield positive payoffs those wish cooperate refer footnote 2 therefore conflict dilemma prisoners dilemma broken proper conditional strategy 8 focus & scope research robert axelrod developed theory evolution cooperation describes emergence cooperation among contending entities theory I1 create specific framework reference collusion among political rivals andor enemies axelrod argues iterated prisoners dilemma game called tit tat fit promote cooperation cooperation occur under given set necessary conditions pieces cooperation literature provide fundamental theoretical background material form tacit cooperation framework michael taylors possibility cooperation describes emergence cooperation similarly axelrod yet delineates strategies just tit tat being able support cooperation equilibrium3 equilibriums 3 contribution 3an aan equilibrium saddle point place payoff matrix both players strategies rationally fall prisoners dilemma equilibrium strategy DD see footnote 2 see prisoners dilemma payoff structure DD 11 shows equilibrium strategy

13 9 taylor makes specifically notion altruism defines altruism being zero sum based payoffs interdependent 111 further scholarly input cooperation under anarchy contribution kenneth oyes enhance widen necessary conditions emergent cooperation important point oye makes conditional strategy effective easily recognized playing game black white choices cooperation defect make strategies transparent furthermore oye discusses number game players how size affect outcome game methodology I1 explicate two historical episodes using game theoretic framework cooperation I1 use case study approach show least twice international setting tacit cooperation emerged theory tacit cooperation drafted chapters 2 3 followed case studies set necessary conditions extracted describe what sorts structures theory promote possibly eventuate cooperation among players game information case studies taken primarily secondary sources explication each depend upon inescapably subjective interpretation events however

14 framework I1 am attempting examine explicit factor interpretation description events these sources sort check balance using these materials small portion my research come primary sources mostly memoirs 10 literature review steven brams superpower games applying games superpower conflict states conditional game theory involve following implicit conversation you cooperate I1 certainty you do my response without saying what appropriate conditional strategy described research tit tat break prisoners dilemma axelrod states tifc tift titt tiac tat policy cooperation first move then doing whatever player did previous move axelrod cited repeatedly game theory cooperation literature testing durability success strategies like tit tat lead cooperation axelrod become my window field game theory without going too much detail study games received widespread attention 1944 publication von neumann morgensterns Morgensterns theory games economic behavior robert leonard notes edited book toward history game theory though game theory

15 now plays central role economic theory ideas 1944 primarily appropriated developed mathematicians weintraub now game theory become interdisciplinary british biologist richard dawkins devote entire chapter selfish gene 1989 describing ways robert axelrod american political scientist taken mathematical theory exciting new directions what does game theory do political scientist james schellenberg 1982 wrote science conflict game theory created especially analyze situations involving conflicts interest 167 continues explaining social scientist mathematical approach games useful constructing theories clear titles big two soviet american perception foreign policy rapoport 1971 superpower games applying game theory superpower conflict brams 1985 many political scientists found niche theory game theory almost exclusively examines conflict cooperation international political pundit much gain elegance robert axelrod exception my research I1 start axelrod school evolutionary cooperation apply conditional strategy tit tat explain two very different international situations where cooperation develops thrust my

16 12 research describing cooperation amidst conflict while cooperation literature existed political studies particularly exclusively use game theory study tacit cooperation defined research axelrod given me theory strategy reference cooperation develops during conflict left open level cooperation occur further research use two political scientists game theoretic approaches oye taylor I1 am able select I1 want study agents cooperation lower level bureaucrat international political studies cooperation never wholly involved individual actor unless actor authority symbolically representing state studies cooperation between rivals enemies involve wartime alliances state centric approaches studying why soviets signed nonaggression pact nazis 1939 course systemic approach commonly used look how bipolar political world form US soviet cooperation many utilize systemic approach view US soviet rivalry two nations identical fates yanov 1989 several scholars note superpowers used rivalry gain international superiority especially lesser developed nations bernstein 1989 metz 1989 scholars view cold war politics cooperation hot war between

