Transitions to Democracy

Transcription

1 Transitions to Democracy

2 OUTLINE

3 INTRODUCTION when an authoritarian regime breaks down and democracy appears on the political agenda, one of five outcomes is possible:

4 The structure of conflicts is such that : 1. no democratic institutions can last, and political forces end up fighting for new dictatorship. 2. no democratic institutions can last, yet political forces agree to democracy as a transitional solution. 3. some democratic institutions will be durable if adopted, but the conflicting political forces fight to establish a dictatorship. 4. some democratic institutions will be durable if adopted, but the conflicting political forces agree to an institutional framework that cannot last. 5. some democratic institutions will be durable if adopted and they are. Przeworski focuses on the fifth outcome: establishment of a stable democracy

5 INTRODUCTION The path that leads to stable democracy: Liberalization of authoritarian regimes. Democratization that has two different aspects: extrication and constitution.

6 LIBERALIZATION A common feature of dictatorship is that they do not tolerate independent organizations. The reason is that as long as no collective alternatives are available, individual attitudes toward the regime matter little for its stability. This is why authoritarian regimes either incorporate independent organizations under centralized control or repress them by force. However, in some moment a group inside the authoritarian power establishment decides to tolerate an autonomous organization in the civil society. Explanations of such decision fall from above and from below.

7 LIBERALIZATION why the regime cracked at a particular moment? the liberalizers in the regime saw the possibility of an alliance with some forces in the civil society that up to then had remained unorganized. why the regime decided not to repress it by force? the regime was divided between Liberalizers and Hardliners. Liberalization is a result of an interaction between splits in the authoritarian regime and autonomous organization of civil society.

8 The chart represents the possible chains of events. SDIC - Status quo dictatorship BDIC Broadened dictatorship NDIC Narrow dictatorship liberalizers prefer BDIC to SDIC because, broadening the social base strengthens the regime as a whole and because groups that enter the regime are natural allies for Liberalizers. if the result is BDIC, the liberalization strategy is successful.

9 LIBERALIZATION If everyone knows everything and everyone knows the same, then only possible outcomes of this game are either status quo, or broadened dictatorship.

10 Suppose that the preferences of Liberalizers are: BDIC > SDIC > TRANSITION > NDIC > INSURRECTION. Then liberalizers will know that if the society organizes, they will have to turn into reformers. So does the civil society. So, if liberalizers open, society organizes. But liberalizers prefer SDIC > TRANSITION. Hence, they will never open. The outcome is SDIC Suppose the preferences of liberalizers are BDIC > SDIC > NDIC > TRANSITION > INSURRECTION and they attach a high probability to the success of repression and will choose it if society organizes. So does the civil society. Since for the society BDIC > NDIC, civil society enters knowing that Liberalizers will opt for repression if they organize. And since for Liberalizers BDIC > SDIC, they open. The outcome is thus BDIC.

11 LIBERALIZATION How then can the process ever arrive at transition? Regarding Przeworski, there are two possible ways, both relying in someone s mistaken assumption.

12 Solution 1 Suppose Liberalizers = proto democratizers = their preferences are: BDIC > TRANSITION > SDIC > NDIC > INSURRECTION. However, they announce that they prefer: BDIC > SDIC> NDIC> TRANSITION and Hardliners believe them. Assume that Hardliners prefer NDIC > SDIC and Hardliners believe that society mistakenly believes that Liberalizers are in fact proto-democratizers. Hence, Hardliners think that the result of opening will be NDIC. They agree to open, but given the true preferences of the Liberalizers, the outcome is TRANSITION.

13 Solution 2 Suppose that the preferences of Liberalizers are: BDIC > SDIC > NDIC > TRANSITION > INSURRECTION and their prior estimate of successful repression is high, which implies that the outcome will be BDIC. Hardliners play no role in this story, perhaps the regime is not divided or the Liberalizers control the weapons. Liberalizers open, expecting society to enter. But the society has a lower estimate of successful repression and believes that Liberalizers have the same estimate. Hence, society organizes. Liberalizers update their beliefs about effectiveness of repression as they watch the streets and they prefer TRANSITION. Hence, the outcome is TRANSITION.

14 LIBERALIZATION conclusion Liberalization an opening in the broadening of the social base of regime without changing its structure is not a feasible project unless everyone has full and accurate knowledge about everybody else s preferences and the probability of successful repression. Some misperceptions lead liberalization to transition; others, to repression

15 DEMOCRATIZATION The struggle for democracy always takes place on two fronts: Against the authoritarian regime for democracy Against one s allies for the best place under democracy

16 DEMOCRATIZATION There are two different aspects of democratization: extrication from the authoritarian regime and the constitution of a democratic regime.

17 EXTRICATION If the regime extricates itself, there are 4 political actors: Hardliners and reformers (who may or may not have been Liberalizers) inside the authoritarian bloc. Moderates and radicals in opposition. Extrication can result only from understanding between Reformers and Moderates.

