Interests, Interactions, and Institutions. Interests: Actors and Preferences. Interests: Actors and Preferences. Interests: Actors and Preferences

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1 Analytical Framework: Interests, Interactions, and Interests, Interactions, and 1. Interests: Actors and preferences 2. Interactions Cooperation, Bargaining, Public Goods, and Collective Action 3. Interests: Actors and Preferences Interests: Actors and Preferences Who are the actors? What do they want? Different actors have different preferences Interests: Actors and Preferences Interests: Actors and Preferences Map 2.1: The Middle East (Source) Washington Post, September 6, 2013

2 Interests: Actors and Preferences Interests: Actors and Preferences Table 2.1: Key Categories of Actors and Interests in World Politics Specifying Actors Interests and preferences A set of actions (or strategies) available to them available to them Preferences Types of interests Power and security Economic or material welfare Ideological or normative goals Preferences Types of interests Power and security Realism Economic or material welfare Liberalism Ideological or normative goals Constructivism Rather than predetermine the interest of each actor, we envision actors have different mixes of goals with different weights Interactions Actors are purposive They develop strategies that they believe are the best response to the anticipated strategies of others. Strategic interactions Political outcomes depend not only on the choices of one actor but also the choices of all relevant actors. Each actor anticipates the choice of others who, in turn, take into account the choices of all other actors when making their decisions. Their strategic choices interact to produce a particular result Interactions Implications of strategic interactions A best-response in a strategic environment does not guarantee the actor s most preferred outcome. The choices made by others can make a really bad choice the best choice among the remaining options. That is, strategic interactions can force actors make a really bad choice rationally. Many of the most intriguing puzzles of international politics originate in strategic interactions.

3 Strategic Interactions: An example Figure 2A.2: The Prisoner s Dilemma Strategic Interactions An example International dispute No Challenge Status Quo Concede Territorial Concession Back down Challenge Target Resist Attack Political Concession Armed Conflict Strategic Interactions An example International dispute No Challenge Status Quo Concede Territorial Concession Back down Challenge Target Political Concession Resist Attack Armed Conflict Strategic Interactions An example International dispute No Challenge Status Quo Concede Territorial Concession Back down Challenge Target Political Concession Resist Attack Armed Conflict Types of interactions Cooperation Coordination Collaboration Bargaining Coercion Collective Action Definition An interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off than the status quo without making others worse off. Debunking Cooperation This can create additional value positive-sum game In the language of game theory, cooperation yields a Pareto Improvement. Alliance and collective security Stable monetary regime Free trade Global environment

4 Pareto Frontier Debunking Cooperation, cont d Cooperation may benefit actors within the cooperative group, but it may also hurt actors outside of this group. Alliance and collective security Stable monetary regime Free trade Global environment Figure 2.1 Debunking Cooperation, cont d Cooperation may benefit actors within the cooperative group, but it may also hurt actors outside of this group. Alliance and collective security Source of the common threat Stable monetary regime A country who benefits from manipulative exchange regime Free trade An interest group within a country who is internationally less competitive Global environment Heavy industry A Puzzle of Cooperation If cooperation is a positive-sum game and yields a Pareto-improvement, why is it so hard for countries to cooperate with one another? Alliance and collective security Stable monetary regime Free trade Global environment Two types of cooperation Coordination A type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive not to comply Collaboration A type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have incentives not to comply with any agreement. Implication: Even though all relevant actors agree that cooperation is a good thing if it s achieved, they can disagree how to bring about this result. Two types of cooperation Coordination A type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive not to comply Choosing among multiple equilibria No incentive to defect from the coordinated arrangement. Once cooperation is achieved, it is self-enforcing and thus stable Generally easier to achieve Collaboration

5 Two types of cooperation Coordination Collaboration A type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have incentives not to comply with any agreement. A single equilibria is available/feasible Strong unilateral incentive to defect from cooperation (or costly process despite a beneficial outcome). Each actor s individual incentive to defect undermines the group s collective interest in cooperation altogether. Arms reduction? Clean air? Two types of cooperation Coordination Collaboration Implication: Even though all relevant actors agree that cooperation is a good thing if it s achieved, they can disagree how to bring about this result. An important class of collaboration problem Provision of Public Goods Public goods are nonexcludable if the good is provided to one person, others cannot be excluded from enjoying it. Public goods are nonrival in consumption if one person consumes the good, this does not diminish the quantity available to others. Public goods include national security and environment Provision of public goods has collective action problems. Even though all wants public goods, each has an incentive to free ride and so fails to contribute to the public goods. Three general solutions to cooperation problem Small group Easier to monitor actors and communicate among them Privileged group can voluntarily provide public goods in return for some private benefits. Repetition Three general solutions to cooperation problem Small group Repetition Use a punishment-reward scheme Shadow of the future Actors can punish a defector by not cooperating with it. Linkage = link different issues to generate artificial iterations. Three general solutions to cooperation problem Small group Repetition To enable the punishment-reward mechanism, the violation must be detected and the violator must be identified.