17 13 united states soviet union never broke craig 1990 kremenyuk Kremenyuk midlarsky et al 1994 game theory often utilized describing cold war superpower relations rapoport did 1971 big two soviet american perception foreign policy recently manus midlarsky uses axelrods axelrode Axelrods tit tat explain part why great powers did learn cooperate prior 1914 appear done during cold war era midlarsky et al research involving cooperation among individuals received much attention international studies many cases however level cooperation analyzed ambiguous left reader determine axelrod 1984 robert kuenne outcomes cooperation readily studied causes group scholars notes 1962 important question antecedent cooperative relationships receive relatively little consideration compared consequences kelly et al 1 particularly studies international politics statement remains somewhat true however onset post cold war era taking everyone surprise many scholars rosenau 1990 suggesting radical new approaches describe what happening world today research does lofty goal attempts simply funnel international situation

18 conflict down individual level see what happen given set circumstances accounting small personal choices big picture international exchange 14

19 CHAPTER 2 FRAMEWORK TACIT cooperation understanding conditions allow cooperation emerge appropriate actions taken foster development cooperation specific setting axelrod introduction under what conditions cooperation emerge world egoists egotists without central authority axelrod question robert axelrod studies book evolution cooperation through answering question theory tacit cooperation part begin take shape evolution cooperation axelrod uses game theory builds upon assumptions explains why utilizes game theory developing ideas cooperation way needed represent what common situations without becoming bogged down details unique each fortunately representation available famous prisoners dilemma game axelrod uses game theorys theodys prisoners dilemma create pithy explanation study cooperation though 1 game prisoners dilemma created early 1950s merrill flood melvin dresher

20 clear details specific cooperative relationships lost process simplification strength comes ability identify common factors different 16 instances emerging cooperation study cooperation solely deliberation social sciences I1 must therefore borrow various fields already established mathematical philosophical theoretical proofs utility cooperation theories literature stands study cooperation multi disciplinary inquiry axelrod taylor being two few political scientists quoted body literature following section consist rather generic explanation game theory application here research game theory prisoners dilemma game theory mathematical origins stated previously theory games formalized until late 1940s early 1950s2 von neumann morgenstern smith though originating mathematical concept game theorys theodys progeny quickly became useful economists today used mathematicians 2 II iigame theory generally attributed von neumann papers although recently frechet raised question priority suggesting several papers borel early 120s really laid foundations game theory luce raiffa

21 17 economists political social scientists hard scientists microbiologists geneticists luce raiffa stated mans written record preoccupation conflict interest possibly topics god love inner struggle received comparable attention luce raiffa note further study conflict interest vast diverse must attempt abstract certain large classes mathematical system 2 abstracting two theorists warn important details lost limiting utility theory games specific fields research scholar notes decades morgensterns Morgensterns creation followed von neumann mathematical theory matured applications multiplied you need look under heading game theory prisoners dilemma abstracts psychology sociology political science journals see proliferation davis 1983 xiii xvi study game theory expanded dramatically since 50s luce raiffa wrote classic games decisions game theory offered many scientists terse description oft confusing decision making process study game theory concerned interaction decisions these interactions what define game theory considers how should make decisions lesser extent how does make them

22 18 davis decisions may depend course upon game being played strategies selected number players entering specified game3 gamec game theodys theorys major goal according andrew colman find solution game hand states solution specification decisions made outcome therefore reached decision makers rational according criteria laid down theory using game theory framework research interactions participants under given set circumstances colman states behavior decision makers accordance normative prescriptions theory problem empirical research theory merely tells outcomes game interactions strategies played under given set conditions does attempt guess why player players behave certain ways tangential line reasoning discussion game theorys theodys elemental assumption notion rationality bertrand russell states reason perfectly clear precise meaning signifies choice right means end you wish achieve according many game theory scholars 3 use game theory research limited two party opposed n person games