18 EXTRICATION Extrication is possible if: 1. An agreement can be reached between reformers and moderates to establish institutions under which the social forces they represent would have a significant political presence in the democratic system. 2. reformers can deliver the consent of hardliners or neutralize them. 3. Moderates can control radicals. When can an agreement that satisfies all these conditions be reached?

19 Considering the situation in Table, Reformers have a dominant strategy, always to ally with Hardliners. The defining feature of this situation is that reformers have no political strength of their own and thus no prospect of being politically successful under democracy. Without special guarantees, they will do very badly under democracy, and even with guarantees they are still better off under the protection of their authoritarian allies.

20 Suppose reformers have sufficient political strength to be able to compete under democracy with guarantees. Still this is not sufficient for them to opt for democracy Reformers prefer democracy with guarantees over other alternatives. Yet the outcome for them depends on the action of moderates: if moderates opt for guarantees, Reformers are better off under democracy, but if Moderates ally with Radicals, Reformers lose.

21 If we examine this structure of conflict in the extensive form, we will see that Reformers will stay with the regime, because if they ally with Moderates, Moderates will give no guaranties.

22 Democratization could evolve spontaneously if the game was repeated: Moderates know that if they respond to the opening by embracing the demands of radicals, Reformers will ally with Hardliners next time around, hence the payoff to Moderates from defecting on the first round will be {4,1,1, }. But if Moderates decide to give guarantees on the first round, Reformers will respond in kind and the payoff to Moderates will be {3,3,3, }

23 But, situations, in which regime change is at stake, are not repeatable: Once reformers decide to make a move, they cannot go back to the status quo, because this is to admit the failure of the strategy of democratic opening and to meet with the wrath of hardliners. Reformers who decide to go back almost never survive their failure. there are two things that could change the payoffs of the game, allowing democratization:

24 Solution 1 Radicals will accept democracy with guaranties Once a competitive democratic framework is established because an agreement between Moderates and Reformers, Radicals find that they can play the game too. They tend to be wary of democratic institutions and skeptical that their victories will ever be tolerated. Yet the attraction of and open-ended democratic interplay is irresistible and Radicals agree to participate in the institutions forged by Moderates and Reformers

25 Solution 2 Moderates will continue to be protected by the existence of autonomous armed forces. If reformers have some political strength of their own and if Moderates prefer an institutional arrangement in which the armed forces remain autonomous as a counterbalance to the demands of Radicals, then Reformers have little to fear from democracy. Under such conditions, the equilibrium outcome will be democracy, but a democracy in which the armed forces will remain free of civilian control and will exercise tutelage over the democratic process

26 CONSTITUTION If the aspect of extrication is absent: the armed forces falls apart, or they support the transition to democracy, each political force opts for the institutional framework that will best further for its values, projects, or interests. then one of three situations are possible to occur, based on two key variables: 1. whether the forces bargaining on the new institutional design are balanced 2. whether the balance is known.

27 1. the relation of forces is known and unbalanced The institutions are custom-made for particular person, party, or alliance. Institutional rules will favor the stronger group

28 2. the relation of forces is known and balanced Imagine, that one alliance of forces, called Row, would find democracy more advantageous under institutional system A, while the other, Column, fells threatened by this system and prefers B. They do not agree. This situation has no equilibrium in pure strategies, and one possible outcome is civil war. Chaos is the worst alternative for all.

29 the relation of forces is known and balanced to terminate conflicts, they must establish some institutional framework by looking for focal points: solutions that are readily available and are non seen as self-serving.

30 the relation of forces is known and balanced However, temporizing solutions may not survive for long: they were adopted because struggle was seen as too dangerous, but if they generate outcomes that hurt, the affected political forces will naturally be tempted to try to avoid the costs involved in competing under democratic rules. Hence, political forces that can pursue alternatives, will do so.

31 3. the relation of forces is not known the timing of constitution writing is important. constitutions, that are written when the relation of forces are still unclear are likely to counteract increasing returns to power, provide insurance to the eventual losers, and reduce the stakes of competition. They are more likely to induce the losers to comply with the outcomes and more likely to induce them to participate. Therefore, they are more likely to be stable across a wide range of historical conditions.

32 CONCLUSIONS: democratization would never occur if preferences and knowledge were perfect. limited democratization could occur if the game were repeated, but it is not. two things that could change the payoffs of the game, allowing democratization: 1. radicals could become less radical; 2. moderates could agree to limits on democracy that protect the reformers undemocratically. Such solutions are inherently unstable, because democracy means these guarantees can be undone later if transaction costs aren't too high. If the regime just falls apart, there will be one of three situations: 1. If the relation of forces is known and unbalanced, then institutional rules will favor the stronger group. 2. If there is a known balance, then civil war may result, so often a "temporary" democracy solution is set up. However, these solutions are by no means guaranteed to be stable (depends on transaction costs). 3. If the relation of forces is unknown, then a solution is set up writing constitution when the relation of forces are still unclear.