6 Three general solutions to cooperation problem Small group Repetition To enable the punishment-reward mechanism, the violation must be detected and the violator must be identified. Implication: Many international institutions are envisioned to provide these mechanisms Definition An interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another. Debunking Bargaining Gains for one are losses for another zero-sum game Bargaining is a process of redistribution, not creating additional value: Allocating a fixed amount of resources among actors. E.g., territorial disputes, NPT, bargaining over regimes, nukes. Figure 2.2: Bargaining Process of Bargaining Characterized by bargaining power that decides the bargaining outcome. An important source of power: reversion point (outcome). The outcome that occurs when bargaining fails. Bargaining failure often yields the status quo. An actor who is more tolerant of reversion point has more bargaining power and is able to extract more concessions. That is, actors improve their bargaining power by changing the reversion point. Coercion Agenda setting Outside option Bargaining Power/Tactics Coercion Outside option Agenda setting Coercion or threat

7 Bargaining Power/Tactics Coercion The threat or imposition of costs on other actors to change their reversion point and hence change their behavior. Military force Economic sanctions The power to hurt (by Thomas Schelling) Coercive bargaining Outside option Agenda setting Bargaining Power/Tactics Coercion Outside option The alternative to bargaining and the option that an actor can obtain by walking away from the current bargaining table. An outside option is exercised when bargaining fails. A reversion point can be inferior to an outside option. Use of military force and economic sanctions can be a powerful outside option to influence other s incentives to make concessions in bargaining. Agenda setting Bargaining Power/Leverage Coercion Outside option Agenda setting A type of first-mover advantage that helps actor influence the bargaining protocol and secure a more favorable bargaining outcomes. Agenda setting is a tactic used prior to or during bargaining. Limit the agenda or options available on the bargaining table Achieving Bargains Bargaining is ubiquitous While bargaining can create losers as well as winners, it can happen. As long as a bargaining generates an outcome better than the reversion point for all parties involved, the bargain can be made. Even if an actor have to agree to make unbearable concessions, the failure of bargaining can be even more painful. A war termination agreement. The surrender in a war. Figure 2.3: Cooperation and Bargaining The Prisoner s Dilemma Figure 2A.2: The Prisoner s Dilemma: A Collaboration Problem

8 The Prisoner s Dilemma Figure 2.4: U.S. and Soviet Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons Inventories, Cooperation Problems and Public Goods Figure 2A.3: Chicken Cooperation Problems and Public Goods Figure 2A.4: The Stag Hunt Interests, Interactions, and 1. Interests: actors and preferences 2. Interactions: cooperation, bargaining, public goods, and collective action 3. Definitions Sets of rules and norms that shape interactions. Sometimes narrow actors choices... and sometimes expand the scope of agreements Include formal institutions with decision-making bodies... also include informal norms and common patterns of practices that guide behavior Norms = generally accepted standards of behavior Key Characteristic Under anarchy, no enforcement mechanisms available Contrast this to domestic institutions

9 How Promote Cooperation Functions of International Functions of International Often rules are self-enforcing. Otherwise, institutions would fall apart Rule-abiding behavior collectively reinforce norms Norms in turn allow states to anticipate likely behavior of others Clear standards/norms remove questions about what s acceptable and what s not. e.g., Collective security arrangements identify aggressors e.g., Trade agreements specify illegal practice and punishment Functions of International provide means to overcome the problem of coordination and collaboration. UNSC ~ Peacekeeping operations. Of salience is verification of compliance and punishment of defectors. Enforcement is key to cooperation, but enforcement itself is a public good and its provision requires collaboration Functions of International Setting standards Verification of compliance A structured process for negotiation Resolving disputes Functions of International Setting standards e.g., Human Rights Verification of compliance e.g., NPT A structured process for negotiation e.g., WTO Resolving disputes e.g., ICJ

10 Functions of International (cont d) In other words, IIs provide a means to overcome cooperation problems Small number of actors Iteration and linkage Functions of International Small number of actors Iteration and linkage Altogether, IIs reduce transaction costs incurred in cooperation and bargaining. Debunking International Products of history Political outcome e.g., UN, UNSC, NPT Formal agreement e.g., ITU Formalizing existing practices e.g.,??? Debunking International Products of history Political outcome e.g., UN, UNSC, NPT Formal agreement e.g., ITU Formalizing existing practices e.g.,??? Tend to benefit some actors Not neutral and often biased Typically institutionalize raw political/economic/financial power Less responsive to borrowing countries (WB, IMF) May create a dispute May reduce an incentive to comply Debunking International (cont d) Still enjoy high compliance rate. Powerful states concede to demands from less powerful states. Why? Debunking International (cont d) Still enjoy high compliance rate. Powerful states concede to demands from less powerful states. Why? Two reasons IIs still facilitate cooperation, if not perfect Costly otherwise transaction costs would be high Cheaper to utilize the existing framework; working outside of IIs or creating/reforming IIs would be costly.

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