23 19 however term rational far precise certainly means different things different theories developed luce raiffa nonetheless concept rationality used here persons playing game use strategy coincide desires fears needs every player minimize potential maximum loss prisoners dilemma game axelrod adheres assumption rationality prisoners dilemma game defines rationality essence very positivistically scenario game gleans title presented thusly imagine you your accomplice charged having committed crime now prisoners sitting separate cells unable communicate awaiting trial enough circumstantial evidence convict both you even you both remain silent you both convicted locked year you admit your guilt help convict your silent partner you free put away ten years reverse happens course confesses you remain silent you both confess then unfortunately you both get nine years campbell rules you want minimal amount years jail possible you dont care how many years your accomplice gets you both know knows scenario neither you know how decide choices according prisoners dilemma either

24 20 confess guilt defined non cooperation defecting D silent defined cooperation C you confess D your partner remains silent C you receive highest payoff go free you dont confess your partner does you get lowest payoff 10 years prison second highest payoff both you remain silent CC year prison dilemma derived suspense uncertainty though better take risk unilaterally defecting remain cooperative may leave you suckers payoff case 10 years prison 11 book prisoners dilemma study conflict cooperation rapoport chammah add insight problem rationality game theory note how definition rationality specifically affects interpretation prisoners dilemma state prisoners dilemma rational choice strategy both players leads outcome worse both chosen strategies irrationally paradox remains unresolved long insist adhering concept rationality zero sum games makes perfect sense makes questionable sense non zero sum games result rapoport chammah derive experimentation prisoners dilemma rationality changes game played long period time iterated prisoners dilemma

25 21 rational choice becomes predominantly cooperate opposed defect through looking prisoners dilemma based game theory tacit cooperation constructed lower level bureaucratic interaction seen representing prisoners dilemma game showing how paradox game broken theory 4 framework cooperation fabricated understand emergence tacit robert axelrod evolution cooperation book evolution cooperation robert axelrod explores notion breaking rationality paradox prisoners dilemma game argumentation based particular strategy tit tat how use strategy prisoners dilemma brings emergence evolution cooperation axelrod notes four areas inquiry prisoners dilemma used analytical tool first study social psychology used understand examine human behavior axelrod states 4 idea paradox works together definition rationality according prisoners dilemma game rational strategy defect case payoff comparatively low low compared mutual cooperation low unrequited cooperation paradox best strategy rational strategy until paradox broken best strategy becomes yields highest payoff best defined here noticeably strategy highest mutual payoff

26 22 iterated prisoners dilemma become E coli colf coll coif social psychology second use prisoners dilemma purpose conceptualizing social processes many best developed models important political social economic processes prisoners dilemma foundation third body literature discusses how prisoners dilemma abstract game aids scholar analyze characteristics elemental universal issues specifically related field like psychology economics why people do do cooperate what rationality luce raiffa discuss etc finally fourth body literature concentrates how eliminate dilemma writers rapoport axelrod discussed issue length realm my research focus although axelrod states none these fields reveal very much how play prisoners dilemma very well axelrods axelrode Axel thesis new approach needed allow players learn choosing strategy way dilemma broken proposes new strategy strategy comes test performed way tournament second chapter evolution cooperation axelrod describes tournament arranged find fit strategy break prisoners dilemma

27 23 support emergence well maintain cooperation tournament designed form round robin sixty people many disciplines countries ages participated overall winner tournament strategy name tit tat created anatol rapoport tit tat strategy defined axelrod thusly TIT TAT starts cooperative choice thereafter does what player did previous move 31 success tit tat dependent upon following proposition axelrods axelrode Axelrods first discount parameter w sufficiently high best strategy independent strategy used player 15 discount parameter refers weight Ww future moves particularly next move relative current move therefore w refers percentage payoff lost each consecutive move constitutes rate discount assuming example 1 current status payoff being 100 percent w number greater 0 less 1 subtracted 1 giving discount parameter 5 point axelrod makes future important enough 5 discount parameter part mathematical formulae test viability theory games use here research purely metaphorical words discount parameter used mathematical formula quantitative research used abstracted sense axelrod does describing certain instances conflict whether discount parameter high low

28 24 cast shadow back upon present thereby affect current strategic situation 12 according axelrod discount parameter must high order tit tat scenario function terminology discount parameter substituted poetic words shadow future oye questions how does shadow future affect likelihood cooperation oye according first proposition noted above better strategy your opponent shadow future relationship relatively high consequently partial answer oye cooperation emerge future play either important course future play 6 single play prisoners I 1 dilemma obvious situation D defect emerge expectation ability predict subsequent trust yet learned each player therefore first condition noted shadow future must high martin shubik states indirectly showing infinite games supergames iterated games 6 single play game each player makes move lead agreement absence sovereign oye sufficient time moves players utilize conditional strategy cooperation emerge forced sort authority having power players involved

29 25 equilibrium fall another category just defect states suppose game repeated endlessly then payoffs become unboundedly large however average payoff per period remain bounded argued reasonable assume players consider payoffs per period take account manage achieve temporary stationary state better 00 defect enforced equilibrium point first move suppose each player chosen initial subgape subgame then each thought second move switch forever retaliation violation status quo enough run joint maximum equilibrium course stationary state better defect 1 11 either cooperate 33 perfect exploitation 5 0 however according shubiks skubiks Shu reasoning perfect exploitation equilibrium entails worse stationary state 11 players therefore equilibrium state better defect DD 11 cooperate CC 33 7 problem how do know shadow future high logically two parties come together very sublime purpose discount parameter high empirically however matter complex two bureaucrats players representing rationalities conflicting entities interact say understanding shadow future same 7 see chapter 1 footnote 2 example payoff matrix

30 even present shadow future high 26 personalities involved situation meaning interacted long period time knowledge makes mutual behavior patterns easily predictable i e trust ambiance situation makes decisions portentous namely threat nuclear war death etc discount parameter argued rather empirically tested though analysis should present strong case way merely egoists egotists recognize fact futures interactive does mean cooperation emerge high discount parameter necessary condition means does constitute sufficient condition nevertheless essential conclusion cooperation emerges evolutionary process spontaneously argument cooperation ability emerge world dominated conditions unconditional defection small clusters individuals able interact cooperatively axelrod furthermore way cooperation emerge conditional words echoing axelrod interaction based reciprocity herein lies second necessary condition effectiveness strategies based reciprocity argued context axelrods axelrode Axelrods tournament where tit

31 27 tat won tit tat strategy conditional play should naturally emerge under first necessary condition large shadow future becomes clear these two necessary conditions intrinsically linked further condition axelrod noted tallied tournament scores strategy compete well nice being first defect being willing forgive limited defection player major reasons these nice strategies did well axelrods axelrode Axelrods tournament eight top ranking strategies nice strategies scored extremely well playing each true test strength then see how well nice strategies did against 11meanies mealies 118 tournament tit tat prosperous axelrod warns against strategies considered nice defining nice strategy three points discusses first strategy should allow player defect early game without provocation probably lead mutual defection secondly fit strategies tournament forgiving axelrod states forgiveness rule propensity cooperate moves player 8the athe 8 term imeanies Ime defined here does forgive begins play defection cooperation

32 28 defected words once provoked nice strategy allow provoker make amends cooperation still therefore possible axelrods axelrode Axelrods tournament showed certain strategies did do well forgiving strategy nal forgiving then impossible cooperation develop first defection thirdly strategy should overly pessimistic prospects opponent defecting initial move strategies try create probabilistic model opponents strategy strategy like tit tat does care likelihood opponent defecting fact very optimistic opponents initial moves unconditionally cooperates first move sum nice strategies must employed order cooperation evolve third necessary condition rather implicit assumption becomes fourth necessary condition emerging cooperation system entities interact anarchic hierarchy authority present forcing cooperation defection then logically cooperation defection does naturally emerge naturally sustained two nations entities conflicting war central authority 9 however lower level 9 argue united nations power central authority figure while may case between national

33 29 bureaucratic activity may determined hierarchical authority discussed chapter 1 lesser bureaucrats disobey authority become own central authority even sub level activity authority overseeing both sides conflict god notwithstanding central authority head state governing body thwart emergence cooperation sees cooperative effort undermining sanctity power idea directly opposing traditional hobbesian thought state state necessary humans naturally exist state prisoners dilemma cooperation emerge must coerced 10 UN developed type analysis however axelrod breaking canon stating central authority non existent necessary cases detrimental natural cooperative interaction emerge axelrod notes variety ways resolve dilemma prisoners dilemma developed states further these various solutions strategy allow additional activity entities UN little do tacit negotiating defined paper tacit negotiations do involve third parties 10 see taylor1987for further insight theoretical fundamentals hobbes hume theoretical relations prisoners dilemma

34 30 alter strategic interaction between among players initial problem needs solved longer exists very nature problem changed fundamentally under normal conditions prisoners dilemma exist however these types remedies available axelrod these normal conditions constituted four parts according axelrod first mechanism available players make enforceable threats commitments then players must know every possibility open themselves opponents order receive optimal payoffs conditions anarchy central authority way threats commitments ensured player power guarantee move makes course making move axelrod state words backed actions cheap meaningless second condition virtually impossible predict opponents strategy particularly each subsequent move means player must make move according move already made according move made second guessing opponent axelrod notes concerning existence condition eliminates possibility reliable reputations might based watching

35 31 player interact third parties result strict attention must paid each player interpret moves player moves must made clarity third condition players cannot get rid opponents nor run away interaction axelrod player cannot decide opponent reason strategy based personality type interaction type game players behave accordingly finally way change opponents payoffs once payoffs changed game changes example prisoners dilemma defined payoff matrix even slight change payoff structure may change game chicken something else utilities payoffs already include whatever consideration each player interests axelrod these four conditions occurring naturally prisoners dilemma axelrod presents theory evolutionary cooperation conditions necessary cooperation emerge

36 32 axelrods axelrode Axel critics hirshleifler Hirshleifler coil coll11 according these authors unless axelrods axelrode Axelrods exact assumptions present prisoners dilemma situation then theory evolutionary cooperation using tit tat strategy does function states Hirshleifler coll claim axelrods hirshleifler Axelrods tournament axelrode analysis idiosyncratic features ought make analysts cautious drawing very sweeping conclusions 370 first note assuming prisoners dilemma corresponds very many real life settings hazardous state host significant classes mixed motive interaction patterns chicken battle sexes forth damaging criticism here whether assume prisoners dilemma actually coincides physical real life situation while forms conflict may real life prisoners dilemmas I1 argue case studies developed chapters 4 5 do resemble prisoners dilemmas trenches world war I1 two sides given choice 1 kill D 2 shoot miss avoid dispensing damage C play game I D 11 hirshleifler Hirshleifler coils colls colis critique axelrod taken article journal conflict resolution june 1988

37 33 rational choice axelrod states weakening enemy important value promote survival major battle ordered sector prisoners dilemma payoff equation set choices ordered thusly 1111 represents greater 1 shooting kill while your enemy does DC 2 neither side shoots kill CC 3 both sides shooting kill each DD 4 your enemy shoots kill you do CD intermediate nuclear forces talks choices negotiators negotiatory 1 make concessions D 2 compromise make arms control deal set choices ordered like 1 your negotiating counterpart makes concessions while you make none you please yourself your bosses DC 2 both sides make concession you both do your job well your bosses pleased CC 3 neither side makes concessions you both do job you assigned do DD 4 you make concessions look like poor negotiator you may lose your job your counterpart makes concessions these two cases neatly fit prisoners dilemma scenario true game does explain human interactions hirshleifler Hirshleifler coll state

38 arguably explain situations two identified here 34 second argument hirshleifler Hirshleifler coll make axelrod impetuously assumes interaction random words did allow social stratification perhaps under certain circumstances men example interact men doctors doctors etc according critics change nature model axelrods axelrode Axelrods tournament randomly tested every strategy played every strategy hirshleifler Hirshleifler coll arguing under interactive situations certain strategy combinations always play way tit tat strategy invade these strategy combinations therefore evolution possible article however hirshleifler Hirshleifler coll never prove point fact run experimentation using same assumption axelrod uses namely populations interact randomly state our analysis underlying prisoners conducted solely within dilemma payoff environment assuming homogeneous unstructured population individuals 371 whether criticism sound authors do validate own claim point do even address point once made two cases I1 research here point becomes moot anyway

39 35 players interacting arbitrarily assigned each words must interact either defect cooperate third cogent argument make results tournament dependent upon structure tournament itself axelrods axelrode Axel tournament conducted round robin allowed strategies play each hirshleifler Hirshleifler coll show elimination tournament round robin then results quite different state tit tat does poorly elimination contests essentially never able defeat competing strategy encounter difficult argument deflect interactive situation where axelrod claims cooperation evolve does assembly participants resemble round robin elimination tournament neither while may little bearing argument stands paper given interactive situation finally hirshleifler Hirshleifler coll argue strategies presented tournament representative limited number experts even basic strategies cooperate defect overlooked state two strategies entered contests simpler still these archetypical prisoners dilemma options always play

40 COOPERATE always play DEFECT turns important circumstances these 36 archetype strategies defeat TIT TAT displace evolutionary competition 371 axelrod readily admits strategies limited even describes strategy beat tit tat namely tit two tats defects opponent defects twice tit two tats forgiving strategy axelrods axelrode Axelrods assumptions based how certain strategies fared tournaments derived general principles tournament results absolute answers tit tat strategy point show how under what conditions cooperation evolve why tit tat should used prisoners dilemma situations rapoport responds hirshleifers colls coils stating futile conclude TITFORTAT TAT performed best contests simulations eye eye policy works effective eliciting cooperation colis argument continues point noting important lesson learn prisoners dilemma strategy what happen even what likely happen what logically happen consequential fact look axelrods axelrode Axelrods tournament according rapoport tit tat while doing very poorly toone contest excelled round robin thus general notion logically reached tit tat

41 37 nice strategies played everyone better off rapoport fact tit tat thwarted another nice strategy defends axelrods axelrode Axelrods evolutionary theory adds hirshleifers coils colls critique michael taylor taylor book possibility cooperation 1987 critiques axelrod point interaction taylor states even where real world interactions truly pairwise unlikely take strange form assumed axelrod analysis hinges assumption individual play whole infinite supergame player while may case general real life situations iterated prisoners dilemma precisely axelrods axelrode Axelrods perspective explain least part interaction between lower level bureaucrats tacit institutions cooperation develop longstanding andor sublime interaction tournaments go axelrod socialization examined takes place pairs according taylor limit itself stated above very well misinterpretation real life interactions tend flexible axelrod asserts evolution cooperation actual critique results

42 38 tournament 12 assumptions made practical use these results fact remains under these conditions pairwise interactions results axelrods axelrode Axelrods tournaments show general substantial theoretical matter theoretical matter substance thesis relevance actual occurrences tacit cooperation nevertheless response taylor I1 use axelrods axelrode Axelrods theory describe pairwise interactions conclusion axelrods axelrode Axelrods assumptions become point reference framework notion tacit cooperation conditions among conditions focus chapters 2 3 begin index phenomenon tacit cooperation though proofs axelrod makes book various articles may may test theory according critics sketch provides emergence cooperation very useful noted used here research laid several conditions place may lead cooperation these conditions briefly reiteration 1 large shadow future high discount parameter 2 reciprocal conditional relationship 3 Axelrods 12 taylors calculations actually coincide axelrods axelrode taylor see

43 strategy used playing game must nice 4 lack central authority degree anarchy speculated these place time 2 party conflict then definition both conceptual tangible made tacit cooperation chapters 4 5 contain two different historical incidents resemble cases cooperation I1 abstract both cases using framework identify emergence tacit cooperation 39

44 CHAPTER 3 FRAMEWORK II 11 ADDITIONS AXELROD introduction section examine two theorists contributed cooperation literature both theorists michael taylor kenneth oye use principles game theory prisoners dilemma two person games framework just axelrod does contribution research show conditions allow cooperation emerge prisoners dilemma these conditions including axelrods axelrode Axelrods present interactive situations naturally come interaction cooperation emerge axelrod say evolve must noted formula made decide how many these conditions necessary cooperation emerge conditions high discount parameter hold importance others however same reasoning personalities how interact may do resulting cooperation present condition interactive situation taylor oye add insight less tangible conditions altruism might allow cooperation emerge

45 41 michael taylors possibility Coppe coode cooperation cation catlon michael taylor book possibility cooperationl cooperation1 Cooperation cooperations1 attempts inspect how well prisoners dilemma correctly represents public goods interactions claims prisoners dilemma does accurately represent these interactions then wants examine prospects voluntary cooperation game 1987 ix examination shed light potential cooperation settings enmity mutual mistrust probable defection taylor critiques liberal justification state asserts human nature diverse number people planet social structure state must set order force people cooperation taylor utilizes issues collective action externalizes andor problem public goods case studies research though critique hobbes humes liberal thoughts state very stimulating research taylors discussion cooperation definition altruism illustrative deliberations cooperation similar axelrods axelrode Axelrods presents set proofs show ithe possibility cooperation second revised edition anarchy cooperation 1976

46 42 certain conditions promote cooperation large shadow future yet describes strategies just tit tat defect being able reach equilibrium 2 another strategy reaches equilibrium tit tat called B plays mutated tit tat called BIB mutated tat tat exactly same except does unconditionally cooperate first move unconditionally defects result strategy brings alternating cooperate defect cooperate defect etc course ideal cooperative situation yet axelrod argue adheres principles being nice strategy however B does follow rule 3 axelrods axelrode Axelrods nice strategy guidelines cooperate does emerge sense taylor manufactures convenient proof axelrods axelrode Axelrods proposition nice strategies seems however real dog eat dog world nice strategy likely yet individuals confronted enemys face resembling own nice strategies common case studies demonstrate taylors major contribution notion altruism altruism defined him following 2an aan equilibrium saddle point place payoff matrix both players strategies rationally fall simple prisoners dilemma equilibrium strategy DD see table I1 reference chapter 1 footnote 2

47 43 altruism considered here takes very simple form each player assumed maximize additive function own payoff players payoffs just long weight attached players payoff nonzero I1 shall say individual acts altruistically I1 shall consider briefly what I1 call sophisticated altruism where players utility depends upon players utilities might incorporate form altruism well payoffs 111 altruism difficult phenomenon trace occurs two players realize future payoffs dependent upon each words players strive best payoff default end helping opponent reach best payoff taylor continues light noting assumed individuals altruistic expense being egoistic pure altruism denotes player wishes maximize persons payoff 115 cares little nothing own simply does happen relationships among states frankly seldom happens setting nevertheless possibility under conditional circumstances shall see later tony ashworths Ashworths research INF negotiations case study altruist prisoners dilemma looks like

48 44 B cooperate defect cooperate defect table II 11 though prisoners dilemma payoff matrix shows how altruists react given prisoners dilemma altruists cooperate realize beneficial do want exploit player 3 accordingly strategy cooperate emerge equilibrium satisfying both players consciences prisoners dilemma between conflicting players actors pure altruism present however altruism defined here taylor may play important part lower level bureaucratic decision making negotiation importance perhaps found concept altruistic attitude help initiate cooperation nothing else altruism allows rivals enemies break through zero sum philosophy allow them understand 3see asee 3see taylor 1987 page 119 full explanation different altruist matrices

49 45 mutual cooperation yield higher payoffs mutual defection taylor makes point defining players prisoners dilemma being pure egoists egotists concerned maximizing own payoff costs probably clear approximation reality 109 people situations tend mix altruist egoist4 taylor states way altruism make difference typical prisoners dilemma setting setting where rational defect declares individuals contribute sufficiently altruistic then might thereby provide starter around conditional cooperation others rational egoists egotists develop 110 words altruism condition present nourishes seeds cooperation sprouting once two people began understand futures even slightly interdependent then cooperation see first signs spring next chapter tony ashworths Ashworths case study emergent sustainable cooperation world war I1 trench warfare develops concept altruism less abstractly 41t 4jt must noted analyzing national conflict safer assume people pure egoists egotists course problem prisoners dilemma you must assume people defect rationally altruism coexists egoism though fear pure egoism creates prisoners dilemma

50 46 oye states kenneth oyes corpe Coppe cooperation kation under anarchy nations dwell perpetual anarchy central authority imposes limits pursuit sovereign interests times absence centralized international authority precludes attainment common goals possibility breach promise impede cooperation even cooperation leave better off yet times states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy again words kenneth oye sense paradox common discussions cooperation emerging prisoners dilemma states even possibility defection promise enough impede cooperation oye states cooperation necessarily forced through sort hobbesian state nature lockean lockbean Lockean civil society cooperation possibility where chaos disorder rule analysis oye makes three points calls circumstantial dimensions explain cooperation exists how promoted long term first notes changing payoff structure game cooperation enhanced question stated thusly how does payoff structure determine significance cooperation simplified answer payoff high enough boost mutual cooperative outcome then players want

51 47 cooperate prisoners dilemma payoff structure changed easier cooperate unrequited cooperation does become suckers payoff then cooperation emerge same time game change conversely mutual cooperation C receives lower payoff mutual defection D then probability game yield cooperative outcome though oyes first point somewhat off mark research I1 am describing prisoners dilemma configuration does become useful describing point cooperation strategy abandoned defection strategy second section oye discusses shadow future axelrod taylor many scholars addressed conclusions course same under iterated prisoners dilemma potential defector compares immediate gain squealing possible sacrifice future gains may result squealing single play stag hunt each hunter tempted defect order defend himself against possibility defection others reputation reliability resisting temptation reduces likelihood defection 14 sense reliability comes mutual realization future hold present decisions made every move every game qualified shadow eventuality present future interdependent notion reiterated reinforced

52 48 cooperation literature point conviction while large shadow future does constitute sufficient condition emergent cooperation represents condition logically lend itself perhaps condition lessening mutual defection even logically cooperative conditions present iterative interactive event likely cooperation emerge oyes third point adds another dimension likelihood evolving cooperative states number players prisoners dilemma game affects trend towards cooperation defection oyes thesis number player diminishes likely cooperation emerge begins assumption altruism stating cooperation requires recognition opportunities advancement mutual interests 19 smaller number players easier recognition comes interaction varied familiar trust come easily secondly number players increases likely player defect predictability becomes harder haphazard strategy likely default defect thirdly number players increases feasibility sanctioning detectors defectors diminishes 19 system free riding take place

53 49 many circumstances break down cooperative efforts smaller number easier team players focus punishment defector players difficult retaliate without destroying forms cooperation while small number players does particularly constitute necessary condition trend watched various case studies see factor leading cooperation additional point oye makes conditional strategy effective easily recognized playing game states black white choices cooperation defect make strategies transparent further necessary condition strategies employed each player must recognized words player cooperates player 13 thinks opposite then player may well defected first place cooperation emerge under these conditions misinterpretation side note may enlightening note how communication defection cooperation correctly determined ones foe again ashworth enlighten us point

54 50 conclusion oye while reinforcing fundamental components theory tacit cooperation adds new dimensions number game players well transparency strategy these ingredients come together following two sections tony ashworths Ashworths look trench warfare study INF talks realto life situations represented these case studies these abstract cooperation conditions viewed concrete